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Abstract 
 
This dissertation is about collective action issues in common property resources. Its focus is 
the “threshold hypothesis,” which posits the existence of a threshold in group size that drives 
the process of institutional change. This hypothesis is tested using a six-century dataset 
concerning the management of the commons by hundreds of communities in the Italian Alps. 
The analysis seeks to determine the group size threshold and the institutional changes that 
occur when groups cross this threshold. There are five main findings. First, the number of 
individuals in villages remained stable for six centuries, despite the population in the region 
tripling in the same period. Second, the longitudinal analysis of face-to-face assemblies and 
community size led to the empirical identification of a threshold size that triggered the 
transition from informal to more formal regimes to manage common property resources. 
Third, when groups increased in size, gradual organizational changes took place: large groups 
split into independent subgroups or structured interactions into multiple layers while 
maintaining a single formal organization. Fourth, resource heterogeneity seemed to have had 
no significant impact on various institutional characteristics. Fifth, social heterogeneity 
showed statistically significant impacts, especially on institutional complexity, consensus, 
and the relative importance of governance rules versus resource management rules. Overall, 
the empirical evidence from this research supports the “threshold hypothesis.” These findings 
shed light on the rationale of institutional change in common property regimes, and clarify 
the mechanisms of collective action in traditional societies. Further research may generalize 
these conclusions to other domains of collective action and to present-day applications.  
iv 
Samenvatting 
 
Dit proefschrift bespreekt collectieve actie problemen inzake gemeenschappelijke bronnen. 
De focus is de “drempelhypothese”, die het bestaan van een drempel in groepsgrootte 
veronderstelt die het proces van institutionele verandering stuurt. Deze hypothese is getest 
middels een dataset betreffende zes eeuwen beheer van gemeenschappelijke middelen bij 
honderden gemeenschappen in the Italiaanse Alpen. De analyse probeert de drempelwaarde 
van de groepsgrootte te bepalen, alsmede de institutionele veranderingen die plaatsvinden 
wanneer groepen deze drempel overschrijden. Er zijn vijf hoofdbevindingen. Ten eerste, het 
aantal inwoners in de dorpen bleef stabiel gedurende zes eeuwen, ondanks dat de bevolking 
in deze regio in dezelfde periode verdrievoudigde. Ten tweede, de longitudinale analyse van 
face-to-face bijeenkomsten en de gemeenschapsgrootte hebben tot de empirische identificatie 
van een drempelwaarde geleid, die de overgang van informele naar formele regimes om 
gemeenschappelijke bronnen te regelen heeft veroorzaakt. Ten derde, wanneer de groepen 
groter werden, bleken er geleidelijke organisatieveranderingen plaats te vinden: grote 
groepen splitsen zich in onafhankelijke subgroepen of gestructureerde interacties in 
verschillende lagen, terwijl wel werd vastgehouden aan één formele organisatie. Ten vierde, 
heterogeniteit van de bronnen leek geen significante invloed op de verschillende 
institutionele karakteristieken te hebben. Ten vijfde, sociale heterogeniteit liet statistisch 
significante invloed zien, in het bijzonder op institutionele complexiteit, consensus, en het 
relatieve belang van governance regels versus regels ten behoeve van het management van de 
middelen. In het algemeen ondersteunt het empirische bewijs in dit onderzoek de 
“drempelhypothese”.  Deze uitkomsten werpen licht op de rationale van institutionele 
verandering in gemeenschappelijke bronnen regimes en verklaren de mechanismes van 
collectieve actie in traditionele samenlevingen. Verder onderzoek zou deze conclusies 
kunnen uitbreiden naar andere terreinen van collectieve actie en hedendaagse toepassingen.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Further progress in the study of transaction costs awaits the identification of the 
critical dimensions with respect to which transaction costs differ and an examination 
of the economizing properties of alternative institutional modes for organizing 
transactions.—(Williamson, 1979) 
 
1.1. Introduction 
A group consists of a number of individuals who interact face-to-face, decide 
whether to cooperate, and collectively act toward the attainment of a common goal. 
An established body of literature has demonstrated that when a group grows in size, 
all else being equal, the likelihood of attaining a collective goal decreases (Hardin, 
1968; Olson, 1965; Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom, Walker, & Gardner, 1992). Greed, or the 
incentive to “free ride” on others’ efforts by maximizing one’s benefit at the expense 
of others’, leads to a lack of coordination of group action and, thus, to the failure of 
collective action (Olson, 1965).  
A similar hypothesis has been forwarded to explain why common-pool 
resources are likely to be depleted. Common-pool resources include, inter alia, 
irrigation systems, fisheries, pastures, forests, or water basins. These are distinguished 
from pure public goods because of the way they can be appropriated. Their size or 
natural characteristics can stop potential users from easily attaining benefits from their 
use. Individual incentives to extract the maximum benefit from a given resource and 
to minimize the share of the social cost of extraction lead to problems of congestion 
and overuse of the resource. These problems are peculiar of collective action 
situations (Olson, 1965) and may result in the depletion of the resource.  
2 
This situation is known in economics as the “tragedy of the commons” 
(Gordon, 1954; Hardin, 1968). Under an open access regime, there are no property 
rights over a common-pool resource: there is no definition of a group of users/owners, 
and there is no right for a user/owner to preclude the use by any other party. Since 
benefit streams from the resource are available to anyone, the resource is gradually 
congested. Ultimately, the resource is depleted because the total demand exceeds its 
rate of regeneration (Bromley, 1991; Stevenson, 1991). 
The present work focuses on the possible relationship between group size and 
the occurrence of institutional change when common-pool resources are concerned. 
This involves a mixed-methods study aimed at developing the theory that there exists 
a critical group size threshold that drives institutional change. The study is grounded 
in the empirical analysis of several historical legal sources concerning the “Carte Di 
Regola” (Rural Charters and associated documents), private-order legal institutions 
for the management of the commons enacted by upland communities in the Italian 
Alps throughout medieval and modern times (1200–1800).  
The remainder of the present chapter provides the background of the problem, 
the research hypothesis, the statement of the problem, the purpose of the study, the 
significance of the study, a summary of the elements of the methodology applied in 
the present study, assumptions and limitations of the research, and a summary of the 
contents of the subsequent chapters. A definition of terms used in the study can be 
found in Appendix A. 
1.2. Background of the Problem 
Traditional solutions to the tragedy of the commons were the establishment of 
a private property rights system, or the enforcement of “command-and-control” 
policies; however, Elinor Ostrom (1990) overruled this conventional wisdom with a 
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different argument: societies are autonomously able to overcome social dilemmas like 
the tragedy of the commons. She contended that groups of users of a common 
resource may engage in cooperative strategies to avert the failure of collective action 
by self-governing their interactions. When self-organizing groups have the possibility 
of contracting their own covenants and setting up institutions, the tragedy of the 
commons may be averted (Ostrom et al., 1992).  
1.2.1. Historical case studies. Historical case studies are valuable in the field 
of institutional analysis, as they render the effects and dynamics of institutions 
observable over an extended period of time (Diamond & Robinson, 2010; Greif, 
2006; Voigt, 2013a). The Carte Di Regola case study is one of the most enduring 
cases of institutional success in the management of common-pool resources. Thus, the 
Carte Di Regola provide a unique facility to observe the behavior of groups in 
institutions using data from historical archives.  
Despite limitations due to the nature of historical data, which can be affected 
by sample smallness or observation limited to certain periods, the Carte Di Regola 
include detail at the individual level, such as a single individual attending a village 
assembly, and at the village level, such as a village assembly of residents taking place. 
Such data allows precise measurements of formal institutional features but also 
provides a way to detect the moment when a switch from an informal to a formal 
institution has taken place (Casari, 2007; Voigt, 2013b). 
1.2.2. The Carte di Regola case study. The present study builds on the work 
of Casari (2007), which provided the first empirical analysis of the Carte Di Regola 
as an effort to “examine changes in institutions that protected property rights and 
regulated their use in the commons in the Italian Alps and, more specifically, in the 
Trentino region, which is situated at the linguistic border with the German-speaking 
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South Tyrol” (p. 187). The case concerns the adoption of alternative management 
systems for the common pastures and forests through medieval and modern times 
(1200–1800). 
The main reason for the emergence of legal institutions is the inherent cost of 
legal and economic transactions: the allocation of property rights always occurs under 
positive transaction costs (Coase, 1937, 1960; Demsetz, 1968; Williamson, 1979). 
Institutions, such as the Carte, are organized and evolve to attain an allocation of 
property rights that correspond to the highest possible social welfare (Allen, 2000; 
Demsetz, 1967; North, 1990). 
1.3.  The “threshold hypothesis.”  
The research hypothesis of this study is that there exists a critical absolute 
group size threshold that drives institutional change. The hypothesis posits (a) that 
group size has an impact on collective action, and (b) that this impact is not gradual 
and corresponds to a “switch” when group size is proximate to a threshold value. 
The present research aims to identify possible “tipping points” in group size as 
well as to seek an economic explanation for group behavior when such a tipping point 
is reached. This tipping point is henceforth defined as the threshold in group size. 
When the threshold is reached, the group decides whether to adopt an informal 
interaction regime to formalize the collective action (North, 1990) by contracting an 
institution. 
One way to validate the threshold hypothesis is to seek support for other 
hypotheses in diverse fields of literature that purport to provide a general prediction of 
the “optimal” number of individuals that can be involved in collective action 
situations. The argumentation for the group size threshold hypothesis in institutions 
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would accordingly develop as an extension of this general field of predictions to the 
realm of the social sciences. 
There is general agreement among researchers that group size refers to the 
number of individuals in a social group. However, the size of a group depends on 
many factors, and is regarded as highly context-dependent in the literature (Hardin, 
1968; Olson, 1965; Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom et al., 1992).  
1.3.1 The analysis. Both direct and indirect tests of the hypothesis were 
conducted. The indirect testing comprised the rejection of alternative explanations 
contrasting with the threshold hypothesis. If the results of the analyses were 
incompatible with the threshold hypothesis, it would be rejected. If, on the contrary, 
the empirical evidence results were incompatible with the alternative hypothesis, it 
would be inferred that the behavior of the groups observed did not occur by chance. 
Three empirical aspects follow from the formulation of the hypothesis: (a) estimation 
of the critical size threshold, (b) determination of the institutional reactions of groups 
crossing the threshold, and (c) determination of the institutional features of groups 
beyond the threshold.  
1.3.2. The framework. The starting point of the framework is the existence of 
a group facing a collective action problem. Statistical analyses are directed to 
disentangle the reasons for observed group size differences.  
This dissertation considers two types of collective action in the commons: the 
appropriation of common resources, and the participation in the creation of 
institutions. The former is a process of direct extraction of resources by a group that is 
coordinated by informal rules of cooperation (or uncoordinated) and therefore at risk 
of collective action failure. The latter is a process of negotiation and implementation 
of management and governance rules for the resource use.  
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Figure 1.1. The framework. 
 
Figure 1.1 illustrates the framework. The first type of collective action is 
governed by an informal institution, and is typical of groups having their size below 
the threshold value. The second type of collective action is governed by a formal 
institution, such as a rural charter, and is peculiar of groups that have crossed the 
group size threshold. The switch from an informal institution to a formal institution is 
an institutional change that is defined as “adoption of a formal institution,” or  
“transition to a formal institution.” “Fission and fusion” are group-behavioral 
responses to the crossing of the threshold. “Fission” implies a fragmentation of the 
group into two or more groups, which on their turn may (or may not) adopt a formal 
institution; “Fusion” refers to the emergence of a cohesion of groups under the 
adoption of formal institutions. The subsequent chapters will discuss these concepts in 
detail. 
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1.4. Statement of the Problem 
A review of the literature revealed an incomplete and unbalanced body of 
knowledge about the possibility of a decisive moment in which a group has to choose 
whether to formalize the rules of the institution or not (North, 1990). The search failed 
to reveal any theory related to institutional change when a group reaches a “group size 
threshold.” The present research also contributes to the debate about the role of group 
size and heterogeneity in collective action, a theoretical and empirical challenge that 
Ostrom left for other scholars (2005b; Poteete, Janssen, & Ostrom, 2010; Varughese 
& Ostrom, 2001). 
1.5. Purpose of the Study 
This dissertation investigates the impact of group size on collective action and 
institutional change using the Carte Di Regola case study. Casari (2007) already 
suggested the relevance of group size for the emergence of formal institutions. As a 
preliminary stage, this dissertation successfully replicates this previous study.
1
  
The present research supplemented the original dataset with additional data 
concerning property rights, content of the documents, organization of communities, 
population, assemblies, household size, land resources, climate and topography.  
Using this dataset, the present author constructed a framework to address new 
research questions concerning the relationship between group size and the transition 
from informal to formal institutions. The research effort focused on potential 
explanations for the existence of a group size threshold capable of triggering a process 
of institutional change. 
 
 
                                                            
1 The interested reader may find the results of the replication in Appendix B. 
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1.6. Significance of the Study 
This dissertation is an empirical research in law and economics and new 
institutional economics. It contributes to the debate about the role of institutions as 
economic and legal responses to the ecological challenges faced by groups, especially 
where common-pool resources are concerned (Greif, 2006; Poteete et al., 2010). 
The dissertation answers Williamson’s (1979) call for further research, in that 
the existence of cognitive “triggers” in group size shows a difference between 
alternative institutional modes for organizing transactions. Numerous studies reveal 
how knowledge of group dynamics and individual cognitive limits sheds light on the 
economics of property rights and the evolution of self-enforcing institutions 
(Acemoglu & Johnson, 2005; Barzel, 1982, 1997; Coase, 1960; Libecap, 1989; 
Williamson, 1981). Nevertheless, despite a long tradition in the literature, the question 
of how formal institutions emerge remains of interest for lawyers, economists, and 
political scientists (Hume, 1739; Laveleye, 1891; Maine, 1861). The threshold 
hypothesis is a potential contributant to a comprehensive answer to this question. If 
successful, the present study would result in a framework for identifying a trigger of 
institutional change that could be used in further research even beyond the social 
sciences. 
The emphasis placed on the intersections with behavioral and cognitive 
sciences—particularly to explain the existence of the threshold and its effect on group 
behavior, such as fission and fusion—renders the study relevant to an academic 
audience in the social sciences and to policymakers.  
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Table 1.1.  
Suggested reading paths 
 
 
1.7. Methodology 
The foundation of this dissertation was largely problem-driven and based on 
the structured observation of multiple case studies and village communities, which 
characterize the management of the commons in the Medieval and Modern Italian 
Alps. An important methodological aspect was the technical treatment of historical 
sources by mixing quantitative and qualitative approaches. The study of institutions 
involves a variety of disciplines and methodologies; this dissertation implemented a 
mixed-methods research approach, involving three distinct yet integrated research 
efforts.  
In Chapter 2 the reader is guided through an exposition of the general problem 
of the management of the commons and of the specific case study. Chapters 4 and 7 
offer a discussion of the theories of group size and heterogeneity in relation to 
common property. Chapter 5  develops a mixed-methods study to investigate the 
existence of group size thresholds. Chapter 6 uses grounded theory to describe fission 
and fusion behavior. Chapter 8 employs multiple regression analysis to understand the 
role of social and resource heterogeneity in formal institutions. Subsections 1.7.1–
1.7.3 discuss in more detail Chapters 5, 6, and 8, which represent the bulk of the 
empirical analysis and of the original contribution of this work.  
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The discussion draws on a range of theories and results found in social 
science, focuses on a specific research question, and uses a research methodology that 
Poteete et al. (2010) described as a “customized path.” The overall goal was to allow 
the discussion to manifest an interdisciplinary breadth without losing depth of content 
related to theoretical and empirical problems. The content reflects the exploration and 
the interpretation of empirical evidence with a minimum use of theoretical modeling 
and with a discursive treatment of the technical aspects of the research, including 
econometric models, statistical testing, and computer simulations. 
1.7.1. Group size thresholds in institutions. Chapter 5 first considered the 
determinants of group size in collective action. Five factors that may explain 
variations in group size were discussed: (a) resource specificity, (b) temptation to free 
ride on others’ effort, (c) transaction costs, (d) heterogeneity of individual 
preferences, and (e) cognitive limits. This chapter summarized relationships that can 
be explained in terms of transaction cost. The focus was on collective action in the use 
of common resources, where individuals interact face-to-face without indirect 
representation.  
Potential threshold values were also investigated. A fertile body of literature in 
behavioral and cognitive science posits the existence of a “turning number” in group 
size. A study by the British evolutionary anthropologist Robin Dunbar (1993a) 
entitled “Co-evolution of neocortex size, group size and language in humans” initiated 
a body of literature involving field investigations, simulations, and experiments on 
primates. The aim of the research was finding a “critical” size in groups of face to 
face interactants that might correlate with cognitive limits. To wit, Dunbar found 
evidence that these limits, namely the neocortex ratio in primates and humans, formed 
the basis of the evolution of language (Dunbar, 1993b), bonding and hierarchical 
                                                                                 11 
 
structure in groups (Zhou, Sornette, Hill, & Dunbar, 2005), and the evolution of social 
networks (Hill & Dunbar, 2003; Kudo & Dunbar, 2001; Stiller & Dunbar, 2007). The 
results of Dunbar’s research met with consensus in the scientific community. 
Critically for the present research effort, the results also showed that cognitive limits 
might also influence the size and structure of institutions for collective action. 
Dunbar’s claim of the existence of a “social brain” in humans (Dunbar, 1998, 2003, 
2009) was confirmed by neuroimaging results (Bickart, Wright, Dautoﬀ, Dickerson, 
& Barrett, 2011; Powell, Lewis, Roberts, García-Fiñana, & Dunbar, 2012, Dunbar, 
2012),
2
 and formed one of the possible interpretations of the historical Carte di 
Regola system in the Italian Alps that was enacted between the 13th–19th centuries 
(Casari, 2007). 
1.7.2. Group fission and fusion in institutions. Fission and fusion denote 
decisions undertaken by the group to sustain collective action under both the informal 
and the formal institutional regimes, and are treated in Chapter 6. The prediction is 
that when the group overcomes the critical size threshold, it will separate into two or 
more independent groups (fission) or, if two or more groups are too small to sustain 
collective action, merge into a larger entity (fusion). This chapter empirically 
investigated the relation between group division and the structure of institutions by 
reconstructing fission–fusion phenomena in a set of communities comprising more 
than one village for more than six centuries. The analysis focuses on the relation 
between the size of plenary face-to-face interacting groups, their internal structure, 
and institutional changes. The goal of the methodology was to derive evidence and 
test the hypothesis that fission–fusion strategies were employed to mitigate increasing 
transaction costs in the allocation of property rights. 
                                                            
2 Chapter 4 contains a review of scholarly contributions on this issue. 
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1.7.3. Effects of group heterogeneity and size on institutional design. 
Chapter 8 considered factors that were deemed to influence the design of the formal 
institution, and ultimately of the collective action in the commons: the level of social 
and resource heterogeneity, and group size.  
Social heterogeneity was measured as the fragmentation of the group in terms 
of individual surnames. Resource heterogeneity is a measure of the diversity of a 
community in terms of the portfolio of natural resources. 
The study was an analysis of the relative influence of these factors on 
institutional design. Social and resource heterogeneity are expected to have an impact 
on both informal and formal institutions. However, the availability of historical 
sources made it possible to focus the research only on formal institutions.  
The design of formal institutions crafted by the group is characterized by a set 
of institutional design features. The inner functioning of the formal institution is 
revealed by the analysis of rule content, rule balance, levels of complexity, the 
consensus within the group in reaching the collective decision, and stability over time 
of these decisions.  
The leading conjecture of this chapter was that heterogeneity increases the 
costs of social contracting for defining and enforcing property rights. The diversity 
exhibited by self-governing communities who wrote and voted on community bylaws 
to manage their common resources was explored. Statistical analyses were conducted 
on a rich sample of coded bylaws and data about attendees in legislative assemblies.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                 13 
 
1.8. Main results.  
The present research conducted to five main results. 
1. The average number of individuals in villages remained stable, at 100–
231 individuals (Dunbar’s range), despite that the general population 
growth in the study area tripled between 1220 and 1800. The population 
growth in villages was associated with the adoption of formal 
institutions, and the populations of villages adopting a charter were 
generally higher than those without. 
2. The empirical analysis of institutional change identified threshold values 
in group size. This study’s estimates again exhibited a remarkable 
convergence with the results obtained by Robin Dunbar (1993a) in his 
research about human primate societies. In addition, results of computer 
simulations, corroborated by additional robustness checks, showed that 
the findings of the present study are in favor of the threshold hypothesis. 
3. In large groups, subgroups handled collective action by organizing in no 
more than four organizational layers.  
4. A puzzling finding is the absence of any significant correlation between 
resource heterogeneity and the considered institutional features.  
5. On the contrary, social heterogeneity showed statistically significant 
impacts, especially on institutional complexity, consensus, and the 
relative importance of governance versus resource management rules. 
1.9. Assumptions and Limitations 
1.9.1. Assumptions. There is a variety of assumptions upon which the overall 
validity of this study rests. Here the main ones are summarized. Assumptions are 
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grouped into six categories: (1) collective action, (2) communities, (3) property rights, 
(4) population growth, (5) production and information costs, (6) village assemblies. 
1. Collective action: 
a. Groups preexisted before any collective action took place; 
b. A number of individuals convened in the same place have the 
potential to interact as a group; 
c. Individuals have bounded rationality (Ostrom, 1990, p. 25); 
d. Large and small groups do not differ as to punishment potential.3 
2. Communities: 
a. The archives and the original sources incorporated in the study were 
complete; 
b. A community does not exist when no document has been written in 
that community that refers to that community; 
c. When a community does not exist, its resource endowments 
(corresponding to the cadastral units compounding the surface of the 
community) are assumed not to be used by the others; therefore, its 
absence in the dataset is allowed without loss of accuracy. 
3. Property rights: 
a. The allocation of property rights occurs under positive transaction 
costs; 
b. The costs of creating a formal institution are fixed in relation to the 
size of the group; 
c. Once a community adopted a charter, the charter was enforced until 
1800; that is, there was no return to an informal regime; 
                                                            
3 See Section 5.2.3 for a discussion of this assumption. 
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d. When a multi-village community transitioned to a formal institution 
by adopting a Carta, the effects of this adoption also involved its sub-
villages; 
e. All the observed institutional changes occurred voluntarily and were 
self-enforced; 
f. Institutional changes occurred among an existing set of alternative 
choices and were never forced by external authority; 
g. When the community did not have a charter, the existence of an 
informal regime was assumed; 
h. Self-enforcement of the informal regime and of the Carte was perfect; 
i. It is possible that the Carte may not be genuinely representative of the 
numbers and organization of the populace and commons; some 
corruption is likely, possibly in an effort toward tax avoidance or 
illicit gain as non-cooperative social behavior. However, although not 
directly observable in the data, such aspects of the data are presumed 
to be uniform and thereby have little impact on the findings. 
4. Population growth: 
a. Population growth is exogenous to the process of institutional change; 
this assumption allows the consideration of changes in population as 
independent from the institutional type and organizational changes. It 
follows that institutions and organizations adapt to increasing or 
decreasing population growth: in particular, groups with larger initial 
populations are assumed to have faster technological change and 
population growth (Kremer, 1993). 
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5.  Production and information costs: 
a. The production function of a community is composed of labor and 
land inputs and exhibits returns to scale that initially increase and 
then decrease with group size; 
b. Common resources are always harvested at fully cooperative 
equilibrium, independent of the institutional regime; 
c. At any time, the amount of resource harvested by the group is equal 
to or less than the sustainable resource production: total effort and 
labor are constant at the optimal level; 
d. Once a formal institution is adopted, the total rents from production 
remain constant when group size increases; 
e. There are different information cost structures in different resource 
settings; 
f. After the adoption of a formal institution, there was no resource 
specificity in production efficiency. 
6. Village assemblies: 
a. There was no distinction between a constitutive quorum (the number 
of quorum members required to consider the assembly valid) and a 
deliberative quorum (the number of attending members required to 
consider the decision valid); 
b. All members were obliged to attend the assembly; therefore, it was 
not necessary to specify compliance to a constitutive quorum; 
c. After making the collective decision in the assembly, its 
implementation was automatic;  
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d. Only village representatives, and not the totality of the villagers, 
attended the higher assemblies of multi-layered communities. 
1.9.2. Limitations. A limitation of the study was the nature of historical data, 
often affected by a small sample of observations for a certain period and limited to the 
community level. Two additional categories of limitations concern assumptions made 
for creation of the dataset, and assumptions made for the interpretation of the data.  
The creation of the database used in this study relies on six assumptions. The 
first is about the quality of data: the data collected from published sources was error-
free, that original sources were error-free, and that first-hand data from archival 
sources was free of clerical and measurement errors. The second is about 
completeness: the list of the documents used for the analyses was complete and fully 
descriptive of the institutional changes that occurred in the Trentino region during 
1200–1800. The third is about the absence of self-selection bias: the subset of 260 
documents used to study the effects of heterogeneity of institutions was representative 
of the whole set of charters and unaffected by self-selection bias. The fourth is about 
the internal consistency of coding: the categories adopted in the grounded theory 
study and in the coding of the content of the subset of 260 charters in Chapter 8 were 
mutually exclusive and complete. The present coding categories reflect an 
interpretation of historical data by a researcher assumed to be unbiased, but different 
criteria could have been adopted. 
A set of four limitations relates to assumptions made for the interpretation of 
the content of data. The first is about the analysis of the documents which guided the 
reconstruction of the transition of villages and communities to formal regimes, as well 
as the reconstruction of group fission and fusion behavior and the consequent internal 
organization of communities. Such interpretation is technically correct insofar as the 
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data is correct; however, it was assumed that other interpretations might be possible 
using different categories and frameworks. With access to the original documents, the 
interpretation in the present study faithfully portrays the historical events as 
documented in the sources. 
The second is about the production of population estimates, and contains a 
number of second-level assumptions. Community population was studied using 
estimates instead of real data. As in Casari (2007), estimates were computed by 
backward projecting the community population for each desired year starting from the 
1810 Napoleonic Census data and using the Italian population trend (Bellettini, 1987). 
This methodology implicitly assumes equal population growth in all the communities. 
It also neglected any effect of internal migrations between communities: this 
limitation may potentially lead to duplicate observations of the same individual in two 
different communities or the same individual being undocumented in one or both; this 
is controlled case by case and not completely eliminable. Population estimates 
included community members (insiders) and outsiders. The number of insiders was 
estimated using assembly attendance; the assembly quorum (observed, or the 
pondered average of the observed quorums when a quorum is not observed) was 
estimated by assuming a constant household size of five. This latter assumption was 
based on constant fertility levels across communities and across time.  
The third is about the reconstruction of informal institutions. The impact of 
social and resource heterogeneity is measured only on formal institutions. Social and 
resource heterogeneity is unobservable in the historical informal institutions of the 
present study. Similarly, no predictions on fission and fusion on multi-village 
informal institutions could be made, as they are likewise unobservable. Therefore, it 
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was assumed that multi-village institutions were generated only after a formal 
institution was adopted.  
The fourth is about economic outcomes. The present study did not directly 
observe the economic outcomes of institutional choices. Therefore, claims as to the 
economic success or efficiency of institutional choices cannot be proven on empirical 
grounds, and thus fall outside the purpose of this dissertation. The results are in the 
form of statements of compatibility with the observed evidence in support of, or in 
contrast to, previous economic and social science theories, statements of 
convergence/divergence of results with other empirical and theoretical studies, 
empirical statements on probability and correlations, and are only explain causal links 
between variables. 
1.10. Structure of the Remainder of the Dissertation 
The dissertation consists of four parts. The first part consists of three chapters: 
Chapter 1 outlines the research effort; Chapter 2 describes the case study; Chapter 3, 
discusses the data sources that were accessed in the research.  
The second part consists of an investigation of the existence of a group size 
threshold, spanning Chapters 4–6. Chapter 4 contains a discussion of theories cited in 
the literature about group size, thresholds in collective action, fission–fusion 
strategies, institutions for property rights on the commons, and institutional change 
and sets the background for the formulation of the threshold hypothesis of 
institutional change. Chapter 5 contains a discussion of the identification of the group 
size threshold and of its determinants. Finally, Chapter 6 is a discussion of the role 
and rationale for fission–fusion strategies.  
The third part includes Chapters 7 and 8 and encompasses a discussion of the 
internal functioning of formal institutions beyond the threshold with a particular focus 
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placed on the determinants of institutional design. Chapter 7 contains a discussion of 
literature related to group heterogeneity and institutions, with a particular focus on the 
study of resource management and collective action. Chapter 8 is dedicated to the role 
of social and resource heterogeneity and group size in forging institutions. See Table 
1.1 below for guidance on relevant chapters based on research interest. 
Chapter 9 offers a synthesis of the findings as well as a discussion of the 
implications and potential further studies. 
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Chapter 2: The Carte Di Regola Case Study  
These are not abuses, they are not privileges, they are not usurpations: it is another 
way of possessing, another system of legislation, another social order, one which, 
unobserved, has descended to us from centuries long past.—(Carlo Cattaneo as cited 
in Grossi, 1981).
4
  
 
2.1. The Governance of Upland Commons 
The present chapter is a historical review of the emergence of institutions for 
the management of the commons with a European and global perspective (Section 
2.1). After briefly illustrating the history of village communities in the Italian Alps 
between 1200 and 1800 (Section 2.2), this chapter outlines the case of the Carte Di 
Regola (Section 2.3). Particular attention is drawn to the reconstruction of the 
conditions that allowed the enactment of the Carte Di Regola. Section 2.4 summarizes 
and concludes the review. 
The present-day understanding about the governance of collective action, 
particularly in the context of common-pool resources, is profoundly indebted to Elinor 
Ostrom’s works (Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom, Burger, Field, Norgaard, & Policansky, 
1999). These researches provide a global outlook that demonstrates how institutions 
for the management of the commons emerged and developed in very different 
settings, at different times, with similar characteristics in design and structure.  
Legal scholars seem to have rediscovered the common characteristics of such 
institutions only in relatively recent times, although a substantial body of literature on 
common property has been written in the past two centuries. Before Ostrom (1990), 
scholars expressed skepticism toward the possibility of overcoming collective action 
                                                            
4 The work was first published in Italian (Grossi, 1977). Cattaneo was speaking of the vestiges of 
collective landholding structures in Su la Bonificazione del Piano di Magadino (On the Redevelopment 
of the Magadino Plain). 
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problems (Olson, 1965) on the commons (Hardin, 1968) without the conversion of 
collective landholdings into private property or, alternatively, through direct 
government regulation. Despite scholarly skepticism, the period ranging from the end 
of the 19th century to the first decades of the 20th century was a fertile period for the 
study of the commons among lawyers and economists. Further studies are the result of 
these first contributions to the fields of legal theory and the political economy of 
property.
5
 
The first contemporary legal scholar to understand the importance of common 
property as a natural institution was Henry Sumner Maine, who wrote Ancient Law: 
Its Connection with the Early History of Society, and its Relation to Modern Ideas 
(1861). The book is the earliest empirical inquiry on common property institutions of 
many populations around the world. In another book, The Effects of Observation of 
India on Modern European Thought, Maine observed the following: 
The facts collected suggest one conclusion which may be now considered as 
almost proved to demonstration. Property in land as we understand it, that is, 
several ownership, ownership by individuals or by groups not larger than 
families, is a more modern institution than joint property or co-ownership, that 
is, ownership in common by large groups of men originally kinsmen… 
Gradually, and probably under the influence of a great variety of causes, the 
institution familiar to us, individual property in land, has arisen from the 
dissolution of the ancient co-ownership. (1875, p. 227) 
Another important contributor was Henri de Laveleye, professor of political 
economy at the University of Liege and author of De la Propriété et de ses Formes 
Primitives (1891). This book went beyond a treatise on property: it explicitly tackled 
                                                            
5 For a celebrative review of the importance of the work of Elinor Ostrom for lawyers, read Fennel 
(2011). 
                                                                                 23 
 
the issue of common property and became an invaluable contribution in terms of 
critical analysis of the capitalist society based on natural law. Laveleye developed an 
important critical analysis of the Romanist origins of the concept of ownership. His 
view was similar to Maine’s and represented a first example of legal and comparative 
economic analysis of common property. Cases cited in Laveleye’s work and reported 
by Grossi (1981) included the Germanic Mark (p. 71); the Russian Mir (p. 9); the 
Javanese dessa (p. 49); the British township (p. 267); the Germanic, Swiss, and 
Scandinavian Allmend (p. 201); and the southern Slav zadruga—all of which were 
institutional forms that escaped the rigid Romanist dogma of the condominium or the 
universitas (p. 299). Rather, they were examples of “living,” dynamic, “universal” 
institutional languages, which Grossi termed “alternative ways of possessing.” Grossi 
contended the following: 
…it would be unacceptable to speak of property in the singular, as the jurists 
and before them the philosophers had done. Their property was now one 
property, one of the many forms of appropriation that men had devised and set 
up as they lived through their history. Other forms had been and could still be 
proposed in response to differing origins. (p. 67) 
Grossi quoted Laveleye:  
Another very widespread error is to speak of “property” as if it were an 
institution having a fixed and immutable form, whereas in reality it has taken 
on the most different forms and is still susceptible to very great and 
unforeseen modifications. (De Laveleye, 1891, p. 381) 
Maine and Laveleye ignited the European controversy on the importance of 
common property rights at the outset of the current legal system, which is 
conceptually based on the centrality of private property. Researchers have underlined 
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how private property was established as the pillar of civil society after the 
Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution in England, where the land tenure system 
swapped after 600 years from the open fields to private property (Grossi, 1977, 1981, 
1990). Grossi concluded that during the Enlightenment and in the late 18th century, 
known as the “Age of Codification,” the sole proprietor was awarded a moral 
superiority over the nonproprietor in social, political, and juridical theory. The legal 
theory at the core of the works of preparation of the Civil Code ignored any form of 
joint ownership on political and philosophical grounds by projecting the “shadow” of 
quiritian (Roman) property into the new forms of property best suited to the newly 
forged French bureaucratic apparatus.
6
  
According to Grossi (1981), in Europe there was a direct identification of 
proprietorship with citizenship and proprietorship with the capacity of exercising civic 
rights and virtues; individual ownership was the symbol of all the virtues, liberties, 
and rights of the citizen, which represented the best of all the possible situations in 
which a man could find himself in relation to goods and society. The ancient open 
fields system continued developing undisturbed in many other places of the world 
(Grossi, 1981). However, collective ownership was regarded as a deformation of the 
norm, representing a juridical deviation, and was often associated with the customs of 
uncivilized populations. A number of later contributions focused attention on resource 
management institutions in the Alpine area or similar settings elsewhere in the world 
(Ostrom, 1990). Settings similar to the Alpine environment with similar institutions 
were explored by the political scientist Samuel Popkin, who wrote a seminal book on 
rational choice theory using the case of village institutions in the rural society of 
contemporary Vietnam (Popkin, 1979). 
                                                            
6 The economic consequences of this abrupt political shock were investigated by Acemoglu, Cantoni, 
Johnson, and Robinson (2011). 
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Other studies focused on settings similar to the Alpine one, such as the 
northern Indian village institutions in the Himalayas (Agrawal, 1998; Agrawal & 
Chhatre, 2006; Baland Pranab, Das, Mookherjee, & Sarkar, 2006; Baland & Platteau, 
1996; Chakravarty-Kaul, 1996). Another key contribution was written by Robert 
McNetting concerning the village of Torbel in Switzerland (Netting, 1981); his work 
inspired many other authors in the study of upland village communities. The 
economist Robert Wade (1988) studied modes of public policy and the society in 
“village republics,” explained the economic conditions for collective action in 
contemporary South India, and referenced many other cases of successful 
management of the commons. Netting (1972) studied a Swiss case, McKean (1984) 
studied a Japanese case, and Campbell and Godoy (1985) studied the open-field 
system in the present-day Andes as well as Medieval England. Despite these cases of 
commons management certainly exhibit differences with the Carte Di Regola, both as 
to their institutional history and the context in which they arose, they share similar 
physical characteristics, the same collective action problem, and analogous solutions. 
A key reference for the Eastern Alps was written by Cole and Wolf (1999), 
two American anthropologists who identified an ethno-linguistic frontier in the 
southern Tyrol and the Trentino region by analyzing the ecology and the origins of the 
ethnicity of the present-day area of the Valley of Non between Trento and Bolzano. 
This contribution was used as one of the references for the data provided on 
population in the present study. A precise reconstruction of the environment, 
population, and social structure in the Alps since the 16th century was written in a 
study by Pier Paolo Viazzo (2006) concerning the village of Alagna, which defined 
the Alps as a “magnificent laboratory” for social scientists. The conclusions of all 
such cases are similar. In Wade’s (1988) words: “These cases are sufficient to negate 
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the necessity of full private property rights or for control by a central authority in 
order to protect common-pool resources” (p. 199). 
A collection of historical studies on the management of common lands in 
general (not only the Alps) in North-western Europe was published by Tine de Moor, 
Paul Warde, and Leigh Shaw-Taylor in 2002. The studies were authored by a number 
of contributors and covered (a) France, the Flanders;
7
 (b) northern and southern 
England; and (c) the Netherlands, Sweden, and south and northwest Germany from c. 
1500–1850.  
Such studies are gradually unveiling a rich heritage of common property 
institutions that were in force (and, in some cases, are still in force) on the European 
continent for centuries before the Enclosures and the French Revolution. Note the 
Italian case of the Partecipanza Agraria di Nonantola in northern Italy, whose origins 
are traced back to the 10th century (Alfani, 2011). 
The rich European panorama of common property is also reflected within the 
boundaries of the Italian peninsula. Grossi (1981) illustrated some of the institutions 
for collective action in the commons that were in force in Italy during medieval and 
modern times in both the north and south. Grossi also noted that the Italian legislators 
in the late 19th century were aware of the existence of these institutions, which often 
differed according the region of emergence. In the north, these institutions appeared 
more linked to a participative “community” (the commons were called generally 
“beni comunali” or “ademprivi”, transl. communal goods), while in the southern part 
of the peninsula, particularly on the islands of Sicily and Sardinia, the institutions for 
collective property were more hierarchically organized and associated to large estates 
(latifondo). The commons in central Italy were largely affected by the establishment 
                                                            
7 See also De Moor, 2009. 
                                                                                 27 
 
of comuni (independent cities) during the 11th century, when urban institutions 
developed on a voluntary, spontaneous basis (sometimes led by local aristocrats) 
having as rationale the thrust for local freedom and self-governance from feudal 
dominations and bounds (Andreatta & Pace, 1981).  
In general, communal goods in Europe were divided and organized in 
concentric circles around the villages and were collectively owned by different kinds 
of institutions, such as the Carte di Regola in the Italian Alps (Casari, 2007). 
2.2. Village Communities in the Italian Alps, c. 1200–1800 
The following is a brief historical overview on the political, economic, and 
legal institutions of the prince-bishop of Trento in c. 1200–1800, which comprises the 
case study that formed the foundation of the present study. The region and the 
emergence of settlements are described. The political economy of the village 
communities, the land tenure system, and the main historical events that affected the 
institutions and the economy of the region in the six centuries before the abolition of 
the regime in 1804 are summarized. 
The Bishopric of Trent (Figure 2.1) was a principality of the Holy Roman 
Empire; the bishopric was a 2,400 square-mile area located in the Alpine area 
between the German-speaking area, or Tyrol, and the Republic of Venice. It was a 
territory roughly corresponding to the current Province of Trento in northern Italy. 
From 1027 to 1803, the prince-bishop of Trento, appointed jointly by the Holy Roman 
Emperor and the Pope, granted villages autonomy in governing collective resources as 
well as in other internal issues concerning community life. An extensive description 
of the economic history of the princedom is contained in two volumes of the Storia 
del Trentino, one that was edited by Castagnetti and Varanini (2004) for medieval 
28 
times, and another by Bellabarba and Olmi (2000) for modern times (until the 
secularization of the prince-bishop).  
 
 
 
Figure 2.1. The Bishopric of Trent, 1648. 
Note. Map of the Holy Roman Empire, 1648, with the territories belonging to the prince-bishop of 
Trento/Trient highlighted. Trento is represented by the single dot. Ecclesiastical lands are shaded in 
pale blue. Source: modified from File:Holy Roman Empire 1648 Ecclesiastical.png; boundaries 
inferred from Tirol-Atlas (edited by A. Leidlmair, Innsbruck: Universitätsverlag Wagner, 1985), Part F 
- Geschichte (F. Dörrer, P. W. Haider, F. Huter, W. Keller, & W. Leitner), specifically maps F6 
(Territoriale Entwicklung, F. Huter & W. Keller) and F9 (Verwaltungsgliederung 1766, F. Dörrer & 
W. Keller). Authors: Roke (map), Hanno Sandvik (addition of colors). Available at: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:HRR_1648_Trient.png. Permission (Reusing this file) released by the 
author under GNU. 
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2.2.1. The rise of the rural community in the Italian Alps. For centuries, the 
Trentino was characterized by settlements in the form of small communities. Casari 
(2007) asserted the median community population in 1810 was just above few 
hundreds inhabitants. Villages were built around the church and the main square. 
Distances between villages were sometimes covered with great difficulty, given the 
tortuous paths that linked them. The potestas (domain/area of influence) of the prince 
extended over the entire region where many settlements were scattered. The 
community became the production unit of the State, typical of the southern part of the 
Tyrol (Cole & Wolf, 1999; Viazzo, 2006), and was a close-knit group governed by 
strong family ties (Barzel, 2001; Ellickson, 1991).
8
 The territorial government relied 
on the enforcement of religious norms in a network of local churches in several of 
these communities, which were directly accountable to the Bishopric in Trento. 
The first settlements in the Trentino region had early origins, but not before 
222 B.C. (Andreatta & Pace, 1981). During the Roman Empire, the territory was 
divided into four municipii: (a) Trento, Feltre, and Valsugana up to Pergine; (b) 
Verona with the Low Val Lagarina; (c) Brescia; and (d) the Garda Lake region up to 
Arco. In 49 B.C., the importance of Trento had grown so much that Julius Caesar 
extended Roman citizenship to those in the region first and later the title of 
“Municipium” to Trento.  
Settlements gradually developed around the town or urban center and were 
scattered in the region up the floor of the most remote valleys. These settlements were 
called “pagi” and “vici” and grew in number in relation to regional population growth 
until they occupied the whole region. Settlements were eventually established at 
higher altitudes. Initially, these settlements were the primitive basis of the collective 
                                                            
8 Barzel studied the characteristics of groups in terms of transaction costs (Barzel, 2001, p. 69) and 
defined a close-knit group as “a social entity within which power is broadly dispersed and members 
have continuing face-to-face interactions with one another”(Ellickson, 1993, p. 1320). 
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life of a few families, and they later evolved into villages termed “Villae” or 
“Viciniae” (from Vicus), established with the primary aim of organizing the collective 
services necessary for survival (Varanini, 2004).  
The evolution of these settlements into “communities” is linked to the rise of 
the comuni in central Italy around the year 1000. These institutions spread from the 
major Italian urban centers in northern Italy and diffused during the 13th century into 
the Trentino region. Legal documents establishing the new institutions were often 
“charters of liberties” containing the right of the inhabitants to write their own statutes 
and to elect their own rulers. The most frequently adopted forms of community 
governance were based on a console (consul), which reflected the stature of privileged 
families; the Podestà, which represented a foreigner; or under the government of 
Capitani del Popolo (Captains of the Populace), a Signorie (Lordships), or 
Corporazioni delle Arti (Guilds) (such as in Florence). 
The rural community form followed a similar track, but it is regarded by 
historians to trace back to earlier than the Roman domination (Andreatta & Pace, 
1981). While the urban community developed as a spontaneous entity to manage 
concessions from the local feudal lord, the rural community emerged often for (a) 
religious ends, (b) the defense of the group’s common interests, (c) the organization 
of the use of the common resources, and (d) the organization of trades and commerce 
necessary for the survival of the population. The librarian and intellectual Tommaso 
Gar recalled that when Saint Vigil, Catholic missionary and third Bishop of Trento, 
came to evangelize the populations of the Adige Valley, he found the population 
already concentrated in small villages grouped by a highly variable number of 
families (Gar, 1860). These pre-existing settlements had common economic rights on 
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ample expanses of forest and pasture, linked by family bonds, membership, and 
mutual cooperation. 
2.2.2. Village economics. The climate in Trentino was very unsettled and 
varied with the altitude where the villages were located. Cold winters and the 
prevalence of mountainous areas with steep slopes resulted in agricultural production 
of only 8% of the total Trentino geographical area where there was, by necessity, little 
diversification in agricultural production. Vineyards and farmland were mostly 
individual property, while the forests, meadows, and pastures were mainly 
collectively owned. Forests covered about half of the area and were important sources 
for firewood, building materials, and materials for handicrafts (e.g., furniture, wheels, 
and wagons). Meadows and pastures covered about a third of the territory and were 
devoted to farm and dairy production. The expansion of the arable land was subjected 
to favorable climatic conditions over time and by area (Coppola, 2002a; Varanini, 
2004).  
Collective goods, particularly grazing land, belonged to one or more 
communities. Grazing lands, forests, and mines were collective goods of the utmost 
importance in the production cycle of communities. Grazing land and forests provided 
the population with a complete food source: game, poultry, and grazing animals. 
Feeding cattle and sheep was problematic in the economy of communities, as grazing 
land was limited to low altitudes due to seasonality. Conversely, large blocks of 
grazing land meant the possibility of developing commercial cheese. Furthermore, the 
production of wood was strategic for commercial relationships with Trento and the 
outside world. Timber traders from Verona, Brescia, and Venice (and later from 
Innsbruck) required good relationships with the local powers in the Trentino region to 
guarantee the supply of wood. Forests were a resource that had slow growth 
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(Castellani, 1982; Clark, 1990) and needed a “planned extraction” to avoid resource 
overexploitation. 
Entrepreneurs and traders had to maintain relations with the prince-bishop to 
access the products coming from the mining sector. The presence of minerals and 
metals in the mountains of Trentino was another source of wealth for many 
communities between 1100 and 1200 A.D. However, mining activity was conducted 
with some difficulty because of the technical limits of the time; excavating the land or 
driving wells to even a modest depth was difficult (Sabbatini, 2002; Varanini, 2004).  
During c. 1400, rural communities found in the commons an important source 
of wealth. The discontinuous expansion of agricultural products and the distribution to 
the head of families of zones of forest that reduced agricultural space can be 
considered the first attempts toward the privatization of collective assets. In the rural 
charters of c. 1400, it is possible to notice an increase in the restrictions for the 
governance of grazing lands; for instance, (a) prohibition of access and use by 
outsiders (forestieri ), (b) limitation of use and management only to insiders (vicini), 
(c) compulsory community herding, and (d) strict determination of the spaces devoted 
to forests and of the pathways used to reach them. 
Commercial relations underwent acceleration in the 12
th 
and 13
th 
centuries 
with the growth of Verona, where many traders who made their fortunes by 
commerce in timber resided. The 14
th
 and 15
th
 centuries ended the monopoly in the 
basin of the River Adige, which led to the subsequent decline of the exploitation of 
forest resources of other basins. The transport always took place through the Rivers 
Adige, Chiese, and Sarca. The transport of timber via rivers in 1400 was especially 
prevalent in Val di Fiemme. During the 15th century, forest management was made 
up of a complex system of practices of cutting trees according to a “schedule” that 
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ensured the regeneration of the vegetation (Agnoletti, 1993, p. 75). These practices 
were traditionally passed down by word-of-mouth (informal institutions) or statutory 
regulations (formal institutions) and seemed to find definition and compliance during 
the 15th century.  
Historians report that, in 1558 and in 1583, the prince-bishop issued a 
directive to protect the forest wealth. The management of the Valle di Fiemme was 
intended to limit the deforestation with rules aimed at the stabilization of extraction 
quantities (Coppola, 2002a, b). The enforcement of the right of collecting firewood 
(in various forms, such as the sorte, which was the entitlement to a fixed proportion of 
cut product from the common forests for the residents in the jurisdiction) satisfied the 
domestic demand for heating, construction, flooring, roof shingles, the domestic 
production of handcrafted tools, and use in the manufacture of charcoal and lime. 
Byproducts of the forest areas came from conifers: turpentine and resin were very 
profitable, and a significant tax was imposed on them (Sabbatini, 2002; Varanini, 
2004). 
The production of timber for commerce evolved differently in the valleys in 
Trentino and was intended to feed the market throughout northern Italy, especially in 
the building and shipbuilding sector. As anticipated, the transport was provided by a 
system of timber rafting on rivers. Several smaller rivers such as the Leno, Sarca, 
Chiese, and Noce connect the Tyrol to the Trentino region for timber rafting. 
Particularly, the River Sarca connects the Tyrol with Riva del Garda. The connection 
with the River Brenta brought the production of the Valsugana and Val di Fiemme to 
the foothills near Vicenza. The economic return was substantial: the communities 
derived considerable concessions for the exploitation of the forests. Princely taxation 
consisted of duties, delivery charges, and logging rights; for example, Sabbatini 
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(2002) reports that the timber trade of the Val di Fiemme yielded 5,000–6,000 florins 
a year, plus the firewood. At the beginning of 1600, the economic interests of the 
county of Tyrol for the duty of Lavis were quantified as 100,000 florins a year 
(Sabbatini, 2002). 
During c. 1200 to 1300, the vast land of the area began to be used seasonally 
for agriculture (Varanini, 2004). The creation of stable settlements was slower, and in 
this period, the high Alp (grazing herds above 10,000 ft.) was inserted in the 
productive cycle. 
During the 15th century, important manufacturing and production services and 
non-agricultural production activities arose. The occupational and social fabric of 
daily life in communities was comprised of innumerable part-time jobs. These 
activities were generally related to seasonal or temporary migration. The first 
corporate organization of wool production and commercialization was recognized 
only in the first quarter of the 15th century. The Statute of Trent in 1523 recognized 
with favor the status of the merchants of Trent. In this period, the diffusion of the 
planting of mulberry trees arose, essential for the growing of silkworms.  
Growing cereals such as rye was suitable for difficult terrain and harsh 
climates. Autumn-sown cereals, legumes, and fruit trees were prevalent in the valley 
of the River Adige. In terms of agricultural innovations, new crops were introduced 
during the 17th century. The introduction of corn, due to its high productivity, 
alleviated, but did not solve, the subordination to the external grain market from the 
River Po, and the Veneto in particular. The orientation of agricultural practices was 
toward simplification. The introduction of the new crops allowed for frequent 
alternation between wheat and corn and the subsequent elimination of periodic rest for 
the land. Profitability of the land was little affected, however, and the new 
                                                                                 35 
 
introductions contributed to the stabilization of soil fertility (Coppola, 2002a; 
Sabbatini, 2002). The negative side of simplification in agriculture was the spread of a 
disease, pellagra, which was the result of the simplification of eating habits, especially 
in the poorer classes, and endemic in northern Italy at that time (Hampl & Hampl, 
1997; Latham, 1973).
9
 
Wine production made a leap to modern techniques and products in the 1500s 
and in vineyards in the 1600s. In the 17th century, the development of the wine sector 
was vigorous, especially in trade. The land devoted to vineyards cultivated below 750 
meters above the sea level in the early 18th century quadrupled in some areas. Wine 
was traded for grains of German origin. Tobacco was another introduction of the 17th 
century, together with potatoes. These innovations in the agricultural sector had a 
positive impact on production. At that time, actual production was lower than 
potential production because of the absence of fertilizers and the difficulty of 
irrigation between breeding the cattle and farming. The backwardness of agronomic 
knowledge, agricultural limitations imposed by contract choice, and lack of capital for 
investments in production were the main reasons for the low productivity of land. 
Furthermore, a large workforce was required. The growth of silk production and the 
increase in the cultivation of mulberry trees for silkworms as well as the growth of 
wine production led to an expansion of the farmland at the expense of pastures and 
meadows (Sabbatini, 2002). 
Other innovations concerned the relationship between animal husbandry and 
the farm. In the 16th century, sheep farming decreased because of the general decline 
of wool production, and driven by low-cost imports of German-made wool from the 
Tyrol area. Cattle grazing was instead developed in the middle-high mountains. The 
                                                            
9 For nutrition habits and anthropometric history of Lower Austria in the 19th century, see Komlos 
(1989). 
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use of agricultural contracts, such as the lease, led to an organization of livestock 
production that allowed the building of stables and other facilities, such as 
warehouses for butter. The limitations of this system derived from uncertainties, such 
as a bad season, that could reduce the amount of hay produced, or sometimes 
epizootics that might reduce the cattle population, especially if the region was 
involved in military operations; for instance, as happened in 1734. Despite these 
limitations, the production system was stabilized in the 17th century (Sabbatini, 
2002). During the 18th century, a few modest changes took place to ensure 
maintenance of a balance among resources and people. Changes in agriculture were 
significant and showed a tendency to overcome the structural weaknesses toward a 
more efficient system. A first change was the reclamation of wetlands along the River 
Adige. Waterways were also a problem in the 19th century; however, there were 
many areas of redemption for landowners, or for the public interest. 
2.2.3. Land tenure system. Contractual solutions between users and local 
aristocrats varied with altitude: lease with rent in kind, rent in kind, enfiteusi and 
livello (particular and ancient forms of agricultural lease), and perpetual lease were 
some of the forms. These contracts underlined different agricultural contexts and 
different social relationships (Stella, 1958), although the absence of any indication 
about land demarcation did not facilitate the determination of the relationship. The 
logic underlying the contract was straightforward: on the one hand, the owner of a 
stock of food was safe from market fluctuations, and on the other hand, the 
appropriation of commercial products, such as grapes, took place (Coppola, 2002a). 
Historians report that the different types of contracts fulfilled two economic 
interests: the owner’s to a constant annuity, usually given in kind or parameterized, 
and the conductor’s to the self-management of the land that, beyond the unavoidable 
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obligation to improve the land, allowed the long-term appreciation of the 
improvements and, eventually, the right or redemption of the land itself. The contract, 
however, often hid a financial rationale (security) rather than a rent (“simulation”): 
this was the case of the “simulated sale” that corresponds to present day “sale and 
lease back” agreements (Coppola, 2002a). 
The “simulated sale” contract worked as follows: a person sold land to another 
person and simultaneously, in addition to the amount received, undersigned a term 
that obligated the seller to sign a lease contract to use the land and to pay a rent equal 
to the interests accrued; in addition, the seller contracted with the buyer for the sale-
back (in the end, the original seller had to buy back the estate). This solution obligated 
the seller to a rent in kind, and was substantially a loan that circumvented the precepts 
of Canon law on usury (Coppola, 2002a, p. 240). Frequently, upon exercise of the 
sale-back, the original seller was not able to buy-back the land, and the operation 
ended with an expropriation. The price of the sold-out land was the amount lent under 
the contract, but the same land was immediately rented to the seller. The rental 
corresponded to the definition of “moneylending.” Other times, the contract had a 
virtuous purpose: in the “middle mountain,” the masi (Alpine farmsteads) were 
assigned to households for periods of 19 to 29 years with the option of renewal. 
Frequently, the contract allowed the cultivation of other crops than those 
strictly specified in the contract in consideration of rent paid, affording the peasant a 
higher degree of discretion that maximized the productive potential of land. 
A new regulation regarding the development of the livestock sector modified 
the contracts on livestock and cattle grazing for the purpose of limiting the negative 
consequences of an excessive load of cattle, which was pertinent for participation in 
the communal exploitation of forest and grazing resources. In the valleys, the 
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expansion of cultivation (due to population growth and the consequent increase in 
demand) affected the feeding of livestock. The lack of summer pastures did not allow 
the massive growing of cattle, which cannot be fed during winter with fodder. Fodder 
was kept up to the threshold that allowed the sustainable yield of the land and a 
modestly profitable sale during the winter. Downstream communities usually let their 
herds be grazed by professional herdsmen on the mountains during summer. This 
solution was very common, but with a low margin of profitability. Collective 
ownership in the middle mountain was rather widely diffused. The most common 
forms of livestock were cattle and sheep. There were local herds and flocks coming in 
from foreign areas. The communities that had most of the pastures and management 
of pastures found it cheaper to rent them to outsiders than to sustain them. Normally, 
the statutes and rural charters contained prohibitions against foreign herders in the 
commons, and these rules were intended to preserve resources and avoid the 
overexploitation of land. 
A possible explanation related to production was also that grazing lands were 
more abundant than meadows. The underlying concern was the supply and retention 
of a significant stock of fodder to be used during the winter. Consequently, stocking 
was commensurate with the need to avoid damaging it.
10
 The area of pasture was 
extended as much as possible, to the detriment of other types of ground cover, so that 
some communities, such as the Val di Fiemme,
11
 provided some rights to use the 
marshes of the Adige valley for a few months when the pastures were already (or still) 
covered with snow. In these situations, of course, the exclusion of foreign flocks was 
vital. When the thaw freed the area of high-altitude pastures and began the period of 
the Alp pastures, a surplus of food allowed more cattle than the one locally present. 
                                                            
10 Archivio Comunale Storico, Lomaso, 26, Instrumento de sentenze de le malghe, 1535, c.1.; see also: 
Archivio Comunale Storico, Lomaso, 8, Instrumento del modo de malgeazar, 1549 
11 Archivio della Magnifica Comunità di Fiemme, Cavalese, Drawer G, 18:28, 15 March 1640 
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Hence, the exclusion of foreigners to access the common goods became more relaxed: 
outsiders were allowed to graze their herds and cattle, and some were entrusted with 
the communal herd when grazing land was not directly used by the neighbors, under 
the payment of a charge (Coppola, 2002a). 
Only a small share of the agricultural land was freehold property. The feudal 
nobility, the merchant aristocracy, the nobles in the largest towns with a wealthy 
heritage, monasteries, ecclesiastical institutions, or hospitals and brotherhoods were 
few and had an insufficiently solid capital base. Aside from the chapter of the 
Cathedral of Trento (Nubola, 2002), other ecclesiastical entities actually survived on 
the rights of the decima and quarta (the tenth or the fourth part of production, 
respectively) rather than on the tax revenue from their landholdings (Varesco, 1981). 
Peasant individual ownership was common in the area but usually burdened with 
feudal or community duties. The increase of population in the 16th century led to an 
expansion of the aggregate demand on resources that was not counterbalanced by the 
availability of the resources. In fact, historians have noticed the expansion of 
farmlands in the period, particularly of land for cereal production, at the expense of 
the watershed, pasture, and forest areas (Coppola, 2002a, b).
12
 
The organization of the land was typified by very large regional communal 
properties, the presence of few possessions of a certain size, and multiple small plots 
as strainers made payable to farmers. Closer to major urban centers, the importance of 
communal land decreased in relation to individual ownership; the closer to the high 
mountains, the greater the share of land relevant to the ever-growing communities in 
relation to the greater fragmentation of individual possession. Interestingly, at the 
feudal system level, while relieving the levy on agriculture (the decima and the quarta 
                                                            
12 The sources used so far do not exhibit a clear picture of the land tenure system for the 16th and the 
17th centuries. Some data are available at the community level on administration booklets and, later, on 
land registers. For earlier data, unfortunately, documentation is scarce. 
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type), the self-organization of production was no longer hampered. There was the 
moderate diffusion of free lands; however, the phenomenon was limited only to the 
middle and high mountains. The range of agricultural contracts did not increase 
substantially.  
The forest economy remained substantially unchanged during the 17th 
century. On the demand side, the weakness of the shipbuilding sector was balanced by 
the need for wood for building in urban centers as well as the need for energy sources, 
especially for the development of local manufacturers, such as those creating silk. On 
the production side, the community-based production systems demonstrated enough 
robustness to ensure the continuity of a productive economic process in a satisfactory 
and rewarding way (Coppola, 2002a, b). The concessions of forest and the 
exploitation of common land were taxed by the prince-bishop and by the Tyrol (steore 
is the name of the Tyrolean tax) as an attempt to reduce the political power assumed 
by the communities (Bonazza, 2002). Varesco (1981) summarized land possessions in 
1780 in Predazzo as differentiated by social groups. In this community, forests were 
entirely the common property of the community, and 50% of the tillable land was 
common property. Churches, fraternities, charitable entities, and wealthy people 
shared the properties of Predazzo (3.45% of the total).
13
  
2.2.4. Regional-scale shocks. The following events have been considered to 
have had an impact on the political, economic, and social life of the communities and 
are the same as in Casari (2007): the outbreak of the Black Death in 1348, the Peasant 
War in 1525, the council of Trento from 1545 to 1563, and the crises of the mid-17th 
                                                            
13 The Urbario (urban register) of 1387 provides no data about the land tenure system. The Estimi 
(register of estimation) of the 1400s does not offer a systematization. Not until the cadastral registers of 
1780 (Archivio di Stato di Trento, 1780) is there data referring to pre-industrial times (Consiglio 
provinciale d’agricoltura pel Tirolo, 1903). 
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century. The period from the crowning of Maria Theresa of Austria in 1740 until the 
arrival of Napoleon in 1796 also changed life in the communities significantly. 
The plague in 1348. The plague outbreak of the 14th century, the Black 
Death, brought a decrease in demographic pressure on resources and the redefinition 
of both private and collective ownership. Trento had about 5,000 inhabitants in 1335 
(Seneca, 1953). The chronicle by the priest John of Parma reported the dramatic 
figure of a mortality rate of five sixths of the total population in 1348. The same priest 
reported the effect of the plague on the production system:  “There were few laborers, 
and the harvest remained in the fields because there were no gatherers” (Curzel, 
Palmato, & Varanini, 2001, p. 211, own translation). Effects on the labor market were 
remarkable: rural wages immediately rocketed upward, as well as the prices of such 
commodities as grain and wine. It took two centuries to reach the population level of 
early 1300. Riva and Rovereto, in the southern part of the region, reached the peak of 
their late-medieval demographic development in this period. 
 The first effect of the plague was a population decrease affecting densely 
inhabited centers, where the contagion was most devastating (Curzel et al., 2001). The 
effects followed with the employment of the surviving workforce in high-rent 
activities such as farming and agriculture, whose products could be easily exchanged 
on the market. This, in turn, resulted in a decrease in the price of meat, milk 
derivatives, and leather as well as the traditional migratory movements from remote 
communities to local centers. Pressure on the Alp (mainly located upstream) 
decreased, which resulted in the exploitation of forests at a sustainable level. The 
trade of timber on local markets through river floating led to an increase in the rents 
from commons. This evidence is in line with Haddock and Kiesling (2002, p. 2), who 
reported that the Black Death left nonhuman inputs virtually untouched; it therefore 
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profoundly altered relative factor values. Labor and human capital rapidly became 
scarce relative to complementary nonhuman factors, while the other factors grew 
increasingly abundant per capita.  
The Peasant War in 1525. On 15 May 1525, the first peasant uprisings 
against fortresses and castles in Mezzocorona spread like a wildfire throughout the 
principality. An uprising had been fomented for a long time and was intended to 
paralyze the centers of noble power. The uprising of 1525 was in opposition to feudal 
power and was highly critical of the judicial system, administration of the region, and 
tax laws. Many of the abusive decisions issued between October 1525 and late winter 
of 1526 against the peasants were ameliorated after just over a year, and several 
punishments were converted into fines, allowing entry into the country of convicted 
peasants and the peaceful restoration of their possessions.  
The process of normalization after the Peasant War included the granting of 
new rural charters to the communities, the reform of the Statute of Trento, and the 
achievement of agreements between the jurisdictions. The introduction of a double 
taxation (one to the Earl of Tyrol and one to the Princedom of Trent) and the increase 
of tax rates sparked the anger of large segments of the population in the early 15th 
century and was subsequently influenced by instances of religious renewal from 
Germany, which had a strong presence due to the progressive deterioration of living 
conditions of inhabitants in the countryside as well as the loss of ancient customs. 
This deterioration had, according to local historians, a unique cause: the continuous 
and uninterrupted request of fiscal contribution, linked to the rapid succession of 
warfare that increased the poverty of communities that were often overpopulated.
14
 
                                                            
14 Archivio di Stato, Trento; Archivio del Principato Vescovile, Sezione latina, capsa 9, n. 54, cc. 74r-
75v. The communities of Anaunia had provided many men to the battles of Grigioni, the struggles in 
Bassano, Tesino, Valsugana, Tenno e Calliano and the fights in Pontenegro (Verona), Brescia and 
Bergamo. Based on old privileges, the soldiers were not obliged to fight; in addition, the division of the 
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Many local churches, while wanting to remain faithful to the Church and the majesty 
of the emperor, could not serve two lords simultaneously. There was widespread 
impoverishment of the rural segments of society and the use of unfair and 
burdensome forms of credit by those who had liquidity (the nobles’ monopoly). The 
farmers were no longer able to accumulate adequate reserves to address the downturn, 
and the free possessions often turned into emphyteusis. 
The Council of Trento (1545–1563). The Council of Trento was formally 
opened on 13 December 1545 and ended on 4 December 1563. It was one of the most 
important events of the history of the Catholic Church, after the Council of Nicaea, 
which had occurred more than eight centuries earlier. The biggest problem was 
feeding the city because of an extreme food scarcity, especially of wheat, which made 
many cardinals afraid to go to the council for fear of becoming part of the famine 
while they were there. Trent and the surrounding area was subjected to great tension 
caused by the increasing economic demands facing an evident shortage of supply 
typified by a constant rise in prices, which came to be higher than those charged in 
Germany. Many non-participants to the council had no choice but to sell their horses 
(Jedin, 1981, p. 287; Mazzone, 2002). 
Crisis (1630–1650). Some demographers saw in the 1630 plague outbreak a 
kind of watershed in the economic history of Italy. In fact, the plague, after several 
epidemics that had largely spared the city and removed the poorest, raged 
indiscriminately throughout society. The recovery was slow and difficult. In fact, in 
                                                                                                                                                                          
spoils and of the profits obtained in Feltre and in Lombardy, and the arbitrary reductions of the military 
pay, were contested. The Diet of Bozen had reformed the Tyrolean Army, establishing the size and 
dividing the contingents so that the communities in Anaunia were requested to contribute with about 
250 men: Levico with 15, Pergine 38, Stenico and the Giudicarie 80, Val di Fiemme 40, and Trento 
about 100. This imperial decision was not well received by the communities, so that also the fidelity 
toward the prince-bishop began wavering. During 1510 in the valley of the River Noce, there had been 
already three years of war, the outbreak of a plague in the summer of 1510, and a poor harvest. From 
1511, there was a decline that would lead the jurisdictions of the princedom to a progressive insolvency 
(Andreolli, 1995; Chiarotti, 2002). 
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typical plagues “of the poor,” human casualties in the 16th century had been 
concentrated among unskilled workers of recent urbanization and the urban poor, 
easily replaceable with a migration from the countryside.
15
 However, the 1630 plague 
affected many skilled craftsmen and employers, preventing the production system 
from working smoothly.  
The entire Italian manufacturing economy was damaged, and it took many 
years to regenerate during, unfortunately, a crucial moment of competition with the 
Netherlands and northern Europe. The 17
th
-century crisis led to a decrease in 
population, thus relieving population pressure on resources. The crisis became harsh 
beyond expectations because of the advent of severe weather conditions that slowed 
the growth of the timber (Coppola, 2002a, p. 246), and the poor conditions led to a 
waste of timber that could not be worked and traded. 
Maria Theresa of Austria (1740–1796). In the middle of the 18th century, the 
authority of the prince-bishop declined, with a limitation of his political power on the 
part of the Habsburgs, in particular, since the crowning of Maria Theresa in 1740. 
Inside the Prince Bishopric, the authority was limited by the increasing commercial 
importance of towns, of the feudal oligarchies, and of the system of self-government 
of Alpine communities. There was a necessity for political centralization to prevent 
political instability, and the centralization policy was one of the aims of the Habsburg 
Government. Reformation of tax collection was facilitated by the creation of the Land 
Register, which was dated 1780 (Archivio di Stato di Trento, 1780). It was a period of 
a renewal, also, of the liberal arts, which took the name of the “Roveretan 
Enlightenment.” In 1753, Maria Theresa of Austria reformed higher education, 
placing it in the Government’s hands. The education of legal scholars was profoundly 
                                                            
15 Many pestilences occurred with periodical frequency, sometimes every 20–30 years in many 
communities in Trentino. See Varesco (1981) and the collection of catastrophic events written by 
Tovazzi (1986). 
                                                                                 45 
 
modified by giving a primary role to natural law. In practice, this rethinking of 
political and social thought led to a project civil code, which eventually came into 
force only in Galicia in 1797.  
This constituted the first step toward a highly centralized State with a 
monopoly of law and enforcement, which became the law of the land under 
Napoleon. The concept of property rights appears to change radically toward the 
prominence of private property over other decentralized ownership regimes. Another 
reform that created tension between communities and the central state was the 
abolition in 1794 of jus protomiseos, which, according to the tradition, attributed a 
preemption right in the purchase of property to the family, the relatives, and the 
fellow citizens of the seller. 
2.3. The Carte Di Regola 
After the 13th century, communities began to draft sets of rules for the rational 
use of their resources and for a peaceful community life for members, rules that had 
been originally handed down orally from father to son. Rules contained in the Carte 
were enforced through representatives (regolani) appointed by the same members 
(vicini, “neighbors”) of the community. 
The main institution of the community was the general assembly of heads of 
households, the Regola. From the year 1111, the prince-bishop of Trento began to 
grant the communities the privilege of managing autonomously some areas on his 
territories (Patti Gebardini—Gebardini covenants—for the Valley of Fiemme) in 
return for annual fees (Sartori Montecroce, 2002). The first Carta recorded is dated 
1202, Civezzano (Giacomoni, 1991). After the 13th century, these concessions 
multiplied and took the form of rural charters and statutes for independent community 
governance, though still requiring confirmation by the bishop to be considered 
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enforceable before community members and third parties. The internal organization 
of rural communities was primitive but based on an innate organization of community 
principles of democracy. Their bylaws (Carte) were usually decided under a majority 
(or supermajority) rule by the universitas, or the comunitas (the totality) of the 
attendees at village assemblies, and often were the result of a long, face-to-face 
decisional process. The head of the community was normally called Regolano, 
Sindaco, or Massaro and was charged with taking care of the economic 
administration of the group. The Saltaro (from the Latin saltus, which means “wild 
forest”), instead, was the officer who ruled the use of the forest and the countryside. 
A theoretic explanation for the emergence of formal institutions provides 
insights as to their persistence, aside from their resulting high costs. Each charter 
established a system of community bylaws directly contracted out and voted on in 
village assemblies (Casari, 2007). The adoption of a rural charter entailed two steps. 
First, the community gathered in an assembly, and only members of the community 
were allowed to attend and to cast a vote. In the assembly, the heads of households 
negotiated the content of the rules for access to the commons as well as the sanctions 
set forth against trespassers. The rules were written down in a formal contract by a 
notary in the presence of witnesses from other communities. Second, the charter had 
to be approved by the prince to be valid and enforceable. In the charters, it was 
possible to identify three basic types of rules: membership rules, governance rules, 
and sanctioning rules (Nequirito, 2002). From the detailed analysis of the rural 
charters, Casari and Lisciandra (2010) identified a three-level system of rights on 
common land attributable to individuals in terms of participation in community life, 
turning into different levels of access to collective resources and exploitation: 
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1. The right of residence, which includes the right to live in the community, 
and therefore to have a permanent residence, but not to use collective 
resources. 
2. The right of use, consisting of the right to exploit the collective resources 
of the community. 
3. The membership right (vicinìa), which was full membership in the 
community, including all the benefits and obligations that the status 
entailed. 
The first two rights are subsets of the third in the sense that the membership 
right was the broadest and included the right of use and the right of residence. In turn, 
the right of use included the right of residence and represented the minimum level of 
participation in community life. The phenomenon of the rural charter underwent 
significant quantitative and qualitative changes over time. 
The textual analysis of rural charters exhibits a general lack of cohesiveness in 
the discipline of social and economic life of charter communities. A charter was 
actually a set of rules that community members established by writing them down 
whenever the need arose. When the regulation of an aspect of economic or social life 
was no longer adequate, new chapters were added, or communities proceeded to enact 
a complete reformulation of the charter.
16
 For example, the introduction into the rural 
charter of Arco 1480 emphasized the need for a reform of the previous charter in 
1295, as new circumstances had occurred that demanded change. The charter 
provided a rule stating the following:  
… [T]he Community council and men from Arco in the diocese of Trento, 
who are here attending this assembly, consider that the ancient decrees, laws, 
                                                            
16 These were subject to the same notary requirements and permissions as the drafts of the original 
documents. See Chapter 3 for details and clarifications on the history of the documents. 
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or poste, however named by the people, handed down by their ancestors, now 
begin to be worn with age, and that have emerged a large number of new facts, 
which require the support of new laws: indeed nature always hastens to 
produce new legal forms. (Riccadonna, 1990, p. 77, own translation) 
After the 15th and the 16th centuries until their suppression, rural charters 
became increasingly structured and began to regulate in greater detail various aspects 
of community life, such as requirements for the optimal use of collective resources 
and, particularly, for the admission of strangers and the distribution of resources 
among community members.
17
 
Each Carta di Regola needed the approval of the prince-bishop of Trento to be 
valid and enforceable at the village level (Nequirito, 2002; Varanini, 2004). 
Nevertheless, when a charter was approved, the rural community was largely 
autonomous in its economic governance but had to abide by a series of feudal 
obligations imposed by the local lords governing the region, administering civil and 
criminal justice, and collecting taxes. This subjection was, in many cases, symbolized 
by the presence of a castle.
18
 The aristocracy was also interested in forests and grazing 
lands, and unjust (and sometimes violent) expropriations began to become more 
frequent after the 1200s. However, the influence of the local lords was more related to 
non-commons. Factual evidence of the influence of the aristocracy on the economic 
governance of the community was noticeable in the following mentioned duties: 
repairing the castle and the adjacent properties of the lord, the collection of the 
decima, the right to nominate the Regolano Maggiore (the General Mayor) of the 
                                                            
17 Thanks to Marco Casari and Maurizio Lisciandra for providing material for this paragraph. 
18 Personal communication with Annamaria Azzolini, Castello del Buonconsiglio, Trento (20 Feb. 
2013). A map with the castles in the princedom from the 11th until the 18th century is available upon 
request. 
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village assembly, and the right to collect taxes. In exchange, the population of the 
communities frequently received privileges.
19
 
After the arrival of Napoleon’s armies in 1796, the Carte Di Regola system 
had a definitive decline in effect.
20
 The emperor had proclaimed the annexation of 
Trentino to the Province of Tyrol in 1803; however, the prince-bishop had already left 
Trento in 1796. Although not formally abolished, the Carte Di Regola system 
suffered a strong attack that was prolonged in the years immediately after, 
culminating in its formal abolition with a circular letter of the emperor dated 5 
January 1805. The official suppression of the charters occurred with the decree of the 
Emperor Maximilian Joseph dated 4 January 1807 and reported by the local historians 
Giampaolo Andreatta and Silvio Pace (1981): 
We have asked for a circumstantiated relation on the constitution of the so-
called “Regolanerie maggiori e minori,” which, in some neighborhoods of the 
southern Tyrol form a sort of intermediate instance, and with the present 
[decree], we order that these abnormal institutions shall be totally and 
absolutely abolished, as incompatible with the new organization of the judicial 
districts as well as with any other regular administration of justice and police. 
In the aforementioned meeting, it shall be decided also in these Districts of 
Tyrol the Heads of the “Ville,” and it shall be assigned to them the duties for 
                                                            
19 Examples: Archivio Provinciale di Trento, Archivio dei conti Thun di castel Thun, documenti 
Cartacei (urbari e atti vari), 1372-1916, n.5, Urbario con stemma Thun, 1536-1549, regist cartaceo. 
Written in German; Privileges to the communities of Grigno and Tesino from the emperors and counts 
of Tyrol Leopold I and Joseph I of Absburg, confirming the rights granted in 1493: Archivio Comunale 
di Pieve Tesino, pergamene n. 217-218 (Laxemburg, 19 May 1700, and Vienna, 18 December 1709, 
sealed). See Nequirito (2002, pp. 141–142).  
20 For example, a common provision was the reduction of the number of village assemblies imposed by 
the Habsburgian Government in the community: Biblioteca comunale di Trento, BCT 1-2356, Carta di 
Regola di Breguzzo, 1795, volume cartaceo. 
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such Heads prescribed with the general order of March 1802. (p. 20, own 
translation)
21
 
According to Casari, at that time, the vast majority of the communities had 
adopted a charter. 
2.4. Conclusions 
This chapter reviewed studies concerning common property in Alpine-like 
settings drawn from a vast array of literature on cases of commons. A brief 
description of the institutional history of the Trentino region followed. Key passages 
in the history of the region showed the transition from settlements into rural 
communities and the advent of the political economy of the village, the land tenure 
system, as well as critical historical events over the six centuries under the Carte. An 
overview of the rural charter system was summarized using secondary and primary 
historical sources. 
Aside from the complexity of the economic, political, and legal dynamics that 
present historical events, it is noticeable that the region remained governed by the 
prince-bishop for eight centuries without interruption; this continuity, from the 
empirical standpoint, is important to delimit the area of observation of the Carte Di 
Regola. The village communities under analysis differed across many dimensions, so 
the adoption of a Carta, available to all, was adopted gradually by the majority. The 
discussion traced the transition from an informal to a formal institution for the 
management of the extensions of commons available to the communities. These 
private-order institutions were long enduring and had all the characteristics that 
Ostrom identified for robust institutions for the management of the commons in her 
lifetime of scholarly work. In addition to the other regional scale shocks observable 
                                                            
21 The same passage is also commented and reported by the statistician Perini (1852) and the historian 
Nequirito (2004). 
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during the centuries of the case study, the arrival of Napoleon’s armies in 1796 
represented an abrupt exogenous institutional change in the region, particularly with 
the abolition of the Carte Di Regola, and the transition to a new centralized political 
regime based on the “rule of law.” A civil code, centered on the preeminence of 
private ownership over the other existing arrangements based on common property, 
marked the decline of the self-governance of communities and eventually culminated 
with their forceful abolition in January 1807. 
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Chapter 3: Data Sources and Documents 
 
3.1. Introduction 
The present chapter offers a discussion of the data sources and the documents 
used for the empirical analysis (Section 3.2). A description is given of the datasets 
used in Chapters 5–7 (Section 3.3). This chapter also provides some definitions 
employed in the description of the datasets and throughout the following chapters. 
The dissertation uses micro-level data about institutions for property rights, 
resources, other historical and topographic information, population, and climate of 
452 communities in the Italian Alps. The dataset offers the opportunity to seek 
support for the threshold hypothesis. The data cover the area of the current Province 
of Trento and span an extensive period, from 1200 to 1800. 
When not specified otherwise, the community is the unit of observation. 
Communities are composed of one or more “villages” or subgroups of villages called 
“clusters” or simply “subgroups.” A village may include one or more “cadastral units” 
according to the 1897 Land Registers. 
Over time, it has been observed that communities were governed under two 
alternative collective action regimes. With the adoption of a charter, a community 
entered the formal regime; that is, the situation of a community under a decentralized 
property rights allocation system, which follows the adoption of a written contract as 
a formal group “interaction technology.” In the analyses, this institution is termed 
“formal.” When the community did not have a charter, the “informal” regime is 
presumed. In this latter case, the community is considered to be ruled under a 
decentralized property rights allocation system based on customs (informal repeated 
interactions among actors in the commons). Communities that were ruled under the 
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formal regime and whose documents were lost are treated as ruled under an 
“informal” regime. 
As a first approximation, community population was used as an estimate of 
the number of “potential” appropriators on the commons. Individuals in a generic 
community were divided in two classes: insiders and outsiders. The definition of 
potential appropriators encompasses both insiders and outsiders, as population 
estimates include both insiders and outsiders in the appropriators’ group. Insiders are 
the “legal” community members: individuals who belong to the “effective” 
appropriators’ group (vicini: literally, neighbors). Outsiders are non-members, and 
therefore, they are not legally entitled to access, use, or manage the common 
resources (forestieri: literally, foreigners).  
When studying the formal regime, data were available to disentangle the 
figures and estimate the number of insiders involved in appropriation. The number of 
“effective” appropriators can be estimated only when a list of insiders is provided, and 
these lists are often available only when there is an assembly record in which it is 
possible to measure “participation.” 
Participants in assemblies are categorized as attending or non-attending 
members or attending non-members. As in other studies considering the management 
of the commons in Italy (Alfani, 2011), the present analysis focuses on the group of 
insiders, the group composed of community members (vicini), this time disregarding 
the group of non-members, also called “outsiders”(forestieri). Participation in 
assemblies was a right granted only to insiders. Only active members could cast a 
vote both individually and on behalf of others if provided with a proxy power. 
Attendance was mandatory upon payment of a fine, and this mechanism was aimed at 
discouraging non-active membership by non-attendance as well as at ensuring 
54 
effective peer monitoring by the threat of social stigma. A residual category includes 
non-members; these were individuals who attended the assemblies and were not 
entitled to cast a vote.  
3.2. Sources 
This subsection comprises a description of the sources obtained after the data 
collection. Table 3.1 summarizes the information available for property rights; content 
of the documents and organization of villages in communities; population, assemblies, 
and households; and land resources, climate, and topography. A separate subsection 
discusses the content of the sources for each entry.
                                                                                                                                                                                
 
Table 3.1.  
Sources of data 
 
Note. Data updated to research and data collection until 2 March 2013. Each source is named “S” followed by a two-digit code for the “content of the source” and another 
two digits for the “type of data.” 
5
5
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3.2.1. Property rights. This subsection illustrates the sources retrieved 
concerning property rights in each village. Two periods are distinguished in data 
collection: before and after the beginning of the 13th century. 
Before the 13th century. Archival data are all but absent before 1200. Most 
documents, particularly ecclesiastical documentation, date from 1170 onwards: at that 
time, a re-organization of the Episcopal Bureau-Chancery occurred, and only from 
that time onwards do historians report reliable evidence concerning economic life of 
communities, settlements and agricultural practices, land rents, and commercial flows. 
Many documents are stored in private archives; for a reference.
22
 
During and after the 13th century. Information about property rights 
arrangements in each village are drawn from a list of 879 documents produced by 
Marco Casari and Maurizio Lisciandra.
23
 These data are retrieved from a variety of 
sources: the collection of rural charters in Giacomoni (1991), a guide of the local 
archives in the region (Casetti, 1961), published (mainly authored by local historians) 
and unpublished material (Laurea theses), online listings of the inventories and the 
archives in the region (Provincia Autonoma di Trento, 2011), and direct access to 
archives. The list of 879 documents concerns 275 villages that were organized into 
254 communities. This dataset has been updated and enlarged during the research for 
this book, with further information on assembly attendance and with the coding of the 
content of the documents, as explained below. 
Each community may have multiple entries, both when it adopts a charter for 
the first time (or a subsequent charter, when the first is not available) and when it 
adopts subsequent charters. This dataset records neither when a community joins a 
super community, nor when a single community separates from a super community. 
                                                            
22 See Casetti (1961) and the online archives di Trento (Provincia Autonoma di Trento, 2011) 
23 The two authors are gratefully acknowledged for generously sharing this dataset. An earlier version 
of the dataset was used by Marco Casari in his 2007 article. 
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Each village can appear more than once, depending on how many documents it has 
issued over the observation period.  
There are three classes of documents: complete charters, modifications of 
charters (also termed: amendments), and documents that are not charters. Complete 
charters are stand-alone documents that lay down the rules for governing the 
economic resources of a community; they can be a first adoption or later renewal of a 
previous charter. Some communities may have no charter, while others may have 
adopted up to seven complete charters in the period studied. Modifications are partial 
amendments to charters that occurred after the adoption of a complete charter that 
take the form of additions or appendices to the pre-existing document. Other 
documents regulate or contract the allocation of property rights on the commons but 
do not take the form of charters, although they may refer to charters. Examples are 
contracts of purchase of community membership and contracts for the division of 
common forest and pastures between two or more communities. In this study, the 
focus is on the first complete charters for two reasons: first, the first adoption of a 
rural charter starts a new interaction regime (formal institution); second, in complete 
charters, the collective action can be better observed. 
The first Carta di Regola in the records dates back to 1202 (Civezzano); thus, 
the year 1200 is taken as the starting year in the analyses. From this year, 
communities could choose between either an entirely informal interaction pertaining 
to the commons or a formal mechanism where appropriation rules were created to 
govern the commons. Thus, communities without a charter are thought to have been 
under informal institutions.
24
 As already commented, the cumulative trend of adoption 
presents an “S” shape with three sudden increases occurring in the middle of the 
                                                            
24 A reconstruction for the time profile of charter adoption has been displayed in Figure S.1, Appendix 
C. 
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1300s, the beginning of the 1500s, and the beginning of the 1600s. One explanation 
for these sharp increases may be the effect of particular historical events at the 
regional level, which may have affected the propensity of the prince to grant such 
charters: the “Black Death” in 1348, the Peasant War of 1525, and the plague of 1628. 
Simply considering their diffusion, rural charters appear to have been an effective 
system for the decentralized management of the commons (Ostrom, 1990): when the 
system was declared unlawful and abolished by Napoleon in 1803, more than two-
thirds of the communities in the region had adopted a charter (Casari, 2007).  
3.2.2. Content of documents. The normative content (hereinafter: “content”) 
of the charters regulated the economic life of the community and represents a case of 
emergence of private-order governance regimes for the management of natural 
resources (Casari, 2007). Given that communities might include one or more villages, 
a community charter could deploy effects on multiple villages. The systematic reading 
of the text of the charters led to the construction of the “polity” dataset, which 
contains detailed information on the content of a sample of 260 documents. The 
present subsection offers a succinct description of the variables describing the content 
and the structure of the institutions.  
A total of 8,994 bylaws articles representing the 260 documents reporting 
information on assemblies have been coded in the polity dataset.
25
 Of the total, 580 
articles (6.4%) belong to the “Unknown Content” category, as the length is known but 
                                                            
25 The details on categories (coding rules, examples, and the actual coding) are described in a separate 
document, Appendix F. Although the four categories are aimed at the description of the village polity 
and are inspired to the famous dataset Polity IV (available at: 
www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm), the analysis of the body of regulation and the 
development of the codebook for this specific case has largely benefited by ongoing joint work with a 
research group on the regulation of institutions for collective action guided by Tine de Moor and based 
in Utrecht since the year 2010 (see: www.collective-action.info/). The accuracy of the codification has 
not yet been verified by other coders. The main difficulty is grounded in some typeset compilations of 
statutes only recently published (Giacomoni, 1991); most of the documents are written in ancient 
Italian, local dialects, and often in Latin. Therefore, inter-coder agreement statistics, like Krippendorff's 
alpha, could not be computed. 
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not the actual content. Each numbered paragraph (article) has been assigned to one of 
the following categories (in parentheses: the number of coded articles for each 
category, the percentage of the total of 8,994):
26
  
1 . (1,404 ,15.7%)
1. 1 . (364 , 4.1%)
1 . (957 ,10.6%)
a Governance articles
Community Governance b Participation articles
c Constraints on Outsiders articles





  
2. Resource Management (5,689 articles, 63.2%) 
The first macro-category identifies the rules that the assembly decided to 
apply in governance of the community, and not those aimed directly at the 
management of the collective action on resources. Governance rules describe the 
requirements and the duration of assembly roles and define the system of checks-and-
balances necessary to elect and make accountable (and, occasionally, even liable) 
those who were called to lead the institution for collective action in their capacity of 
community officers (Example 1, Appendix F). Participation rules described the 
requirements, the periodicity, and the modes of participation to legislative assemblies 
of community members. Another set of rules described the behavior of the 
community toward the outsiders (Examples 2, 3, 4, Appendix F). These rules are 
named “constraints on outsiders” (Example 5, Appendix F), because, generally, these 
rules imposed limitations to the action of outsiders, who were excluded from 
assembly participation. Therefore, this exclusion also entailed the impossibility of 
being an active part in the rule-making process.
27
  
                                                            
26 As noted above, 580 articles (6.4%) belonging to the “Unknown content” category were omitted. 
27 Such limitations were normally welfare-detrimental to outsiders; for instance, limitations were 
imposed on the extension of village membership as a consequence of marriage with a village member, 
or limitations in the access and use of the commons as a consequence of inheritance rules when the 
offspring was born from a mixed marriage (marriage of an outsider and an insider), or the requirement 
of the payment of a lump sum to be admitted to the village membership or the use of the commons, or 
limitations in being counterparts of resource-trading with insiders. 
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The particular structure of the charters allowed separation of this set of rules 
from another set that focused directly on resource management. These rules defined 
the precise actions and precautions that had (or had not) to be undertaken by village 
members in order to coordinate in the access and use of natural resources, mainly the 
commons (forest and pasture; Example 6, Appendix F). The violation of each rule 
was normally backed by a monetary sanction (Casari, 2007), comprising at least the 
restoration of the damage and often a component to deter future damages. This latter 
component was highly variable and increased according to the action (i.e., grazing the 
cattle, cutting timber), the condition of the tortfeasor (i.e., village member, foreigner, 
etc.), and the timing of the offense (i.e., during the day or night, caused once or 
caused repeatedly). In this sense, sanctions were “graduated” (Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom, 
2005a). 
The rules were addressed to the community members, vicini, who comprised 
the group of the insiders. The requirements for being part of the insider group, as well 
as the procedures for being admitted to the insider group (membership rules), were 
carefully specified in the community bylaws. Such “contracts” were drafted and voted 
for by the representatives of the insider group itself: the heads of the families, who 
comprised the Regola, the legislative assembly of the community. The residual 
portion of the community population comprised of the forestieri (outsiders, or “non-
members”), who normally were neither granted participation in the community 
governance nor access to or management of the commons (mainly pasture and forest) 
unless the regulation allowed them use or access rights by virtue of monetary 
payments (purchase of rights) or inheritance (Casari & Lisciandra, 2010). Though not 
necessarily a minority, outsiders were, therefore, passive subjects of the rules 
determined by the legislative assembly of the insiders; therefore, it is not surprising to 
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find rules aimed at imposing constraints on their actions and rights within the 
community (Example 5, Appendix F). 
Although the bulk of the rural charters is represented by practical resource 
management rules (Example 6, Appendix F), the text of the rural charters describes in 
detail the governance of the community (Example 1, Appendix F) and the modes of 
participation in legislative assemblies. Together with the provision decided, it reports 
sometimes the minutes of the meeting: attendance was generally mandatory, and 
absence (Example 2, Appendix F) or non-cooperative behavior in assemblies (e.g., 
swearing, insulting or beating assembly participants, or simply carrying weapons 
during assemblies, as in Example 3, Appendix F) were subject to punishment.  
At times, a description of the voting procedures was also specified in the 
documents (Example 4, Appendix F), and often were reported the assembly quorums 
and the modes for representing resident village members who were not able to 
participate for a just cause.
28
 
3.2.3. Organization of communities. “Single-layered” communities are 
considered separate from “multi-layered” communities (Chapter 6). In order to be 
able to draw the distinction, information was collected from several sources about the 
first document ever issued from each community, the number of villages included in 
each community, and evidence of multi-village organization. The information 
described in this subsection is included in the “main” dataset. 
First documents. Data about the year of the first documentary evidence of 
villages have been collected from three sources, including the earliest document 
written in that village, mentioning a person coming from that village, or simply 
                                                            
28 Codebook at Appendix F, section “Participation.” 
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quoting the village name.
29
 First, the online lists of all the archives (Casetti, 1961) and 
the inventories in the Trentino region (Provincia Autonoma di Trento, 2011) were 
searched. The online sources quote archives and inventories and organize them in six 
categories: communal archives, parish archives, private archives, communal 
inventories, parish inventories, and private inventories. Second, the first evidences of 
local churches were sought, being considered a good indicator of stable settlements in 
the region (Curzel, 1999). It was also possible to reconstruct the first document 
available in every archive of the region using the archive inventories compiled by 
Casetti (1961). This latter source also contains notices from local historians and 
archivists concerning the documents of the single villages. Third, the name of the first 
notary from each community in notarial records was sought using the compilation of 
Father Remo Stenico (Stenico, 1999). The year of the first documentary evidence of a 
community is determined by the earliest documentary evidence of the villages that 
compound the community. Out of the total 452 units of observations (92.7% of the 
total), 419 years were obtained. 
Evidence of fission–fusion. The data in documents allows also observing 
phenomena of fission and fusion among communities. Each entry refers to a 
community as composed by one or more cadastral units as described by the Land 
Register 1897 (Consiglio provinciale d’agricoltura pel Tirolo, 1903). Cadastral units 
were used as building blocks of single-village communities and multi-village 
communities using the information in the charters and from the other documents 
referring to the community. The patterns of aggregation and disaggregation of 
cadastral units were interpreted as indexes of fusion and fission, respectively. A first 
analysis of the data reveals that in the year 1350, there were 218 communities, 7 of 
                                                            
29 A comprehensive guide to the archives of the area is offered in the online catalogues di Trento 
(Provincia Autonoma di Trento, 2011). 
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which were involved in fission, 19 in fusion; after 450 years, in 1800, within a total of 
314 communities, 33 were involved fission, and only 5 in fusion.
30
 A detailed study of 
each of these cases is the purpose of Chapter 6. 
Evidence of multi-village organizations. In multi-layered communities, the 
village of origin of all the active members was reconstructed using data on 
“assembly” attendance. To obtain an estimate of the number of appropriators for this 
subsample, reference was made to the procedure used to estimate population, and then 
the average population of each village was calculated. However, many villages did 
not have a population estimate, and in the calculation of the population of the multi-
layered community, three observations that had missing population values (10 
estimates of cluster size) were disregarded. To estimate cluster size, the population 
estimate of the multi-layered community in the considered year was used and divided 
for the number of clusters. Therefore, every cluster in multi-layered communities, 
provisionally, has the same size. An improved estimate of each cluster’s size was 
based on effective attendance to assemblies: the whole community was considered 
represented when there were at least three active members from each village. 
3.2.4. Population, households, and assemblies. Data concerning the size of 
groups is of utmost importance for this dissertation. Research in archives and in 
several other sources resulted in data on three levels of detail: population size, 
assembly size, and household size. These observations differ in nature: they are at 
times direct observations of data points scattered temporally or geographically or 
indirect observations of scattered data points or cross-sectional data retrieved from 
secondary sources. The present subsection offers a description of the procedures 
                                                            
30 These preliminary analyses have been obtained using the “reduced panel” dataset, Section 3.3.2.  
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adopted to produce estimates that may be considered reliable for the analyses that will 
be carried out throughout the remaining chapters of the thesis. 
 
Table 3.2.  
Population in Trentino (1200–1835) 
 
 
Population. Population data at the village level was estimated from 1000 
through 1800. This interval was chosen for two reasons. First, as mentioned above, 
written documents were extremely rare before the year 1000 (the earliest notice is 
dated 845). Second, this choice facilitates coverage of the entire period of the 
Bishopric of Trento (1027–1801). Village population was estimated, starting from the 
1810 Napoleonic census of the population, at the village level (Andreatta & Pace, 
1981) for 415 communities. The absence of some communities’ population size for 
the year 1810 is because the census does not report a population for the villages; these 
communities do not appear in the statistics. A second source was a set of Italian 
population estimates at 50-year intervals from 1000 to 1800 (Bellettini, 1987). The 
first charter is dated 1202 (Civezzano); thus, the period 1200–1800 is used. The 
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populations of villages in the year 1810 were used to backward project population 
estimates for each community until the desired starting year of observation. This 
involved using a scaling factor that replicates the Italian population trend for 1000–
1800 (Bellettini, 1987) with fixed gaps (smaller than k=50) in each of the villages
31
 
by backward projection. The reference point was the Italian population for 1810 in 
Andreatta and Pace, arbitrarily approximated to 1800. The population size p of the 
community i at the year  1200,...1800   t   approximated at the nearest multiple of k=5 
is | |i t i tp B p  , and where 
|
|1800
{0,1} {1,..., 452}
ITALIAN t
t
ITALIAN
p
B i I
p
      is the scaling factor 
based on the Italian population trend for 1000–1800, and 
t tI I   is the number 
of communities in the main dataset in the year t. The trend was then calculated by 
backward projection with fixed gaps of 5tk   between each observation. Population 
estimates were obtained for the surface of the Province of Trento covered by all the 
communities considered in this study existing in each t with a distance of k years,
452
1
It t it
i
P B p

  .  
A limitation of this methodology is that the population estimates thereby 
generated could be considered a questionable approximation: it should not be possible 
to use national-level data at the community level or at the Trentino regional level. The 
limitations underlined in Casari (2007) are overcome in three ways:  
1. erasing the observations in each year concerning communities that are not 
existent according to the used documents
32
;
 
 
                                                            
31 Figure 3.1, Appendix C. 
32 When a community is not existent, it is assumed that the resource endowments of the community 
(corresponding to the cadastral units compounding the surface of the community) are not used and that 
their absence in the dataset can be tolerable without loss of accuracy. 
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2. taking into account when a village joins a conglomerate of villages (fusion 
into a super community) or separates from a conglomerate (fission from a 
super community); 
3. cross-checking the validity of this estimation method with population data 
from a variety of sources. 
Several robustness checks of these estimates have been carried out. The first 
source is Trentino population estimates by other scholars: Cole and Wolf (1999), 
Ferrarese (2005), Franceschini (2009), and Chiocchetti and Chiusole (1965). The 
second is scattered village population data from various sources: Epiboli (1977), 
Varesco (1981), Goio (1978), Ciresa and Salvotti (1978), Piva (1981), Motta (1978), 
Curzel et al. (2001), Debiasi (1953), Seneca (1953), Ferrarese (2005), Franceschini 
(2009), Franceschini (2005), Chiocchetti (1983), Garbellotti (2006), Sparapani 
(1989), and Tardivo (2005).  
The comparison with historical evidence returns results that confirm the 
internal validity of the method. The complete set of historical and historiographical 
sources comprises 486 observations of population size scattered in the whole Trentino 
region and throughout the period 1220–1849. These raw data were merged with 
population estimates produced for the same communities using a fuzzy matching 
algorithm that minimizes the Levenshtein distance (Levenshtein, 1966).
33
 A perfect 
match was obtained (d=0) for 257 observations; errors were manually cleaned, and 92 
other observations having 0<d<10 were identified. For the total of 349 observations, a 
Spearman’s rho of 0.8434 was obtained. For the perfect matches, an even higher 
correlation ( 0.8713  ) was obtained. This means that the case-by-case “correction” 
                                                            
33 The Levenshtein distance between two strings is defined as the minimum number of edits needed to 
transform one string into the other, with the allowable edit operations being insertion, deletion, or 
substitution of a single character. The Levenshtein distance is widely implemented in algorithms for 
spellcheck in word processing software (Levenshtein, 1966). 
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of matched communities introduced errors in the sample but still at an acceptable 
level. 
Population size estimates provide a general estimate of potential appropriators 
on the commons. Hence, population data at the village level for the period 1200–1800 
are required. Cole and Wolf (1999), in their study on the Italian Alps, provide an 
indirect population estimate of 83,280 inhabitants in the region in 1312, of 124,920 in 
1427, of 173,500 in 1650, of 206,000 in 1754, and 290,000 in 1835.
34
 This means that 
the population increased 2.99 times between 1312 and 1800 (Table 3.2).  
Population estimates (Estimate A) were first calculated for each community in 
the extended panel (Period: 1200–1800, Gap: 5 years. See: Section 3.3). Each 
community is observed since the year of the first document reporting its existence and 
when already included in a multi-layered community. According to Estimate A, the 
population increased by 2.28 times between 1315 and 1800, 2.99 times between 1250 
and 1800, and 5.6 times between 1200 and 1800.  
A more accurate estimate for the population of each community was obtained 
in the reduced panel in six selected years (Estimate B). The following were accurately 
adjusted case-by-case: fission–fusion of communities and multiple entries for the 
same community in the same year due to the simultaneous existence of communities 
both as single-layered entities and as part of multi-layered communities. The 
aggregate population at the regional level is estimated as 85,972 in 1350 and 241,245 
                                                            
34 For their population estimates before 1754, Cole & Wolf (1999) referred to Wopfner (1954, p. 222–
324), who reported that the Trentino represented the 34.7% of the total population of the Tyrol. For 
1312, 1427, and 1650, Cole & Wolf (1999) reported only the total population of the Tyrol: to compute 
the respective estimates, the present author consiered that the proportion between the population of the 
Trentino and the population of the Tyrol remained constant at 34,7%. For the 1835 estimate the source 
reported by Cole & Wolf (1999) is Fiebiger (1959, p. 15-16). The average of the populations in 1754 
and 1835—248,000 inhabitants—is taken as a reference for the end period (1800). 
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in 1800.
35
 According to Estimate B, the aggregate population in Trentino increased 
2.81 times between 1350 and 1800 (Figure 3.1). 
Some limitations in the production of population estimates have been 
unavoidable. First, they disregard the effect of internal migrations in the region. This 
minor criticism is offset by historical evidence. In their study of inheritance rules in 
the same area, Casari and Lisciandra (2010) point out that geographical mobility in 
the area is limited by the rules of transmission of common property. Second, 
population estimates include both insiders and outsiders on the commons: using 
population exhibits some limitations for the accurate study of the behavior of the 
insider group under the formal regime. This second point is overcome by the present 
arguments, which are based mainly on the determinants of group size studied under 
the formal regime.  
Household size. The issue of the household size was as been studied by local 
historical demographers, and since information is scarce and from scattered and 
heterogeneous sources, relying on an approximation is unavoidable. Estimates should 
take into account birth and death rates, migratory flows, catastrophic events, 
environmental conditions, and production system in a given historical period. The 
convention used by local historians (Bezzi, 1964) is to assume five people per family. 
This convention is also adopted in pastoral visits (mandatory since after the Council 
of Trento, 1564) and tax registers (reliable as from 1220), today stored in local 
archives (Debiasi, 1953; Garbellotti, 2006; Seneca, 1953). This approximation can be 
robustly applied to the whole group of attendants, as there was no requirement to own 
land individually in order to participate in the meetings. According to Seneca (1953), 
in 1333, every household (fuoco) paid 4 pounds of the imposed collection, in equal 
                                                            
35 Close to the estimate by Cole and Wolf (1999); for details, see Section 3.3. 
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amounts everywhere in the Princedom of Trento. A household size of four individuals 
is inferred for present purposes. This lower size can be explained considering the 
demographic decrease during the second half of the c. 1300 (extremely cold winter). 
An increase in household size can be expected to have coincided with the 
demographic increase that occurred in 1258–1288. Debiasi (1953) asserts that using a 
multiplier of 5 provides a good approximation. The major limitation of this 
approximation is that it is fixed over time; thus, it does not control for fertility 
differentials across communities and over time. 
There is further historical comfort for this approximation of five individuals 
per household. This number is a fixed index deduced by the ratios between the 
population of the communities analyzed by Debiasi (1953) and the number of the 
families of populated settlements where data were accurate (Data: a sample of 
communities located in Valle di Non (n=48) retrieved in two scrolls dated 1620 
[A.S.T., Capsa IX, file 169, latin section; deck V, file 49, Atti Trentini] and 1633 
[A.S.T., Capsa LXV, file 17 and Capsa IX, file 171, latin section], cited by Debiasi 
(1953)). These ratios range between 4.21 and 5.59. Debiasi excluded towns such as 
Lauregno, which has a higher index (6.90), as its population is of German origin: this 
population lived in strong familiar nuclei—indivisible farmsteads—and not in 
agglomerates of houses in communities. Other estimations of household size are used 
by historians for 1660. For example, Chiocchetti (1983) asserts, “… [T]he 75% of the 
families with living parents did not go over 5 components” (own translation). These 
estimations are based on a good number of French and English censuses, refereed by 
Chiocchetti, which provide a household size estimate of around 4.73 individuals per 
family (very close to 5). In the study by Garbellotti (2006) about poverty rates in 
Trento during 1717, the average household size was 3.12 for poor households and 
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4.74 for non-poor households. This considered, the convention of an average 
household size of five is adopted and fixed for the entire observation period (1200–
1800). The scattered information has been included in the “documents” dataset. 
 
Table 3.3.  
Assembly roles 1245–1801 
 
Note. Source: assemblies dataset. 
 
Assemblies. As in other studies considering the management of the commons 
in Italy (Alfani, 2011), the present study focuses on the group of insiders (vicini), the 
group composed of community members. Another estimate, which can capture the 
size of interacting insiders on the commons, was derived. This estimate gives a 
number of appropriators on the commons authorized by the institution the insiders 
decided to create. Therefore, the population and insider estimates diverge, and the 
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second is obviously smaller. For the purpose of this study, there is no need to know 
the number of outsiders; thus, it is disregarded. 
Assemblies were usually held in the square of the village. The sound of the 
village bell tower (ad sonum campanae) announced that the assembly was summoned. 
The day before, each participant would have been called to attendance with a door-to-
door explicit convocation by a village officer. Often, the documents reported in their 
preamble a summary description of the assembly dynamics, and these preambles are 
the essential sources to understand the functioning of the institutions. The preamble of 
the documents often contains information concerning all the attendants: their name 
and surname, the name and the surname of their ancestors, their job in the village, 
their village of origin, and the role they had in the assembly. Assembly quorums were 
also reported.
36
 Additionally, documents report the name and the surname of the 
notaries that wrote the charter and the witnesses (usually coming from other 
surrounding villages).  
From the 879 documents, information was extracted concerning the attendance 
at village assemblies from 1249–1801. A subset of 243 documents contains a list of 
attendants, a small subset of 102 documents reports the quorum of the attendants, and 
92 documents exhibit a complete list of attendance together with the quorum in 
fractional form (i.e., one half, three quarters, eight ninths, etc.). Only meetings with 
two attendants or more recorded were selected for the purposes of the present study.
37
 
The individuals catalogued number 9,301 from 413 locations. Including 
relatives used in identifying a member, a catalog of 12,638 individuals comprises the 
“assemblies” dataset. The relevant information has been copied in the dataset of the 
documents: number of “active members,” number of “non-active members,” number 
                                                            
36 Quorums measure the fraction of attendants qualified to cast a vote out of the total of qualified 
attendants. 
37 This information has been imported to the documents dataset. 
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of non-members, and number of villages represented in the assembly. It was 
eventually possible to construct a dataset on assemblies from the direct observation of 
the preambles to the original documents’ sources. A selection relevant for this study is 
obtained by keeping only the assemblies with a complete list of attendance and 
focusing only on active attendance: (7,765 individuals). One issue in constructing the 
database was that there were individuals registered with their father’s or grandfather’s 
surname, or sometimes only a nickname: 5,698 (70.1%) individuals provided their 
surname, 2,027 (24.9%) provided their father’s surname, 33 (0.5%) provided their 
grandfather’s surname, and 367 (4.5%) provided a nickname. Individuals may 
accumulate more surnames, or just have a nickname, both, or nothing but their name. 
When the surname of the observed individual was not available, and the individual 
was cited to be the “son of” or the “nephew of,” the surname of the closest relative 
was attributed. The sample covers the assignment and enforcement of property rights 
on land in 159 communities and instances of the assemblies from 1245–1801. Table 
3.3 provides an illustration of how the individuals recorded in the dataset were 
distributed according to their role in the assembly. 
The individuals represented in the table can be divided into two classes: those 
having voting rights (active if they cast a vote, non-active if they do not) and those 
without voting rights (non-members) in the process of deliberation of the community 
charter. The attendees without voting rights were the notary, the witnesses, and other 
non-attending village members. 
Typically, the group of attendants was not huge: a smaller decision group 
faces a lower amount of transaction costs in collective action. The documents in some 
cases reported a quorum.
38
 The number of villages represented in each assembly is 
                                                            
38 Table 3.4, Appendix D. 
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also an interesting variable, reported for the sake of completeness, and is not to be 
confounded with the number of villages in the community. In fact, assembly 
attendants, including witnesses and notaries, may come from different villages that 
are not necessarily part of the organizational structure of the community. 
Participation. For the purposes of the present study, “quorum” is defined as 
the percentage of active members in the community assembly required for the 
meeting to be validly constituted and to deliberate the collective decision. The sample 
size of assemblies where both the number of attendants and the historical raw quorum 
are available is 92. The sample size of communities with a list of active members but 
without mention of a quorum is 147. The total sample of communities having a list of 
attendance with two attendants or more is, therefore, 239. The main advantage of this 
selection is that it allows the analysis of the dynamics in assemblies using different 
data with higher detail at the group level (quorum and content of the decision-making) 
and at the individual level (personal information; social status; whether in favor or 
against the decision if attending, identification of non-attending, village of origin, 
occupation, and other information concerning familiar relationships of the individuals, 
whether attending or not). Additionally, such lists also report details about non-
members having a particular role in the assembly, such as notaries and witnesses. The 
lists of attendance are usually placed at the beginning or at the end of the 
documents.
39
 
Appropriation. An estimate of the number of insiders was inferred from 
evidence of community assemblies. The estimate produced is the number of people 
potentially participating in appropriation on the commons, and not only in collective 
choice during assemblies. The number of active members does not provide a real 
                                                            
39 This information has been imported to the documents dataset. 
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figure about the number of people in the insider group (i.e., the group involved in 
appropriation). Appropriation involves the number of people in a family, while at a 
meeting there is only a member. Hence, the household size, considered as a unit for 
preference aggregation, is of interest for the study of appropriation. Estimates are built 
for the size of the group involved in appropriation on the commons, using the 
convention of five individuals per family to estimate household size. To estimate 
participation for the sample of documents reporting attending members but without a 
quorum, a pondered average of the 102 quorums found in the documents, 0.73pq , 
was used.
40
 
It was assumed that there is no distinction between a constitutive quorum (the 
number of members required to consider the assembly valid) and a deliberative 
quorum (the number of attending members required to consider the decision valid). 
All the members were obliged to attend the assembly; therefore, it was not necessary 
to specify the compliance to a constitutive quorum. The notary could report in the 
document the share of attending individuals (e.g., “Two parts out of three of 
community members are attending this assembly”), or a phrasing referring 
exclusively to the decision (e.g., “The decision is taken by the two parts out of three 
of community members”). In the latter case, it is assumed that the notary reported the 
number of members collectively undertaking the decision out of the total number of 
community members entitled to cast a vote, specifying the non-active members and, 
in some cases, the nays.  
An important point in the wording of the document concerns whether the 
quorums in the documents are empirical statements or legal statements (the 
requirement of a particular quorum for the validity of the meeting). This distinction is 
                                                            
40 Table 5.6, Appendix D. This information has been imported to the documents dataset. 
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important if the aim is to estimate the total attendants (the 100%) using the registered 
quorum in the formula 
a
q
 (where a is the registered attendance, and {0,1}q  is the 
recorded quorum). If the recorded quorum is an empirical statement, the total figure 
would be a real estimate of attendance. If the registered quorum reports simply the 
fulfillment of a legal requirement, it means that the attendance could also be 100% 
when only 75% is reported; therefore, the legal quorum is an underestimate of the real 
attendance, and the 100% is the maximum possible estimate (with a risk of 
overestimation). From the wording of the document, this distinction is often non-
obvious.  
The total number of the members called to the meeting is calculated by 
dividing the minimum attendance by the quorum: this is the maximum number of 
attendants (a perfect estimate if quorums are empirical statements, an overestimate if 
quorums are legal statements). The mean value between minimum and maximum was 
found and multiplied by the conventional household size (five members per family). 
In this way, a reasonable estimate was obtained for the number of individuals 
involved in appropriation through the 239 lists of attendance reported in the 
documents.
41
 
3.2.5. Land resources, climate, and topography. An estimation of the land 
resource endowments of each village was obtained by aggregation or disaggregation 
of the cadastral units to fit the surface of the units of observation as per the Carte of 
each village according to the cataloguing method used in the volumes by Giacomoni 
(1991). The 1897 Land Register reported by the Consiglio provinciale d’agricoltura 
pel Tirolo (1903) contains a detailed description of the surface of each cadastral unit 
                                                            
41 Table 3.5, Appendix D. This information has been imported to the documents dataset. 
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per type of resource (plow land, meadow, fruit garden, vineyard, grazing land, alp, 
forest, lake, pond, wasteland, and houses).  
Land resources. The total sum of the resources of the 452 villages does not 
cover the whole surface of the current Province of Trento. Additionally, the total sum 
of the 452 observations in the dataset would lead to repetition of many units, as the 
raw dataset can consider the same village both as a single community and as part of a 
super community. Additional sources of information about resources are the land 
surveys compiled in 1780 during the age of Maria Theresa (di Stato di Trento, 1780). 
These data are the most ancient available on resource use, comprising precisely 
collected data about endowments, use, and rents available for the preindustrial era 
(Perini, 1852). Casari and Lisciandra (2010) collected data in cadastral records about 
resources in 31 villages governed by the Carte Di Regola in 1780: surfaces in hectares 
of forest, meadow, and grazing land have been considered as commons. All the other 
resources (i.e., fruit garden, plow land, and vineyard) have been considered as 
managed under private property. This dataset includes data about the total rent of the 
whole land, with resource-specific details.
42
 
Topography. Topographical variables considered were latitude, longitude, 
altitude, and linear distances. Additional data about topography have been retrieved 
from the dataset used by Casari (2007). The Google™ Distance Matrix Service, the 
same implemented by Google Maps, was used to determine linear distances (in 
kilometers) of villages from Trento and from the closest town as well as geographical 
district (all the communities are attributed a categorical value ranging from 1–15, 
corresponding to the contemporary administrative zoning of the region). 
                                                            
42 This dataset was not used in the present study. 
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Climate. Proxies were built for climate in each community in the period 1200–
1800. The proxies are based on temperature, precipitation, and altitude data, which are 
factors influencing the productivity of the land (Mathieu & Furter, 2007; Thapa, 
1995)
43
 and (likely) affecting group size. Altitudes have been collected with the aid of 
Google™ Elevation API, the same implemented by Google™ Maps. As to air 
temperatures and precipitations, two studies about the climate in the Alps over the 
past two millennia were found (Casty, Wanner, Urg, Esper, & Ohm, 2005; Mangini, 
Spotl, & Verdes, 2005). Estimates of precipitation by the two sets of authors for the 
purpose of studying precipitation and temperature variability cannot be applied to 
these studies. The period covered by the data (1500–2000) is insufficient for our 
purposes, and the comparison of yearly average estimates on seasonal data from 
1500–1658 and monthly data from 1658–2000 would lead to unreliable results. Thus, 
it was decided to rely on yearly temperature and altitude as proxies for climate, as the 
sources found for yearly temperatures cover the whole period 1200–1800 and were 
recorded at a location close to Trento. Moreover, yearly average temperatures can 
already capture productivity without recourse to an additional instrument. The study 
by Casty et al. (2005) contains data on temperature and precipitation on the European 
Alps since 1500 with the purpose of investigation of temperature and precipitation 
variability. The four datasets produced by the same authors were consulted: seasonal 
estimates (for the period 1500–1658) and monthly estimates (for 1658–2000) for both 
temperatures and precipitation.
44
  
                                                            
43 The proxies are retrieved from the data storage: http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/paleo/data.html. 
44 Some specifications from the Authors: 
 
Eighty-seven early instrumental temperature and 146 precipitation time series from all over 
Europe in combination with 11 documentary records for temperature (precipitation), including 
estimates derived from narratives, annals, scientific writings, and monastery records are used 
as predictors for the gridded reconstruction of the greater Alpine area climate. The data 
detailed by Mitchell et al. (2004; CRU TS 2.0; http://www.cru.uea.ac.uk/timm/grid/CRU TS 2 
0.html), comprising monthly global land surface grids of observed climate for the 1901–2000 
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The study by Mangini et al. (2005) contains the reconstruction of air 
temperature in the Central Alps during the past 2000 years from the chemical analysis 
of a stalagmite retrieved in the Central Alps in 1998 (47.0882N, 11.6715E, 120 km 
North of Trento, 46.24N/11.42E). The dataset is compounded of 540 average annual 
temperature reconstructions within a period from 90 BC to 1935 AD. Between each 
observation, there is a gap of 3–5 years. The gaps are approximated to the nearest 
multiple of five—this involves one observation every five years, as representative of 
the five-year period, having as its figure the end-period year (e.g., “1205”represents 
the period 1200–1205)—and the duplicates originated thereby removed, obtaining 
121 temperature estimates from 1200 until 1800, without fear of significant errors. 
The temperatures reported in the study were not of ready use, and they required 
treatment. The stalagmite was, for particular climate conditions, inside a cave at 2347 
meters above the sea level, while communities were at an elevation ranging from 73 
to 1579 meters. A handbook of Alpine meteorology (Kappenberger & Kerkmann, 
1997) was helpful in suggesting a solution to this issue in preparing estimates for each 
of the years covered in this study. An empirical rule of Alpine climate indicates 
average temperature decreases of 6.5 degrees Celsius with any increase of 1000 
meters in elevation. “In average” represents an annual average of temperature by 
applying a decreasing factor of -6.5 degrees Celsius for every kilometer below the 
altitude of the stalagmite. This empirical rule does not take into account many other 
meteorological variables affecting climate, such as humidity, winds, or thermal 
inversion. Meteorologists (Kappenberger & Kerkmann, 1997) assert that the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
period with half-degree resolution (60km × 60 km), serve as predictors. These data revise and 
extend the recently published version of New et al. (2000). We selected 199 grid points 
representing the greater Alpine area (43.25–48.25N and 4.25–16.25E), excluding non-Alpine 
parts in France (46.25–48.25N and 4.25–5.75E), the Po Plain, and Croatia (43.25–45.25N and 
5.75–16.25E). Temperature and precipitation are reconstructed independently, i.e. they share 
no common predictors (Casty et al., 2005, p. 1857). 
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“6.5°C/km rule” is affected by variability, with errors limited to ±10°C/km (except 
when elevation is proximate to sea level). Similar estimates were produced for the 
average yearly temperature of each village by taking the temperature in the Spannagel 
Cave as a proxy and applying the 6.5/1000 factor to the absolute value of the 
differential of elevation between the Spannagel Cave and the considered community, 
to be added to the temperature registered in Spannagel (2347 mts. a.s.l.) in the year 
considered; that is, 
| |
6.5 | |ˆ
1000
s c
c t s t
e e
T T
 
  . T stands for air temperature in °C, c for 
community, s for Spannagel Cave, t for the year, and e for elevation (altitude in 
meters above sea level). When a community is composed of more villages, the 
average altitude of all the villages was used. In all temperature estimates in the 
present study, air temperature is referred to. This procedure, according to 
meteorologists, ensures the production of a reliable proxy for yearly temperatures for 
altitudes ranging from 750 to 1300 meters above the sea level. Using this method, the 
yearly average temperature was derived for each of the units of observation in every 
year between 1200 and 1800.  
3.3. Datasets 
This section offers a description of the datasets and of the samples used in 
Chapters 5, 6, and 8 based on the sources described above. A summary is provided in 
Table 3.6. 
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Table 3.6.  
Datasets 
 
Note. Each intermediate dataset is named with the filename in bold. The dataset used for analyses is in 
italics. A dataset groups sources of different types, described by the code in Table 3.1. 
These datasets extend those used in Casari (2007)
45
 in addition to the updated 
archival data derived from research carried out by Casari and Lisciandra.
46
 The new 
datasets include temperatures, precipitations, details on assembly participation, 
organization of villages, and the coding carried out on the content of the documents. 
The table groups the sources in a unique “folder of datasets” for each chapter. 
Each “folder” contains several “intermediate” datasets described in the previous 
sections (documents, assemblies, polity) or a combination of multiple sources (main, 
see Subsection 3.3.1). The datasets marked in italics are the final ones on which 
analyses are eventually carried out. Additional datasets are derived from one variable 
of the others for simulation purposes: these ones are described together with the 
simulation in each chapter of reference. The following subsections provide details on 
these intermediate datasets, separately for each chapter. 
3.3.1. The main dataset. The main dataset contains the basic information for 
all the communities and the villages analyzed in Chapters 5, 6 and 8. It works as a 
                                                            
45 Thanks to Marco Casari for having shared the datasets used for the 2007 paper and Maurizio 
Lisciandra for providing the complete dataset with all the information on the documents. 
46 Last version: 4 September 2010. 
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“cross-section,” prepared based on the one used by Casari (2007). The resulting 
dataset contains information about the year of the first adoption of a charter in each 
village. The dataset also includes geographical data and land resources data for each 
community: latitude and longitude, altitude, and linear distances from relevant towns 
in the region where a market would take place. Data on the internal organization of 
communities are also included. In order to include data on resources, these data were 
merged with the Land Register dated 1897 using, again, a fuzzy matching algorithm 
with minimization of the Levenshtein distance. This procedure allowed the 
reconstruction of the surface of the 452 communities.
47
  
3.3.2. Datasets used in Chapter 5. Starting from the main dataset, an 
expanded panel was generated,
48
 and from this panel, a reduced panel was generated 
containing the data about institutions for property rights, resources, other historical 
and topographic information, population, and the temperature estimates. Although the 
word “panel” is used, the datasets are not technically panels but multiple cross-
sections in which a one-year-observation represents the events that occurred in a 
community in a timeframe of more years. In the expanded panel, each community is 
observed from the year of the first document—that is, at most 121 times between 
1200 and 1800—with a gap set at k=5 years, representative of the five-year period 
denoted by the end-period year (e.g., 1205 represents the period 1200–1205). In the 
reduced panel, the gap is set arbitrarily at approximately k=100 years. Therefore, in 
these datasets, year x represents the period ranging from year x to the year x+k. This 
methodology serves the purpose of capturing institutional and other changes of 
interest that occurred between two dates, and is normally employed in survival 
                                                            
47 Data about land resources in communities separated by almost 80 years were compared: It was 
considered that this potential limitation has only a limited impact on the estimates considering the late 
industrial development of the Trentino region. The first industrialization occurred in this region 
between 1850 and 1910, and this period is not covered by the scope of this study. 
48 Used in Appendix B for the event history analysis model in Section B.2. 
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analysis (Allison, 1984; Jenkins, 2004). Being two time-sensitive datasets, it was 
possible to include time-varying information other than the institutional changes 
derived from the dataset of the documents: air temperature, population estimates, 
scattered population data from other sources, and control for time trend. 
The reduced panel improves the accuracy of the population estimates. To 
capture changes in surface extension and fission–fusion phenomena, a smaller panel is 
built in which each community is observed once and controlled case-by-case in six 
selected years (six cross-sections, or a heavily unbalanced panel), and only if a 
document reporting the existence of the community has been found before each 
considered year. This panel contains 1,564 observations, of which 1,498 are 
communities with a population estimate. The communities considered are those 
available in the cross-section dataset in each of six selected years, which (with the 
exception of the year 1450) have already been noted in Section 2.2. The events 
considered were the following: 
 1350:  after 1348, the Black Death  
 1450:  before the publication of the Guttenberg Bible in 1453, which 
starts the diffusion of paper as a way to convey information 
 1550:  after 1525, the Peasant War 
 1650: after 1630, a period of crisis during the second half of the 17th 
century, in conjunction with the Thirty Years’ War and a pan-
European plague  
 1750:  after the year 1740, crowning of Maria Theresa, Empress of 
Austria  
 1800:  the end period, when Napoleon invaded Italy and abolished the 
Carte Di Regola system 
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These dates have been chosen arbitrarily in order to consider group size in 
conditions after the occurrence of critical historical events affecting population (Black 
Death and the crisis of the second half of the 17th century) and the political scenario 
(as in the Peasant War, the crowning of Maria Theresa, and the end period), two 
factors that may have different impact on the propensity of the prince to grant the 
charters to communities. Additionally, the midpoint of each century is considered a 
representative point for the century. The gap between the clusters of observations is 
set at k=100 years. Communities in 1250 were disregarded, because no relevant 
historical event occurred in that year. Communities were observed in 1800 and not 
1850, because between 1750 and 1800, the phenomenon of the Carte Di Regola 
underwent changes and lost the characteristics of self-governance and decentralization 
from the central authority. A treatment dummy was generated, which separates in a 
given year communities that adopted a charter from those who did not. When the 
observed community belongs to a super community that adopted a charter, the effects 
of this adoption also are considered to affect the sub villages.
49
 
In order to identify the threshold in the size of the group of appropriators on 
the commons, another source has been used. The goal was to obtain an estimate from 
a source different from population to account for the presence of outsiders in the 
community. While the community population proxies the number of all the 
individuals “tempted” to overuse the commons, an estimate of the group of insiders 
focuses on collective action in the commons of those that are involved in running the 
institution and is, in general, preferable. In order to obtain an estimate of the 
                                                            
49 The district of Trento (which includes the villages of Trento, Gardolo, Montevaccino, Cognola, 
Valsorda, Mattarello, Ravina, Romagnano, and Sardagna) was removed from the dataset for three 
reasons: 1) Trento was not governed by a charter granted by the prince but a statute; 2) Trento was 
directly governed by the prince and was not self-governed by the citizens; 3) Due to its size and the 
land resource endowment, the connectedness to commercial routes, and the vivacity typical of a urban 
center, Trento cannot be considered a community. 
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appropriators’ group size, the procedure described in Section 3.2.4 was used. 
Analyses were eventually carried out on the sample of appropriators’ group size 
estimates in 239 assemblies from 1245–1801 included in the documents dataset and 
originated from the assemblies dataset. 
3.3.3. Datasets used in Chapter 6. The fission–fusion dataset uses population 
estimates based on the 1800 data extracted from main and produced using the 
procedure described above in Section 3.2. Data from documents are used to 
reconstruct institutional changes. The villages are observed during their institutional 
changes in the management of common resources as the population changes. Since 
one of the purposes of the chapter is to understand the internal organization of the 
multi-village communities and their institutional changes, the village was adopted as 
the observation unit, being the basic unit of the multi-village organization, instead of 
the community. The goal was to obtain a dataset that allows simultaneously 
reconstruct, describe, and explain the following: 
1. the organization and governance structures of the multi-villages, clusters, 
and single villages; 
2. the group behavior exhibited in multi-villages, clusters, and single villages 
in relation to changes in population size: individual adoption, fusion, and 
fission; 
3. the assembly levels, and identify the largest grouping meeting face-to-face 
(when more levels are available, it is assumed that the higher levels are 
attended by representatives); 
4. estimates at the village and cluster level, obtained from unpacking the 
multi-village population estimates (the size of groups involved in 
institutional changes). 
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A set of 21 multi-village organizations—representing, in total, 129 villages, 
and a control group of 76 stand-alone villages in the Italian Alps—were observed 
between the years 1267 and 1796. These cases were studied to provide empirical 
support and understand how the fission–fusion behavior is related to transaction costs, 
group size, and institutional change.  
3.3.4. Datasets used in Chapter 8. Chapter 8 exploits societal
50
 and 
resource
51
 diversities exhibited by 159 self-governing communities that wrote and 
voted on community bylaws to manage their common resources in the Italian Alps 
during 1245–1801. The unit of observation is the community where assemblies took 
place. All the communities having a document reporting a list of attendance over the 
period 1200–1800 were selected from the documents dataset, regardless of the type of 
document (a complete Carta di Regola or modification thereof), and a sample of 260 
observations included in the time interval 1245–1801 was obtained. Statistical 
analyses were conducted on the sample of 8,994 coded bylaw articles included in the 
polity database. Using the assembly data on attendance,
52
 an insider group size was 
estimated: the assembly was participated in by all the heads of the families, and—
using the assembly quorums—it was possible to obtain an estimate of the total 
number of individuals qualified to attend (the number of the families that ought to 
attend the assembly) and to multiply this number for the conventional average 
household size of five individuals defined above in Section 3.2. In addition, in the 
final “heterogeneity” dataset, community-level population estimates are computed in 
correspondence to each assembly (but are not employed in the analyses) using data 
from the Napoleonic Census 1810 reported in Andreatta and Pace (1981) and included 
                                                            
50 Measured by “surname heterogeneity” and “number of villages within a community.” See Chapter 8. 
51 Owing to the highly variable conditions of altitude, temperature, and position, settlements were 
endowed with resources in differing proportions, with evidence of this heterogeneity reported in a chart 
that uses the 1897 Land Register data (published in 1903). See Figure 3.2, Appendix C. 
52 Table 3.4, Appendix D. 
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in the main dataset and the Italian Population trend in Bellettini (1987). The sample 
mean population size is rather low (530 individuals), and the high variation in 
population may be explained by countless factors. In addition, data concerning land 
resources, climate, and topography were imported from the main dataset. 
3.4. Conclusion 
The present chapter had the primary goal of providing a description and a 
critical analysis of the historical sources retrieved in archives and in local scholarly 
production for the Trentino region in medieval and modern times. In Section 3.2, the 
sources have been divided into five classes: property rights; content of the documents; 
organization; population, households, and assemblies; and land resources, climate, 
and topography. An illustration of each class followed sequentially in each 
subsection, in which is also included a description of the methodologies adopted to 
produce proxies that have been gathered in four intermediate datasets: documents, 
assemblies, polity, and, eventually, main. In Section 3.3, it is shown how the 
interactions of these intermediate datasets have been employed to produce the final 
datasets used for statistical analyses in Chapters 5, 6, and 8. Conceptual distinctions 
relevant for a better understanding of the consistency of the analyses have been 
drawn; these will be beneficial for the reading of Chapters 5–8. 
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Chapter 4: The Threshold Hypothesis 
For that which is common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed upon it. 
Every one thinks chiefly of his own, hardly at all of the common interest; and only 
when he is himself concerned as an individual. For besides other considerations, 
everybody is more inclined to neglect the duty which he expects another to fulfill; as 
in families many attendants are often less useful than a few.—(Aristotle, Politics, 
Book II, Chapter III, 1261b; translated by Jowett, 1885) 
 
The larger the group, the less it will be able to favor its common interests.—(Olson, 
1965) 
 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter discusses the threshold hypothesis, a conjecture about the impact 
of group size in collective action. When a group increases in size beyond a given 
threshold, it generates an institutional change. This study focuses on institutions for 
the management of common resources.  This chapter offers a review of key 
contributions in the literature, and illustrates the existence and the characteristics of 
tipping points in group size. The existence of a possible relationship between tipping 
points in group size and institutional change is put forward. This study takes into 
consideration two types of institutional change: first, the transition from an informal 
to formal institution; second, the fission and fusion of institutions. 
The remaining part of the chapter is structured as follows. This section 
clarifies some fundamental distinctions that advance theoretical arguments concerning 
group size, the degree of the formality of institutions, and the role of cognitive limits. 
Section 4.2 discusses relevant issues in the standard economic modeling of the 
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commons; Section 4.3 illustrates advances in the modeling of common property 
rights; Section 4.4 clarifies the role of transaction costs for various types of 
institutions and organization; Section 4.5 reviews studies in rational choice theory and 
new institutional economics about the relation of group size and type of institutions; 
Section 4.6 introduces the reader to findings in behavioral sciences and anthropology 
about the importance of bounded cognition and bounded rationality in relation to 
group size threshold; Section 4.7 discusses contributions on fission and fusion 
strategies; Section 4.8 concludes with a formulation of the threshold hypothesis. 
Chapters 5 and 6 present empirical tests of the threshold hypothesis illustrated in the 
present chapter. Below the reader can find a review of scholarly contributions 
concerning conceptual distinctions relevant to the threshold hypothesis.  
The framework described in Chapter 1 has put forward a number of important 
distinctions, the first being the existence of alternative governance regimes for the 
commons. In addition, Table 4.1 contains a list of alternative governance regimes for 
upland commons based on Casari (2007). This table synthesizes alternative 
arrangements relevant for the case study of the commons in the Italian Alps, and 
shows the main contributions reviewed in Casari’s (2007) article as well as others of 
interest with reference to specific features of each regime. The governance regimes 
considered in the case study of this dissertation are the last two shown in the table. 
Other conceptual distinctions drawn in this chapter and relevant for the 
formulation of the threshold hypothesis are, inter alia: (a) how the commons have 
been modeled; (b) the distinction between managing resource production and 
managing the group’s collective action; (c) the distinction between economic and 
legal property rights; (d) the scholarly definition of common property and the 
conditions for the emergence of cooperation on the commons; (e) the diﬀerence 
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between informal and formal institutions and organization; and (f) a definition of 
benefit-driven institutional change. 
The content of the present chapter distinguishes governance regimes along two 
dimensions: a distinction between economic and legal property rights drawn in Barzel 
(1997) and a distinction between informal and formal institutions inspired by North 
(1990), among others. Further clarifications of the institutional regimes come from a 
historical investigation into the origins of common property provided in Chapter 2.
 Table 4.1.  
Alternative governance regimes for upland commons 
 
9
0
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4.2. The Commons 
In the absence of property rights, the simultaneous access to a common 
resource by multiple uncoordinated users is likely to lead to resource depletion and to 
the erosion of the welfare attainable from extraction (tragedy of the commons). The 
tragedy of the commons is a problem of collective action that is inherent in two 
theoretical aspects. The first aspect is the propensity to deplete natural resources 
under an open-access regime, whether renewable or not. This problem concerns the 
production function of natural resources that are governed by precise “biological” 
laws, the study of which is an important aspect of resource management. The second 
aspect is represented by the sustainable strategies adopted by individuals for use of a 
natural resource. Contributions concerning the governance of the commons refer to 
either one or both of these aspects. This distinction is critical, as it allows the separate 
management of the mechanical aspects of resource production from other aspects 
related to managing the collective action of the group of users. 
The textbook example of an open-access resource is the fishery (Clark, 1990). 
A large body of literature has been written about the governance and management of 
fisheries since the seminal work by Gordon (1954). Gordon explored the economic 
theory behind the exploitation of fisheries and elaborated upon one of the most widely 
used economic models of resource use in the literature: the Gordon–Schaefer model 
(Gordon, 1954; Schaefer, 1956). Indeed, the concepts that were modeled in the article 
had already been discussed by A. G. Huntsman in the article “Fishery Depletion” 
(Huntsman, 1944). A series of papers by Gordon preceded this seminal article 
concerned with the optimal harvest in fisheries. The problem of “overexploitation” 
was modeled as a problem of “optimal eﬀort” to exert capture of the “optimal catch.” 
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Before economics and institutional analysis, fishery issues have long been in 
the remit of marine biology and resource scientists who have described the static and 
dynamic modeling of resource management, and from which the term 
“bioeconomics” arose (Clark, 1990; Stevenson, 1991). Libecap and Johnson (1982) 
wrote one of the most interesting contributions about the ineﬃciencies of government 
regulation of fisheries; the authors recognized that all models written started by 
assuming that property rights surrounding the stock were always absent, reproducing 
a situation of open access with homogeneous agents. Instead, contracts were possible 
by allocating fishing property rights among heterogeneous fishermen. The shrimp 
fishermen in Texas in the U.S. had to engage in very costly negotiations to allocate 
property rights by contracting without State support; the costliness of such contracting 
was primarily due to the contracts being highly incomplete, since the contractual 
parties were heterogeneous in terms of fishing skills. In contrast, Libecap and Johnson 
also described the reasons for the absence of incentives for the State to regulate the 
industry, which substantially remained under a situation of common property of the 
fishermen. 
These models have been appropriately extended to understand the “biology” 
and the “economics” of resources that work as fisheries, such as forest and 
pasturelands. Fisheries, water basins, oil wells, forestry, and pasturelands have in 
common that they are “commons.” Two elements are represented in the definition of a 
commons. First, multiple users (or commoners) have economic rights over a defined 
natural renewable resource. Second, each user cannot prevent other co-users from 
extracting units from the same resource. Technically, the use of a common-pool 
resource is rival but non-excludable: users compete on extraction quantities, and 
cannot prevent others from extraction. The resource has boundaries defined by nature 
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(i.e., by orography), and users interact accordingly in sharing the use of the common 
resource. As in the case of fisheries, boundaries are uncertain and require human 
intervention (zoning). Establishing boundaries may be expensive from the negotiation 
standpoint. Some users may prefer to exploit their superior knowledge of the resource 
(e.g., where the best catch will move, where the best trees are, or where the best grass 
is) at the expense of other potential users, which can lead to social dilemmas similar 
to the tragedy of the commons (Hardin, 1968). 
4.3. Common Property Rights 
Early economic modeling neglected the role of transaction costs in the 
allocation of property rights (Coase, 1960; Williamson, 1979), a gap filled by Libecap 
in his 1989 book, Contracting for Property Rights. In addition, earlier economic 
models of resource use relied on a set of very restrictive assumptions in addition to 
the zero-transaction cost framework, such as homogeneous agents and the absence of 
incentives to cooperate.  
The neoclassical paradigm of economic science assumed that the behavior of 
firms is based on a well-defined underlying institutional setting working in perfect 
markets, which the writings of George Akerlof (1970) and Ronald Coase (1937, 1960) 
proved to be a flawed view of how markets work in practice. There is the need to 
draw attention to the notion of “property” that results from the writings of institutional 
economists after Coase; for example, that which emerged from Demsetz’s Toward a 
Theory of Property Rights (1967) and other writings in 1964 and 1968 by the same 
author on transaction costs. 
Demsetz (1967) reported an interesting account of the emergence of property 
rights among the American Indians as a way “to internalize externalities when the 
gains of internalization become larger than the cost of internalization.” The author 
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explained that property rights institutions evolve toward an institutional arrangement 
that ensures the highest benefit from ownership. Communal ownership was included 
in the analysis, together with private ownership and state ownership. Demsetz defined 
communal ownership as “a right which can be exercised by all members of the 
community” (p. 354). 
Further discussion in the literature made explicit the distinction between 
economic property rights and the legal protection that the state grants to the economic 
expectations of individuals from the use of goods through the institution of property, 
intended as “ownership.” This distinction is made clear by Barzel (1997), who 
explicitly writes about economic property rights and legal property rights.
53
 
The term “property rights” carries two distinct meanings in the economic 
literature. One, developed primarily by Alchian (1965; 1987) and Cheung (1969), is 
essentially the ability to enjoy a piece of property. The other, much more prevalent 
and much older, is essentially what the state assigns to a person (Ellickson, 1991). In 
the present study, the first are denoted as “economic (property) rights,” and the 
second as “legal (property) rights.” Economic rights are the end (i.e., what people 
ultimately seek), whereas legal rights are the means to achieve the end.  
“The economic property rights an individual has over a commodity (or an 
asset)” are considered the “individual’s ability, in expected terms, to consume the 
good (or the services of the asset) directly or to consume it indirectly through 
exchange” (Barzel, 1997, p. 3). 
“Legal rights are the rights recognized and enforced, in part, by the 
government” (Barzel, 1997, p. 4). 
                                                            
53 Voigt (2013a) adopted a similar distinction between de facto (informal) institutions and de jure 
(formal) institutions. 
95                                                                                
 
These definitions are fundamental for distinguishing “open access” from “joint 
ownership”; that is, distinguishing situations of joint ownership of a good from 
“crowding” of a resource upon which diﬀerent types of legal rights may also insist.54 
For example, 100 hectares of forest may be under communal ownership of a village, 
because each villager has an expectation of extracting an undefined quantity of goods. 
In this sense, the villager has economic property rights on the forest insofar as he has 
interacted with the other villagers. This distinction was the reason for a conceptual 
confusion between open access and commons present also in Hardin’s (1968) article 
and discussed later in related literature (Banner, 2002; Ciriacy-Wantrup & Bishop, 
1975; Fennel, 2011). Stevenson (1991) defined “common property” as follows: 
Common property is a form of resource ownership with the following 
characteristics: 1) the resource unit has bounds that are well defined by 
physical, biological and social parameters; 2) there is a well delineated group 
of users, who are distinct from persons excluded from resource use; 3) 
multiple included users participate in resource extraction; 5) users share joint, 
non-exclusive entitlement to the in situ or fugitive resource prior to its capture 
or use; 6) users compete for the resource, and thereby impose negative 
externalities on one another; 7) a well-delineated group of right holders exists, 
which may or may not coincide with the group of users. (p. 40) 
Non-cooperative harvesting of the forest defines a situation of open access, 
under which neither economic nor legal rights can be enforced, and this is exactly the 
situation that creates a social dilemma in a “crowded” resource. Cooperative solutions 
in the harvesting of the forest are properly identified as a commons. Users 
                                                            
54 The literature also considers the case of “semicommons”: “In a semicommons, a resource is owned 
and used in common for one major purpose, but, with respect to some other major purpose, individual 
economic units—individuals, families, or firms—have property fights to separate pieces of the 
commons. Most property mixes elements of common and private ownership, but one or the other 
dominates” (Smith, 2000). 
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communicate and are able to bargain for property rights and reach Nash equilibria; 
economic rights thus exist and are enforceable (Ostrom, Gardner, & Walker, 1994). 
Legal rights may also protect the legitimate expectations of benefits through 
the setting of clear rules of cooperation backed by sanctions.
55
 In this sense, the 
choice of a property rights regime is not indifferent to collective action (Ostrom, 
2003; Ostrom, 2009a; Ostrom & Hess, 2007; Schlager & Ostrom, 1991). The 
successful economic governance of the commons is obtained when the players bear 
the short-term fixed costs of creating legal institutions and is similar to an investment, 
because the future revenues from cooperation offset the costs sustained for setting up 
the formal institution.
56
 The characteristics of these “bottom-up” institutions are 
described by Ostrom in her Governing the Commons (1990), which states under 
which conditions Olson’s “logic” (1965) and Hardin’s tragedy (1968) may fall short 
in explaining the institutional reality of “CPR systems”(CPR stands for “Common-
Pool Resources”). Ostrom succeeded well, with plenty of global case studies. Other 
economists and social scientists became interested in the study of the commons, such 
as Platteau and Baland (1998); Nugent and Sanchez (1998); de Janvry, Mccarthy, and 
                                                            
55 Sanctioning rules are recognized as extremely important for sustaining cooperation: See the 
important contributions by Kandori (1992); Fehr and Gächter (2000, 2002); de Quervain et al. (2004); 
Henrich et al. (2006); Rockenbach and Milinski (2006); Herrmann et al. (2008); Gächter et al. (2008); 
Henrich et al. (2010); Boyd et al. (2010); Sigmund et al. (2010); and Gneezy and Rustichini (2000). 
56 The formal institutional solution is based on written “social contracts” and leads to a more efficient 
solution of the dilemma, provided that bargaining costs are internalized by the network in terms of a 
marginal increase in information costs that does not overcome the marginal benefits from production. 
Usually, the agreement concerns restrictions on quantity and quality of resources extractable, 
limitations on number of users, and additional governance rules concerning the punishment of 
defectors. Technically, the formal regime works by restraining the first collective action (direct 
appropriation) to another collective action situation based on group formal decision-making (e.g., 
through a system of assemblies). Casari underlines that there are informational advantages in adopting 
a formal allocation regime: First, a clearer definition of property rights—restrained to a well-defined 
group of users who commit to cooperate in the long run using the institution and bearing the costs of 
creation and maintenance; second, certainty in the punishment, which acts as a deterrent of property 
trespassing, makes the property violator internalize the cost of trespassing, and sustains cooperation 
(Fudenberg & Maskin, 1986). Additionally, the setting of a restriction on the quantity of units 
demanded raises the individual rents from the resource. Membership rules then define a densely 
connected network of members, allowing a high level of social capital among the members that lowers 
discount rates and ensures social cooperation under the predictions of the folk theorem in a formal 
institution for collective action. Information costs are lower within the member’s network, which can 
set rules for the extraction of the resource at the optimal level, subject to the regulation constraint. 
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Sadoulet (1998); Bromley (1991, 1998); Baland and Platteau (1996); Chakravarty-
Kaul (1996); Field (1985); and Ostrom and Walker (1989). The scholarship by 
Ostrom engendered a new research field and led to the production of a prodigious 
body of literature (Ostrom et al., 1999) with such originality and importance for the 
social science literature that her receipt of the Nobel Prize in 2009 was no surprise to 
those familiar with her work. 
4.4. Type of Institutions and Organization 
Two other important books were issued in the 1990s about the economics of 
institutions for property rights. The first is Institutions, Institutional Change and 
Economic Performance (North, 1990).
57
 North defined institutions as “constraints that 
shape human interactions” (p. 1). North argued that institutions were meant to “reduce 
uncertainty by establishing a stable (but not necessarily eﬃcient) structure to human 
interaction” (p. 6), and the author distinguished institutions from organizations as “… 
groups of individuals bound by some common purpose to achieve objectives. 
Modeling organizations is analyzing governance structures, skills, and how learning 
by doing will determine the organization’s success over time” (p. 5). This definition is 
adopted by the present study to draw a distinction between formal and informal 
institutions, as illustrated in the framework (Figure 1.1). The fission–fusion behavior 
is related to an organizational choice of the group engaged in collective action to 
structure their institutional interactions. Informal institutions are called by North 
“informal constraints”: 
In all societies from the most primitive to the most advanced, people impose 
constraints upon themselves to give a structure to their relations with others. 
Under conditions of limited information and limited computational ability, 
                                                            
57 North, one of the key authors in new institutional economics and Nobel Prize winner in 1993, was 
also the author of an interesting book on the economic history of the Western World used as a 
reference for the present study (North & Thomas, 1973; North & Weingast, 2006). 
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constraints reduce the costs of human interaction as opposed to a world of no 
institutions. (p. 36) 
North continued by illustrating the conditions that make informal institutions 
self-enforcing and provided a definition of formal constraints: 
The diﬀerence between informal and formal constraints is one of degree … 
Formal rules include political (and judicial) rules, economic rules, and 
contracts. The hierarchy of such rules, from constitutions, to statute and 
common laws, to specific bylaws, and finally to individual contracts defines 
constraints, from general rules to particular specifications. (p. 47) 
Many criticisms have been brought against the notion of transaction costs (De 
Alessi, 1983; Williamson, 1979), at least as many as have been brought against the 
notion of institutions (Voigt, 2013a), and this distinction, as noted in a previous 
chapter, is not different from the point of view of collective action (Banner, 2002; 
Libecap, 2009; Libecap & Wiggins, 1984; Ostrom, 2003). The collection and 
dissemination of information is crucial to ensure the cohesiveness of the social group 
as well as to define clear roles and objectives expected in a group from each 
component. At the first level, economic property rights belong to the realm of 
informal institutions (direct appropriation of the commons), while legal property 
rights are established with a legal institution (appropriation of the commons mediated 
by the participation in an institution). In general, the assignment of property right is a 
relevant event in a group, as it changes the behavioral norms for the assignment of the 
benefits deriving from the use of the good (including the commons); thus, diﬀerent 
institutional forms correspond to diﬀerent technologies regarding assignment of these 
benefits. In their “production,” these institutions are distinguished on three levels: 
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diﬀerent types of collective action, diﬀerent institutional forms, and diﬀerent property 
rights (economic or legal). 
The debate on common property institutions is an old one (as shown in 
Chapter 2). In recent times, contributions have shed light on the economic reasons for 
the transition from common property to private property (a) during the Enclosures in 
England, (b) with an economic analysis of both the legal regimes, and (c) with a 
recognition that the common property (or semicommon property) institutions were 
widely used in Europe throughout the late medieval and modern period. The general 
findings of these studies validate that Demsetz (1967), as well as all the literature 
about transaction cost-based explanations about institutional change, was more than 
credible.  
McCloskey (1972) wrote one of the first studies on the effect of the open-field 
system on the eﬃciency of agriculture in England. Sixteen years later, Clark (1998), 
in the same journal, published an empirical study that confirmed McCloskey’s results 
on the economic profitability of enclosures vis-a-vis scattering in the open fields. The 
common lands in England survived until 1750, because “enclosure was generally 
unprofitable before 1750 when changing relative prices made private property rights 
marginally more eﬃcient.” Smith (2000) formalized the concept of semicommon 
property rights and underlined that members of a group may rely on customs or set 
formal laws to delineate common property rights on land: 
Various rights to the commons, both waste and arable, were quite well 
defined. Supervision of these limitations did not originate with an overlord. 
Many common-field villages were not under the direction of a lord of the 
manor. Instead, it seems that much of the regulation was customary and that 
some of the customs made their way into increasingly formal legislation. The 
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customs (and later laws) were administered by local town gatherings and the 
courts leet and, later, the equity courts. For some purposes, such as fence 
inspection, special oﬃcials (reeves) were sometimes appointed by the village 
assembly. (p. 137) 
In another article, Smith analyzed governance and exclusion as two diﬀerent 
mechanisms to delineate property rights on land by citing the emergence of the “open-
field” system in England as an example (Smith, 2002). 
4.5. Group Size and the Type of Institutions 
This section outlines the terms of the relationship between group size and type 
of institutions by reviewing key contributions in new institutional economics. Section 
4.5.1 describes why informal and formal institution have different transaction costs;  
Section 4.5.2 contains a review of previous works, which aims at finding a theoretical 
link between transaction costs and the existence of a threshold group size potentially 
driving institutional change. 
4.5.1. The cost of institutions. Eﬃcient institutions are meant to minimize 
transaction costs by defining efficient rules to allocate property rights (Eggertsson, 
1990; North, 1990; Williamson, 1979, 1981). Barzel (1997) remarked upon the close 
relatedness of the concept of property rights with those of transaction costs and 
defined transaction costs as the costs associated with the transfer, capture, and 
protection of rights. The choice of a formal institution may be related to increasing 
transaction costs within which group size may be an important factor.  
Intuitively, when group size increases, transaction cost also increases. This 
theory is explored in subsequent chapters. Although intuitive, this connection has 
been overlooked by researchers. Some models include transaction costs when 
evaluating the evolution of property rights; however, the same models also show size 
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only in terms of extension of the surface and include the assumption that groups have 
the same size (Field, 1985, 1989). The theory is clarified if transaction costs defined 
in the commons are the costs incurred by individuals in collecting and disseminating 
information about others’ behavior and the level of resource exploitation in the 
appropriation of goods.
58
 This is compatible with the theory that transaction costs 
increase with the number of appropriators on land propounded by Cheung (1969) in a 
study about share tenancy. The collection and dissemination of information about 
economic rights and entitlements relies on social interactions in the use of and access 
to land resources (Smith, 2002). 
Questions remain about the link between group size and the degree of 
formality of an institution and if group size is a determinant of the organization of 
collective action (and, therefore, of the degree of formality of an institution). Mancur 
Olson’s Logic of Collective Action (1965) provided the primary impetus to tackle this 
issue:  
… unless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there is 
coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their common 
interest, rational self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their 
common or group interests. (p. 2) 
Ostrom (1990) showed that rational, self-interested individuals cooperate to 
create self-enforcing institutions for collective action with which to achieve a 
common goal. Therefore, Olson’s statement is not false—it is simply a partial 
definition. Olson’s thesis sheds light on the characteristics of group behavior 
compatible with a transaction cost-based institutional change. Olson defined the 
                                                            
58 This definition includes the costs to acquire information about the neighbors’ entitlements and 
includes the costs of an enforcement system, interpreted as the costs of the procedure needed to 
determine the subjects entitled to ownership of a good and the scope of their rights and to make the 
party who trespassed or misused property rights internalize such costs (fine or penalty). 
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purpose of organizations and referred to unorganized groups as “a number of 
individuals with a common interest” (p. 5). He stated that not all groups are defined 
by an organization and that “most (though by no means all) of the action taken by or 
on behalf of groups of individuals is taken through organization…” (p. 5). For 
individual interests, unorganized action is more eﬃcient: “There is obviously no 
purpose in having an organization when individual, unorganized action can serve the 
interest of the individual as well as or better than an organization” (p. 7). 
Olson (1990) does not exclude the notion that unorganized individuals may 
coordinate their individual actions to attain a common goal. To Olson, therefore, what 
is defined herein as an informal institution is an “unorganized group” (i.e., a number 
of individuals acting in their own interests without creating an entity that is expected 
to further the common interests of the group members, similar to labor unions). 
Formal institutions are “organizations” in Olson’s language. It is precisely within the 
realm of organizations that Olson’s arguments are applied with regard to small and 
large groups wanting a collective good. Individuals face diﬀerent cost functions; thus, 
obtaining a collective good entails total costs that are an increasing function of the 
quantity of the good. Olson contended: 
Sometimes a group must set up a formal organization before it can obtain a 
collective good, and the cost of establishing an organization entails that the 
first unit of a collective good obtained will be relatively expensive. And even 
when no organization or coordination is required, the lumpiness or other 
technical characteristics of the public goods themselves will ensure that the 
first unit of a collective good will be disproportionately expensive. (p. 22) 
The distinction between formal and informal institutions, in Olson’s 
discussion (1990), is discreet. Olson asserted that individual gains are proportionate to 
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the size of the group, so that the larger the group, the lower the share of profits the 
individual will receive from the expenditure of participation in the collective 
enterprise. The non-technical conclusion of the Olsonian argument on small groups is 
that “the larger the group the farther it will fall short of providing an optimal amount 
of collective good” (p. 35), an argument that was challenged by Ostrom (1990). 
The advantages of a small group include that individual contributions (or non-
contributions) are noticed by others; according to Olson (1990), this is an obvious 
outcome of the number of individuals in the group. This theory seems to create a 
problem when the members’ contributions are not observable due to excessive group 
size. Group size may increase, but the costs of observing each individual’s 
contribution increases. This problem leads to the decision between an informal 
institution and a formal institution, summarized in the following eight Olsonian 
statements that summarize the economics of a transition from informal to formal 
institutions as determined by group size. The transition would be based on what Olson 
calls “costs of organization,” distinguished from the costs of contributing to the 
participation to the collective action, which are referred to in this dissertation as the 
transaction costs needed for the group to create and operate a formal institution. 
Olson’s words were the following: 
1. The smallest type of group … may get along without any group agreement 
or organization.  
2. A group agreement might be set up to spread the costs more widely or to 
step up the level of provision of the collective good… 
3. In any group larger than this, on the other hand, no collective good can be 
obtained without some group agreement, coordination, or organization… 
4. The larger a group is, the more agreement and organization it will need… 
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5. It may not be necessary the entire group be organized, since some subset 
of the whole group may be able to provide the collective good… 
6. In short, costs of organization are an increasing function of the number of 
individuals in the group. (Though the more members in the group, the 
greater the total costs of organization, the costs of organization per person 
need not to rise, for there are surely economies of scale in organization)… 
7. additional costs must be incurred to obtain an agreement about how the 
burden will be shared and to coordinate or organize the eﬀort to obtain the 
collective good. These are costs of communication among group 
members, the costs of any bargaining among them, and the costs of 
creating, staﬃng, and maintaining any formal group organization… 
8. there are significant initial or minimal costs of organization for each 
group. The greater the number in the group, the greater these minimal 
costs will be (Olson, 1965, p. 46). 
These statements from Olson define his theory, on theoretical grounds—in the 
first statement that informal institutions are more suited to small groups, in the second 
and third statements that groups invest resources to set up a formal institution, and in 
the fourth statement that larger groups require higher formality (further discussed in 
Chapter 8 of this dissertation). Olson posits in the fifth statement that large groups 
may be organizations of sub-groups (further discussed in Chapter 6 of this 
dissertation) and in the sixth and seventh statements that individual transaction costs 
in appropriation normally increase with group size and that formal institutions limit 
these costs by adding a fixed initial cost of the formal organization that decreases per 
person as group size increases (economies of scale in organization). Olson concludes 
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in the eighth statement that this cost is higher when the group size is large as opposed 
to when it is small. 
4.5.2. Does a threshold in group size exist? The final (eighth) statement 
raises a question about the possibility that there is a threshold size for a group when it 
metamorphoses from an informal to a formal institution. What may possibly 
determine this threshold, if existent? Olson (1965) does not discuss the issue 
explicitly; however, the existence of a threshold does not contradict his arguments, 
and neither does it contradict the other contributions in the new institutional 
economics. It has simply not been considered; nevertheless, this threshold may have 
important consequences for the decisions about how to structure eﬃcient institutions. 
Researchers after Olson (1965) tackled the issue of group size and identified a 
“paradox” concerning the mechanisms and the determinants of the voluntary 
provision of public goods. Theoretical, empirical, and experimental studies have 
tested or challenged, at diﬀerent levels, (a) the Olsonian proposition that a “large 
group will fail,”(b) how large or small groups may or may not contribute to the 
provision, (c) whether large groups or small groups are successful, and (d) whether or 
not size is relevant (Agrawal & Goyal, 2001; Bandiera, Barankay, & Rasul, 2005; 
Chamberlin, 1974; Esteban & Ray, 2001; Oliver & Marwell, 1988). Ostrom defined 
the role of group size, together with group heterogeneity, as a puzzle in collective 
action (Ostrom, 2005a; Ostrom, 2009b; Poteete & Ostrom, 2004). These findings, 
although important, do not provide an answer to the research question of this 
dissertation (i.e., is there a group size threshold in the formalization of collective 
action?). 
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4.6. Group Size and Cognitive Limits 
While there is agreement in that different institutional forms have different 
costs, and that transaction costs increase with group size, no explicit prediction on a 
threshold group size emerged from the analysis of the literature. This section expands 
the analysis by considering the role of limited cognition and its relationship with 
group size. The bounded rationality assumption is discussed in paragraphs 4.6.1, and 
the argument is grounded on existing contributions in new institutional economics 
(North, 1990; Ostrom, 1990); Section 4.6.2 describes the relationship between 
bounded rationality (Williamson, 1986; Colinsk, 1996) and cognitive limits and 
suggests a proof a contrario for the existence of a threshold group size; section 4.6.3 
offers a discussion of potential group size threshold values researched by 
anthropologist and behavioral scientists (Dunbar, 1993a, 1993b). 
4.6.1. The bounded rationality assumption. The link between group size and 
the evolution of institutions was also inspired by North (1990). Interestingly, North 
provided the link with limited cognition, based on biological functioning of the brain, 
as influencing human transactions as a source of costs and potential institutional 
ineﬃciencies. In the following passage, he considered the origins of informal 
institutions: 
Where do informal constraints come from? They come from socially 
transmitted information and are a part of the heritage that we call culture. The 
way the mind processes information depends upon the brain’s ability to learn 
and be programmed with one or more elaborately structured natural languages 
that can code for perceptual, attitudinal and moral (behavioral) as well as 
factual information.(Johansson, 1988, p. 176)” (p. 37). 
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In addition, Ostrom (1990) assumed that individuals interacting on the 
commons have bounded rationality:  
As an institutionalist studying empirical phenomena, I presume that 
individuals try to solve problems as eﬀectively as they can. That assumption 
imposes a discipline on me. Instead of presuming that some individuals are 
incompetent, evil, or irrational, and others are omniscient, I presume that 
individuals have very similar limited capabilities to reason and figure out the 
structure of complex environments. (p. 25) 
Thus, a theory of institutional change based on the idea of the existence of a 
critical group size threshold needs bounded rationality to be embedded by necessity as 
an assumption. 
4.6.2. Bounded rationality and cognitive limits. Defining what is “bounded” 
in bounded rationality is necessary to identify a threshold and, thus, to enable 
empirical support in favor of the conjecture. Conlisk (1996) reviewed the available 
evidence on bounds of rationality. He divided the literature in two groups: studies 
(mainly in economic psychology) providing direct evidence from rationality tests on 
single individuals and studies providing indirect evidence of economic-bounded 
rationality jointly with other hypotheses. The first type of studies show that people 
often: 
…display intransitivity; misunderstand statistical independence; mistake 
random data for patterned data and vice versa; fail to appreciate [the] law of 
large number eﬀects; fail to recognize statistical dominance; make errors in 
updating probabilities on the basis of new information; understate the 
significance of given sample sizes; fail to understand covariation for even the 
simplest 2 X 2 contingency tables; make false inferences about causality; 
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ignore relevant information; use irrelevant information (as in sunk cost 
fallacies); exaggerate the importance of vivid over pallid evidence; exaggerate 
the importance of fallible predictors; exaggerate the ex-ante probability of a 
random event which has already occurred; display overconfidence in judgment 
relative to evidence; exaggerate confirming over disconfirming evidence 
relative to initial beliefs; give answers that are highly sensitive to logically 
irrelevant changes in questions; do redundant and ambiguous tests to confirm 
a hypothesis at the expense of decisive tests to disconfirm; make frequent 
errors in deductive reasoning tasks such as syllogisms; place higher value on 
an opportunity if an experimenter rigs it to be the “status quo” opportunity; 
fail to discount the future consistently; fail to adjust repeated choices to 
accommodate intertemporal connections; and more. (p. 670) 
Although these studies confirm the existence of bounds of reason, limits 
related to group size seem not to belong to this family of bounded rationality. The 
second type of study assumes unbounded rationality, but failed predictions; thus, the 
author sought a proof a contrario, admitting that any explanation coming from this 
type of evidence would be confounded. These studies concern consumer behavior, the 
formation of rational expectations, decision experiments, and experiments on 
common value auctions. Economic modeling of bounded rationality refers explicitly 
to transaction costs in firms, organizations, and institutions. A link is also provided by 
Williamson (1986): “Economizing on transaction costs essentially reduces to 
economizing on bounded rationality…” (p. 110). An alternative explanation is 
provided by a family of economic models that Conlisk (1996) termed “population 
distribution models”: 
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A common type of model in which a population of individuals distributes over 
categories of some sort, making adaptive transitions among the categories as 
time passes. Transitions are governed by imitation, fitness-sensitive 
reproduction, or other mechanisms… Although most of these models view 
behavior as boundedly rational, some treat agents as perfectly rational but 
imperfectly informed.
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 …Among the interactions considered are imitation, 
word-of-mouth communication, fads and fashions, bandwagons, threshold 
eﬀects, herding, increasing returns, lock-ins, and informational cascades. (p. 
680) 
Thus, the factors explaining a transition from informal to formal are based on 
the assumption of bounded rationality and, under the hypothesis of a critical group 
size threshold, may be confined to two factors: 
1. Dividing the population of N communities in two groups, informal and 
formal institutions, the transition of one community is more likely 
depending on the number of communities already having transitioned.  
2. Considering each community singularly, there is a group size threshold 
determined by an existing link between transaction costs, bounded 
rationality, and capacity to acquire information.  
The first explanation does not exclude the first and is more related to a well-
established body of literature in sociology concerning “critical mass” and threshold 
models based on computer simulations and modeling rather than on direct observation 
(Granovetter, 1978; Macy, 1991; Oliver, 1993; Oliver & Marwell, 1988). If this 
explanation holds true, in the present study, the process of institutional change would 
be determined by the number of communities that already transitioned to a Carta and 
                                                            
59 See Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992, 1998). 
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would manifest more as a diﬀusion process. However, Casari (2007) already tested 
whether the adoption of a Carta depends on the number of neighbors already having a 
charter and found no statistical evidence to support it. In addition, the author of the 
present study performed analyses that confirmed that the process of institutional 
change (that is, the transition to a Carta) seems not to follow from a “contagion” 
arising from neighboring communities. The empirical evidence from Casari’s and the 
present studies do not support this explanation.
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The second explanation is compatible with the claims in the previous 
subsection that (a) agents face increasing transaction costs, (b) these costs depend on 
each individual’s capacity to acquire information, and (c) these capacities depend on 
limits present in the processing and storage of information in the individual’s 
memory. The consequence is that these limits should be expected to remain constant 
as group size increases, and they may be associated with transaction costs; however, 
their origin is in the individual’s cognitive limits.61 Thus, the transition to a formal 
institution may be related to the existence of a group size threshold related to 
cognitive limits or, more precisely, to memory constraints.
62
 To make this claim 
testable, it is necessary to determine whether the memory constraints that determine 
the threshold are individual or whether they are general in the human species. The 
next subsection provides support from the literature as to why the latter is the case. 
                                                            
60 A video displaying the geographical pattern of appearance of each community and the adoption of 
the first Carta has been prepared and is available upon request. The assistance of Delia Mocanu in 
preparing this animation during the course on network science at Northeastern University, Boston 
(MA), is gratefully acknowledged. The observation of the timing of adoption for the communities that 
adopted the first charter (Figure B.1), the geographical distribution of communities, and their 
population size displays no clear-cut visual pattern (Video on “Charter Diﬀusion”: firstcharter1.wmv). 
Hence on this point two conclusions are advanced: 
(1) The adoption pattern is not dependent on geographical contagion;  
(2) Adoption seems more related to the large size of villages. 
61 The consequences of this threshold on individual behavior may be that the capacity of being 
“perfectly informed” is aﬀected, and yet the individual may also act irrationally. However, here, the 
interest is on the consequences on the institutional form of these limits. 
62 For a more recent model of bounded rationality based on memory constraints, see Mullainathan 
(2002). 
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4.6.3. Estimates of the threshold. An increasing number of empirical studies 
in evolutionary anthropology and behavioral sciences link group size to features of the 
human brain and, in particular, to the existence of a memory storage limit and the 
consequent capacity to manage a limited amount of information (Cowan, 2000; 
Halford, Baker, McCredden, Bain, & Mccredden, 2005; Miller, 1955) or to the 
capacity to keep track and socialize with a variable, yet limited, number of 
acquaintances (Dunbar, 1993a, 1993b). The main finding is that there exists a 
threshold number of interpersonal contacts that an individual can manage. One 
consequence of this finding for the present study is that, in collective action of 
unstructured groups, this threshold value has an “upper bound” to achieve a 
successful collective action. 
Dunbar (1993a, 1993b) indicated that this cognitive limit is proportional to the 
volume of neocortex, a part of the human brain that developed late in human 
evolution. The latest stages of the evolution of the human brain, and, in particular, of 
the neocortex can explain the adoption of language to communicate and set the basis 
of human society as known today (Dunbar, 1993a, 1993b). Group size co-evolved 
with language and the neocortex in human history. This assertion was defined by 
Dunbar (1998, 2003) as a social brain hypothesis. When the threshold value is 
overcome and the group gets larger, cooperation becomes diﬃcult in unstructured 
groups; beyond a certain group size, individuals do not keep memory of 
acquaintances and of their reputations in terms of cooperation (Axelrod, 1984; Cox, 
Slockin, & Steele, 1999). 
Dunbar (1993b) illustrated the results of his statistical analyses on a sample of 
N=36 non-human primate genera: 
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The estimating equation is a best-fit reduced major axis regression between 
neocortex ratio and mean group size: 
log (N)=0.093 + 3.389 log (Cr)     (4.1) 
(R
2
=0.764; t34=10.35; p<0.01), where N is the mean group size and Cr is the 
ratio of neocortical volume to the volume of the rest of the brain (Dunbar, 
1993a, p. 682). 
When Dunbar applied this estimating equation to the neocortex ratio of the 
human brain, he obtained a prediction of 147.8; the range is moderately wide (100.2–
231.1 individuals, 95% confidence limit). Other estimates based on diﬀerent 
neocortical indexes give predictions of 107.6, 189.1, and 248.6, all within 95% 
confidence limits. 
The same author compared the resulting estimate with scattered results on 
many human societies. The ethnographic literature analyzed revealed that group sizes 
fall into three quite distinct classes: small living groups of 30–50 people (overnight 
camps), large population units (tribes) of 500–2000 people, and an intermediate level 
of grouping (village) of 100–200 people. The average sizes of these three are 37.7, 
1154.7, and 148.4, respectively. The latter has a range of 90–221.5, N=9. If all 
available data are considered (taking the median when only a range is available), the 
mean is 134.8. If only nomadic hunter-gatherer societies are considered, the mean is 
156.4. None of these diﬀer significantly from the predicted value (z=0.431, p=0.667 
2-tailed). The author of the cited study  provided account of many historical examples 
drawn from historical and ethnographic literature: “The mean size of 179.6 for the 
twentieth-century armies … does not diﬀer significantly from the 147.8 predicted 
value of the Dunbar’s equation (z=0:913, p=0:361 2-tailed).”63 In the case of the 
                                                            
63 See details in Table 4.2. 
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Hutterites communities, group size is explicitly limited at 150. When the number of 
individuals is significantly larger, it becomes diﬃcult to control behavior by means of 
peer pressure alone (Hardin, 1988). Rather than creating a police force, as the 
anthropologist suggested, they prefer to split the community. 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Distribution of group sizes in traditional societies. 
Note. Reproduced from Dunbar (1993). The original footnote reports: “Individual societies are placed 
along the abscissa in arbitrary order. The group size predicted by equation (1) is indicated in the 
horizontal line; 95% confidence limits around this value are indicated by the dotted lines” Sources: 
Table 4.2 (Appendix D). 
 
The same happened in settlements in New Guinea (Forge, 1972). Naroll 
(1956) instead carried out a study on a mixed sample of hunter-gatherers and large-
scale agriculturalist and found a threshold size of 500, beyond which social cohesion 
needed authoritarian oﬃcials. Other studies suggesting an upper limit in group size 
are found in ethnographic literature. For instance, Johnson (1983) found:  
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On both theoretical and empirical grounds that both central tendency and 
maximum potential range of variation in camp size among a variety of pastoral 
nomad groups is heavily constrained by limitations on the ability of 
individuals and small groups to monitor and process information in decision-
making contexts. (p. 175) 
Another interesting view was recently prepared by Feinman (2010), who 
asserted that small groups “…often dampen the emergence of decision-making 
hierarchies; alternatively, large, more collective, or democratic formations may 
necessitate greater administrative or hierarchical political complexity per capita than 
is found in more autocratic groups of comparable size” (p. 37). This might explain 
why smaller groups may decide to merge to build a larger organization. 
Dunbar (1993a, 1993b) also illustrated the role of social grooming in group 
size.
64
 His point was that language evolved as a cheap form of social grooming, 
thereby enabling the ancestral humans to maintain the cohesion of the unusually large 
groups required for survival in diﬃcult environments. Language may have evolved as 
a consequence of the need to increase group size (and not merely an exchange of 
information). Language is a bonding mechanism in humans. First, individuals prefer 
to spend time with their preferred social partners, which enables them to acquire 
information about each other’s behavior by direct observation. Second, language 
permits the acquisition of information about third-party social relationships, enabling 
an individual to acquire knowledge of the behavioral features of other group members 
without actually having to observe them in action. Language is explained as an 
“eﬃcient” bonding mechanism and that it measures eﬃciency with the maximum 
number of simultaneous “interactants” during a social interaction. 
                                                            
64 Prediction of percentage of time devoted to social grooming, assuming that group size is a 
determinant. 
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Dunbar reported results from experiments conducted on conversational 
groups. In these experiments, the distance between the speaker and the listener and 
the number of simultaneous conversations among people was relevant; there seems to 
be a limit in the number of people that can take part in a conversation. This depends 
on the environment where the conversation is taking place but also on the physical 
long-term “information-storage” limitations of the brain reported in other studies, 
such as Cowan (2000), Cox et al. (1999), and Miller (1955). His fundamental 
argument was the following: “There is a cognitive limit to the number of individuals 
with whom any one person can maintain stable relationships; this limit is a direct 
function of neocortical size, and this, in turn, limits group size” (Dunbar, 1993a, p. 
691). 
The author of the present study proposes two possibilities in response to 
Dunbar. First, the predicted group size is a limit that reflects demands made on 
ancestral human populations at some point in their past history; as neocortical size 
evolves, other factors may dictate the need for smaller groups. Second, the limits 
imposed by the neocortical volume are applied to the number of individuals with 
whom a stable interpersonal relationship can be maintained; no prediction as to the 
structure of groups can follow. 
The number 150 in group size has been widely popularized and entitled 
“Dunbar’s number” after his 1993 publication. The number has been applied in social 
sciences, and, in particular, to the study of social networks.
65
 This cognitive limit has 
                                                            
65 An everyday-life example is represented by the online social network Facebook. A detailed study of 
Facebook’s global statistics is surprising: In May 2011, among the 721 million individuals defined as 
active users worldwide, the average active user had less than 200 contacts. The research reported is 
authored by Ugander et al. (2011): “Indeed, most individuals have a moderate number of friends on 
Facebook, less than 200, while a much smaller population have many hundreds or even thousands of 
friends. The median friend count for global users in our study was 99. The small population of users 
with abnormally high degrees, sometimes called ‘hubs’ in the networks literature, have degrees far 
larger than the average or median Facebook user. The distribution is clearly right-skewed with a high 
variance, but it is notable that there is substantial curvature exhibited in the distribution on a log-log 
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been explored in many writings by the same author, who has included an abundance 
of historical and experimental evidence. One of the applications concerns the size of 
networks and their relation to language and human memory (Bickart et al., 2011; 
Dunbar, 2003; Dunbar, 2012; Hill & Dunbar, 2003; Stiller & Dunbar, 2007). 
The contribution of the social brain hypothesis to the theory of a group size 
threshold in institutions is remarkable, because it provides a general prediction of the 
optimal number of appropriators involved in the formalization process of collective 
action. The social brain explains why groups have been able to overcome collective 
action in harvesting the commons by keeping the number of interacting appropriators 
within the 100.2–231.1 range. This number is connected to the costs of acquiring 
information and acts both on the number of interacting individuals in appropriation 
and in participation in institutions.
66
 
4.7. Large Groups and Fission–Fusion Strategies 
The present section addresses what happens to the group when the size 
threshold is overcome and transaction costs increase above the capacities of the 
human brain to handle the processing and storage of information. This situation is 
typical of very large groups. Dunbar (1993a) mentions that groups may split to cope 
with cognitive constraints. Olson (1965) also emphasized that “it may not be 
necessary [that] the entire group be organized, since some subset of the whole group 
may be able to provide the collective good.” Arrangements to manage collective 
                                                                                                                                                                          
scale.” The oﬃcial statistics on the website referred to 2011 (last access: 9/9/2011), reporting that 
Facebook had more than 750 million active users, and the average user had 130 friends. The same 
statistics referring to the year 2010 (last access: 16/3/2010) scored a population of more than 400 
million of active users and, again, the average user had 130 friends. In one year, the population 
increased significantly, despite that the average user’s number of contacts remains unchanged. 
66 The aggregation of preferences at family level works on the household size, with daily contacts with 
high connections ranging from 1–9 individuals (Cowan, 2000; Hill & Dunbar, 2003; Miller, 1955). 
Then, the aggregation of preferences occurs below the kin group size, a close-knit group estimated at 
32–34 individuals for males (Dunbar & Spoors, 1995) gathered for decision-making in community 
assemblies. The group of acquaintances in the community network should range from 100–231, which 
is the number of contacts that are involved in the collective action on resources (Dunbar, 1993b). It is 
expected that a community assembly of active members will include, on average, 32–34 individuals. 
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action can be devised by the group to structure interactions under a diﬀerent 
“governance structure.” The importance of organization in institutions is stressed also 
by North (1990), as noted previously: “…[G]roups of individuals [are] bound by 
some common purpose to achieve objectives. Modeling organizations is analyzing 
governance structures, skills, and how learning by doing will determine the 
organization’s success over time” (p. 5). 
Studies have also been conducted in anthropology and sociology that relate the 
size of groups and networks to support cliques and kinship (Dunbar & Spoors, 1995; 
Roberts, Wilson, Pawel, & Dunbar, 2008; Stiller & Dunbar, 2007). In two of his 
writings in the early 1980s, Edney (1980, 1981) proposed decentralization as a way to 
solve global dilemmas before Dunbar and Ostrom. Edney declared that long-term 
solutions for the tragedy of the commons require “unpacking” collective action into 
smaller groups. He observed that cooperative behavior is facilitated when participants 
in a group that manages common-pool resources comprise about 150 people (Edney, 
1981).
67
 Edney asserted that the advantages of such an upper-limit threshold are 
appreciable in terms of improved communication. Additionally, the fragmentation of 
a large group into smaller subgroups allows the “diversification” of the risk of the 
tragedy. Shortages in one group cannot endanger the entire large group, and the 
impact of potential free riders is, therefore, limited. Edney observed that “the 
improved focus on the group itself, the greater ease of monitoring exploitative power, 
and the opportunities for trust to develop among individuals with face-to-face contact 
are also enhanced” (Edney, 1981, p. 28). 
The link between the organization of groups and cognitive limits has been 
widely studied in anthropology, where a common group behavior is termed fission–
                                                            
67 “[…] the upper limit for a simple, self-contained, sustaining, well-functioning commons may be as 
low as 150 people” (Edney, 1981, p. 27). 
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fusion. Fission and fusion are literally the split of a group into clusters of a smaller 
size and the merger of two or more small groups into a larger cluster entity, 
respectively. These two dynamics were studied first by primatologists to investigate 
how primates are able to overcome ecological constraints (Lehmann, Korstjens, & 
Dunbar, 2007); however, related research has recently extended to human societies: 
We…propose that the term “fission–fusion dynamics” be used to refer to the 
extent of variation in spatial cohesion and individual membership in a group 
over time. As a consequence, any animal society can be characterized by its 
degree of fission–fusion dynamics, which can vary from highly cohesive with 
stable group membership to highly fluid with either relatively stable or 
flexible subgroup membership. (Aureli et al., 2008, p. 628) 
According to this strand in the literature, the fission or fusion of groups is 
related to the size of the group, which is in turn related to the amount of time required 
for (a) information acquisition and dissemination (defined by Lehmann et al. (2007) 
as “social time,” which acts as an opposing force to fission), (b) seeding and moving 
(in Dunbar’s model determined also by climate and diet), and (c) resting time 
(enforced by seasonality). These factors result in an ecologically determined 
“subgroup size” (Grove, Pearce, & Dunbar, 2012). 
Recent studies often relate group size with the organization of groups, 
suggesting that social groups normally structure their interaction in hierarchies, which 
follow similar rules both in human and non-human primates and have on average 
between three and four layers (Bonabeau, Dagorn, & Fréon, 1999; Hill, Bentley, & 
Dunbar, 2008): “[…] rather than a single or a continuous spectrum of group sizes, 
humans spontaneously form groups of preferred sizes organized in a geometrical 
series approximating 3–5, 9–15, 30–45” (Zhou et al., 2005, p. 439). 
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The size of social networks is also limited. Hill and Dunbar (2003) studied the 
exchange of Christmas cards to examine social network size in humans and found that 
the average network size is remarkably close to 150, Dunbar’s number (Hill & 
Dunbar, 2003; Kudo & Dunbar, 2001). These findings led Dunbar to first develop a 
theory of the evolution of language in humans. 
The social brain hypothesis states that social group size is limited by the 
organism’s ability to manage its social relations at the cognitive level (Dunbar, 1998, 
2003). One consequence of this hypothesis is what economists call bounded 
rationality, and another is that transaction costs are an increasing function of group 
size. The field of neurosciences has recently confirmed that human cognitive limits 
may aﬀect group size.68 In later research, Dunbar found that the “support clique” size 
is determined by memory constraints and numbers around 20 individuals (Stiller & 
Dunbar, 2007). The frequency and intensity of contacts also matter. High-frequency 
contacts, the “support group,” are managed by the “working memory,” which is able 
to store and process only a few variables and items at once from the “magic” range of 
“7 plus/minus 2” (Aiello et al., 2010; Cowan, 2000; Dunbar & Spoors, 1995; Halford 
et al., 2005; Hill et al., 2008; Miller, 1955) until the limit of 15 occurs for the number 
of individuals in the circle of “acquaintances” (Stiller & Dunbar, 2007).  
Other studies in anthropological archaeology, even prior to Dunbar’s, have 
concerned regularities in group size in human societies and refer to the existence of a 
threshold in long-term memory and the formation of groups of diﬀerent sizes (Kosse, 
                                                            
68 For instance, a correlation is found between social network size and the volume of the amygdala 
(Bickart et al., 2011). The orbital prefrontal cortex is a part of the brain approximately located in the 
frontal part of the human brain, just behind the eye balls’ orbits. It is an almond-shaped part of the 
brain which research demonstrated to have a primary role in the formation of long-term memory and 
emotional learning. In a study comparing the social brain hypothesis also at a within-species level, 
Dunbar finds a significant linear relationship between the volume of the orbital prefrontal cortex and 
the size of social networks (Powell et al., 2012). This region of the brain, widely observed by 
neuroeconomists, is thought to influence the cognitive processing of decision-making and governs 
emotions and reward. 
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1990, 2001). In Chapter 5, the discussion will focus on the impact of these limits in 
the determination of the appropriator’s group size. Considering the common 
agreement of local historians in estimating the average household size as five 
individuals (Chiocchetti, 1983; Debiasi, 1953; Garbellotti, 2006), it is easily obtained 
with an average estimate of 100 to 300 appropriators on the commons under a formal 
regime, which is consistent with the predictions of Dunbar (1993b) as well as the 
results obtained by Hill and Dunbar (2003). 
The organization of collective action in groups of a size diﬀerent from the 
optimal one has been explained by the science of networks. In large real-world social 
networks, nodes (individuals) exhibit a tendency to create sub-groups termed clusters. 
Clusters are close-knit groups characterized by highly dense contacts, increasing the 
likelihood that any two nodes within the cluster, compared to any two nodes in the 
broader social network, will establish a tie (Watts & Strogatz, 1998). Networks with 
high local clustering (“village networks” and “clustered decentralized networks”) are 
normally more eﬃcient in information transmission, because they are characterized 
by shorter average paths, shorter network diameters, higher average degrees, and 
higher density than centralized networks (“wheel” networks) (Borgatti, Mehra, Brass, 
& Labianca, 2009; Marwell, Oliver, & Prahl, 1988; Siegel, 2009). Results of 
fieldwork and experiments in human anthropology have shown that even when group 
members appear to interact in larger networks, they actually interact in smaller 
“circles” or clusters so that social interactions are structured in multiple “layers” of 
diﬀerent intensity and cognitive manageability (Stiller & Dunbar, 2007). The 
tendency to stabilize this size of social interactions, fundamental in a face-to-face 
society, may lead to institutions in which interactions are sized according to the 
interactants’ cognitive limits. 
121                                                                                
 
Stiller and Dunbar (2007), interestingly, note the following:  
In effect, an individual sits in the centre of a personal social network that has 
the form of a series of concentric circles of acquaintanceship containing, 
roughly, 5, 15, 50, 150, 500, [and] 1500 individuals, with their circles 
reﬂecting successively declining emotional closeness and frequency of contact 
(Hill and Dunbar, 2003). (Note that each of these values is inclusive of the 
groupings within them.) This consistency raises the question of what limits 
network size at any given level. (p. 94) 
From the institutional standpoint, these findings underline the importance of 
clustering social interactions in “cliques” in face-to-face societies as a basis for 
managing large-scale collective action at lower transaction cost. 
4.8. Conclusions 
The literature reviewed in this chapter allows a formulation of the threshold 
hypothesis under the following terms: (a) institutions for the management of the 
commons having the requirements listed by Ostrom (1990) (b) transform from 
informal to formal institutions (c) when they overcome the group size threshold; (d) 
the threshold is included in Dunbar’s range; and (e) after crossing the threshold, (f) 
large groups structure their internal organization in smaller sub-groups. 
This statement (a) identifies the institutional context under analysis, (b) is the 
institutional change the present research is designed to explain, (c) describes the 
behavior to observe, (d) defines the link with the “general” threshold needed to 
observe to confirm the hypothesis, (e) denotes the transition to be observed to make 
claims as to the role of organization in large groups, and (f) validates the observation 
of large groups with respect to the general group size threshold to confirm the 
hypothesis. A straightforward visualization of this hypothesis is in the framework 
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illustrated in Chapter 1 (Figure 1.1). The rationale of a threshold-driven institutional 
change is linked to the minimization of transaction costs in institutions. In principle, 
this change may lead to a more eﬃcient allocation of resources than in alternative 
regimes.  
The goal of the next two chapters will be providing empirical support for the 
existence of a critical size threshold in the transition to a formal institution and for the 
existence and rationale of fission–fusion strategies in institutions. 
  
123                                                                                
 
Chapter 5: Group Size Thresholds in Institutions 
Even with agreement that group size refers to the number of individuals, there is no 
consensus on the turning point between small and large groups. What is a small 
group? To what extent, if at all, does the assessment of size depend on context? How 
is context important and why?—(Poteete & Ostrom, 2004) 
 
5.1. Introduction  
The present chapter seeks to identify the group size required for successful 
collective action in the commons based on analysis of the Carte Di Regola in the 
Trentino region. The main finding is that, while population almost tripled in the 
region during a period of six centuries, the mean community size remained stable. 
The first goal of this chapter is to explain what determined the observed group 
size in these communities. The focus is on the “Appropriators’ group size” which 
corresponds to the number of individuals in the “insider” group, those who are 
entitled to access and use the commons included within the boundaries of the 
community. This concept is distinct from “community population size”, which is 
broader and includes also non-members (outsiders) living in the community.  
The second objective of this chapter is to offer empirical support for the 
existence of a group size threshold that may be responsible for driving change from an 
informal to a formal institution. The existence of a group size threshold might explain 
the stability of the group, as diﬀerences in group sizes correspond to diﬀerent forms 
of property rights allocation and to diﬀerent forms of internal organization.  
This section illustrates alternative explanations for group size variations in 
institutions, and why this study’s conclusions is that transaction costs69 mattered in 
                                                            
69 For a definition, see Appendix A. 
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producing the result summarized above.  
According to economists, the allocation of property rights is a welfare 
maximization problem. For example, in a study on transaction costs, Douglas Allen 
asserted the following: “Every distribution of property rights has with it a set of 
production costs and a set of transaction costs. The distribution of property rights that 
maximizes the gains from trade, net of all costs, is the optimal distribution” (2000, p. 
900). 
Thus, the determination of group size in institutions may be led by factors 
related to production costs (extraction of the resource) and factors related to 
transaction costs (Allen, 2000; Allen & Lueck, 2002). 
An alternative explanation of group size and institutional change besides 
transaction costs could be based on production costs. The evidence shows that 
considering only production costs might lead to a partial, if not misleading, result. 
This chapter provides empirical tests for five factors: resource specificity, free-riding, 
transaction costs, heterogeneous individual preferences, cognitive limits. This list is 
not exhaustive of all the possible factors, and these factors are not mutually exclusive. 
A brief review of each of the factors illustrates their common denominator and 
justifies the assumption of the existence of a group size threshold. 
Factor 1 – Resource specificity. Group size differences may be due to 
“resource specificities” because of different production costs, and in particular of 
different economies of scale across resources. This claim is based on the assumption 
that diﬀerent resource types can have diﬀerent production functions. 
Factor 2 – Free-riding. A second factor is that there might be diﬀerences in 
the magnitude of the incentives oﬀered to the individual in groups of diﬀerent size, 
where these incentives are dependent on non-cooperation (Hardin, 1968; Olson, 
125                                                                                
 
1965). In this case, large non-cooperating groups are assumed to fail and only small 
groups to survive. As the non-cooperation assumption is relaxed, however, the 
argument clashes theoretically with the paramount evidence contained in the scholarly 
production of Ostrom. Large groups succeed in managing the commons by 
transitioning to a formal institution (Ostrom, 1990).  
Factor 3 – Transaction costs. The free-riding argument neglects the existence 
of costs besides the direct costs of production incurred by individuals when taking 
part to an economic exchange. In practice, economic exchanges involve also three 
types transaction costs: search and information costs, bargaining and decision costs, 
policing and enforcement costs (Dahlman, 1979). Assuming no transaction costs can 
lead to widely different implications for the designs for institutions and the allocation 
of property rights.70   
Concerning the first two factors, the first case of the free-riding “problem” 
would not be a problem if individuals cooperated at zero transaction costs, regardless 
of the size of the group. In the second case, diﬀerences in group size could be 
explained only with groups experiencing diﬃculty in the management of resources 
that require diﬀerent levels of monitoring costs. This statement logically transforms 
the resource specificity argument into a subcase of the transaction cost argument. If 
the argument is true, it should be possible to observe formal institutions in groups 
where transaction costs are higher. Setting up a formal institution is aimed at 
minimizing these costs, also in which case the free-riding argument would become a 
subcase of the transaction cost argument. The institutional change may thus be 
considered led by the higher net benefits that the group may enjoy in investing in a 
                                                            
70 According to the Coase theorem (Coase, 1960; Cheung, 1969), in a positive transaction world the 
cost-benefit decisions of the individuals are affected by the presence of externalities. The presence of 
externalities in exchanges has notable consequences for welfare-maximizing reallocations of property 
rights on resources: in this case, institutions function as constraints on market agents’ behavior 
(Eggertsson, 1990; North, 1990). 
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formal institution when its size grows (Demsetz, 1967). If transaction costs are 
positive and increasing with group size, the transition to a formal institution should be 
inherent to diﬀerent group sizes, and a formal institution is expected to be peculiar of 
large groups. 
Factor 4 – Heterogeneous individual preferences. Further support to a 
transaction-cost grounded diﬀerence in group sizes is in the mechanisms of collective 
action once the group decides to bear costs to set up an institution and interact in 
assemblies for managing the group. Large groups normally find it diﬃcult to 
aggregate consensus due to heterogeneity of individual preferences toward risk, and 
this diﬃculty, aggregation of preferences (Factor 4), is again related to transaction 
costs related to the moment in which individuals gather to make decisions in 
assemblies. 
Factor 5 – Cognitive limits. The existence of a group size threshold is 
compatible only with an institutional change driven by transaction costs. It will be 
considered explanatory of the whole process if evidence is found in line with 
Dunbar’s hypothesized group size range and the social brain hypothesis (1993a, b, 
1998). Collective action of face-to-face groups is “easily” solved where group size is 
below an upper bound because of the existence of a threshold in the number of 
interpersonal contacts that an individual can manage within his or her memory. This 
chapter claims that this latter factor is crucial for collective action in the commons, as 
one of the problems leading to the tragedy is precisely the lack of coordination and 
cooperation among an undefined number of users of an open access resource. 
For ease of interpretation of the results, in the process of institutional change 
population growth was assumed to be exogenously determined. This assumption, in 
both Chapters 5 and 6, was made to consider changes in population as independent 
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from the institutional type and organization changes. Consequently, institutions and 
organizations were presumed to adapt to increasing or decreasing population growth. 
In particular, groups with larger initial population were deemed to have faster 
technological change and population growth (Kremer, 1993).   
The organization of the chapter is the following. Section 5.2 discusses each 
factor, and develops testable implications. Section 5.3 presents statistical analyses and 
empirical support for each argument. Section 5.4 offers a synthesis of the findings, 
and concludes. 
5.2 Methods. 
This research studied factors determining group size in relation to the two 
dimensions of collective action outlined in the framework. Recall the distinction 
between direct appropriation of the commons (“appropriation”) and the creation of 
institutions (“participation”): the two collective actions share the common feature of 
referring to groups of individuals interacting directly (face-to-face).
71
 The former type 
of collective action, “appropriation”, consists of the costly transactions of an 
informally interacting group, sustained by rules of cooperation that characterize an 
informal institution. The collective action in institutions, “participation”, focuses on 
group decision-making—for instance, through a system of assemblies—toward 
enacting a formal institution. 
The analysis proceeds by examining the five factors and testing which of them 
                                                            
71 This distinction allows separating this type of collective action from others that are not of interest in 
this dissertation. For instance, collective action of groups in indirect democracies is not considered. 
Parliaments are structured decision bodies based on indirect representation of the interest of electors, 
and although treated by a rich body of literature, the size of contemporary parliaments, and every other 
collective action mechanism in state-centered legislatures, falls outside the scope of this thesis. In these 
cases, the individual incentive to reach the common goal in group decisions may be sustained (and to a 
certain extent determined) by economic interest (i.e., salaries). A principal-agent logic governs these 
situations (Shepsle, 1989, 2010). Another case not considered is the choice of the optimal size of a firm 
to organize production (Coase, 1937; Cornes, Mason, & Sandler, 1986; Williamson, 1967): Although 
this choice concerns group behavior in hierarchical organizations, the institutions studied in this case 
involve at times multiple villages organized in “horizontal” coordinating governance structures. 
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are most important in explaining the existence of a threshold in group size. Two 
sections illustrate the economies of scale (Section 5.2.1) and the “free-riding” 
argument (Section 5.2.2), usually made by scholars in rational choice, environmental, 
and development studies. Three subsections discuss the role of transaction costs in 
influencing the size of the appropriators’ group (Section 5.2.3); of heterogeneous 
individual preferences (Section 5.2.4); and, finally, of “cognitive limits” (Section 
5.2.5). Each section includes the elaboration of testable implications concerning group 
size in light of each factor.  
Section 3 contains empirical analyses on the full sample of communities in six 
selected years (1350, 1450, 1550, 1650, 1750, and 1800), which used population as a 
proxy to estimate the number of potential appropriators in each community. As a 
second stage, the same section posits how group size diﬀered in relation to diﬀerent 
levels of participation. The level of participation is proxied by the deliberative 
quorum of a large sample of village assemblies. The number of active members in 
community assemblies from 1249 through 1796 was used as a proxy for participation. 
The section tests the existence of an upper bound threshold value by estimating the 
number of directly interacting appropriators on the commons. Using the data of 
participation at community assemblies and the attendance quorums reported in the 
documents, an estimate of the eﬀective number of appropriators that is superior in 
quality to population was computed; however, this was obviously restricted only to 
communities adopting a formal institution where it was possible to observe a 
complete list of attendance. The datasets used for the analyses are listed in Table 3.6 
and described in Subsection 3.3.2 (Chapter 3). 
5.2.1. The resource specificity argument. Group size may be resource-
specific. The production function in appropriation can be diﬀerent if the resource is a 
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forest or pasture. It is possible that communities basing their economy mainly on 
forests have a population diﬀerent from communities with a prevalence of pasture, 
even when assuming the optimal scale of production is adopted and that the 
communities have the same extension in terms of hectares. It follows that group size 
may be resource-specific. This argument is explicit and at times implicit in most 
studies in natural resource management (Agrawal, 1998; Baland & Platteau, 1996). 
Why should there be a diﬀerence? 
Consider the simple case of a community in which the output in production 
follows a Cobb–Douglas function of a combination of inputs required to produce 
output Y: labor L (number of workers) and land K (hectares). When doubling the 
amount of labor and land, the output doubles and economies of scale are constant 
(α=1). When doubling the amount of labor and land, the output more than doubles, 
and economies of scale are increasing (α>1). In this case, returns to scale are 
increasing. This means that when L and K both increase of α, the increase in the 
output Y is greater than proportional to α. 
Three factors may affect the maximum group size. 
The first factor is the surface extension of the land. Land resources have 
boundaries demarked by the environment (orography) or by the law (property rights). 
If a community wishes to produce the optimal amount of output, if this amount is 
proportional to the productivity of land resources (which is resource-specific), the 
amount of labor (group size) to produce the optimal amount of output should be 
resource-specific as well. Hence, it is expected to find a maximum group size 
determined by the physical characteristics of the land (Field, 1989). 
The second factor is the amount of resource endowments of a group included 
in the surface. As the number of appropriators increases, fixed costs in production can 
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be spread over a larger base (Agrawal, 1998; Archetti, 2009). The practical 
implication for this argument is that group size should be related to the resource 
endowments of the group. Large endowments of land resources should lead to a 
higher output and “feed” a larger group. Small endowments, instead, lead to smaller 
group size. 
The third factor is the growth rate of the resources. Each resource type has its 
own biologic growth rate (Clark, 1990). The complete exhaustion of a forest area 
leads to the impoverishment of a community for 40 years, while the exhaustion of a 
pasture area requires a “sleeping” period of only one or two years (Castellani, 1982; 
Pearson & Ison, 1997). The output Y and therefore the level of revenue on output are 
also influenced by random shocks, historical events affecting production, and/or the 
demand for legal institutions. When relative prices of timber and milk increase, 
payoffs for cooperation in such areas of production can be higher. 
The list is not exhaustive. Other factors affecting group size through resource 
specificity are climate, warfare, pestilences or famine, or other historical events, 
which may affect the output level, labor, or capital (Barzel, 2001; Perini, 1852; 
Tovazzi, 1986). 
5.2.2. The free-riding argument. The larger the group the more frequent is 
free-riding in resource appropriation. The issue of group size has been a concern 
tackled by Ostrom in the following terms:  
The central question…is how a group of principals who are in an 
interdependent situation can organize and govern themselves to obtain 
continuing joint benefit when all face the temptation to free ride, shirk, or 
otherwise act opportunistically. (Ostrom, 1990, p. 29) 
The traditional view on large groups, later criticized by Ostrom (1990), may 
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be described as relying on the assumption that there is an intrinsic conflict between 
individual and public interests. If the individual is self-interested, collective action 
problems are exacerbated due to the free-riding temptation (Gordon, 1954; Hardin, 
1968). Amongst its limitations, this argument does not make any quantitative 
prediction about a minimum or a maximum group size in collective action; the issue 
of size thresholds is not treated in Olson’s work, either. The fundamental claim is that 
small groups are more successful than large groups in collective action.
72
 Olson’s 
contribution focuses on public (and not common) goods and has been studied 
extensively by others through simulations as well as empirical and experimental 
studies (Agrawal & Goyal, 2001; Chamberlin, 1974; Esteban & Ray, 2001; Oliver & 
Marwell, 1988). The basic theory driving the studies that manifested after the Olson 
study is that the larger the group, the smaller the capacity of one actor to cover the 
costs of coordination and, consequently, the larger the discomfort in the group. Under 
this argument, it would be expected that only small communities are able to engage in 
successful collective action. 
One issue is whether group size really increases the temptation to free ride 
independently on the context. One may argue that large groups have a higher 
“punishment potential” with respect to smaller ones against a possible free rider.73 By 
following the Olsonian argument, it can be concluded that, in general, the temptation 
to free ride increases with group size. However, empirical evidence exists contrary to 
this prediction. It would be more prudent to determine that whether an increase in 
group size corresponds to an increase in temptation to free ride depends on the 
                                                            
72 In Governing the Commons, Elinor Ostrom writes: “I focus entirely on small-scale CPRs, where the 
CPR is itself located within one country and the number of individuals aﬀected varies from 50 to 
15,000 persons that are heavily dependent on the CPR for economic returns” (Ostrom, 1990, p. 26). As 
reported in the quotation at the beginning of the chapter, also for her, there must be a “turning point,” 
which is equivalent to what has been defined as threshold group size in the present study. 
73 Thanks to Vincent Buskens for having raised this point. 
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context.
74
 Thus far, the literature contains no clear evidence on the role of punishment 
for free-riding in groups of diﬀerent size. For the purpose of this chapter, the issue 
may be considered implicit in the ceteris paribus assumption.  
Making the issue explicit requires assuming that punishment potential does not 
diﬀer in large and small groups (communities). The assumption is grounded on 
theoretical and empirical arguments and can be offered without loss of generality. As 
to the theoretical arguments, the assumption is based on recent findings from 
experiments on public goods. The (variable) punishment potential of the group is 
certainly an element that aﬀects the levels of cooperation in a small-scale society. 
Nevertheless, it is also true that experimental evidence today is not able to confirm 
with certainty the role of punishment institutions on the relation between group size 
and free-riding. 
Recent studies found that small-scale societies developed costly “altruistic 
punishment” institutions aimed at increasing cooperation levels (Fehr & Gachter, 
2002). In these experiments, group size is interpreted as hindering individual 
monitoring potential and encouraging violations. The introduction of arrangements in 
the group to make deviations from cooperative strategies unprofitable for potential 
defectors is a solution to sustain cooperation. The whole group bears a part of the 
                                                            
74 The problem posed by the example is one of rule enforcement: This problem is called “punishment 
potential,” the ability of detecting and inflicting sanctions in a society. An example may clarify the 
terms of the problem: 
Example. Let us consider two groups (communities), A and B, which are identical as to environmental 
setting, individual characteristics, and everything else, differing only in terms of size: A is small, B is 
large. 
Where is free-riding more likely: in A or B? A traditional economic argument (Becker, 1968) would be 
that the probability of getting caught is low in the large community (B) and high in the small 
community (A), regardless of the intensity of the sanction (even if there were a “draconian” 
punishment, like capital punishment), and therefore, free-riding is more likely in the large group (B). 
Why? The deterrent potential of the rule is lower in the large community than in the smaller. This 
means that the expectation of (monetary) gain from the defection for the violator is higher in the large 
community than in the smaller, where the violator could be more easily caught and punished. Detecting 
and sanctioning a violator is, therefore, more expensive in a large group than in the smaller. If the 
marginal costs of punishment are higher than the benefits of getting the violator, the incentives of the 
violator to free ride are reasonably higher in the large community than in the smaller, because his 
action is more likely to go unnoticed. 
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costs of the establishment of the rules of monitoring and punishment and of their 
enforcement. Experimental evidence has shown how the emergence of altruistic 
cooperation is easier when groups are smaller, because mutual monitoring is easier. 
Larger groups have to cope with insuﬃcient monitoring and ineﬀective punishment 
potential with the introduction of punishment rules as well as face higher enforcement 
costs per member (Boyd, Gintis, Bowles, & Richerson, 2003). These costs are higher 
in larger groups, because anonymity and escaping from monitoring, and free-riding, 
are more easily achieved in larger groups. Concomitant with this view, large groups 
would need a larger punishment potential to sustain cooperation. 
On the other hand, criticisms have been raised about the claim that costly 
punishment increases cooperation (Saaksvuori, Mappes, Puurtinen, & Sa, 2011; Wu et 
al., 2009). The absence of free-riding and the promotion of cooperation may depend 
on the ways in which sanctions are assigned by peers. For instance, the absence may 
depend on individual decision rules or on collective decision rules (Miltenburg, 
Buskens, & Barrera, 2012) as well as developing centralized sanctioning or legitimate 
authority in complex societies (Baldassarri & Grossman, 2011). The eﬀectiveness of 
punishment in deterring free-riding may be aﬀected by group internal diversity so 
that, in smaller groups, harsher rules may work better because mutual monitoring is 
weak. Conversely, milder rules may work in large homogeneous groups.  
Other criticisms have been raised against the claim that costly punishment 
works better in large groups than in smaller groups. According to these criticisms, 
large groups do not need a larger peer-punishment potential to sustain cooperation. 
For instance, Carpenter (2007) established that, theoretic grounds aside, punishment 
would not deter free-riding regardless of the size or structure of groups. The same 
author found that experimental evidence indicates that people apply costly 
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punishment and that large groups “contribute at rates no lower than small groups 
because punishment does not fall appreciably in large groups…hindrances to 
monitoring do reduce the provision of the public good” (Carpenter, 2007). 
Experimental results abound on the impact of punishment and group size on 
behavior in public good games; however, the evidence in these studies must be 
considered carefully (Pedersen, Kurzban, & Mccullough, 2013). The game 
environments used thus far have not allowed free riders to be sanctioned. Even so, 
they have not allowed for groups of the size of the typical community in the present 
study (in the order of hundreds), while, for instance, the Isaac and Walker (1994) 
study used groups of at most 100 individuals and the Boyd et al. (2003) study groups 
of up to 256 individuals. Only Baldassarri and Grossman (2011) conducted a study on 
a large group (of 1,543 individuals). In addition, the experimental conditions have had 
very diﬀerent characteristics from the typical community, as they were lab 
experiments or based on computer simulations. 
The free-riding argument suffers of three main limitations.  
The first major limitation is that it is based on a simplification of the Olsonian 
argument and on a ceteris paribus assumption that is functional to the research 
question in this dissertation (i.e., whether there is an increasing or decreasing relation 
between group size and free-riding). The answer, as explained, can be provided 
independently on consideration of the punishment potential of a larger group both 
under the ceteris paribus assumption and under the “equal punishment potential” 
assumption.  
The second limitation is that this argument seems to neglect all the details of 
the contexts in which a group happens to act and cannot account for all the recent 
experimental evidence. This context dependency may also not be relevant under the 
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assumptions offered above.  
The third limitation is intrinsic in the data: punishment potential cannot be 
observed in detail. However, in Chapter 8, the increasing role specification with group 
size (measured as the number of roles in an assembly) is reported. This contingency 
might imply that more role specification may reflect the need to ensure the 
enforcement of punishment or the emergence of specific enforcement roles (e.g., 
community police officers). Thus, to sustain cooperation in a formal institution, a 
more complex society is required. Notwithstanding these limitations, the free-riding 
argument is sound. One of the possible tests that will confirm or reject the argument 
examines whether only small groups are able to cooperate or if large groups are able 
to find ways to control free-riding and under which conditions small and large groups 
are able to overcome social dilemmas. 
5.2.3. The transaction costs argument. Transaction costs increase with group 
size. Large groups face high transaction costs in appropriation because of increasing 
costs of collecting information about others’ behavior and about the levels of 
exploitation of the common resources. Transaction costs oﬀer an alternative to 
resource specificity in explaining why groups may diﬀer in size according to the type 
of resource(s) with which the community is endowed (Allen, 2000). Transaction costs 
were analyzed in relation to cooperation for collective action, individuals’ temptation 
to free ride, and group size. 
Collecting information in the forest may be more costly than in other resource 
settings, and payoﬀs would differ depending on the resource. Diﬀerent types of 
resources mean diﬀerent costs of monitoring and enforcing punishment rules. The 
information cost structure in a forest area is diﬀerent from that in a pasture area. The 
individual costs of obtaining information may be diﬀerent in diﬀerent resource 
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environments, and these costs aﬀect the payoﬀs of individuals when they have to 
decide whether it is worth cooperating with others. This theory has been formalized in 
game theory with the concepts of “imperfect monitoring” and “discount factors” in 
games that are repeated for more than one round, such as the prisoner’s dilemma. In 
the prisoner’s dilemma, there is no need to gather information about the other player’s 
strategy, nor is there a way to predict because of the impossibility of communication. 
Instead, when interaction is repeated, players may capitalize on information acquired 
from the previous game round. Axelrod and Keohane (1985) note that the propensity 
of actors to cooperate is aﬀected by three situational dimensions: mutuality of 
interests, the shadow of the future, and the number of actors.  
In particular, Axelrod and Keohane (1985) proposed that long-term 
cooperation is possible under the “shadow of the future” when actors are concerned 
about the future. The key drivers of cooperation under the “shadow” are (a) long time 
horizons, (b) regularity of stakes, (c) reliability of information about the others’ 
actions, and (d) quick feedback about changes in others’ actions. In repeated games, 
players may also sign contracts and form expectations as to the future strategies of 
agents, and assign value to them. The folk theorems predict that when players have 
suﬃcient information on each other and foresee interactions in the future, cooperation 
may be sustained indefinitely if players are sufficiently patient (Abreau, Pearce, & 
Stacchetti, 1990; Fudenberg & Maskin, 1986).  
Low discount rates are associated with higher individual payoﬀs, meaning that 
when the costs of interaction are lower, cooperation can be sustained in the long run. 
At times, the group may also bear the cost to set up a sanctioning system to detect and 
punish defectors with monetary or physical sanctions. This choice has been 
discovered by recent research to be beneficial for cooperation and to reflect the 
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information cost structure of a group (Boyd, Gintis, & Bowles, 2010; de Quervain et 
al., 2004; Fehr & Gächter, 2000, 2002; Gächter, Renner, & Sefton, 2008; Henrich et 
al., 2006, 2010; Herrmann, Thöni, & Gächter, 2008; Kandori, 1992; Rockenbach & 
Milinski, 2006; Sigmund, De Silva, Traulsen, & Hauert, 2010). Transaction costs as 
the costs of allocation and protection of property rights can be interpreted as the costs 
of acquiring information about the level of exploitation of diﬀerent types of common 
resources and others’ behavior (Dahlman, 1979; Field, 1989; Williamson, 1979, 
1981). Uncertainty in property rights allocation and protection is associated with 
higher costs of information and may aﬀect the aggregate social payoﬀ. “…people are 
expected to cooperate in sharing the information, rewarding its producers and 
preserving it by developing means such as writing” (Barzel, 2001, p. 17). 
In communities characterized by close-knit interaction, it has often been found 
that a small group size has allowed the adoption of “welfare maximizing norms” 
(Baland & Platteau, 1996; Cole & Wolf, 1999; Ellickson, 1991; Ostrom, 1990; Ray & 
Bhattacharya, 2011; Viazzo, 2006; Wade, 1988).
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The transaction costs argument includes the prediction of the free-riding 
argument. Recent studies on the commons have led to the conclusion that Olson’s 
theory is not supported by field evidence. Sometimes, large groups overcome 
collective action problems, and some studies have found consistently decreasing free-
riding as the group increased in size (Carpenter, 2007; Oliver & Marwell, 1988). 
Before Olson’s logic, Buchanan and Tullock already predicted that large group size 
would lead to higher benefits that, eventually, oﬀset the costs of coordination 
(Buchanan & Tullock, 1962). The “transaction costs” argument states that monitoring 
and enforcement costs are necessary to guarantee the acquisition of information for 
                                                            
75 Harsher punishments are expected to be found where monitoring and enforcement requires specific 
investments in information (i.e., monitoring during nighttime, in forest or meadows). 
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the optimal allocation of property rights and that these costs increase with group size; 
therefore, according to the argument, large groups are usually groups where there is a 
high level of aggregate rents but also high levels of costs to acquire information. 
The transaction costs argument integrates also a gap left by the resource 
specificity argument, which, taken literally, allows for a theoretically unlimited 
increase in group size if resource availability is unbounded (Agrawal, 1998). The 
transaction costs argument predicts that group size will increase until the group no 
longer obtains positive benefits from rents from production and transaction costs. The 
lack of sustainability of an excessively large group is revealed by severe transaction 
costs increasing due to diﬃcult information flows that render the group ultimately 
unstable (Carley, 1991). The implication for the present study is that groups that are 
excessively large, to cope with information and transaction costs, may structure in 
subgroups (fission) to improve information transmission and lower the costs of 
acquiring information. Non-stable social groups are characterized by altered 
information flows, and usually non-stable groups are too large in size (Carley, 1991). 
In such groups, a solution to cope with instability would be the fission of the group 
into smaller sub-groups (Aureli et al., 2008; Lehmann et al., 2007). 
5.2.4. The heterogeneous preferences argument. The larger the group the 
more difficult is finding a common agreement. In a group, individual preferences may 
diﬀer along many dimensions, such as (a) individual diﬀerences generated by 
individual levels of impatience, (b) tolerance for risk, (c) individual willingness to 
engage in certain effort/compensation ratios, and (d) individual endowments (human 
capital, utility, etc.). Preference aggregation is more “diﬃcult” in groups with 
heterogeneous individual preferences. Larger groups are more likely to be 
heterogeneous. This argument can explain why a large group might be unable to make 
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collective choices that are not later overturned, while smaller groups might reach a 
decision that is stable over time more eﬀectively. 
The “heterogeneous individual preferences” argument focuses on the 
aggregation of individual preferences to achieve a collective choice. Olson’s 
argument is based on the independence of individual choice, while the heterogeneous 
preferences argument considers group choices after a strategy to reach an agreement 
has been chosen. This argument assumes that once the collective decision has been 
taken, its implementation is automatic. The argument is submitted to more extensive 
testing in Chapter 8.  
This argument contemplates three interlinked aspects of heterogeneity in 
collective choice: the existence of heterogeneity of (a) income, (b) preferences, and 
(c) wealth as sources of disagreement (Erlei, 2008). A recent empirical study 
demonstrated the existence of a link between conflict and wealth inequality and 
polarization (Esteban & Ray, 2011). Any sort of diversity in individuals’ 
heterogeneity in income or preferences (e.g., non-convergence in religious creed, 
ethnic origin, etc.) negatively aﬀects participation levels (Alesina & La Ferrara, 
2000). This argument is backed by an established body of literature in economics and 
public policy, some with convincing historical examples (Brown, 1975). 
Heterogeneity aﬀects the aggregation of individual preferences.76 This form of 
heterogeneity aﬀects group choice by rendering ineﬀective the majority rule, leading 
to cyclical voting notwithstanding that the individual preferences are not cyclical. An 
example may help to render the argument: 
 
                                                            
76 Homogeneity is also associated with lower negotiation costs (Heckathorn, 1993; Naidu, 2005; 
Oliver, Marwell, & Teixeira, 1985; Poteete & Ostrom, 2004; Putnam, 1993; Ray & Bhattacharya, 
2011). See Chapters 7–8 for a more ample discussion. 
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Example. Mike, John, and Peter have different preferences toward ice cream, 
beer, and coke. Mike ranks coke over ice cream, and ice cream over beer. John ranks 
ice cream over beer and beer over coke. Peter ranks beer over coke and coke over ice 
cream. If they have to decide to purchase a set of identical goods (or three cokes, or 
three ice creams, or three beers), what will they decide to do? 
Kenneth Arrow (Arrow, 1951; Shepsle, 2010) demonstrated that the social 
preferences between alternatives (i.e., coke, beer, and ice cream) depend only on the 
individual preferences (i.e. Mike’s, John’s, and Peter’s preferences toward coke, beer, 
and ice cream). This axiom is known in social choice as “independence of irrelevant 
alternatives” (Ray, 1973) and is one of the conditions that explained the impossibility 
of aggregating ranked individual preferences, known as the “Arrow’s impossibility 
theorem” (Arrow, 1951, p. 15, 23, 27). More precisely, the impossibility theorem 
asserts that when voters have three or more distinct alternatives (options), no voting 
system can convert the ranked preferences of individuals into a community-wide 
(complete and transitive) ranking while also meeting a certain set of criteria additional 
to the independence of irrelevant alternatives: unrestricted domain (universality),
77
 
non-dictatorship (no mimicking of a single voter), monotonicity,
78
 and non-
imposition.
79
 
In a situation with ranked non-single peaked and multidimensional 
preferences, as the one portrayed in the simple example above, there is no winner. 
Even a majority rule can be ineﬀective to overcome the deadlock. This situation is 
known in the literature as “Condorcet’s paradox.” At the first voting round, every 
                                                            
77 For any set of individual voter preferences, the social welfare function should yield a unique and 
complete ranking of societal choices. 
78 If any individual modifies his or her preference order by promoting a certain option, then the societal 
preference order should respond only by promoting that same option or not changing, never by placing 
it lower than before. 
79 Every possible societal preference order should be achievable by some set of individual preference 
orders. 
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choice can pass with a simple majority and can be overturned in the next round with 
another decision, always with the simple majority of the votes. Super majority rules 
(like a quorum of 2/3) lead to decisions capable of surviving more than two electoral 
rounds (cyclical voting). 
Group heterogeneity increases with group size until reaching a community-
wide consensus becomes impossible.
80
 Hence, the smaller the group, the lower the 
likelihood that the group is heterogeneous (Ostrom, 2010, p.52). 
The argument is evident on a purely statistical basis. A simple example would 
be to assume as given the degree of heterogeneity in the population (all the inhabitants 
in Trentino), then draw randomly from the population two communities, x=100 and 
y=200. Reaching an agreement in y is more diﬃcult than in x because of the higher 
expected heterogeneity in y than in x, only by virtue of a larger number of individuals 
in the group. The practical consequence is the likely instability of choices in large 
groups due to cyclical preferences, as predicted by Arrow’s theorem. 
This generates three important implications for the management of collective 
action in face-to-face groups. First, if the diﬃculty of collective action in face-to-face 
groups increases with group size, the diﬃculty, caused by heterogeneity in 
preferences, can be minimized by keeping groups as small as possible. Second, if 
communities are perfectly homogeneous, they can decide under a unanimity rule. As 
heterogeneity increases, and it increases with group size as argued above, the 
unanimity rule is expected to be substituted by a majority rule. Therefore, the 
expectation is that collective decisions are taken with higher quorums in small-sized 
                                                            
80 The measurement of group heterogeneity has a long tradition in sociology and economics. Olson  
already anticipated this concept in his theory of collective action (Olson, 1965, p. 53), and the reader 
may find abundance of literature referenced in Ostrom (2010, p. 52). Please refer to Chapter 7 for 
details. One widely used measure of heterogeneity is the “fractionalization index,” computed as the 
probability that two randomly drawn individuals from the population belong to diﬀerent types (Alesina, 
2000). 
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groups. Third, to cope with heterogeneity in individual preferences, collective action 
of face-to-face groups becomes organized in more levels (i.e., splits up in smaller 
decision units), where agreement is easier to achieve. A first aggregation of 
preferences occurs naturally at a household level, meaning that the community 
assembly is comprised of a representative for each household (center of aggregation 
of economic and social interests). Second, the aggregation of preferences occurs at a 
community level, meaning that a large and heterogeneous community may adopt a 
two-layered system of assemblies where the first “bottom” layer is the community 
assembly and the higher layer is a sort of coordinating body, a “conglomerate” of 
communities: a super community (community of villages). 
An important question left unanswered by this hypothesis is the existence of 
an optimal number that triggers such strategies of aggregation of heterogeneous 
preferences at the community level. 
5.2.5. The cognitive limits argument. Large groups hardly sustain 
cooperation due to individual cognitive limits. Collective action is aﬀected by the 
limitation of the human brain to maintain stable relationships with other people. There 
exists an upper bound beyond which an individual cannot keep accurate memory of 
acquaintances and of their history. The cognitive limits argument predicts that, in 
order to solve collective action, eventually the group reacts to an enlargement beyond 
this cognitive limit by splitting into smaller subgroups or by organizing in multi-
layered structures. 
The formulation of the cognitive limits argument substantially reproduces the 
threshold hypothesis that has been described in Section 4.8. For ease of reading, the 
first part of the hypothesis is in conjectural form: 
Conjecture: Institutions for the management of the commons having the 
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requirements listed by Ostrom (1990) transit from informal to formal institutions 
when they overcome the group size threshold.
81
 
The argument can be tested taking as landmarks the findings of Dunbar (1998, 
2003) concerning the prediction obtained in his 1993a study and in light of the social 
brain hypothesis. The predictions obtained by the cited anthropologist (Equation 4.1, 
Chapter 4) report that the mean group size threshold in face-to-face interaction should 
be approximately 147.8. In addition, his hypothesis concerns not only the mean group 
size but also the limited variance of the value. The 95% confidence interval is 
between 100.2 and 231.1 individuals (Section 4.6.3). Accordingly, to test the 
cognitive limits argument and to state that it is consistent with Dunbar’s findings 
would be to find that the size of communities adopting a formal institution is, on 
average, above the predicted number of 147.8 and  above the range (110.2–231.1). 
5.3. Results and Discussion 
This section offers empirical evidence about group size in the context of the 
Carte Di Regola system. The evidence follows the five arguments presented in 
Section 5.2. The aim of this section is to test which factor is most supported by 
empirical evidence. For each argument, an outline of the concept is first provided, and 
the empirical question and the methodology used are described. Statistical analyses 
were carried out on the reduced panel
82
 to find support for each of the hypotheses; 
findings are summarized and implications considered. Considering the nature of the 
data, it was preferable to use non-parametric methods (Allison, 1984; Jenkins, 2004; 
Siegel, 1956). 
                                                            
81 The second part of the conjecture will be tested in Chapter 6. 
82 The dataset considers communities at six selected dates (1350, 1450, 1550, 1650, 1750, and 1800). In 
the descriptive analyses in the selected dates, 66 observations having missing values in population were 
excluded. In the econometric analyses presented in Appendix B, these observations were also included, 
setting population to zero and creating a dummy that returns 1 when the observation is missing and 0 
otherwise (Cohen & Cohen, 1983): It was not possible to proceed to case-wise deletion in dynamic 
analyses, as the existence of such communities could not be excluded with certainty. 
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5.3.1. Test of the resource specificity argument. Group size was not 
resource-specific. The resource specificity argument can explain why large groups 
may be more successful than small groups in solving collective action in the 
commons. It is assumed that the production function with labor and land inputs 
exhibits returns to scale that are initially increasing and then decreasing. An optimal 
scale dimension should exist. Evidence is pursued of group size being diﬀerent when 
having a prevalence of forest versus a prevalence of pasture. In the selected years 
(1350 to 1800), communities with a prevalence of forest have a median population 
that is not statistically diﬀerent from that of communities with a prevalence of pasture. 
No evidence was found that economies of scale are a major factor in the 
determination of group size. First, one must reconstruct the resource endowments of 
each community in the reduced panel
83
 and divide the communities in three 
categories: forest is prevalent, pasture is prevalent, and a residual category containing 
all the other observations (mixed resources and limited commons). When the medians 
are analyzed, a test of diﬀerence between medians of the two extreme categories is 
performed. The results are consistent with the argument under two assumptions put 
forward for the remaining part of the present chapter. The first is that once a formal 
institution is adopted, there is no resource specificity in eﬃciency. The second 
assumption is that, once a formal institution is adopted, the total surplus remains 
constant when group size increases. 
                                                            
83 Recall dataset description for this chapter in Section 3.3.2. 
  
Table 5.1.  
Is group size resource-specific? 
 
Note. The panel resource type on the first line of each year displays the median population estimate, while the second displays the number of observations in communities 
where pasture is prevalent, forest is prevalent, or having mixed resources. The second panel displays the χ2 value of a test of equality of medians and the p-value, both 
continuity corrected. For ease of reading, when the median population is not an integer, only the integer is reported; tests are carried out on the original statistic. 
 
1
4
5
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The discussion begins with some assumptions and provides an overview of the 
indirect impact of economies of scale on group size.  
Consider a production function where output is a function of capital and labor 
(Douglas, 1976). Community population data are taken as a measure of the labor 
force employed in production, and the land resource endowment of communities is 
taken as capital. Returns to scale can be evaluated only considering (a) the 
simultaneous change in the quantity of the inputs over time and (b) the difference in 
resource production depending on the type of each resource. Output and returns on 
scale remain unobserved in our dataset. Hence, the resource specificity argument 
cannot be tested directly. Can the question of whether the observed size of the group 
is aﬀected by resource specificity be tested indirectly? Two examples are considered 
below to explore this question. 
Example. Let us consider two communities: A=50 individuals and 1 hectare of 
commons, and B=100 individuals and 2 hectares of commons of the same type (i.e., 
forest). Economic theory predicts that if returns to scale are increasing (Douglas, 
1976), the output in B is higher than in A.
84
 
If it is assumed that returns to scale in production are increasing, the resource 
specificity argument would be consistent with communities with formal institutions 
having a larger size than communities under an informal regime. 
Example. Let two communities, C (endowed only with forest, F) and D 
(endowed only with pasture, P), be of size n, so that nC: FC>0, PC=0 and nD: FD=0, 
PD>0. 
If there exists a diﬀerence in size between communities with only forest (type 
C) versus communities with only pasture (type D), the resource specificity argument 
                                                            
84 With decreasing return on scale, it should have been lower; with constant returns to scale, the output 
in A is equal to the output in B. 
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is confirmed. If the converse pertains, the resource specificity argument would lose 
explanatory power, and a further explanation should be found. 
Using the reduced panel, the null hypothesis of equality of the two medians in 
the two types (with prevalence of pasture and with prevalence of forest) of 
communities in all the selected years (1350–1800) was tested. The resource 
endowments of each community were broken down in single components. Many 
communities start their “documentary” existence only later in the dataset: these 
surfaces are referred to as surfaces represented by the documents. To have an idea of 
the resource covered in the dataset for each considered year, it is necessary to add the 
resource endowments of each one-layer community and of each two-layer community 
in the dataset. The total surface in each year is equal to the sum of each resource type 
in each community existing in the considered year. In this study, commons are 
considered half of the surface devoted to meadow,
85
 grazing land, alp, and forest. 
Commons surface is, therefore, the total surface obtained by adding up each resource. 
It was necessary to determine empirically which communities had prevalence 
of forest, which a prevalence of pasture, and a third set covering all other 
communities having a mix of resources and scarce commons. The ratio between forest 
(F) and pasture (P) surface in a community was first considered, and communities 
were divided in three categories according to the magnitude of the forest/pasture ratio. 
It is then necessary to separate communities with large commons from communities 
with scarce commons. If a community is defined as composed of two types of land 
(common and private), the size of common land (F + P) relative to private land (T) 
must be considered. Thus, a scalar k, arbitrarily set at k=10, is used to underline 
empirically the diﬀerent productivity of private land versus common land. 
                                                            
85 This is an arbitrary convention that was adopted, because meadows had a mixed management 
regime, half private and half commons. 
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Communities in 1800 were analyzed and divided in the following three 
categories according to “resource type”: (a) “pasture-prevalent,” (b) “forest-
prevalent,” and (c) a residual category entitled “mixed resources.” The forest-
prevalent category is characterized by a forest-to-pasture ratio greater than 3:1 and by 
a commons-to-private land ratio at least equal to 5:1. The pasture-prevalent category 
is characterized by a forest-to-pasture ratio lower than 2:1 and by a commons-to-
private land ratio at least equal to 5:1. Communities with a mix of forest vs. pasture 
and endowed with scarce commons are placed in the residual category and 
disregarded when testing the equality of medians. The same categorizations were 
replicated in each of the selected years (1350–1800). 
The results of the test are reported in Table 5.1. The test in all the cases failed 
to reject the null hypothesis that the median size of communities is equal in the two 
groups, forest-prevalent and pasture-prevalent. The medians of the two groups are 
very similar. The present authors consider this sound evidence that economies of scale 
were not a major factor in the determination of group size in collective action. Hence, 
group size was not resource-specific.  
5.3.2. Test of the free-riding argument. Also large groups were successful, 
although using different “institutional technologies.” The collective action in 
harvesting the common resources (appropriation) is considered in analyzing this 
argument. If the free-riding argument is relevant, under an unregulated regime of 
appropriation on the common land, the surplus per capita should decrease as group 
size increases until its complete dissipation. Consider a group of N agents who harvest 
a common resource of fixed size exploited at the optimal level. In natural resource 
management economics, the maximum sustainable yield (MSY) defines the condition 
where the amount that is extracted from the stock of the resource is equal to the 
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growth of the resource in the same time unit. Under the MSY, the aggregate surplus, 
π, is maximized.86 The optimal extraction level is the optimal level of aggregate 
surplus π* extracted from the resource from the N interacting agents and is defined as 
a Nash equilibrium (Clark, 1990; Gordon, 1954). The strategy of the group of N 
agents is to keep π* constant. If π is considered as a function of N, it is understood 
that, when keeping π * constant, the (individual and) aggregate surplus in Nash 
equilibrium π */N decreases as N increases.87 Therefore, the main prediction of this 
model applying the free-riding argument is that keeping a small group size helps in 
limiting the tragedy of the commons. 
In this simple model, under formal institutions the surplus per capita should 
remain constant as group size increases.
88
 The group of N agents obtains a higher 
aggregate surplus when small and informal interaction might be the solution that 
allows a higher rent level. When a group decides to adopt a formal institution, there is 
no size limit in the number of agents to maintain the aggregate benefits at the optimal 
level. The free-riding argument in the Olsonian formulation does not make any 
quantitative predictions about an optimal group size. Creating a formal institution is a 
type of collective action that should be easily solved only in small groups where there 
is no actual need of formal institutions. This conjecture cannot be tested directly, 
given the lack of suﬃcient historical data to provide reliable estimates of aggregate 
surpluses in the considered dates.
89
 However, it can be tested indirectly using data 
from population size in formal institutions
90
, in the context of collective action for 
                                                            
86 This concept is based on biological growth, which diﬀers for each type of resource. 
87 Figure 5.1, curve [1], Appendix C. 
88 Figure 5.1, curve [2], Appendix C. 
89 i.e., the model in curve [1] in Figure 5.1, Appendix C cannot be tested empirically. Variation in per 
capita rents for a set of communities for a reasonable time period should be observed in order to make 
tests, and unfortunately, these data are not available. Particularly, to confirm the conjecture, as group 
size increases, per capita rents should decrease. 
90 Curve [2] in Figure 5.1 is tested. 
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creating and sustaining institutions for the management of the commons 
(participation). 
If the free-riding argument is relevant, small communities should be found to 
be more successful in adopting formal institutions for collective action than large 
communities. After having divided communities into two categories, with informal 
and formal institutions, the median population of communities in each of the selected 
dates from 1350 through 1800 was analyzed. The descriptive statistics were illustrated 
and a rank-sum test of whether the medians were equal in the two categories in the 
same year performed. It was found that the free-riding argument alone does not 
explain the empirical evidence. 
The group size eﬀect was defined as the phenomenon of group size, with 
changes from n to m>n in correspondence with institutional changes from informal to 
formal institutions. In each of the selected dates (1300–1800), it was observed that the 
median population of the communities that do not adopt a charter is almost half that 
of communities adopting a charter. This evidence confirms that adopting a formal 
institution can be a way to solve collective action problems. In the change from 
informal to formal institutions, group size can increase. Hence, large groups can be 
successful (Henrich et al., 2005; Olson, 1965; Ostrom, 1990). 
The results of a Wilcoxon rank sum (Mann–Whitney) test performed in all the 
selected years show that the distributions of the population estimates in informal and 
formal institutions were diﬀerent with statistical certainty.91 A median test confirmed 
the first result: that the median population size of communities under informal 
institutions is lower than that of those under formal institutions with statistical 
                                                            
91 For 1350, n=193, z =-4.85, Prob>|z|=0.00; 1450,  n= 213, z =-3.95, Prob>|z|=0.00; 1550,  n= 244, z 
=-4.82, Prob>|z|=0.00; 1650,  n= 264, z =-5.21, Prob>|z|=0.00; 1750,  n= 275, z =-5.06, Prob>|z|=0.00; 
1800,  n= 283, z =-4.59, Prob>|z|=0.00. 
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certainty in all the selected years apart from the years 1450 and 1550.
 92
 In this test, 
the probability that a community randomly drawn from the communities under 
informal institutions is larger than a community randomly drawn from those under is 
estimated to be 0.374. 
Outliers in population were excluded in some analyses.
93
 Among the 
communities under informal institutions (n=778), there were 157 outliers, and under 
formal institutions (n=720), 107 outliers.
94
 A closer analysis revealed that outside 
values are two-layer communities (super communities) or larger towns like Riva, 
Pergine, Rovereto, Brentonico, Avio, Borgo Valsugana, and others. All outliers were 
kept in the remaining analyses, as all existent communities were recorded either as 
independent entities or as included within a super community. The fact they are 
considered outliers the identification algorithm is not a suﬃcient reason to drop them 
from the analyses; it was decided to keep them, as their presence facilitated study of 
the organization of collective action with a higher degree of historical accuracy. Note 
that in this case, the mean and the variance are not suitable measures of centrality and 
dispersion of the data, and it is contended that using non-parametric methods is 
preferable. Medians and quartiles are considered more robust predictors of centrality 
and dispersion. 
Because only changes from informal to formal institutions were recorded and 
there was a trend of population growth, one may suspect that the relationship between 
institutional change and group size increase is aﬀected by population growth. 
                                                            
92 For 1350, n=193, Pearson χ2= 10.54, Prob>|z|=0.00 (continuity corrected); 1450,  n= 213, Pearson 
χ2= 9.68, Prob>|z|=0.00 (continuity corrected); 1550,  n= 244, Pearson χ2= 11.95, Prob>|z|=0.00 
(continuity corrected); 1650,  n= 264, Pearson χ2= 16.09, Prob>|z|=0.00 (continuity corrected); 1750,  
n= 275, Pearson χ2= 20.90, Prob>|z|=0.00 (continuity corrected); 1800,  n= 283, Pearson χ2= 19.55, 
Prob>|z|=0.00 (continuity corrected). 
93 Figure 5.2, Appendix C; Table 5.2, Appendix D, for a tabular form. 
94 Outliers have been identified using a “blocked adaptive computationally-eﬃcient outlier nominators” 
(BACON) algorithm (Billor, Hadi, & Velleman, 2000) for each of the selected years, setting the cut-off 
level at a significance level of p=0.15. 
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According to this criticism, the group size eﬀect is produced by population growth 
and is not related to institutional change.
95
 Therefore, seeking an explanation for 
group size eﬀects in collective action mechanisms would be pointless. Both empirical 
and theoretical arguments are put forward to support the results. 
Theoretically, population growth does not solve collective action problems. 
Indeed, according to the free-riding argument of collective action (Olson, 1965), as 
group size increases, collective action problems worsen. Moreover, at the community 
level, population growth is subject to countless negative shocks—pestilences, war, 
famine, and other factors—which give rise to population fluctuations. The regional 
population growth in the period was not always increasing. For instance, population 
decreased between 1350 and 1450. Population estimates were produced for 
communities at the exact year of first charter adoption (n=230), covering the period 
1200–1800. The populations of communities in the exact year of the first charter 
adoption were considered. The empirical distribution of population size was highly 
asymmetric; thus, the observations were divided into 10 classes.
96
 
The first six classes were defined to cover gaps of 150 individuals. Classes 7 
and 8 cover an interval of 300 individuals; Class 9 covers an interval of 500 
individuals, and Class 10 is residual: the empirical distribution is highly asymmetric. 
As the median community size increased, the year of first adoption decreased. Large 
communities adopted a charter earlier than smaller communities. 
A visual inspection
97
 showed a discontinuity between the medians of the 
median year of first charter adoption between population classes below 1200 (Classes 
1–8; M=1428, n=24) and above 1200 inhabitants (Classes 9–10; M=1561, n=206). As 
the class size increased, the median year of charter adoption remained stable until 
                                                            
95 As assumed at the beginning of this chapter; see Section 5.1 and Kremer, 1993 
96 Table 5.3, Appendix C. 
97 Figure 5.3, Appendix C. 
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1200 individuals was reached, and then dramatically dropped by more than a century 
after 1200 individuals. A rank-sum test was carried out on communities that adopted a 
charter before 1800, which identified two groups: 0=population above 1200, and 
1=population below 1200. The test predicted that the distributions of the two groups 
would be diﬀerent with statistical certainty (z=4.070, p-value=0.000). The median test 
provided a similar result but also showed that 19 communities above 1200 inhabitants 
had a first available charter earlier than the median year of the whole sample (n=24) 
and that 109 communities below 1200 had the first available charter later than the 
median year of the whole sample (n=206). The result was 0.06% significant (Pearson 
χ2=7.6122, p=0.006 (continuity corrected)).  
No such discontinuity was detected between the group with observations from 
the first two population classes (population below 300 inhabitants) (Classes 1–2; 
M=1561, n=123) and the remaining observations (Classes 3–10; M=1533, n=107). 
The rank-sum test shows that the medians are not statistically diﬀerent between the 
two treatment groups (0=population above 300 inhabitants; 1=population below 300 
inhabitants) at any level lower than 95.48% (z=-0.057, p=0.9548). The result of the 
median test underlines that the majority of the communities with a population below 
300 inhabitants adopted a charter later than the median year (n=65 out of 123) and 
that communities with a population above 300 inhabitants adopted a charter earlier 
than the median year (n=58 out of 107). Thus, this failed to substantiate a rejection of 
the null hypothesis that there is no diﬀerence between the two median years of charter 
adoption (Pearson χ2=0.8735, p=0.350 (continuity corrected)). 
After these analyses, the exact relation between group size and adoption of a 
formal institution remains unclear. For instance, there could be a linearly increasing 
probability in group size, or there could be a threshold size. 
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5.3.3. Test of the transaction costs argument. There are differences in group 
sizes attributable to transaction costs. The transaction costs argument is based on the 
assumption that, if an alternative property rights arrangement exists to cope with 
positive transaction costs, the group will choose the alternative that guarantees the 
highest rent from collective action in harvesting the commons. Accordingly, if 
transaction costs increase with group size, large groups will adopt the institutional 
arrangement that will ensure the highest level of total rent and the net of transaction 
costs between the available alternatives. In the present case, when the group size 
increases, it will choose the regime that allows it to keep the level of total rents 
constant at the optimal level, which is flat. This is consistent with the second 
assumption made above. If true, the formal regime—besides an initial setup cost—
allows a better management of transaction cost.  
The present analysis concentrated on the choice between informal and formal 
institutions for collective action on harvesting the commons and observed where 
group size was largest. From the empirical side, group size is considered in the 
population data and proceeds through two steps. First, the increase in group size was 
considered in the change from informal to formal institutions as a first index of 
charter adoption and a strategy to cope with increasing transaction costs. It was 
initially observed whether such an increase occurred in each of the selected years. 
Second, it was tested whether there were diﬀerences in group size under informal and 
formal regimes between communities with prevalence of forest and communities with 
prevalence of pasture. 
In general, economies of scale in production may not explain institutional 
changes from informal to formal regimes so evidently. 
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Example. Assume that the costs of creating a formal institution are fixed (i.e., 
invariant with the size of the group): adopting a rural charter costs L=100, and let two 
communities, x and y, be of size 150 and 300, respectively, so that the costs of 
adopting a formal institution are Lx=Ly=100. 
If the transaction costs argument is true, group size should be smaller in 
communities where transaction costs on the commons are highest and larger in 
communities where these costs are lowest. Hence, to confirm the resource specificity 
argument, a statistically diﬀerent group size would be required in communities with 
prevalence of resources having diﬀerent productivity. To confirm the transaction costs 
argument, a statistically diﬀerent group size is instead required in communities 
adopting diﬀerent institutional arrangements to manage resources where transaction 
cost structure is diﬀerent. 
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Figure 5.4. Group size and institutional change (1350–1800). 
 
Note. On the left: the dark bar includes the community with the median population under informal and 
formal institution. On the right: the chart represents the relative difference (%) in frequency in each 
class. In each chart, the x axis plots 10 bins representing group size classes described in text. Below the 
year of the charts, the D from combined Kolmogorov Smirnov test, the exact p-value, and other 
relevant statistics are reported. 
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Is group size higher under informal or formal institutions? In Figure 5.4, the 
panel tests on the left visually display for each year that the majority of communities 
under informal institutions have a median population between 150–300 individuals 
(300–450 in 1750 and 1800) and that communities under formal institutions have a 
population in the upper population class (they have a median at least 150 individuals 
larger). The dark bar contains the median population estimate. The panel on the right 
portrays for each of the selected years (1350–1800) the relative diﬀerences in 
frequencies for each population size class. 
Each community in each year is captured once in one of the two frequency 
distributions, either under informal institutions or under formal institutions. F(x) is the 
frequency distribution of communities under informal institutions, and G(x) is the 
frequency distribution of communities under formal institutions. Cases where no 
change occurred, where F(x)=0 and G(x)>0, were removed from the chart. This was 
interpreted as F(x)=G(x)=0 and graphically with a blank bar. Blank bars occur in 
Class 6 in 1350, Class 10 in 1450, Class 10 in 1550, and Class 10 in 1650. The blank 
bars in Class 7 in 1450 and Class 5 in 1550 are due to F(x)=G(x). G(x)k - F (x)k is 
defined as the absolute diﬀerence in frequencies for the k-th class and [G(x)k - 
F(x)k]/N(x)k as the relative difference in frequencies for the k-th class. 
At a visual inspection, it is immediately clear that as the population size class 
increases, the formal solution becomes more preferred, particularly by large 
communities. The number of communities that choose a formal institution increases 
with the increase of the size class within the same year. The number of communities 
that choose a formal institution increases within the same class through time, until, in 
1800, the preference for formal institutions is clear in each class, but with an 
increasing trend from lower-size classes to higher-size classes. Using the 
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Kolmogorov–Smirnov test98 in each of the selected years, it was tested whether the 
two distributions of population size classes are statistically diﬀerent. The first 
hypothesis tested asserts that the frequency distributions of the informal institutions 
group contain observations belonging to a population size class lower than for those 
in the formal institutions group. The result is always a positive D, significant at the 
1% level in all the years except 1450, where the result is significant at the 5% level. 
The second hypothesis asserts that the frequency distributions of the informal 
institutions group contains observations belonging to a population size class higher 
than for those in the formal institutions group. The result is always a null D and 
always 1% significant. This means that the population of communities under formal 
institutions is always statistically higher than that of communities under formal 
institutions. Figure 5.4 shows the two main parameters of the result from the 
combination of two tests. 
Is group size related to diﬀerent transaction costs in diﬀerent resource 
environments? To evaluate the eﬀects of the change from informal to formal 
institutions in communities with prevalence of forest and with prevalence of pasture, 
it is necessary to observe the medians and perform a median test and estimate the 
probability P that the population of a community randomly drawn from the informal 
institutions group is higher than the one of a community randomly drawn from the 
formal institutions group.
99
  
When considering the diﬀerence between the median of population size in the 
two groups, forest-prevalent and pasture-prevalent, in the change from informal to 
formal institutions, it is found that, regardless of the composition of the resource 
                                                            
98 The test indicates with D the largest diﬀerence between the distribution functions in the direction 
considered by the two tests, either D+=maxx {F (x) - G(x)} or D
-=minx {F(x) - G(x)}, and the combined 
test combines the results of the two tests D=max { |D+|, |D-| }. 
99 Statistics and results of the tests are reported in Table 5.4, Appendix D. 
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portfolio, communities under formal institutions have a significantly higher 
population and that the diﬀerence in absolute terms is not huge. The diﬀerence in 
population from informal to formal was tested using a rank-sum test, which confirmed 
almost always an institutional specificity such that the median populations in the two 
groups (informal and formal) are not statistically diﬀerent at any level smaller than 
10%. This eﬀect is remarkable in communities where forest is prevalent. The 
estimated probability (P) is generally lower in communities where forest is prevalent. 
This eﬀect is attributed to the diﬀerent transaction costs in the two resources. The cost 
of securing property rights and collecting information in forest is much higher than in 
pasture, where mutual monitoring is easier using eyesight. Moreover, trespassing on 
resource harvesting limitation in the forest is even easier during nighttime, when 
monitoring is diﬃcult. Additionally, damages on forest areas due to over-exploitation 
have eﬀects for decades due to the slow renewal rate of the resource, while 
trespassing on pasture surely has a lower impact (yearly production, limited in milder 
seasons and at altitudes when there is no snow and ice). 
This result was cross-checked with a similar analysis conducted on a 
remoteness index. Remoteness is measured as linear distance in kilometers from the 
closest local town: communities that are more isolated have a distance from the local 
town above the sample median. The intuition is that more isolated communities may 
have a higher transaction cost structure than that of less isolated communities. The 
diﬀerence in transaction costs was due to the increased costs of collecting information 
about the environment and others’ behavior (monitoring costs) in more remote 
communities.
100
 
                                                            
100 Assuming that a villager could walk on average 4 kilometers per hour, working more than 6 
kilometers from the village would have meant more than 3 hours of walking every day, or even less 
(distance for the time requirement) if carrying a cart or weights on bumpy pathways. 
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Example. Let two communities, A=B=100 inhabitants, be endowed with 
identical resource endowments x=y=200 hectares of commons but be far from the 
closest local town (A=6 kilometers and B=12 kilometers). When group size increases 
such that A=B=200, in less isolated communities, it is easier to collect information 
about others’ behavior. In addition, mutual monitoring by neighboring communities is 
more stringent. 
Outsiders coming from neighboring communities are better recognized in the 
commons in less isolated communities, where the individual cost of monitoring is 
lower than in more isolated communities, where cheating on neighbors is easier 
because monitoring may require an ad-hoc activity. More isolated communities are 
defined here as communities being more than six linear kilometers away from the 
closest local town (the median distance of all the communities in 1800). Less isolated 
communities are less than six linear kilometers away from the closest local town. The 
median scores were calculated for more isolated and less isolated communities under 
informal and formal institutions, a median test was performed, and the probability that 
a community randomly drawn from the informal institutions sample has a larger 
population than a randomly drawn community from the formal institutions set was 
estimated.
101
  
Field evidence is compatible with the present authors’ intuition that more 
remote communities always have a lower median size than less remote communities 
do; however, this diﬀerence is not large enough to indicate a fundamental role for 
remoteness in the determination of group size in collective action. The interesting 
result is that a statistically significant increase in group size is found when 
communities, regardless of isolation, adopt a formal institution from the informal 
                                                            
101 Results are reported in Table 5.5, Appendix D. 
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status. 
The transaction costs argument in the two specifications identified, resource-
specific transaction costs and remoteness-specific transaction costs, supports the 
regularities found in the field evidence. First, the median population is usually lower 
where forest is prevalent and when communities are more isolated, though this 
diﬀerence is not huge. Second, the diﬀerence in population size in the change from 
informal to formal institution is larger (and statistically significant) in communities 
where forest is prevalent, regardless of isolation. 
 
Table 5.6.  
Assembly quorums found in documents 
 
Note. n=102. The quorum reported are those found directly in historical sources, with and without a list 
of attendants or any reference to attendants of any type. As can be seen, the most preferred are super-
majorities, which count more than the 95% of the total quorums found. The number of observations 
having an estimate for assembly size (attending members + attending non-members) is 92. Source: 
Author’s estimates. 
 
5.3.4. Test of the heterogeneous preferences argument. Large groups 
approve collective contracts with lower deliberative quorums. In the next two 
arguments, on the focus is the size of the insiders group in participation and 
appropriation under the formal regime. The heterogeneous preferences argument 
posits that there is a tendency for the group involved in face-to-face interaction to 
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remain small to cope with heterogeneous preferences and to avoid cyclical voting: 
larger groups are likely to be heterogeneous. The heterogeneous preferences argument 
tackles the second collective action of interest for this study: participation in the 
creation and the management of institutions for collective action. Participation entails 
that the decision-making about the use of the commons is made by the restricted 
group of insiders, regulating beforehand the number of potential coordinating 
individuals in the commons and the consequences for trespassing through a 
sanctioning system toward outsiders but also toward insiders.  
The focus is on collective decision-making when a formal institution is 
adopted. Attendance to community assemblies is considered. When, during the 
assembly, all participants are asked to intervene and cast a vote, the probability of a 
deadlock in the collective choice increases dramatically, and decisions are likely to be 
unstable due to cyclical voting. It is more likely for a small group to decide quickly 
and unanimously than it is for a larger one. As group size increases, more time and 
eﬀort is required to reach consensus due to the increased costs of interaction among 
participants caused by the substantial time for collecting and processing individual 
preferences, when preferences are heterogeneous. According to the heterogeneous 
preferences argument, therefore, larger groups should have lower constitutive 
quorums, while small communities should have higher constitutive quorums. This 
hypothesis is moderately supported by the field evidence. 
Analyses are performed on group size using the insiders data concerning 
community assemblies, and attendance is described by dividing mentioned individuals 
into three classes: (a) active members (i.e., community members who eﬀectively 
attend the meeting and have “voice”– the right to cast a vote), (b) non-active members 
(i.e., members who are not attending and, therefore, inactive in the collective 
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decision), and (c) non-members attending the meeting with particular functions 
(witnesses, notaries, priests, oﬃcers, etc.).102 
The number of active members can be a good proxy for the number of direct 
interactants in a meeting; this sample was focused on to study participation in 
institutions for collective action. Evidence about participation was found in a set of 
documents reporting quorums of attendance (n=94 docs from 1336–1796), comprising 
10.8% of the total. In Table 5.6, the raw quorums found in the documents are 
summarized. A subset of 92 of these documents reports the list of active members. 
Upon visual inspection, the “2/3” (n=64) and the “unanimity” (n=19) rules are widely 
used (together, in 81.3% of the cases): this indicates a situation in which preference 
aggregation for the group decision is easy. Active membership is focused on. If the 
heterogeneous preferences argument holds, it should be possible to observe a higher 
quorum in assemblies having a smaller size in terms of active members. This choice 
indicates that reaching a collective consensus in a smaller group is easier.
103
 It is 
tested whether there is a diﬀerence in active membership size between assemblies 
having a high constitutive quorum and assemblies having a low constitutive quorum. 
The threshold is fixed in quorums equal to unanimity or “below unanimity” rules. 
The heterogeneous preferences argument is supported by field evidence. The 
test results of equality of medians returns a χ2=4.7639 and a p-value=0.029 (both 
continuity corrected, n=84). The Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann–Whitney) confirms these 
results (z=2.743, p-value=0.0061, n=84). A randomly drawn assembly where there is 
a quorum lower than unanimity has a probability of 0.748 of having a higher number 
of attending active members than a randomly drawn assembly where the quorum is 
unanimity. 
                                                            
102 Figure 5.5, Appendix C. 
103 Figure 5.6, Appendix C, offers a visual representation of the results of the estimates of active 
membership size and quorums. 
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5.3.5. Test of the cognitive limits argument. There existed a group size 
threshold in collective action. The social brain hypothesis concerns the collective 
action carried out by the group of community members (insiders) having direct 
interaction in harvesting the commons (appropriation). The hypothesis predicts that 
there is an upper bound to the number of contacts which a person is capable to handle 
with his memory. When individuals are involved in interaction for appropriating 
common-pool resources, the memory constraint makes the identification of neighbors, 
as well as keeping track of their behavior, “diﬃcult.” This hypothesis may explain 
why collecting information about others’ behavior and the level of depletion of 
common resources is “expensive” for the human brain. When the upper bound is 
reached, institutions are built to meet this human cognitive limitation in collective 
action. The present subsection aims to investigate whether there is a threshold group 
size in direct interaction for appropriation on the commons repeated over the 
centuries, estimate this size, and compare the results with current literature in the 
behavioral sciences. The analysis is focused on communities adopting a charter for 
which there are details about community assemblies. 
This subsection will introduce the basic evidence, evidence from simple 
regression analysis, show the compatibility of the results with previous studies, and 
highlight potential weaknesses of the result. A simulation is used to overcome 
criticisms to the results by replicating the research conditions of previous studies with 
the present data. The link between the estimated group size thresholds and 
institutional change is finally expounded with the aid of additional evidence. 
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Figure 5.7.1. Number of appropriators (log-scaled) 1249–1801. 
Technical note. Obtaining the number of appropriators for each village in multi-layered communities is 
conceptually and empirically problematic. The number of appropriators is an estimate based on 
community assemblies, valid at the community level and not at the village level. If estimates at the 
village level are desired, a village estimate might be computed either by a) dividing the community 
population for the number of villages of the multi-layered community or by b) computing the estimate 
for the number of appropriators in each village using the number of people coming from each village in 
each assembly. The problems with a) are that population is computed using sources different from 
assembly data and includes outsiders; in addition, if community population is divided by the number of 
villages, it is assumed that villages are equally sized; finally, even using the proportion of each village 
on the total community population in 1800 is not a good choice: outsiders would still be counted in, 
and the estimate would be not comparable with the appropriators’ estimate of the single-layered 
villages. The problem with b) is that the estimate of appropriators would need to be applied with too 
restrictive assumptions: many assemblies do not report a quorum, and the pondered quorum of 0.73 
would need to be applied, and if in assemblies there are members from more than one village, it would 
need to be assumed that there is the same proportion of appropriators from every village. Since 
collective action is being considered at the community level, unpacking the communities into villages 
is not desirable: this would mean treating every village in the multi-layered community as having a 
separate assembly. This is information not available at this stage of the research; however, a more 
detailed dataset is available in Chapter 6. In the present context, multi-layered and single-layered are 
pooled together and treated equally as units of observation for “collective action.” 
  
Figure 5.8. Appropriators’ group size vs. population (1249–1800). 
1
6
6
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Basic evidence. Summary statistics report a median size of 155 individuals for 
the full sample (N=239) in which multi-layered communities are considered 
unpacked.
104
 The median group size estimate is remarkably close to Dunbar’s 147.8 
individuals and in the predicted range. Under visual analysis, the size of the groups 
involved in collective action in the commons seems stable over time.  
Evidence from regressions. Using the ordinary least square method (OLS) it 
was possible to determine an estimate of the average group of appropriators 
controlling for the effect of time.
105
  
The first regression was carried out on the full sample of 239 observations for 
which it was possible to an estimate the number of appropriators. The estimating 
equation was: 
(124.134) (0.074)
183.028 0.009allAPPROPRIATORS YEAR      (5.1) 
2 0.00; 239R n    
Standard errors in Equation 5.1 are adjusted for 154 clusters representing 
communities. The coeﬃcient of YEAR is not statistically significant at the 10% level 
(p=0.142). Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that the coeﬃcient is not diﬀerent from zero 
at the 10% level (Prob>F=0.8956). While the population of Trentino in the same 
period tripled, the number of appropriators remained stable throughout the period of 
observation (Figure 5.8). The simple linear regression could be more precise if it were 
possible to unpack multi-layered communities into estimates at the village level. A 
more accurate estimate could be obtained based on the number of appropriators in 
each village, while the current estimate represents the appropriators convened at the 
community level. In Figure 5.7.1, four particular cases are noticed: Comun Comunale 
                                                            
104 Table 5.7, Appendix D. 
105 For a definition of appropriators, please refer to Appendix A. A description of the data is offered in 
Section 3.2.4. Technical details for estimation are reported in Figure 5.7.1. 
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and Rumo are particularly large conglomerates of communities, while Riva del Garda 
and Avio are exceptionally large communities. Cases where active members are from 
the village where the assembly takes place (single-layered communities) were 
separated visually from cases where active members come from diﬀerent villages 
(multi-layered communities, 42 observations out of 239). Notice that some multi-
layered communities had a small number of appropriators, and this evidence was 
meaningful for the way collective action was organized in communities. In single-
layered communities, the village and the community are overlapping concepts, and 
active members are from the same village. In multi-layered communities, instead, 
active members may come from a village other than that in which the assembly takes 
place. This indicates that the assembly regulates institutional collective action on two 
levels: the single-village level and the assembly-of-single-villages level. It is also 
considered that not all the active members could attend, and in many cases, 
representatives of the villages are sent to the assembly. Therefore, the appropriators’ 
group size is certainly an estimate of the number of individuals involved in the 
institutional collective action at the multi-layered level, but it cannot be used to 
estimate appropriators at the village level (Figure 5.7.1).  
A second regression  employed the subsample of single-layered communities. 
Coefficients are reported in Equation 5.2:  
(164.21) (0.099)
170.91 0.009single layerAPPROPRIATORS YEAR       (5.2) 
2 0.00; 143R n   
Standard errors were adjusted for 93 clusters representing communities. The 
communities in the sample were estimated to have on average 170 appropriators 
interacting face-to-face between 1245 and 1801. Again, the coeﬃcient for year is 
statistically zero at the 10% level (Prob>F=0.9232): this means that there was no 
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significant time trend in the estimation of group size. 
The analysis of the coefficients in both Equations 5.1 and 5.2  showed that the 
number of appropriators in formal institutions was stable over time. A reliable 
estimate of the average number of appropriators for the case of the Carte Di Regola is 
computed to be 183. This number is deemed to hold both for single-layered and multi-
layered communities, as what is of interest is the number of face-to-face interactants. 
It is conjectured that large groups adapt to this cognitive limit by adopting a formal 
institution—for example, a system of village assemblies such as the Carte Di 
Regola—to allow interactions at a “cognitively sustainable” level and as a strategy to 
minimize transaction costs.  
Criticisms to the results. However, it is borne in mind that Dunbar’s 
hypothesis concerns the mean value (147.8) but also the limited variance (100.2–
231.1). One possible criticism of these results is that only a limited number of 
observations in our sample actually fall within Dunbar’s interval; namely, 43%.106 
This objection is answered first by underlining the diﬀerences between the present 
sample and Dunbar’s (a); as a second stage it is specified how the present 
methodology diﬀers from the anthropologist’s (b); as a third stage the results of the 
two studies are compared (c); The present claim has been finally reinforced using a 
simulation. 
(a) Differences in the treatment of the sample. As discussed in Section 4.6.3, 
Dunbar’s results are based on a best-fit reduced major axis regression. The cited 
author uses a best-fit reduced major axis regression between neocortex ratio and mean 
group size computed on a sample (N=36) of non-human primate genera. The 
dependent, group size N, and the correlate, the neocortex ratio Cr, are log-
                                                            
106 Thanks to Vincent Buskens for raising this point. 
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transformed. Using the inverse transformation, the anthropologist obtained the 
predicted 147.8 mean value and the 95% confidence interval (100.2–231.1) for 
humans, which turn out to  be an “out of sample” prediction. Foreseeing that the 
results obtained were internally valid for the primates in the sample, Dunbar (1993a) 
reinforced the external validity of the finding by reporting abundant historical and 
anthropological evidence in support of his claim. Admittedly, the evidence is 
convincing and is confirmed also in later studies by the same author. Studies by other 
authors applied diﬀerent methodologies.  
(b) Differences in methodology. The present sample reports a result that is in 
line with Dunbar’s hypothesis but uses a larger sample (n=239) of observations 
spanning over six centuries (1245–1801). In addition, while Dunbar (1993a) analyzes 
“mean group size” of “non-human primate genera,” the present study directly 
observes point estimates of human group size. The linear fit between the dependent 
APPROPRIATORS and the correlate YEAR is computed using heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors without operating transformations. Therefore, the estimating 
equations, as well as the variables used to compute the prediction and the results, are 
completely diﬀerent.  
(c) Comparing the results of the two studies. Apparently, the present result is 
even weaker than Dunbar’s: the coeﬃcient before YEAR is not even significant, and 
the variance explained by the model is very close to null, while in Dunbar’s result, the 
variance explained by the model is 76.4% and the coeﬃcient before the neocortex 
ratio log(Cr) is 1% significant. For the external validity of the present result, the same 
literature quoted in Dunbar (1993a) and all the following studies reported in Section 
4.6.3 were used for support. As to the internal validity of the result, it should be 
stressed that the present findings are based on a “within-sample” prediction based on 
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point estimates, while Dunbar refers to the mean group size in non-human primate 
genera. Dunbar (1993a), in his study (p. 682), refereed his sources for neocortex size 
(Stephan, Frahm, & Baron, 1981) and group size (Dunbar, 1992; in particular, see his 
paper’s Table 1, in which he refers to “Mean values from relevant chapters in Smuts, 
Cheney, Seyfarth, Wrangham, and Struhsaker (1987) ” as the primary source for 
mean group size). The author, however, did not report how many non-human groups 
of primates (i.e., the sample sizes) were included in each of the 36 group size means 
used to obtain the predicted mean value of 147.8. The primary source was consulted 
for group size (Smuts et al., 1987): a closer look of, for instance, Tables 11-1 to 11-5 
(pp. 123–128) shows that the original data draws estimates based on a variety of field 
studies. Group size estimates are referred to each species and are divided by country 
of observation, and for each country, there are details on the mean group size 
computed on a number of groups reported to vary from 1 to 85, depending on the 
level of aggregation. The question remains as to why Dunbar chose the mean group 
size and not the maximum for each genus. His answer is reported here: 
The main justification for using mean group size in these analyses lies in the 
nature of primate social groups…primate groups tend to oscillate in size over 
quite a wide range around the optimal value. At the point of fission (by 
definition, their maximum observed size), groups tend to be unstable and close 
to social disintegration; this is of course why they undergo fission at that point. 
Hence, maximum group size is likely to represent the point of complete social 
collapse rather than the maximum group size that the animals can maintain as 
a cohesive social unit. Consequently, mean group size is likely to be a better 
estimate of the limiting group size for a species than the maximum ever 
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observed in any population. (Dunbar, 1993a, p. 682)
107
 
This choice is well documented, and for the same reason indicators of 
centrality (the mean or the median) are chosen for the present analysis as well as 
throughout Chapter 6. However, there is a statistical caveat behind this choice that the 
reader must take into consideration: the mean value (147.8) and the limited variance 
(100.2-231.1) of Dunbar’s results are based on “means of means” and not on direct 
estimates. This “mechanically” allows to control considerably the oscillation of the 
population variance and to obtain a more robust prediction. Why? Because of general 
statistical properties, an average of averages within a sample is said to very closely 
approximate the population average as the number of samples increases;
108
 however, 
the same does not hold for the population variance. 
Overcoming the criticisms: a simulation. A simulation was performed to 
replicate Dunbar’s research setting in our dataset. The aim of the simulation is to 
show that the present results are in line with the anthropologist’s on the 
methodological side, in order to strengthen their internal validity.  
The claim tested is that if the present n=239 observations are divided in z=36 
uniform classes (analogous to Dunbar’s N=36 “non-human primate genera”) each 
containing a number of k groups suﬃciently large, as k increases: (a) the mean of the 
z=36 uniform classes (on their turn, means of the k groups) will tend to the population 
mean (Mn=198.60, n=239) as k increases, (b) the variance of the mean will be reduced 
dramatically as k increases. As a consequence, an increasing number of observations 
(this time, means of means) will fall within the 100.2–231.1 range.  
                                                            
107 For further discussion, see Dunbar (1992a). 
108 The property mentioned is the well known “central limit theorem”. According to the theorem, the 
distribution of an average tends to be normal, even when the distribution from which the average is 
computed is decidedly non-normal (e.g., a uniform distribution). For an animated test of the central 
limit theorem, please consult http://www.statisticalengineering.com/central_limit_theorem.html (last 
visited: 12.3.2013). 
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The simulation is designed as follows. The n=239 appropriators’ group size 
estimates were pooled, and a routine that draws randomly from the pool 
k={1,2,…100} sets of j={1, 2, …100} observations (1 observation is 1 appropriator’s 
group size estimate) for z=36 times was programmed. The k={1, 2, …100} sets are 
defined as “simulation rounds.” For each simulation round, z=36 group size means are 
computed, and eventually the mean of the 36 means and the proportion of means 
falling into the 100.2–231.1 interval are computed.  
 
 
Figure 5.9. Simulation of Dunbar’s research setting using this study’s data. 
Note. The lower dashed line depicts the percentage of observations in the interval in the observed 
point-data on appropriators (N=239), assumed constant. The upper dashed line shows that 95% of 
Dunbar’s observations fall into the interval (95% confidence interval). 
 
While the demonstration of part (a) and (b) of the claim is obvious on a 
statistical basis, the consequences on the inclusion of the means in the 100.2–231.1 
range are surprising. In Figure 5.9, it is observed that the percentage of group size 
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means included in the range 100.2–231.1 reached 95% when the number of groups 
included in the simulation round reached 30.  
Based on this simulation, it is apparent that the present results are now closer 
to Dunbar’s. This methodology may also have helped the anthropologist to get such a 
high R
2
 and a “moderately wide” confidence interval. Consequently, the two studies 
report results that are compatible, even though the present study exhibits fewer 
observations in the same range. At the same time, the results should not be directly 
compared, because the methodologies diﬀer as to data used and methodologies. Had 
the present observations been divided in groups and a mean group size for each group 
computed, the percentage of observations in Dunbar’s range would have increased 
substantially, even reaching 100% if the number of groups these observations were 
divided into was suﬃciently large. 
In Mccarty, Killworth, Bernard, Johnsen, and Shelley (2001), a team of 
anthropologists, after performing seven surveys in the U.S., found that the average 
network size of respondents was 290 (s.d. 232, median 231), using diﬀerent methods 
of counting and several robustness checks. The authors in some occasions aﬃrmed 
that the number is not an “average of averages” but a “repeated finding” and “almost 
certainly not an artifact of the method,”109 thus openly challenging the findings and 
the methodologies used in Dunbar (1992, 1993a). The number 290 is known among 
specialists as “Bernard–Killworth’s number,” though it is less well known than the 
analogous Dunbar’s number. There are two lessons to be learned from this. First, 
Dunbar’s range can be an underestimate of the cognitive limit, defined as the number 
of people with whom one can maintain stable social relationships (and perhaps 
                                                            
109 H. Russell Bernard. “Honoring Peter Killworth’s contribution to social network theory.” Paper 
presented to the University of Southampton, 28 September 2006. Retrieved from 
http://nersp.osg.ufl.edu/~ufruss/documents/killworth%20event%20sept%202006.ppt (last visited: 
20/3/2013). 
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methodologically biased). Second, other estimates of this limit refer to human social 
networks (Mccarty et al., 2001; Ugander, Karrer, Backstrom, & Marlow, 2011), with 
direct observation and diﬀerent methodologies, and all report estimates appreciably 
higher than the upper-bound limit. What is relevant for the present case study is that 
the findings of these studies only serve to further support our claim, since higher 
estimates would only lead to including more observations in this range (Mccarty et 
al., 2001; Ugander et al., 2011). Therefore, the present estimate is considered as one 
peculiar of this case study, although in line with the findings of Dunbar (1992, 
1993a), Ugander et al. (2011), and Mccarty et al. (2001). 
Linking the estimated thresholds to institutional change. A last set of tests 
have been carried out to understand whether or not the linear predictions of 183 (if the 
full sample is considered, which includes also multi-layered communities) or 170 (if 
only single-layered communities are considered) appropriators, the mean group size 
of 198.8 individuals or the median of 155—all included in Dunbar’s range—identify 
thresholds for institutional change. The evidence appears to strongly support the 
cognitive limits argument, and these reasons are contained in two additional tests 
performed on informal institutions. The argument is backed by additional evidence 
articulated in three stages: (1) reasons for using the villages’ size under informal 
institutions as informative for subsequent analyses, (2) estimation of “comfort” and 
“tolerance” zones, (3) robustness checks. 
(1) Indirect evidence from informal institutions. Little can be said about 
informal institutions without direct observation: knowledge is limited to the existence 
of villages and multi-villages, their estimated population, and the year of their 
transition to a formal institution. What is known, for instance, is whether they had 
informal gatherings for coordinating their action, or whether they simply harvested on 
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the commons. The present study also does not observe—as also in formal 
institutions—the proportion of outsiders on the total population. It was considered that 
in informal institutions, the proportion of outsiders was reasonably low. If one of the 
purposes of adopting a formal institution was to define the number of legal users 
(thus, the distinction between insiders and outsiders), one can assume that in informal 
institutions, outsiders were not problematic for the management of the commons. 
Thus, the population of communities under informal institutions can be considered a 
proxy for the number of appropriators on the commons.  
(2) Estimation of the “comfort” and “tolerance” zones. Based on the available 
information, the single-layered communities under informal institutions (n=778) were 
selected from the reduced panel. The median population size of this sample is 231 
(IQR=253). Incidentally, this value is equal to Dunbar’s upper limit in the 95% 
confidence interval. The way in which the observed year is correlated with population 
was analyzed using the following linear regression estimation: 
(116.73) (0.074)***
13.048 0.20POPULATION YEAR        (5.3) 
2 0.00; 778R n   
The population of informal communities seems to remain stable over time, and 
the coeﬃcient of YEAR is statistically significant at the 1% level. Visually,110 the 
linear fit is just above 231 (the median, or Dunbar’s upper bound of the 95% 
confidence limit). Only 36.8% of the observations are in Dunbar’s range, and when 
the medians for each of the six selected years are computed, four of these medians are 
below 231. The medians for the years 1750 and 1800 are above Dunbar’s upper 
bound and concern years of particular diﬃculty for the Carte di Regola regime. 
Therefore, it can be considered that Dunbar’s upper bound value is also an 
                                                            
110 Figure 5.10, Appendix C. 
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upper bound for informal institutions. A “comfort zone” can be defined below this 
value. 
At this stage, it is not possible to state how much of the informal communities 
this upper bound meant for entry in a “zone of tolerance” in which, at any time, the 
transition to a formal regime was possible. Many of these villages transitioned to a 
formal regime. Following a similar reasoning, the free-riding hypothesis
111
 and 
compatibly with economic theory (Kremer, 1993) were tested. It can be conjectured 
that if the upper bound exists, large communities transition to the formal regime by 
adopting the first Carta earlier than small ones do. Accordingly, from the documents 
dataset, the communities of which the number of appropriators during the first 
adoption of a Carta (n=71) can also be observed were selected, without excluding 
multi-village communities from the final sample. The community population in 1810 
and the year of the adoption of the first charter (n=65) are first considered. The linear 
regression equation is: 
1810
(831.06)*** (0.540)***
3240.24 1.673POPULATION YEAR       (5.4) 
2 0.13; 65R n    
An increase of 100 years in the first adoption of a Carta is correlated with a 
decrease of 167 inhabitants of the community population (standard errors clustered 
for 65 communities). Thus, on average, larger communities in 1810 were the first to 
adopt a Carta.  
(3) Robustness checks. As a robustness check, community population at the 
year of the adoption of the first Carta was considered. This allowed checking whether 
the result was consistent at the population size value closest to the upper bound. The 
result was substantially unchanged: 
                                                            
111 Figure 5.3, Appendix C, using the main dataset. 
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(477.84)** (0.310)*
1285.44 0.575adoptionPOPULATION YEAR       (5.5) 
2 0.05; 65R n    
It was also observed that, out of the 65 communities in the sample, 77% 
transitioned while having a size in the comfort zone (below Dunbar’s upper bound), 
and 23% transited to a formal institution when having a size in the zone of 
tolerance.
112
 In addition, the number of appropriators at the year of transition to a 
formal institution is stable over time; thus: 
(153.98) (0.100)
15.74 0.096allAPPROPRIATORS YEAR        (5.6) 
2 0.01; 71R n    
 
(192.14) (0.120)
170.04 0.003single layerAPPROPRIATORS YEAR        (5.7) 
2 0.00; 57R n    
Again, group size during the transition to a Carte regime in the full sample of 
appropriators’ group estimates and in a subsample containing only single-layered 
communities was considered. The coeﬃcient of YEAR was not significant but 
statistically not diﬀerent from zero at the 10% level (Prob>F=0.7757 in Equation 5.6; 
Prob>F=0.9751 in Equation 5.7). Note that the predicted value of 170 in Equation 5.7 
was remarkably similar to the one obtained with a larger sample in Equation 5.2. The 
median number of estimated appropriators on the commons was 142, while the mean 
was 163 (Dunbar’s mean was 147.8). The basic result obtained from statistical 
analyses on historical data was that large communities are those who adopted a first 
Carta the earliest. This was interpreted as evidence that an upper bound in group size 
                                                            
112 It is acknowledged that many factors could determine how wide the zone of tolerance was; that is, 
how long the informal community waits to grow before transiting to a formal regime. These 
investigations, however, fall outside the scope of this chapter. 
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does exist. 
5.4. Conclusions 
Much debate in recent decades has been devoted to understanding the role of 
group size in collective action and in institutions. This chapter contributes to this 
literature by identifying and testing five key factors that may explain the importance 
of group size for collective action in the commons. The analysis used the case study 
of hundreds of communities in the Italian Alps and their institutional changes from 
1200–1800 using a variety of historical sources. The following were considered as 
potential predictors of institutional change: that group size may be resource specific, 
the free-riding logic, the transaction costs in delineating and enforcing property rights, 
the diﬃculties in aggregating individual preferences and in reaching a collective 
consensus, the human cognitive limits in social interaction, which eventually should 
reveal the existence of a critical threshold in group size. 
In conclusion, it was found that group size matters in the choice between an 
informal and a formal institution. In communities adopting a formal institution, the 
median size is considerably larger than the median size of communities under 
informal institutions for the selected dates in 1350–1800. Among the communities 
that ever adopted a charter (n=230), the timing of charter adoption is related to 
community size. The larger the community, the earlier the adoption. Particularly, it 
was found that communities with a population above 1200 inhabitants have a median 
year of first charter adoption statistically lower than the other communities. On the 
whole, the free-riding argument is not supported by empirical evidence: Large groups 
are also able to solve collective action using formal institutions. 
A small and not statistically significant diﬀerence was found between the 
median of population size in the forest-prevalent and pasture-prevalent groups in the 
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considered years. Overall, there is a slight resource specificity in group size, which 
may also be related to differences in transaction costs between the two diﬀerent 
resources, and not necessarily to economies of scale in production. The conclusion for 
the case of the Trentino communities is that from 1350–1800 economies of scale are 
not a major factor in explaining the role of group size in collective action. 
It was found that communities always increase in size in the change from 
informal to formal institutions. Over time, the formal solution is established as the 
most preferred by the vast majority of communities. The median population is almost 
always significantly higher under formal institutions than under informal institutions, 
but the diﬀerence, in absolute terms, is not large and is more significant in forest-
prevalent communities. It was found that group size in the two types of resources is 
institution-specific, remarkably so in communities where forest is prevalent. This 
effect is attributed to the diﬀerent transaction costs in the two resources: in fact, 
transaction costs are higher in forest. Remoteness was also considered in terms of 
linear distance from local town as another proxy to capture diﬀerences in transaction 
costs structure for the interaction on the commons. More isolated communities usually 
have a higher transaction cost structure than less isolated communities: if the 
transaction cost argument holds, more isolated communities are expected to be 
smaller in size and to increase their size when they adopt a formal institution. It was 
found that, overall, more isolated communities are smaller in size, even though the 
diﬀerence between those and less isolated communities is not huge. There was a 
statistically significant increase in size when a charter was adopted by the 
communities, regardless of their remoteness from the closest local town. 
The heterogeneous preferences argument is moderately supported by field 
evidence. When comparing the median size of groups adopting a unanimity rule with 
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the median of groups using other quorums, the hypothesis of equality of medians 
(medians are not statistically diﬀerent at any level below p<0.05) can be rejected. The 
hypothesis of equality of the distributions of the attendance of active members is also 
rejected (p<0.01). A randomly drawn assembly not adopting a quorum of unanimity 
has a probability of 0.748 to have a higher number of attending active members than a 
randomly drawn assembly where the quorum is unanimity. 
Field evidence strongly supports the role of cognitive limits in explaining 
group size and institutional change. Notwithstanding population in the Trentino 
region tripled between 1250 and 1800,
113
 group size in collective action in harvesting 
the commons remains in the order of hundreds for six centuries; particularly, the 
number of appropriators estimated using the data from assemblies points to a stable 
size over time.
114
 In formal institutions, potential threshold values of 198 (if the mean 
is considered) or 155 (if the median is considered) appropriators were identified. The 
threshold is quantified in 183 (full sample, which includes multi-layered 
communities) or 170 (if only single-layered communities are considered) predicted 
appropriators in 1245–1801. The linear fit is stable throughout the observation period.  
A simulation was performed to demonstrate how this result strongly supports 
the argument and how this result is also in line with Dunbar’s hypothesis of a limit in 
the number of contacts with which the human brain is able to handle stable 
relationships. In groups governed by an informal institution, an upper bound cognitive 
limit was identified at 231 individuals (median), having a similar characteristic of 
stability over time. This result potentially explains the rationale of the transition to a 
formal institution if groups are transaction cost minimizers. What cannot be observed 
is the behavior of the group internal to the community once these thresholds have 
                                                            
113 From 88,674 to 265,805 inhabitants; Figure 3.1, Appendix C. 
114 Figure 5.8, Appendix C. 
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been passed and the group finds itself in the zone of tolerance. However, in this case, 
what organization strategies are adopted by the group for collective action? This 
question is addressed in Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 6: Group Fission and Fusion in Institutions 
You know that at the encounter of two Roman Legions I have taken two Battalions of 
six thousand infantry and three hundred cavalry effective for each Battalion, and I 
have divided them by companies, by arms, and names. You know that in organizing 
the army for marching and fighting, I have not made mention of other forces, but have 
only shown that in doubling the forces, nothing else had to be done but to double the 
orders (arrangements).—( Machiavelli, 2003, Book VI) 
 
6.1. Introduction 
The present chapter studies the phenomenon of fission and fusion of face-to-
face groups among ~200 villages in Trentino and traces their institutional changes in 
the long run. It also investigates the consequences of fission and fusion for the 
internal organization of groups. Two issues deriving from Chapter 5 suggest the 
opportunity of treating this topic. The first is theoretical, and concerns the existence of 
group organization strategies capable of minimizing transaction costs when group size 
increases beyond a threshold, regardless of the degree of formality of institutions. The 
second is empirical, and is based on the evidence that population in Trentino almost 
tripled during 1200-1800 while community population on average remained constant. 
The general expectation is that communities in which group size increased 
above the threshold experienced fission events (or a restructuring of the internal 
organization of the group), regardless of time and keeping constant all other factors.  
This chapter introduces the research question, presents previous studies that 
tackled similar phenomena, illustrates the data and analyses, and eventually presents 
an interpretation of the evidence using a simple economic model. 
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Based on the structured observation of case studies over the long run, this 
chapter claims that groups aiming at the optimal management of common lands not 
only face the choice between informal and formal institutions but may also intervene 
on the costs of institutional choice by deciding how to organize collective action 
within these institutional forms. The voluntary division of groups into two or more 
subgroups and the adoption of an internal structure to manage collective action is a 
recurrent phenomenon in the organization of the social life, and represents a solution 
of a “cost minimization problem”. There may be multiple methods to organize 
collective action in consequence of fission and fusion after the transition to formal 
institution and that the choice of these methods is dependent on group size.  
To support this conjecture, this chapter reconstructs the dynamics of fission 
and fusion in communities composed of more than one village: the systematic 
observation of the fission and fusion behavior in these communities seeks 
compatibility with current theories, and mainly with the transaction-cost driven 
institutional change described in Sections 4.3–4.8. Specifically, empirical evidence is 
sought in support of the conjecture in the context of communities that have to decide 
how to allocate property rights on common land. This chapter finally tests whether 
fission and fusion are compatible with the existence of thresholds in group size. 
The data and the analyses in this chapter are in line with previous findings in 
the literature about group size, network size, and hierarchical structures (Zhou et al., 
2005) already described in Section 4.6.3. Anthropologists and biologists have long 
observed fission behavior in nature.
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 Group and network sizes are cognitively 
                                                            
115 See Chapter 4.7 for a review. As discussed in Chapter 5, Dunbar (1993a, p. 682) justified the choice 
of the mean group size of primate groups to determine the existence of cognitive limits. Dunbar also 
remarked that, whereas other animals like birds or herbivores have relatively simple aggregations, 
primate groups are characterized by aggregations that are structured in complex sets of social and 
kinship networks. It can be observed that bird flocks split as they exceed their optimal size, while in 
primate groups, this point oscillates considerably: “At the point of fission [...], groups tend to be 
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limited, and internal structures are adopted to cope with such constraints (Dunbar, 
1993a, 1998; Kosse, 1990; Kosse, 2001; Zhou et al., 2005). This process of unpacking 
the group size problem and then solving collective action has been identified by 
anthropologists and biologists by the name “fission–fusion dynamics,” which properly 
define the “extent of variation in spatial cohesion and individual membership in a 
group over time” (Aureli et al., 2008). The observation of fission–fusion behavior in 
institutions allows testing of the second part of the threshold hypothesis, reported in 
Section 4.8: 
Conjecture. After crossing the threshold, large groups tend to structure their 
internal organization in smaller sub-groups.  
Why do communities fission? The question that ignited the present research 
was whether there could be a connection between the observation of division and 
adoption of an internal organization of villages, what anthropologists and 
primatologists since long called fission–fusion behavior, and the threshold hypothesis. 
One explanation is that the rationale behind this behavior, observed in multi-
layered villages (fission) or in small villages (fusion), may be economic in its essence 
and, consequently, influence the institutional decisions of a group, eventually 
embodied in its legal documents. The social brain hypothesis posits the existence of 
fission–fusion behavior in relation to cognitive limits of the human brain, which is 
able to keep track of a limited number of contacts; this limitation is due to the 
existence of a relationship between the size of groups and the neocortex volume in 
primates and in humans (Dunbar, 1993a, 1998, 2003, 2009, 2012) and has found 
empirical support also by other scholars (Bickart et al., 2011).  
                                                                                                                                                                          
unstable and close to social disintegration: this is why they undergo fission at that point.” (Dunbar, 
1993a) The effectiveness of this principle has been observed in action in many human and non-human 
social settings, and it has been found to be a rather common and universal principle governing the 
engineering of nature. 
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Chapter 5 illustrated whether these human cognitive limits may affect the 
functioning of institutions for property rights, finding that group size may well be 
determined by transaction costs and by human cognitive limits, and concluding that 
these limits may also affect the structure of institutions. A series of studies claim that 
groups adopt an internal organization to coordinate relationships at a lower cost for 
information collection and dissemination. For instance, Zhou et al. (2005) find that: 
The fact that these relationships are not simply a matter of memory for 
individuals but, rather, of integrating and managing information about the 
constantly changing relationships between individuals within a group, is 
indicated by the fact that relative neocortex size correlates with a number of 
core aspects of social behaviour and socialization in primates (Byrne 1995; 
Pawlowski et al. 1998; Joffe 1997; Lewis 2000; Byrne & Corp 2004). It has, 
however, always been recognized that both human and non-human primate 
groups are internally highly structured (e.g., Dunbar 1988). (Zhou et al., 2005)  
Technically, fission–fusion strategies are both universal and “end neutral.” 
They occur in non-human and human behavior as an effective problem-solving 
strategy. In the context of institutional analysis, the logic of fission–fusion behavior is 
susceptible to an economic interpretation: dividing a group can allow for efficient 
problem solving when meager resources are available. One reason is mechanical: a 
complex and apparently unsolvable problem is unpacked in smaller and simpler sub-
problems. Eventually, a solution is found by combining the solutions to the sub-
problems. The recursive fractioning of a problem into small problems can allow, with 
constant effort, a solution in a shorter time by parallelizing task performance.
116
 
                                                            
116 The principle has found application in computer programming, where an entire group of algorithms 
named “Divide et Impera” exploit precisely this problem-solving strategy. The recursive reduction of a 
complicated problem in smaller sub-problems allows parallelized computation, thereby increasing 
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Another reason is economic, and concerns how institutional change is influenced by 
transaction costs in relation to group size: the present chapter offers an investigation 
of this second reason. 
The problem faced by the upland village communities studied in this chapter is 
eminently economic: the historical evidence is that, using Carte Di Regola, hundreds 
of communities were able to sustain cooperation in resource extraction and to avoid 
the tragedy of the commons for more than six centuries (Casari, 2007; Ostrom, 1990).  
The present chapter investigates the effects of fission–fusion strategies in 
governance structures and in institutional change: groups can solve collective action 
in institutions by organizing a large group in smaller clusters. Where a large group 
would fail the collective enterprise, the division of the group may ensure coordination 
in smaller units toward the collective goal: therefore, a divided and structured group 
may be better able to overcome the collective action problem.  
Recall that in the process of institutional change, population growth is 
assumed to be exogenously determined. Under this assumption, the increase in group 
size – in this chapter proxied by village population – leads to group fission–fusion and 
to the creation of structured interactions of subgroups, which allow the minimization 
of transaction cost and the further increase of the total group size, while at the same 
time the strategy allows solving the problem of collective action.
117
 
This chapter logically continues the investigation carried out in Chapter 5 on 
the consequences of the existence of a threshold in group sizes under different 
institutional regimes. From the methodological point of view, this study is inspired by 
a family of qualitative studies under a methodological paradigm that, in the social 
                                                                                                                                                                          
computational efficiency. An example of these algorithms is the “mergesort,” attributed to John Von 
Neumann in 1945. For a reader-friendly treatment of the issue, read Knuth (1998). 
117 See Section 5.1 and Kremer, 1993. 
188 
sciences, has been termed “grounded theory” (Bryman, 2010, pp. 541–550).118 The 
current chapter is a presentation of results that does not fully reflect the path followed 
in the research in chronological order: the research started from the systematic 
observation of the available data on the fission–fusion behavior of groups in formal 
institutions. First, coding, concepts, and categories were elaborated, and the 
framework was refined with constant comparison with the documents until categories 
became saturated. The research question was then formulated, and in many cases the 
present author proceeded to the collection of new data and to the refinement of a 
concept of the research question: the results of this stage are the fission–fusion dataset 
and the cases reported in Appendix B, which integrate this study. Next came analyses 
to confirm the conjecture, and this concluded with a theoretical model of institutional 
change that lines up with the observed data. The main purpose of this effort was the 
extrapolation of theoretical implications on two levels: first, the compatibility with the 
threshold hypothesis expounded in Chapter 4, and second, the compatibility of the 
observed phenomena with existing theories of group behavior and institutional 
change. 
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 6.2 describes the methodology 
adopted to select the cases: collecting, organizing and analyzing the data using 
                                                            
118 Grounded Theory (GT) is a research methodology for analyzing qualitative data proposed by Glaser 
and Strauss (1967). The scientists defined GT as “the discovery of theory from data.” Unlike other 
methodologies in the social sciences, GT provides the researcher freedom of generating new concepts 
to explain human behavior by “letting the data speak.” The goal of the research is the formulation of 
hypotheses based on the systematic conceptualization of an observed phenomenon. One of the main 
concerns of researchers using this methodology is asking, “What is the main problem participants are 
going to solve?” in the observed phenomenon. GT is not simply a “descriptive” method but makes use 
of the inductive and then deductive method to formulate and verify hypotheses, respectively. Normally, 
the explanatory power of claims in GT does not rely on the traditional concept of statistical 
significance of key predictors but rather on probability statements (“whether it is plausible”) about the 
relationship of concepts and categories obtained after an organization of the data called “open coding.” 
Only once all these steps have been completed can a formal theory follow. Hence, GT is not concerned 
with “validity” in a traditional sense but mainly with the “fit” of the theory with the data. Another 
methodological profile relevant for this study is that, in GT, a pre-research literature review is 
considered potentially harmful to results, as it may insert preconceptions about what to find, and the 
researcher may lose sensitivity in creating new concepts. 
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categories created ad-hoc for the case studies. Section 6.3 illustrates the results of the 
analyses conducted on the data, discussing whether the results of the observation are 
compatible with the threshold hypothesis; a possible interpretation of the data is 
eventually offered by modeling institutional and organization changes along three 
dimensions: group size, transaction costs, and rents from production of a pool of 
common resources. In Section 6.4, a discussion of the limitations of this study 
concludes the chapter. 
6.2. Methods 
The present section expounds the methods adopted to study fission and fusion 
behavior. Subsection 6.2.2 describes the criteria for the selection of relevant cases and 
their classifications according to the process of substantive coding from the original 
legal documents. Subsection 6.2.3 tackles the generation of codes, concepts, and 
categories for reconstructing the internal organization of each of the units of 
observation in every observation period. Subsection 6.2.4 describes the methods 
followed for the production of group size estimates. 
6.2.1. Case selection and data categorization. To provide evidence for the 
hypothesis, the fission–fusion database is built (Section 3.3). The dataset reconstructs 
details of 21 multi-village organizations representing 129 villages in total and a 
control group of 76 stand-alone villages in the Italian Alps between the year 1267 and 
1796.  
Due to a limitation inherent in historical data, full details on fission and fusion 
behavior could be provided only for formal institutions, because of the availability of 
written documents. The present research, however, does not exclude the existence of 
fission and fusion behavior also in multi-village organizations under an informal 
regime. Events referring to villages under informal institutions are inferred from the 
190 
institutional changes that occurred in the multi-village organizations selected for this 
study.  
The villages are observed during their institutional changes in the management 
of common resources as the population increases. These village communities used 
Carte to self-govern their economic life for six centuries (from 1202–1807). The 
analysis focuses on the relation between the size of face-to-face assemblies of group 
members and the internal structure of groups.
119
 For ease of reading, the concepts and 
the categories extrapolated after the observation of each of the case studies are 
presented, followed by a description of the fission–fusion dataset. 
To describe fission–fusion behavior of groups in institutions, the dataset 
distinguishes the organization of the multi-village from the resulting governance 
structure of the organization. Observing a multi-village organization normally entails 
the adoption of a Carta and, therefore, the setting up of a formal institution that may 
govern more than one village. The governance of the institution may be developed in 
one or more layers. 
The formal regulation of collective action in the rural charters shows evidence 
of fission and fusion of communities over time. In the present case study, sometimes 
face-to-face interaction occurs in communities that are structured in two or more 
coordinating subgroups. Such communities are termed multi-layered. Multi-layered 
communities are distinguished from single-layered and cluster communities. The 
distinction between single-layered and multi-layered communities concerns the 
governance of communities. Single-layered communities can be ruled under either an 
informal or a formal regime, while multi-layered communities require a formal 
institution. In a single-layered community, active members meet only in a general 
                                                            
119 In Appendix E, a detailed case history is provided in the form of summary tables. 
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assembly (or do interact informally, if the single-layered community does not have a 
formal regime), and all members have access to all of the common resources 
according to the assembly regulations. In a multi-layered community, at least one of 
the two criteria does not hold: either there are separate assemblies by village or 
subgroup or there is a partitioning of the common resources for use by village or 
subgroup or both.
120
 A multi-layered community may include two or more bordering 
villages, or it may consist of a multi-village organization or a cluster of more villages. 
In that case, the general assembly may still include all members or only selected 
representatives from each village or a subgroup of members. These concepts are 
summarized in Table 6.1. 
6.2.2. Internal structure of multi-village organizations. In multi-layered 
communities, face-to-face interaction may occur in multi-village assemblies gathering 
the whole group of appropriators from all the communities; however, collective action 
problems are more often resolved face-to face at the single-village level (with or 
without recourse to a formal institution). In this case, each village subsequently sends 
its representatives to the multi-village assembly for the purpose of coordinating a 
collective action in the multi-layered structure (Figure 6.1).  
 
 
                                                            
120 Examples. In the community of Fiemme, for centuries, the common pastureland was divided in 
multiple parts and then assigned on a rota basis to a group of villages belonging to the community. 
Coredo, Smarano, and Sfruz were a single-layered community with common use of the land, with a 
general assembly; Don, Amblar, and Romeno were a single-layered community, and the content of the 
rural charter was the common use of pasture. 
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 Figure 6.1. Internal structure of multi-village organizations. 
Note. “V” stands for (single) “Village”, “C” for “Cluster”, “M” for “Multi-village”. 
 
Figure 6.1 represents the categories adopted to interpret the internal 
organization of communities including more than one village (multi-village 
communities). Communities with more than 1 layer are defined “multi-layer”. The 
others are “single-layer” (or “one-layer”). Multi-layer communities (MV,MCV, 
MCV+) are organizations of multiple villages in which collective action is structured 
in two or more levels. One-layer communities are single-village interaction units 
within (or independent from) the multi-village organization (V). Therefore a single-
village that at some point in its existence belongs to a multi-village organization, 
having it a charter or not (that is, having it surely a village assembly or not), is 
considered “one-layer”. Appropriators are deemed to interact face-to-face in that 
village. Similarly, are considered one-layer also “Stand-alone” communities: villages 
that at some point in their life adopt a charter. Stand-alone communities are deemed to 
have a face-to-face appropriators’ assembly at the village level, and represent a 
separate group of control in statistical tests. A multi-village organization (M) is 
instead regarded as a one-layer if in the single villages do not adopt charters 
individually (there is only one organizational layer). Clusters may be made of one or 
more villages. They are multi-village or single-village organizations. When they are 
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single-village organizations, they are never from the Stand-Alone sample. They 
usually aggregate one or more villages from a multi-village organization for a limited 
period of time after (1) the fission of a multi-village organization, (2) the merge of 
two or more villages belonging to the same multi-village organization, (3) the 
aggregation of one or more villages resulting after the fission of a multi-village 
organization in a multi-layered structure (i.e. Valley of Fiemme).  
The distinctions above were drawn after observing a selection of 21 cases of 
multi-village organizations, and this paragraph summarizes the four criteria adopted 
for selection. First, only formal multi-village organizations were selected (Sample 
1),
121
 and the informal ones were excluded, because they never had a charter during 
their existence, and thus, an institutional analysis would be not precise: if registered in 
the dataset, they were regarded and recorded as stand-alone communities. Information 
on internal groupings in each multi-village organization was obtained using the border 
reconstruction made in Casari (2007); Casari and Lisciandra (2010) used the 
description of the boundaries in the text of rural charters matched with the details in 
the cadastral units in 1897 (Consiglio provinciale d’Agricoltura pel Tirolo, 1903).122 
Therefore, a complete list of villages belonging to multi-village organizations was 
obtained (Sample 2). Second, multi-villages of which there was no partial list of the 
villages belonging to the multi-village available were also excluded from the 
selection. From this shortlist, 26 cases of formal multi-village organizations were 
identified. Single villages that never had a charter may have been included as single 
                                                            
121 Recall that multi-village organizations can be informal when they do not adopt a charter; otherwise, 
they are formal. 
122 It is possible that the 21 cases selected in this chapter are not all the existent multi-villages, as the 
selection was based on the division in cadastral units dated 1897 and on the text of rural charters. Other 
cases may be existent, and those not observed might also have less institutional changes than those 
observed in the current selection. This might constitute a potential selection bias in the data. So far, no 
other case fitting with the requirements listed above has been found by the present author, and these 
potential cases are considered among the 76 stand-alone villages included in the control group. 
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villages in a multi-village organization and participated in the collective action for the 
management of the commons. Third, the following were dropped from this shortlist: 
Trento (it had a statute, not a charter), Vezzano and Padergnone, Primiero, Val di 
Fassa, and Ton (too few observations, or no change of interest for this study). Fourth, 
multi-villages not having a population estimate in 1800 were also excluded from 
selection.
123
 Another important criterion relevant for selection was to consider stand-
alone villages separately (Sample 4). Stand-alone villages never belong to a multi-
village during their existence and were considered one-layered structure communities 
by default.
124
 They were considered as a “control group” in the present analyses of the 
effects of fission and fusion in multi-village organization.  
The multi-village organizations selected are 21, and represent 129 villages at 
the year of first and last institutional change.
125
 The selected case histories constitute 
the fission–fusion dataset, an unbalanced panel that observes each village at every 
grouping level at every year of occurrence of an institutional change. Sample 2 
observes the behavior of 28 temporary groupings of villages. Sample 4 observes 76 
stand-alone villages at the years of first and last institutional change. There are 1,013 
village observations in the database in total. The period covered in the dataset is 529 
years (1267–1796). 
6.2.3. Internal structure of communities. This subsection describes the 
concepts and the categories used to organize the data on village population. In the 
organization of each multi-village community, there are three grouping levels that 
                                                            
123 Their inclusion would have prevented the calculation of a population estimate also of all the villages 
belonging to the multi-village at the time of every institutional change recorded in the documents 
dataset, reporting all the information concerning charter adoption and renewal (Casari & Lisciandra, 
2010). 
124 Hence, when calculating statistics on the distribution of the appropriators’ group size of stand-alone 
villages, it is possible that the real figures are overestimated. 
125 Table 6.3, Appendix D, lists the 21 cases with the number of villages in each one, recorded at the 
year of last institutional change. 
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may or may not exist: the village level (Level 1), the multi-village level (Level 2), and 
the cluster level (Level 3, represented in Sample 3). In each of the levels, it was 
determined whether there was an assembly or not using the data about charter 
adoption (the documents dataset): if a charter was adopted in the level, there was 
necessarily an assembly.  
Considering all the villages (Level 1) and all the years in the dataset, only one-
third of the observations had an assembly at the village level (340 observations out of 
the 861 involving villages in multi-village organizations). Of the clusters, 68% had an 
assembly at the cluster level (334 observations out of the 861 involving villages in 
multi-village organizations). Of the multi-village organizations, 78% had an assembly 
at the multi-village level.  
At the year of last institutional change, the numbers do vary significantly: 66% 
of the multi-village organizations (called communities in the previous chapter), 69% 
of the clusters, and 39.53% of the single villages had an assembly. In the 39.53% 
representing the villages within the multi-villages, stand-alone communities were not 
included:
126
 in those dates, 62% of them (n=127 out of 205) would have had an 
assembly.  
From the definition of the “assembly level” described above, two important 
features of the structure of community organization are inferred. The first concerns 
the number of layers compounding the structure of formal collective action, as 
described by the number of assemblies. From this point of view, villages were divided 
into four classes: ruled under informal interaction, one-layer, two-layer, and three-
layer
127
. For example, if a community had an assembly only at the multi-village level 
and not at the village level, or only at the village level, it was considered a “one-layer” 
                                                            
126 Stand-alone communities are observed at the first and the last institutional change. 
127 Table 6.4, Appendix D. 
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village. The second piece of information overcomes this limitation, as it offers a 
description of the structure based on the mix of the assemblies.
128
 Another useful 
distinction to identify the layers is the one adopted at the beginning referred to the 
multi-village communities.
129
 Consistent with similar findings in the literature (Zhou 
et al., 2005), the maximum number of layers of multi-village organizations is four, 
and 80% of the cases have between 1–3 layers. 
6.2.4. Group size estimates. The criteria for the selection of the sub-sample of 
observations that was used to test the social brain hypothesis are as follows. First, 
group size estimates were computed for each of the observations in Samples 1, 2, 3, 
and 4. Therefore, group size estimates were obtained at every level: village groups, 
cluster groups, and multi-village groups. Estimates based on population data and 
estimates based on assembly data are distinguished.
130
 Eventually, the level at which 
plenary face-to-face assemblies are held was identified. 
Estimates based on population data. Population estimates include both the 
insider and the outsider groups, and provide a figure of the potential number of 
appropriators interacting in the commons. For each multi-village organization, the 
1810 Napoleonic census data were extracted (Andreatta & Pace, 1981). Such data was 
also extracted for the villages included in the multi-village organization, when 
existent and when the census provided an estimate. Earlier estimates were computed 
using the Italian population trend calculated by Bellettini (1987) to scale back the 
1810 population, rounded to the nearest integer. The validity of this procedure has 
been proven satisfactory for the Trentino case study.
131
  
                                                            
128 Table 6.5, Appendix D. 
129 Table 6.6, Appendix D, contains a frequency distribution at the last institutional change. 
130 In Appendix E, summary tables are provided with the population statistics for each year in all the 
multi-village organizations. 
131 See Chapter 3; these estimates have been validated by cross-checking with population data points in 
a variety of other direct historical sources. 
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If the village existed, but no 1810 census data were available, the village 
population was set to zero throughout its life. When census data were available for a 
community that did not exist at a certain date, the population of that village was 
divided among all the remaining villages in the multi-village organization in 
proportion to the total population of the multi-village population represented by each 
single village. When no census data was available for the single village, but the 
census of all the other villages was available for 1810, the population of that village 
was obtained by subtraction from the total of all the other villages. When no census 
data was available and the village was not existent, the village was removed from the 
dataset. A null estimate was eventually obtained for 143 villages, and three villages at 
the cluster level corresponding to one cluster (out of 861 observations over time). All 
the remaining observations have a population estimate. 
The population of the 76 stand-alone villages (Sample 4, the control group) is 
obtained by extracting the first and the last institutional change
132
 from the documents 
dataset provided by Casari and Lisciandra (2010) and applying the same procedure 
(1810 census data and backward projections of population using the Italian population 
trend, rounded to the nearest integer). 
Estimates based on assembly data. Estimates based on assembly data are 
obtained from the appropriators’ group size estimates in the previous chapter: this 
estimate isolates the insiders’ group in total population and is therefore smaller than 
the population estimate. This figure is useful to understand assembly interaction and 
the number of appropriators allowed extracting resources on the commons. It was also 
thought that the level of mutual knowledge among the insiders was higher and that 
                                                            
132 See Section 6.2.6. 
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regular face-to-face interaction was more frequent. These estimates are superior to 
population estimates in terms of accuracy, as their origin is from first-hand data.
133
 
6.2.5. Considering plenary versus partial assemblies. Legal rules on the 
management of the commons are written in the village statute (Carta di Regola) and 
decided in village assemblies through a process of direct voting. Therefore, the charter 
is the main source to understand the dynamics of interactions within a village. In 
order to be able to test whether the threshold hypothesis is compatible with the data, it 
is necessary to identify the largest group of interactants in each of the assemblies in 
each of the three levels: multi-village, village, and cluster. The goal is to identify, 
within the villages observed at the last institutional change, when the assembly is 
plenary or partial. “Plenary assembly” is defined as a group size estimate that 
represents the largest face-to-face group of interactants, even when collective action is 
structured in more than one level. Plenary assemblies are distinguished from “partial 
assemblies,” where only village representatives participate in the face-to-face 
interaction. If the multi-village or the cluster group has a charter, the assembly may 
count only the representatives from the villages (partial assembly) that ratify decisions 
taken at the village level in a plenary assembly; alternatively, it may be that all the 
households’ members from all the villages participate in the assembly and cast their 
vote in a multi-village plenary assembly.  
In the analysis of the whole charter set of village and multi-village 
organizations at the last date of institutional change, plenary assemblies are identified 
using the following three criteria. First, if the charter of the multi-village or the cluster 
organization explicitly reports a complete list of participants from all the villages and 
the voter turnout, the assembly is considered plenary, and is attributed a unique code. 
                                                            
133 The reader is invited to consult Chapter 3 for details concerning the reconstruction of group size 
estimates based on assembly data. 
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Second, the absence of a list of attendance at the multi-village and cluster level jointly 
with the existence of at least a village having a village assembly within the multi-
village assembly interprets the multi-village or the cluster assembly as a partial 
assembly; therefore, the multi-village organization has plenary assemblies at the 
village level. This evidence is further corroborated by the presence of a list of 
attendance at the village level with the report of the voter turnout with a high 
correlation between the estimate of the appropriators’ group obtained using 
population and the estimate obtained using the assembly data.
134
 Third, a village 
assembly is assumed when there is no plenary assembly at the multi-village and 
cluster level, and the village does not yet have a charter. To the ends of the solution of 
collective action, informal interaction has effects that are analogous to a plenary 
assembly. Therefore, villages without a charter are regarded as having an assembly at 
the village level, particularly when at least one village within the multi-village 
organization has an assembly at the village level. At the year of last change, only five 
villages had plenary assemblies.
135
 The same criteria were used to identify the plenary 
assemblies for the first institutional change.
136
 Again, this study found a strong 
prevalence of assemblies at the village level (only 10 villages have an assembly at the 
cluster or multi-village level). The results of a correlation analysis support the validity 
of the second criterion.
137
  
                                                            
134 Using Sample 3, the Pearson’s correlation with appropriators’ group size is ρ=0.1535, still positive 
but not statistically significant. The Spearman rank correlation on n=12 gives a correlation coefficient 
of ρ=0.244, and the two measures are independent (Prob>|t|=0.4433); using Sample 4, a Pearson’s 
correlation of ρ=0.4299, significant at the 1% level, is obtained. The Spearman rank correlation on 
n=36 is 0.568, and the samples are statistically not independent (Prob>|t|=0.0003). 
135 Table B.3, Appendix D. 
136 Table S.4, Appendix D. 
137 Using Sample 3, the Pearson’s correlation is ρ=1.00, significant at the 1% level. The Spearman’s 
rank correlation on n=2 gives, obviously, a correlation coefficient of 1; using Sample 4, a ρ=0.639, 
significant at the 1% level, is obtained. The Spearman’s rank correlation on n=28 is ρ=0.749. 
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Institutional changes recorded by rural charters are considered. The present 
analyses excluded charters not regulating the commons. Statistical analyses 
considered the first and sometimes the last institutional change. The sample belonging 
to the last institutional change includes 205 villages (Sample 2 and Sample 4), 129 
under the 21 multi-village organization, 76 stand-alone. The first reason for this 
choice is based on the fact that many villages report a date of foundation 
(reconstructed using the year of the first document written in the village or 
mentioning the village) that is later than the first institutional change; thus, observing 
the first institutional change would lead to missing observations (but would be useful 
to capture the evolution of the internal structure of the multi-village organizations: 
this sample will be used later). The second reason for this choice is that population 
grew dramatically from 1200–1800,138 and choosing the last institutional change 
ensures observation at the maximum group size. 
6.2.6. Fission, fusion, and institutional change. This chapter analyzed the 
structure of multi-layered communities and the largest unit where interaction occurs 
face-to-face. The focus is on group size at the moment of institutional changes and, in 
particular, when institutional changes bring about the fission of the multi-villages into 
smaller subgroups or the fusion of single villages into a structured multi-village 
organization. In studying institutional changes, the multi-village organization as the 
unit of observation is considered.  
Three institutional changes are defined: individual adoption, fusion, and 
fission. Empirically, these institutional changes – and particularly the fusion – are not 
sudden one-step decisions, but entail a series of intermediate steps. The next 
paragraphs introduce a discussion of each institutional change. 
                                                            
138 Figure 3.1, Appendix C. 
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“Individual adoption” is the transition of a village from an informal regime to 
a formal institution. This change is the initial status from which further changes of a 
multi-village are considered. It is assumed that, once a community adopts a charter, 
the charter is enforced until 1800; that is, there is no switchback to the informal status. 
Often, individual adoption is followed by a fusion, the merge of the villages in 
a multi-village organization. The fusion is oftentimes followed by a fission event, 
underlining a collective action problem. 
The fission phenomenon is described with four alternatives: coexistence, 
clustering, clustering and coexistence, and independence. Fission events can be 
“strong” or “weak” in terms of the intensity, measured by transaction costs they 
require to be enforced. 
a) Strong fission. Events of two types entail and generate “high” transaction 
costs. The first is the split of a multi-village into two or more independent clusters 
because of the independent adoption of a charter by one or more of the villages. This 
event is termed “independence,” because with the adoption of a charter, the villages 
separate their interaction from the multi-village organization and have an assembly 
independent from the multi-village one and from those of the other villages. The 
second strong fission event is termed “clustering,” and occurs when the multi-village 
structures operate by letting each village organize independently in clusters of one or 
more villages, which send to the multi-village assembly only the representatives of 
villages (i.e., Val di Fiemme).  
b) Weak fission. Two events are regarded as weak institutional changes.
139
 The 
first is defined as “coexistence”, and is a fission event comprising the adoption of a 
charter by one or more villages that does not require bargaining with all the other 
                                                            
139 “Renewals,” amendments of a previous regulation, are not regarded as proper changes involving 
fission–fusion and therefore are not considered in the analyses. 
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villages or the multi-village organization while coexisting with the multi-village 
charter. This event may occur also after a fission clustering, hence generating a 
second weak institutional change, termed “clustering and coexistence”: this case 
occurs when, within a cluster, one or more villages may decide to have a village 
charter coexisting with the cluster charter and the multi-village charter (if any). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
 
Table 6.9.  
Institutional changes and group size in 1200–1800: detail 
 
Note. The mean group size is referred to the largest cluster after institutional change, and is rounded to the nearest integer. Source: dataset constructed by the Author. 
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 Figure 6.6. Institutional changes through fission–fusion in 1200–1800. 
Note. The figure illustrates a total of 53 institutional changes. We start from the FUSION box with 21 multi-villages. The number next to “End” denotes the number of multi-
villages in the corresponding box in the year 1800. Arrow widths are proportional to the frequency of changes. The dashed lines denote loops, institutional changes of 
communities within the same box. The numbers of loop changes are in parentheses next to the dashed lines. Source: dataset constructed by the Author. 
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6.3. Results and Discussion 
6.3.1. Empirical strategy. The present subsection illustrates the results of the 
systematic observation of the case studies. As anticipated, this chapter presented 
statistical analyses of the cases after the presentation of coding and data organization, 
while the research analysis and coding employed a “circular” process involving 
observation, categorization, analysis, comparison across categories, and in some cases 
additional data collection. The results presented here are, therefore, final 
considerations drawn upon the completion of the process.
140
  
Based on this information, this study performed statistical analyses on the 
internal structure of communities in relation to population. Based on the internal 
structure of communities, the population was compared across different group levels; 
alternative group size estimates were also used; eventually, analyses were performed 
separately for the first and the last institutional change observed in plenary meetings; 
the pattern of 53 institutional changes that occurred in the 21 multi-villages were 
studied, and these changes were placed in relation with population size. Subsection 
6.3.7 provides an interpretation of the findings using a simple economic model. 
6.3.2. Internal structure of communities. In multi-village organizations 
observed during their last institutional change, when group size increases, the number 
of villages comprised in each multi-village also increases. The pairwise correlation is 
ρ=0.64.141  
6.3.3. Internal organization of multi-village organizations. This result can 
be considered a first evidence of the existence of an internal organization result of 
fission–fusion strategies: larger multi-villages have a higher number of within-
                                                            
140 The results of this process are organized in the tables in Appendix C. These tables reconstruct the 
institutional history of each of the 21 multi-villages and of the within-villages for each year of 
observation. 
141 Figure 6.2, Appendix C, and Figure S.2, Appendix C, for the first institutional change. 
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villages. In addition, as the population of multi-villages increases over time, 
generally, the number of within-villages increases.
142
 The equation of the linear fit 
reports the following results: 
(0. )*** (0.000)***726
0.0012.918villages multi villageN POPULATION      
2 0.54; 21R n    
The coefficient before multi villagePOPULATION   has been found to be 
statistically different from zero (Prob>F=0. 0078). If a multi-village is considered at 
its last institutional change with a population equal to 1,000 inhabitants, the number 
of villages that are included is predicted to be, on average, 3.918. This increase is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. This result is interpreted to index that, as 
group size increases, the internal organization of communities becomes more 
complex. Fission events (the increase of the number of within-villages) may be aimed 
at solving this complexity: the fission of a village may bring a reduction of transaction 
costs within the multi-village. 
6.3.4. Group size estimates. It is useful to recall that “group” refers to the size 
of villages, clusters of villages, the size of multi-village communities, or the size of 
the largest face-to-face group (village, cluster, or multi-village) at the last institutional 
change and is expressed in terms of population when not otherwise indicated. 
Analyses are therefore carried out to compare the size of these groups across their 
categories. The purpose of this comparison is twofold: (a) to test whether groups 
belonging to different levels differ significantly in size and (b) to test whether group 
size estimates are within Dunbar’s range—a contingency that would allow testing the 
threshold hypothesis in the context of fission–fusion behavior. 
                                                            
142 The reader can find a scatterplot also for the first institutional change in Figure S.2, Appendix C.  
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The median sizes of single villages are remarkably similar (310, 306, and 
366). In addition, there is little difference between the median size at the first (306) 
and the last (366) institutional change in stand-alone villages.
143
 The variation 
(measured by the IQR) is also similar (526 and 566). As previously commented in 
Chapter 5, population estimates include both community members and non-members, 
and indicate the potential number of appropriators on the commons. Unlike the results 
in Chapter 5, this time, it has been possible to identify the largest face-to-face group 
of interactants, albeit with two limits. The first is that these estimates were based on 
population size; therefore, the medians—although indicators of a central value robust 
to outliers—are still overestimating the number of effective appropriators on the 
commons because they also include outsiders. The second is that these estimates are 
performed only for the first and last institutional change. 
Using direct observation of assembly participation assemblies,
144
 quorums, 
and household size, an estimate of the insider group size was computed in Chapter 5, 
and the number of appropriators in each community where an assembly has been 
observed plotted, this time selecting only the sample of communities involved in 
fission–fusion (n=173). The scatter in Figure 6.3 (Appendix C) visually separates 
villages from clusters and multi-villages, while Table 6.8 (Appendix D) reports 
statistics in tabular form. The histogram (Figure 6.4, Appendix C) represents 
assembly size frequencies in custom-made classes at the last institutional change.
145
 It 
is possible to notice that Dunbar’s range is the assembly size in handling face-to-face 
interaction in assemblies (the absolute frequency is 56; the relative is 0.273).  
 
                                                            
143 Table 6.7, Appendix D. 
144 Figure S.3, Appendix C, in tabular form at Table S.2, Appendix D. 
145 The first institutional change is instead shown in Figure S.4, Appendix C. 
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6.3.5. Village population distribution at last institutional change. The 
analysis of the empirical distribution of group size is aimed at comparing the size of 
face-to-face interaction. A first comparison can be carried out on kernel density 
estimates: the visual evidence is that, generally, the control group (Sample 4) and the 
main group (plenary) have a similar distribution at the date of last institutional 
change.
146
 
Statistical tests aimed at finding significant differences between distributions 
have also been carried out across samples during first or last institutional change. The 
empirical distributions of population estimates were first analyzed in Sample 4. The 
comparison was between the median population in plenary assemblies versus the 
median population of stand-alone villages. It was necessary to test whether there were 
significant differences between the medians of the two samples during the first 
institutional change and, later, during the last institutional change. In general, this 
difference is expected to be significant, since stand-alone villages should have a 
smaller size than units of plenary assemblies. In fact, at the first institutional change, 
the evidence indicates that the two medians are statistically different and that the 
median of the stand-alone sample is lower (Pearson’s χ2=19.2873, p-value=0.000, 
n=205). At the last institutional change, the medians are, instead, found to be not 
statistically different (Pearson’s χ2=0.8487, p-value=0.357, n=205). 
The empirical distributions of plenary assemblies and stand-alone are now 
compared in first and last institutional change to see whether there are significant 
differences within the same samples that may underline time-dependent effects. Time 
is not expected to significantly change the distribution of Sample 2. Instead, Sample 4 
is expected to shift to the right: the median of Sample 4 at the first institutional change 
                                                            
146 Figure 6.5, Appendix C. The kernel densities for the first institutional change are in Appendix C at 
Figure S.6, together with a set of empirical distributions at Figures S.5 and S.7. 
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is expected to become significantly lower than the one of Sample 4 at the last 
institutional change. This would mean, assuming that while stand-alone villages are 
not sensitive to a population increase, the villages in the sample of last institutional 
changes can increase in size and solve the collective action problem using a different 
internal structure. In accordance with this intuition, the median of the stand-alone 
villages does not change statistically from the first to the last institutional change 
(Pearson’s χ2=0.9474, p=0.33, n=152), while the sample median changes significantly 
from the first to the last institutional change (Pearson’s χ2=8.2049, p=0.04, n=410): 
the median size of the villages in the sample of plenary assemblies increases. 
6.3.6. Fission, fusion, and institutional change. Using the categories outlined 
in Section 6.2, this study identified 53 institutional changes involving individual 
adoption, fusion, and fission between 1276 and 1796. The general finding is that the 
institutional change follows a common pattern (Figure 6.6, below); namely: 1) fusion, 
2) fission coexistence, 3) fission clustering, 4) fission clustering and coexistence, and 
5) fission independence. Table 6.9 provides a summary in tabular form.  
As in Figure 6.6, as to the intensity of institutional changes, 17 cases are 
strong institutional changes (32%, solid line), while the remaining are weak (68%, 
dashed line). Strong changes are those involving independence and clustering. 
After observing the existence of a common path in institutional changes, the 
goal becomes to understand whether group size relates to institutional changes. An 
intuitive way to do this is observing how the size of the multi-village organization and 
the size of the largest cluster within the multi-village organization are distributed in a 
scatterplot after each type of fission event (Figure 6.7). 
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Figure 6.7. Institutional change, structure, and group size. 
 
In this way, it is possible to observe whether the internal organization of 
communities exhibits patterns also in terms of size of the largest face-to-face 
interacting group after every institutional change that has been observed. Two facts 
are worth noting. First, the size of the largest cluster is variable but extremely stable 
in relation to the institutional change: as can be seen, an ideal linear fit would be 
almost flat. Second, the different fission types underline a precise “sequence” of 
institutional changes, so that multi-villages where the largest cluster had a strong 
institutional change (independence) are not greater than ~1,000 inhabitants, strong 
institutional changes with clustering do not occur over ~6,000 inhabitants (regardless 
of whether they are results of fission clustering or fission clustering and coexistence), 
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while weak institutional changes occur until ~10,000 inhabitants covering the full 
multi-village size spectrum.
147
  
This evidence not only seems suggestive that the process of institutional 
change follows a precise path but also that this path is related with group size. It is 
conjectured that this relation between institutional change and group size may be 
driven by transaction costs. Each type of institutional change is conjectured to bring a 
different amount of transaction costs, in part dependent on the size of the group, in 
part dependent on other factors that can be “context specific,” to be considered 
necessarily under the ceteris paribus assumption. As a result, these analyses call for 
the clarification of a potential causal relationship running from increasing group size 
(because of assumed exogenous population growth at the beginning of this study) to 
increase in transaction costs, to internal organization of communities (layers) and 
institutional changes (fission and fusion behavior). Concerning fission events, in 
particular, some specific conjectures can be derived from the evidence found. 
a) Fission coexistence. As group size increases exogenously, fission 
coexistence is the lowest transaction cost change a village may adopt to solve 
collective action: it does not involve bargaining costs with the higher organizational 
levels, and it is a decision that can be undertaken unilaterally at the village level to 
manage the commons by formally regulating interactions that would be otherwise left 
to informal interaction. The evidence in support of this claim is that this change was 
the first chosen by any villages and the most frequently reiterated in multi-villages: 22 
“loops” are observed. 
b) Fission clustering. As group size increases exogenously, fission clustering 
is a change that is the second most demanding in terms of transaction costs: it requires 
                                                            
147 Table 6.9 for the results in tabular form. 
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the consensus of the highest multi-village level. However, the multi-village 
organization with a clustered internal structure has the major advantage of 
maintaining cohesion and bargaining power in political relations with the prince (e.g., 
the case of the Valley of Fiemme). In support of this claim, it was found that fission 
clustering is the second most preferred: four last changes and three loops are due to 
fission clustering. 
c) Fission independence. As group size increases exogenously, fission 
independence is the highest transaction cost solution, comparable to the division of 
two countries. To negotiate the definitive separation, a smaller group size is required 
to allow face-to-face interaction, and this might explain why (a) only few cases of 
fission independence and few loops are observed, (b) all the changes are at a small 
group size.  
6.3.7. Interpretation of the results: a simple model. As anticipated in the 
introduction, the rationale of fission–fusion behavior is mechanic, but essentially 
economic; this fact is abundantly documented in the animal world, where the essential 
traits of the “natural” economic rationale emerge most strikingly (Smuts et al., 1987, 
p. 248).  
The evidence presented in Chapter 5 referring to the same case study shows 
how the exogenous growth of population carries to a first institutional change from 
informal to formal institutions, and this transition is interpreted to be compatible with 
the presence of cognitive limits and—on a statistical basis—incompatible with other 
alternative explanations.  
The present chapter sought to find whether the internal structure of multi-
village organizations and the type and timing of institutional changes can be 
determined by group size. It was observed that the same exogenous population growth 
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led to further changes in the internal structure of formal multi-village communities; 
that these changes followed a precise path; and that this path was related to the size of 
the multi-villages, their villages, and their clusters of villages. 
Since observations are limited, the following subsection offers a possible 
interpretation of the results by means of a simple economic model. It is useful to 
recall the context of the model: the groups in this study are communities acting on 
common-pool resources. Unlike other models of optimal resource use, which consider 
mainly production costs and technology (Clark, 1990; Gordon, 1954; Hardin, 1968; 
Schaefer, 1956), this model accounts also for positive transaction costs (Allen, 2000) 
and the presence of two alternative institutional forms (informal institutions, and the 
Carte Di Regola). Most importantly, the model accounts also for the exogenous 
changes in group size (Kremer, 1993) as one of the key predictors of transaction costs 
in institutions. The two excerpts quoted in the previous subsection support this view: 
after the adoption of a formal institution, the community cannot increase 
unboundedly. There is an upper limit subject to the condition of optimal resource use 
determined by the presence and the enforcement of a Carta di Regola.  
The situation depicted as “excessive group size” can be resolved by the 
community in three ways: (1) impoverishment, (2) migration, or (3) changing the 
internal organization of the community by replacing or amending the institution, 
thereby increasing the level of aggregate surplus from production available at the 
village level. The third is the one observed in this chapter. The internal organization 
of the community can be changed in two ways: (a) by simply amending or replacing 
the “technical” rules of resource management without changing the structure of the 
community or (b) by changing the structure of the community. While (a) will be 
treated in Chapter 8, this chapter focuses on changes in the internal structure: 
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individual adoption, fusion, and fission. The link between these changes and 
transaction costs is also underlined by the second of the excerpts in the preceding 
subsection: fission normally occurs in a way that produces cohesive groups. Cohesive 
groups are defined as groups in which heterogeneity of individual preferences is low. 
Such groups are characterized by the presence of cooperation levels that are generally 
higher than those of groups with a high heterogeneity of individual preferences.
148
 
The reason for this regularity is that in a cohesive (and, to some degree, 
homogeneous) group, trust and social capital are more likely to emerge: as a 
consequence, group members benefit from low transaction cost relationships (Putnam, 
1993). The community is assumed to engage in fission–fusion behavior when its 
marginal benefit of doing so outweighs its marginal costs; therefore, a relation 
between production costs, transaction costs, and group size could be explanatory of 
the institutional changes observed. 
The next paragraphs set up of the model, state the welfare problem, identify 
the optimal group size, and offer a number of predictions on institutional changes. 
Model setup. Consider a group of N homogeneous individuals using a natural 
resource under a decentralized common property regime in Ostrom’s sense (1990). 
The condition of optimal resource use would lead to rents from production constant 
with the increase of group size. In fact, if it is assumed that the common resource is 
always harvested at fully cooperative equilibrium, at any time, the amount of resource 
harvested by the group is equal to the sustainable resource production at most.
149
 
The aggregate surplus (ω) is defined as the aggregate rents from production 
(π) minus the transaction costs (ψ) borne by the group. Aggregate rents are defined as 
the difference between production costs and total revenues from production of the 
                                                            
148 For a discussion and empirical test of social and resource fractionalization in groups and institutions, 
please see Chapters 7–8. 
149 In this model, for simplicity, adjustments of group size because of discounting are not considered. 
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group’s aggregate portfolio of resources at a given time. The aggregate portfolio of 
resource is defined as the sum of individual equilibrium resource portfolios (the 
amount of resources extractable by each user at the equilibrium level), which, in turn, 
are composed of different types of resources which may have a different yield. Total 
revenues from resource production can be calculated as the yield from resource 
production of each resource type in the resource portfolio of the considered 
community times the unit price of each resource, here assumed constant over time. 
Returns of scale are assumed constant (Bardhan, 1973; Douglas, 1976; Mundlak, 
2005). The definitions of “production costs” and transaction costs in this context are 
germane. 
The aggregate costs of production are the costs of aggregate effort employed 
in resource extraction and depend on the group size. The cost of the aggregate effort 
depends on the technology of extraction, the amount of workforce available using the 
technology, and the amount of labor exerted on the commons to extract a given 
quantity of a resource. This cost is assumed constantly at the optimal level (slightly 
lower than the cost at a zero-growth level) over time, so that rents are always a fixed 
proportion of revenues. When the amount of effort remains stable over time, the cost 
of effort is optimal. If the aggregate cost of effort is at optimal level as group size 
increases, the shape of π does not change with group size and can be approximated 
with a horizontal line. Finally, rents from production do not depend on transaction 
costs.  
Transaction costs (ψ) are defined as the costs of collecting and disseminating 
information about the state of depletion of the resource and about the behavior of the 
other group members: basically, the costs of writing and enforcing an agreement to 
implement optimal resource use. It is assumed that transaction costs increase more 
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than proportionally to the increase in group size. The discount rate is assumed to be 
very close to zero.
150
  
Individuals in the group endorse a set of bargaining efforts that tend to 
increase transaction costs. These efforts can be expressed in terms of participation, 
communication, and thrust to implement agreements. If individuals rely only on 
informal interactions, this cost component is limited to the communication effort. 
Participation effort is the cost of participating in an assembly where other people are 
gathered and interact simultaneously. Communication effort is the cost entailed by the 
set of actions performed by members to effectively vehicle information to other 
members, both under informal institutions and legal institutions.
151
 Implementation 
effort is the cost of reaching a decision in collective action, after the negotiation has 
taken place. Transaction costs in each time are modeled as a function of bargaining 
costs, monitoring costs, and enforcement costs for each individual in the group in the 
considered time (Dahlman, 1979). While individual bargaining costs tend to increase 
more than group size, monitoring and enforcement costs tend to be higher when few 
people are on the resource, decrease due to “network effects,” and then increase as the 
network gets more complex due to the increase of the distances among the individuals 
(that is, the steps needed to connect 
1i  to 2i  are probabilistically higher in a larger 
                                                            
150 The welfare implication of a fully cooperative equilibrium as designed in this model is that each 
individual wishes always to cooperate (has no time preferences). Mathematically (Conrad, 2010), on an 
infinite discrete time horizon, this means that if the present value of aggregate rent V (supposing that 
0 0 V   and t NV   for  1,2,...,t    ) has to face a discount rate 0   , then the discount 
factor / (1 )      and future payments are basically unaffected by discounting because
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151 This effort type is considered devoid of negotiation. 
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network with the same number of links – i.e., when people do not perfectly know 
who’s who in the group). Hence, the relation between transaction costs and group size 
can be approximated by a U-shaped curve. 
Monitoring is defined as the cost of individual direct collection of information 
about the level of exploitation of the resource and about the behavior of insiders and 
outsiders in the same commons. Monitoring enables the individual to detect rule 
violation on the commons. The cost of discovering an outsider in an area assigned to 
individuals is highest when the individual is alone. As group size increases, it 
becomes progressively easier to control the area if there is an informal or a formal 
agreement among insiders. However, at a certain point, individuals experience 
difficulty in remembering all the members of the agreement (Dunbar, 1993a, b, 2003; 
Miller, 1955). Memory constraints become material if the group counts people 
coming from different communities. If there are neighboring villages, people may 
find it difficult to distinguish insiders from outsiders by memory only. 
Transaction costs are affected by enforcement levels: as group size increases 
beyond the optimal level, the failure to recognize who is responsible for damaging or 
over-extracting in the commons requires investments to (a) clarify legal property 
rights in order to reduce revenue variability affecting economic property rights, (b) 
properly govern a larger polity that enforces property rights, and (c) reward monitors 
and punish trespassers and monitors when necessary. 
The welfare problem. Even when the group decides to pursue the condition of 
optimal resource use, the aggregate surplus is devoured by transaction costs. Since the 
group is burdened by an amount of transaction costs which varies with group size, a 
variation in group size is translated in a variation of aggregate surplus. 
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Optimal group size. The optimal group size is reached when the aggregate 
surplus 
*  for N at the time of observation is maximized. In a situation of optimality, 
the group maximizes the total subject to two fundamental conditions: 
1. Aggregate rents from production are constant as group size increases;  
2. Transaction costs are convex and can be minimized.  
In other words, at the optimal size, the group enjoys the highest attainable 
surplus from production net of transaction costs. Rules in formal and informal 
regimes that aim at rent maximization for the group are regarded here as “rent 
maximizing rules” (Ellickson, 1991). When group size increases, transaction costs 
decrease until a minimum is reached; informal interaction among users allows better 
control of the area and, subject to the zero-growth condition, surplus production 
available increases steadily until a maximum at 
*N , where aggregate surplus is 
maximized and transaction costs minimized. After 
*N , transaction costs increase 
rapidly because of the increasing difficulty of interaction among resource users, and 
the competition in accessing the resource leads to a progressive erosion of the surplus. 
The situation is sustainable while there is available surplus; however, if the group 
increases further, rents disappear, where ψ=π. The tragedy occurs when ψ>π, when 
cooperation is definitively not a profitable strategy. The existence of cognitive 
constraints in group cooperation is compatible with the representation of a U-shaped 
relationship between transaction costs and group size.
                                                                                                                                                                              
 
Table 6.10.  
Institutional change and fission–fusion: model predictions and observed behavior 
  
Note. N=group size. (1) conditions are numbered and referenced in the description of the model. (2) categories of observed structures refer to Figure 6.1. Group size in stand-
alone villages under informal institutions is not observable, and therefore communities belonging to this sample are not included in the analyses. Villages, clusters and multi-
villages under formal institutions have changes that are directly observed, while institutional changes of all the villages under single layer governance and informal institution 
are indirectly observed when a change in the multi-village to which they belong occurs. Graphically, the model works as follows: 
 
2
1
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Consequently: 
Proposition 1. (Optimal group size). Given a group of individuals possessing 
economic rights over a common-pool resource, facing positive transaction costs and 
constant returns to scale from production, there exists always an optimal group size 
N=
*N  (cond. 2) that allows the group to achieve the surplus maximization. 
Predictions on institutional changes. Two regimes of social interaction in 
decentralized systems are considered: informal and formal. Informal interaction is 
based on repeated face-to-face interaction using customs; formal interaction is based 
on a written contractual agreement. These two regimes correspond to two different 
collective action problems: the former is direct interaction in resource extraction, 
while the latter is the participation in institutions for collective action. This regime 
adoption can be related to group size. Two transaction cost curves are defined for the 
informal (
I ) and the formal ( F ) interaction regimes. Recall that a formal 
interaction regime is an investment for the group that occurs “once-forever.” This 
investment does not allow variability in rents from production and allows a higher 
surplus due to its technological superiority (lower transaction costs).
152
 With the 
adoption of a formal regime, the new aggregate rent level is 
F I  . The adoption of 
the formal regime is not profitable when group size is small and occurs when 
I = F
, which also indicates the positive setup cost of a formal regime for the group. This 
refers to group size at the adoption of a formal regime with N  being the size beyond 
which it is profitable to adopt a legal institution. When transaction costs for the group 
equal the rent from production, the total rent is eroded; if group size further increases, 
the group faces a social loss: the maximum group size N  under the formal regime is 
                                                            
152 In 1398, for instance, Mortaso had, before adopting the first legal institution, a group of insiders that 
was estimated at 110 individuals. In 1568, after the adoption of the first rural charter, the group of 
insiders counted approximately 170 individuals. 
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at 
F  . Hence, optimal group sizes in each regime can be identified: 
* * *( , )IN    and 
** * *( , )FN   . 
When N N  (cond. 1), the costs for the transition to a formal regime are 
higher than under informal interaction. Under this scenario, the optimal choice for the 
group is to remain informal. When N N  (cond. 3.a), the adoption of a formal 
regime is convenient and exhibits increasing surplus gains as group size increases. 
Benefits increase until 
**N . In conclusion, the adoption of a formal regime can lead to 
two gains:  
1. transaction costs are further minimized after the adoption of a formal 
regime:
F I   ; 
2. formal regimes allow a profitable allocation of property rights in larger 
groups: 
** *N N  (cond. 5). 
a) Fission. The fission of the groups, the adoption of a multi-layered structure, 
or a fusion of two or more groups may be profitable strategies to cope with the 
exogenous increase of group size. 
a.1) Fission independence. The point 
F   is critical: at this level, the 
group obtains no surplus under a formal interaction regime. If the group size increases 
over this threshold, transaction costs overcome the rent from production and 
cooperation breaks down in tragedy. Therefore, N  identifies the upper bound in 
group size under formal institutions, which is delineated by N N N   (cond. 4). 
When group size is N N  (cond. 6.a), it can be profitable for the community to 
fission into two independent communities (fission coexistence). 
a.2) Fission coexistence. It is also possible that the leaving subgroup forms 
more than one subgroup. Until group size is of a size defined as **[ , ]N N N N   , it 
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can be profitable for the community to fission into two independent communities 
(fission coexistence). The fission of a group under a formal interaction regime brings 
to the formation of two or more groups (the original and the new subgroups originated 
from the leaving subgroup) and may imply that the original group disappears after the 
fission if the two new groups decide to become independent (that is, 
0A  divides in 1A  
and 
2A , and 0A  disappears); the two (or more) new groups may opt for a formal 
regime or rely on informal interaction, depending on their size.  
a.3) Fission clustering. Another solution for the group to lower transaction 
costs at **[ , ]N N N N   is the split of interactions in two or more clusters (fission 
clustering) (Archetti, 2009; Lehmann et al., 2007). Such fission may occur both under 
informal institutions and under formal institutions, and the cause is the increase in 
transaction costs above an “acceptable” level for the group, corresponding to the 
entrance into a zone of tolerance. The resulting subgroups may coexist (fission 
clustering & coexistence), and, in this case, there are groupings of subgroups 
(clusters). This process can be repeated if a new subgroup increases above N . 
The result of the fission process can be modeled; however, the model displays 
unpredictability due to the divergence in the transaction cost structure of the group. 
The final outcome of the fission for the leaving subgroup is to be placed in a situation 
where it can obtain a positive surplus, regardless of whether this surplus is below or 
above the minimal size for adopting a formal interaction regime. In order to occur, 
this operation must entail an additional cost that is at least offset by the surplus gains 
in the new situation. Some case studies are useful to complete and clarify the 
institutional picture. 
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Example. Fission. Consider a group of size N  under a formal regime. When 
N N  (cond. 6.a), the group splits in two equal subgroups of size / 2N   . 
Assuming that both subgroups shared the land equally, then each subgroup will have a 
rent of π/2. 
Both groups face the same structure of transaction costs; hence, both groups 
face the same transaction cost curve. The change in group size causes only a 
movement on the transaction cost curve: the fission or multi-layered governance 
affects the rent level but not the structure of transaction costs, provided that the 
structure of the subgroups is unchanged with respect to the original group. The 
situation described depicts a case of bargaining under positive transaction costs, 
which leads to a mutually beneficial institutional change: the leaving subgroup 
obtains rents in leaving, and the main group obtains rents in allowing the fission. It is 
assumed that any reorganization of production affecting group size, such as fissioning 
or the adoption of a multi-layered structure, is performed only if both the leaving 
subgroup and the remaining subgroup are better off under the institutional change; 
thus, such a change can be defined as “mutually beneficial.” 
Example. Mutually beneficial fission. After the fission, the leaving subgroup 
( )N N    returns to a point where it can enjoy a positive surplus. In doing this, it 
decides whether to adopt a formal institution (if this leads to a higher surplus) rather 
than relying on informal cooperation. If the leaving subgroup approximates N in the 
new situation (post-fission), it may enjoy a positive surplus A’ higher than in its 
previous position. The remaining subgroup N   benefits from the reduction in size, 
and it can now enjoy the benefits deriving from the new surplus level A. The benefit 
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from the change is measured by 'A A . The model is general enough to also capture 
the case of an internal fractioning of a community. It is possible to state the following: 
Proposition 2. (Mutually beneficial fission). Under positive transaction costs, 
there always exists **N N N  , such that at least two subgroups N   and 
( )N N    will both benefit from a fission. 
b) Multi-layered structure. The adoption of a multi-layered structure follows 
a fission with clustering at **[ , ]N N N N   (cond. 6.b) and consists in the 
reorganization of the original group in one or more dependent subgroups into a 
“clustered” organizational structure on two or more levels (Zhou et al., 2005). The 
entitlements over the common land are shared by two or more groups of smaller size 
that interact within an organizational structure, so that the sum of the transaction costs 
of the single clusters is lower than in the case of their informal simultaneous 
interaction. 
Example 3. Multi-layered structure. Consider a group of N=400 individuals 
who cannot sustain cooperation. One solution is the adoption of a governance 
structure in two levels: (i) one group of 
1 200n   individuals under a formal regime 
and (ii) two groups of 
2 3 100n n   individuals each under informal interaction. The 
2 3n n  groups depend on the main group 1n . The three groups send one representative 
each to a general assembly, which eventually counts three individuals in total. 
The operation exemplified in the case above may appear counterintuitive at 
first sight, considering that this solution brings additional costs in terms of 
coordination of the various groups in a new system of assemblies and in terms of 
multiplication of assemblies. On the other hand, this operation may result in the 
reduction of transaction costs deriving from interactions that are “cognitively 
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unsustainable.” The evidence found on cases of fission coexistence, fission clustering, 
and fission clustering and coexistence is compatible with this example. 
c) Fusion. Another strategy (alternative to cond. 1) for two or more 
neighboring groups at N N  is to merge into a larger group to enjoy the benefits of a 
formal interaction regime in terms of reduction of transaction costs (cond. 3.b). 
Fusion may occur depending on the distance between the two (or more) subgroups, 
the cost of transport from one community to another, and the cost of enforcing 
borders. To this extent, the fusion is exactly the reverse procedure of a fission. 
Intuitively, the fusion is the first step of institutional change in multi-village 
organizations. An example can clarify this intuition. 
Example. Fusion. Consider two communities of size 100N     under 
informal regimes. The group merges into a multi-layered community having group 
size equal to 200N N N        and endowments equal to 2π. Assume that both 
subgroups share the land equally, and if returns on scale are constant and transaction 
costs decreasing in group size, the two groups may find it beneficial to merge rather 
than stay independent until N N   .  
Proposition 3. (Mutually beneficial fusion). Under positive transaction costs, 
assuming { , ,...}k    subgroups of equal size and with equal endowments π, when 
...N N     (cond. 3.b), it is always profitable for the communities to formally merge 
in a larger group with larger endowment   in order to enjoy the benefits of a 
reduction in transaction costs and an increase of the aggregate surplus after the fusion. 
Table 6.10 summarizes in tabular form the decisions a group may face in 
solving the collective action problem to achieve surplus maximization and 
accommodate cognitive limits under the model’s predictions. The other two columns 
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on the right show how the observed structures and behavior in the data are represented 
by the model’s predictions. The general conclusion that can be drawn from the model 
is as follows: a group will proceed to institutional change only when the surplus 
obtainable is higher than under the previous institutional choice (Alchian & Demsetz, 
1972; Demsetz, 1967). According to the model, a formal interaction technology is 
convenient when it allows an increase of the aggregate surplus attainable by the group 
and to manage a larger group size. Similarly, it is also shown how fission–fusion 
behavior may be interpreted as institutional changes profitable in economic terms. 
The potential for economic benefits deriving from these changes may explain why 
they are observable in nature. 
6.4. Conclusions 
This chapter started from the observation of fission–fusion behavior and group 
size in a selected sample of multi-village communities, and the economic and legal 
rationale underpinning the behavior was examined. The internal organization of these 
multi-villages was detected and reconstructed, although the proxy used for group size 
had some inevitable limitations concerned with the measurement of the real size at 
which the group solves face-to-face collective action. 
It was found that collective action is internally structured in subgroups 
organized in no more than four organizational layers (Figure 6.1). When comparing 
the population of face-to-face units in multi-village organizations with the population 
of a control group of stand-alone villages at the last institutional change, it was found 
that the median is not statistically different in the two groups. The median population 
of the stand-alone group remains basically unchanged from the first until the last 
institutional change (MF=ML=306, IQRF=528, IQRL=566, NF=NL=76), while the 
median population of the face-to-face units is significantly higher. These facts can be 
227                                                                                                                                                                        
 
explained by the existence of a relation between human cognitive limits and 
institutional change. Such cognitive limits are naturally present in our information 
processing capabilities and therefore affect our capacity to solve problems and to 
transact efficiently in collective action settings. The adoption of a fission–fusion 
strategy allows the overcoming of these limits by means of an efficient internal 
structure. This argument has been used in this chapter to suggest the applicability of 
the threshold hypothesis to the field of economic institutions and organizations. 
It was found that the process of institutional change follows a pattern repeated 
in all the case studies: fusion, fission coexistence, clustering, clustering and 
coexistence, independence. Institutional changes (specifically, fission) were not a 
sudden one-step choice for the group, but occurred through gradual transformations. It 
was conjectured that these changes are in sequence ordered by increasing transaction 
costs (Figure 6.6–6.7): this conjecture was supported by the observation of 
institutional changes entailing low transaction costs and repeated in sequence with 
high frequency (fission coexistence), alongside changes with high transaction costs 
repeated in sequence at a lower frequency (fission independence). Accordingly, if a 
relation exists between institutional change and group size, these changes should be 
sorted also by decreasing group size order.  
In an analysis of the relation between the size of multi-villages and of the 
largest cluster after every fission event, the hypothesis finds empirical support. The 
different types of fission events identify a spectrum where independence is adopted by 
smaller multi-villages up to ~ 1,000 inhabitants, clustering (including clustering and 
coexistence) occurs up to ~ 6,000 inhabitants, while coexistence occurs along the 
whole population size spectrum in multi-villages up to ~ 9,000 inhabitants. The size 
of the largest cluster (village) varies between 102 and 6,259 inhabitants. 
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After organizing the data according to systematic coding, and after analyzing 
the data, a simple model was elaborated to provide an economic interpretation of the 
findings. When group size increases exogenously, if rents from productions are kept 
optimal in perpetuity, institutions adapt to minimize transaction costs in order to 
maximize the aggregate welfare from the common-pool resources. The transition 
from an informal to a formal institution and the fusion or the fission of the group are 
modeled as transaction cost minimization choices. The adoption of an internal 
structure through fission–fusion strategies can be a solution to overcome the limit 
imposed by transaction costs in collective action.  
This study has four main limitations. The first stands in the limited number of 
observations on which it bases its claims. The second is that the analysis of fission 
and fusion behavior could be based only on the observation of villages belonging to 
formal multi-village organizations, because institutional changes were reported in 
written documents. This study cannot exclude the occurrence of fission and fusion 
behavior also in informal multi-village organizations, which remain unobserved. The 
third is that population almost tripled between 1200 and 1800, and this might explain 
why fission events were observed more frequently than other institutional changes. 
Fourth, the interpretation of the results is based on the assumption that population 
growth was exogenous to the process of institutional change. Although this 
assumption is plausible (Black & Henderson, 1999; Kremer, 1993), further research 
on new data will be able to clarify the direction and degree of causality between 
institutions, population, and economic growth.  
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Chapter 7: Defining Heterogeneity and Institutional Design 
Two neighbours may agree to drain a meadow, which they possess in common; 
because ‘tis easy for them to know each other mind; and each must perceive, that the 
immediate consequences of his falling in his part, is the abandoning the whole 
project. But ‘tis very difficult, and indeed impossible, that a thousand persons shou’d 
agree in any such situation; it being difficult for them to concert so complicated a 
design, and still more difficult for them to execute it; while each seek a pretext to free 
himself of the trouble and the expense, and wou’d lay the whole burden on others. 
Political society easily remedies both these inconveniences.—(Hume, 1739) 
 
7.1. Introduction.  
This chapter introduces the conceptual framework for the empirical 
investigation of institutional design carried out in Chapter 8. The focus is on the 
relationship between group and resource heterogeneity and the design of institutions 
for the management of common-pool resources. This study defines the concept of 
heterogeneity, outlines the main achievements, limitations and gaps in the literature.  
This chapter starts by providing an account of the recent scholarly interest for 
the study of the effects of appropriators’ heterogeneity on the likelihood of self-
organization and the design of rules (Ostrom, 2005). The next chapter investigates 
empirically whether heterogeneity was a key determinant of the institutional design, 
stability and change in the Carte di Regola system. The final section of this chapter 
provides a graphical description about how the present author proposes to contribute 
to the scholarly debate. 
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7.2. The Relevance of Heterogeneity 
7.2.1. Definition. As a first approximation, group heterogeneity may be 
defined as referring to existing differences across the group’s observation units. 
Unlike group size, which has a very intuitive measure (counting individuals in 
relation to a universal scale), heterogeneity must be expressed in relation to a 
measured “dimension” (i.e., group A and group B differ in terms of index x), resulting 
after the implementation of a “methodology” considered suitable to measure the 
difference along the chosen dimension (i.e., when index x is computed with method j 
on groups A and B, group A is more heterogeneous than group B because 
A Bx x ). 
The emphases of the literature can hardly be limited to only one of these aspects. 
In recent decades, an increasing number of papers on heterogeneity in 
collective action tackled either the dimensions of heterogeneity (for instance, cultural 
backgrounds, interests, and endowments: Baland & Platteau, 1996; Ostrom, 2005), or 
the methodology (for instance, fractionalization or polarization: Alesina, 
Devleeschauwer, Easterly, & Kurlat, 2003; Esteban & Ray, 1994; Montalvo & 
Reynal-Querol, 2003), or both (Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, & Kurlat, 2003; 
Esteban & Ray, 1994; Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, 2003; Leeson, 2005; Ostrom, 
2005). Normally, these contributions are attempts to disentangle the consequences of 
heterogeneity on economic outcomes.  
More recently, a branch of this literature has been concerned with the 
resilience of institutions for the management of common-pool resources. The 
contributions on this issue—differing in methodologies, geographical scope, sample 
sizes, and periods of observation—often report contrasting results and highlight a 
substantial disagreement among scholars. An example of this disagreement concerns 
precisely the role of heterogeneity and group size in collective action. Heterogeneity 
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and group size are expected to have an influence on collective action; however, 
scholarly consensus breaks down on the precise nature of their relationship and on the 
relative importance of either factor.  
Part of the problem is theoretical: the lack of agreement is on their 
conceptualizations (i.e., how to classify group size and sorting out sources of 
heterogeneity) often being misspecified (Ostrom, 2005). A second group of problems 
is on the empirical side and is inevitably related to the theoretical impasses (i.e., 
isolating the influence of either factor when they are interdependent and interrelated 
with several other variables: Poteete & Ostrom, 2004). Although it is generally 
thought that an increase in group size and heterogeneity is accompanied by an 
increase of transaction costs, which have an impact on the way public goods are 
provided (Barros, 2008), no definitive answer has thus far been provided as to 
whether and how group heterogeneity may have an impact on the design of 
institutions for the management of the commons. 
7.2.2. Heterogeneity in institutions. The study of heterogeneity and of its 
consequences in collective action and institutions has a long scholarly tradition, being 
separately treated in two strands of research and predominantly dealing with the 
determinants of the provision of public and collective goods. 
The first strand of studies moved from the theoretical study of collective 
action (Heckathorn, 1993; Oliver et al., 1985; Olson, 1965), later inspiring literature 
on common-pool resources. The groundbreaking study by Ostrom (1990) on the 
governance of the commons explicitly uses the expression “institutions for collective 
action,” first raising the problems of size and heterogeneity in self-governing groups 
managing common-pool resources. There have been numerous contributions 
following this first study, which are only outlined here.  
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A further stream of literature commenced with Tiebout (1956) and has been 
developed in the works of Alesina, Easterly, and Baqir (1999) and Alesina and La 
Ferrara (2005). Such contributions inspired scholars interested in economic growth 
and the effects of inequality, fractionalization, and inter-group conflicts on 
institutional and economic outcomes (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2001; 
Alesina et al., 2003; Easterly, 2001; Habyarimana, Humphreys, Posner, Jeremy, & 
Weinstein, 2007; Vigdor, 2004); these have been followed by a rich body of both 
theoretical and empirical papers, and—more recently—experiments (Smith, 2011).  
The leading question in the study of common-pool resources (i.e., forest, 
pasture, water basins, the atmosphere, etc.) has recently shifted to research on the 
effects of the heterogeneity of appropriators on the likelihood of self-organization and 
the type of rules designed (Ostrom, 2005). Contributions in this strand of literature 
differ in their definition of group heterogeneity along a diversity of dimensions. For 
instance, Vedeld (2000) focuses on resource heterogeneity, particularly forest 
coverage. Varughese and Ostrom (2001) highlight the terms of the institutional 
consequences for the presence of heterogeneity: when the interests of appropriators 
differ, it is particularly challenging to achieve a self-governing solution to common-
pool resource problems. One study of particular interest for our analyses—also often 
quoted by Elinor Ostrom, among many others, when reporting the issue of 
heterogeneity—is Lam’s (1998) study performed on 150 farmer-governed and 
agency-governed irrigation systems in Nepal. Lam investigated the impact of several 
variables on three performance proxies: physical condition of irrigation systems, 
quantity of water available to farmers at different moments of the year, and 
agricultural productivity of the systems. The use of multiple regression allowed Lam 
to control for environmental differences (read: resource heterogeneity) among 
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systems. The model specifications contained several factors, including the physical 
size of the resource system, terrain characteristics, and number of farmers. The 
strongest impact, however, was identified in the form of the governance system. In 
particular, it was found that irrigation systems self-governed by the farmers 
themselves performed significantly better than the agency-governed ones on all three 
performance indexes (Lam, 1998; Poteete et al., 2010). 
The problem is often raised of appropriators with more economic and political 
assets having similar interests to those with fewer, which may also differ 
substantially.
153
 Ostrom (2005) reviews a series of case studies of interest dealing 
with economic inequality, related to income, assets, stability of income streams, 
values, knowledge and skills, and location, in maintaining the resource. Ostrom also 
reviews studies dealing with forms of social heterogeneity (age, gender, ethnicity, 
status, and residence), which often are mirrored in forms of political and economic 
heterogeneity at the base of a group’s interests in shared resources (Poteete et al., 
2010). Across all of the studies reviewed by Ostrom, heterogeneity usually has an 
impact on collective action, yet occasionally does. When it was present, heterogeneity 
had a highly variable impact. 
Despite the case studies reported by Poteete et al. (2010) showing that 
institutional arrangements can mitigate the effects of heterogeneity, it is usually 
regarded as an obstacle to collective action, because it hinders individuals from 
reaching cooperative solutions (Bandiera et al., 2005; Libecap, 1995) and is seen as 
negatively affecting the quality of institutions (La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer, & 
Vishny, 1999). This argument highlights a major concern within the literature on 
heterogeneity (Ostrom, 2005), that the direction of causality remains uncertain.  
                                                            
153 See Bandiera et al. (2005) for a review of evidence from field studies and from an individual level 
panel dataset of rural workers in a farm in the UK. 
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This uncertainty is in part due to the existence of endogeneity in the process of 
institutional formation: when the researcher observes institutions, it is indeed very 
difficult to determine cause and effect. A common problem bringing researchers to 
false inferences is making empirical statements affected by “reverse causality”; that 
is, affirming that A B  is not statistically significant when, in reality, A B  is 
perhaps statistically significantly. An example relevant for the present study is the 
understanding of the direction of causality in the relationship between heterogeneity 
and institutions (Aoki, 2007): do good institutions cause less heterogeneity, which 
causes economic outcomes, which in turn affect those institutions? Alternatively, is 
less heterogeneity causing good institutions, which cause economic outcomes, which 
in turn affect heterogeneity (Leeson, 2005)? The answer to these questions is of key 
importance for anyone taking the challenge of first defining and then measuring 
institutions, as Voigt wisely points out in a recent debate that appeared in the Journal 
of Institutional Economics (Robinson, 2013; Shirley, 2013; Voigt, 2013a, b). The 
challenge tackled in the next chapter is to investigate whether a relation from 
heterogeneity to features of institutional design can be defended on theoretical and 
empirical grounds. 
7.3. The Relevance of Institutional Design 
7.3.1. Robust institutions. Before exploring the potential consequences of 
heterogeneity on institutional design, the type of institutions studied in the present 
context, as well as the dimensions along which they differ from those reported in 
other studies investigating the same relation, need to be specified. 
The institutions observed can be generically defined as “robust,” where robust 
is intended as a synonym for “good.” According to Leeson (2005), two approaches 
have emerged in the study of why economic progress is linked to institutions 
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(Acemoglu et al., 2001; Acemoglu & Johnson, 2005). The first supports the existence 
of a causal link from heterogeneity to bad institutions and to poor economic 
performance (Alesina et al., 1999; Alesina et al., 2003; La Porta et al., 1999; Levine 
& Easterly, 1997). The second, and more recent (Easterly, 2001; Leeson, 2005), 
asserts that bad institutions lead to heterogeneity and, consequently, to poor economic 
performance. Leeson, quoting Easterly (2001), emphasizes the “importance of 
institutions in mitigating the problems typically associated with fractionalization” (p. 
76). In the case studied by Leeson, “heterogeneous agents in pre-colonial Africa relied 
on social distance-reducing signals to make trade with one another possible” (p. 77). 
Leeson shows “how colonial institutions created noise in these signals, inhibiting 
widespread cooperation” (p. 75), and one of the main claims in the paper is that 
heterogeneity does not lead necessarily to “bad” institutions and poor economic 
outcomes: “What matters for progress is the ability of individuals to realize the gains 
from widespread exchange” (p. 76). Since finding generically good institutions might 
be at least questionable, for the purpose of the present study, institutions defined as 
good are those that satisfy the eight design principles for robust CPR (Common-Pool 
Resources) institutions identified by Ostrom (1990):  
1. Clearly defined boundaries  
2. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local 
conditions  
3. Collective-choice arrangements allowing for the participation of all or 
most of the appropriators in the decision-making process  
4. Effective monitoring by monitors who are part of or accountable to the 
appropriators  
5. Graduated sanctions for appropriators who do not respect community rules  
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6. Conflict-resolution mechanisms that are cheap and easily accessed  
7. Minimal recognition (e.g., by the government) of rights to organize  
8. In case of larger CPRs, organization in the form of multiple layers of 
nested enterprises, with small, local CPRs at their bases. (Ostrom, 1990, p. 
92) 
Bottom-up institutions are observed, and the “goodness of institutions” from 
the above characteristics but also from their actual institutional outcomes is inferred. 
The first institutional outcome (and the more easily observable) is identified in the 
“endurance” of the institution, which may be considered an index of robustness 
grounded in the feasibility of long-term social cooperation. The second outcome is 
“sustainability,” where the commoners are able to overcome the potential tragedy of 
the commons and are able to use the resource at a sustainable rate (i.e., avoiding 
depletion). A more precise definition of sustainability would require the direct 
observation of welfare effects of these economic choices, but when these are not 
observable, it is necessary to roughly approximate endurance with “economic 
sustainability.” 
7.3.2. Institutional design. Chapter 8 will investigate empirically whether 
heterogeneity is a key determinant of the institutional design, stability, and change in 
the Carte di Regola system. This subsection, instead, defines the extent to which the 
heterogeneity and institutional design are theoretically connected.  
Although in a very different context from that of contemporary democratic 
constitutions, these historical institutions replicate on a wider timeframe analogous 
present-day political and legal situations. How formal institutions change, and in 
particular the type of constitutional changes a society might undergo—whether 
amendments or replacements—has been the object of a recent inquiry on the 
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determinants of constitutional change in 20th century Latin America, as opposed to 
constitutional stability (Negretto, 2012). On this point, Negretto puts forward and tests 
two main arguments relevant to the purpose of this chapter: “…constitutions are 
replaced when they fail to work as governance structures or when their design 
prevents competing political interests from accommodating to changing 
environments” (p. 749) and “…the frequency of amendments depends both on the 
length and detail of the constitution and on the interaction between the rigidity of 
amendment procedures and the fragmentation of the party system” (p. 750).  
Even though the Carte di Regola cannot be defined properly as “constitutions” 
and are certainly very different from contemporary constitutions, these cases of self-
governance constitute an ideal empirical setting for observing the determinants of 
institutional design, given their extraordinary endurance. The theoretical problem at 
the root of this chapter has been long debated in political theory, as shown by the 
passage by David Hume (1965) quoted at the beginning of this chapter. The excerpt 
focuses on the conditions that allow successful collective action in a common-pool 
resource situation and raises the Olsonian argument that “large groups will fail” more 
than two centuries before Olson (1965).  
While devising the problem of public good provision, this passage suggests 
that a large group size has consequences in the formation of collective agreements. 
This problem, despite the abundant literature produced in recent years, is still 
regarded as a theoretical and empirical challenge (Ostrom, 1990; Poteete & Ostrom, 
2004, Ostrom 2010). Hume granted to political society alone the merit of providing 
solutions to solve collective action problems: history demonstrates that large groups 
are also able to avert the tragedy of the commons by writing their own covenants 
(Ostrom et al., 1994). However, a less restrictive reading of the excerpt is compatible 
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with alternative solutions when Hume posits their existence as conditional on 
“complicated designs,” difficult to be agreed upon, and of difficult enforcement. 
In addition, Wade (1988), in his analysis of southern Indian village 
institutions, cites Hume and highlights the importance of heterogeneity of preferences 
as a factor influencing the design of “from within” solutions to collective action:  
It is also intuitively clear that if a group contains diverse preferences about 
how much of the public good should be supplied (how thoroughly the meadow 
should be drained, in Hume’s example) it may be difficult to reach a 
consensus. Yet there can be only one level of supply in the case of a public 
good, so a consensus must somehow be reached. Where there are more than a 
handful of individuals whose preferences must converge, the transaction costs 
of obtaining the agreement may be high. Even if there was perfect consensus 
the free rider problem would remain; but the need to reach consensus adds to 
the difficulties facing any group or potential group that would provide itself 
with public goods. (Wade, 1988, p. 16)  
Wade’s statement is susceptible of being generalized as a story of transaction 
costs: a group of individuals gathered in legislative assemblies where interaction 
through discussion and direct vote is possible, at different costs of attaining and 
sustaining an agreement, can be considered as a typical example of collective action 
in institutions. Large groups face the risk of failure in reaching consensus over a 
certain course of action, and failure is seen as a consequence of unsustainable 
transaction costs in a large group or of the impossibility of aggregating individual 
preferences.
154
 
 
                                                            
154 See relevant parts in Chapter 5. 
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7.4. Conceptual Framework 
The present section describes the plan to tackle the analysis of the effects of 
heterogeneity and size on institutional design in the next chapter.  
The framework described in Chapter 1 (Figure 1.1) adopts only one of the 
possible research paths in studying the issue. Here, only a specification of the 
framework is presented, which has the following characteristics. First, the analyses 
are limited to formal institutions, despite the awareness that group size and 
heterogeneity are also relevant under informal institutions: this limitation is caused by 
the availability of data only for formal institutions. Second, exogenous population 
growth is posited, and heterogeneity is also modeled as independent of institutional 
outcomes. Third, the context is limited both in terms of the field of application and the 
territory: the community management of the commons in the Italian Alps from 1245–
1801 is studied. Fourth, the study of heterogeneity is limited to only two of the 
possible dimensions: social and resource heterogeneity. 
The conceptual map in Figure 7.1 represents the participation of the group to 
building institutions as affected by some dimension of resource and social 
heterogeneity. Participation is also affected by a second characteristic: the size of the 
resources of which the community is endowed, and an index of the numerosity of the 
individuals called to decide the destiny of the institution and of the community. The 
direct appropriation of common resources is then “mediated” by an institution written 
by the group, which is modeled as necessarily dependent on the design of the 
institution. The design of institutions is modeled as determined by group 
heterogeneity and size. 
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7.5. Conclusions 
The purpose of this chapter was to introduce the reader to an issue of utmost 
relevance in institutional analysis: the definition and the effects of group 
heterogeneity and the design of institutions.  
More specifically, this chapter provided a definition of heterogeneity and 
presented the main problems raised in the literature according to its measurement and 
its interpretation.  
 
Figure 7.1. The framework: group size and heterogeneity. 
 
A separate section provided a focused literature review on heterogeneity and 
of its consequences in collective action and institutions. 
In Section 7.2, institutional design was defined in relation to the specific type 
of institutions analyzed in this study. Ostrom’s requirements for robust CPR 
institutions were recalled. The section highlighted the way in which the literature 
implicitly identified heterogeneity as an important variable in the study of the 
institutional design of successful institutions, and also underlined a literature gap 
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concerning the consequences of heterogeneity on institutional design in the study of 
self-enforcing institutions for the management of the commons. 
Section 7.3 illustrated how a specification of the framework may provide one 
research strategy in studying the issue. The next chapter will develop the strategy and 
propose the empirical study of the effects of group heterogeneity and size on the 
design of institutions.  
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Chapter 8: Effects of Group Heterogeneity and Size on Institutional Design 
An institution is defined as collective action in control, liberation and expansion of 
individual action. Its forms are unorganized custom and organized going concerns. 
The individual action is participation in bargaining, managing and rationing 
transactions, which are the ultimate units of economic activity.—(Commons, 1931) 
 
8.1. Introduction 
8.1.1. Background. This chapter is concerned with the effect of social and 
resource heterogeneity on the process of institutional design and, ultimately, on 
institutional change. This study conjectures that factors pre-existing collective action 
might influence the institutional decision process. As a consequence, institutional 
design may vary in response to changes in group characteristics (Williamson, 1979). 
Differences in institutional design, for example, can be related to differences of 
transaction costs in groups that are heterogeneous. Two dimensions of this 
heterogeneity are here explored: social and resource heterogeneity. 
In the specific context of the Carte di Regola, heterogeneity is seen as a factor 
that increases the costs of social contracting for the allocation of property rights, 
decreases the likelihood of social cooperation, and hinders the process of aggregation 
of individual preferences in the provision of public goods. The aggregation of 
preferences is made difficult by increasing heterogeneity. When transaction costs are 
positive, institutions emerge to allocate property rights and attain the maximization of 
the surplus from production.
155
 Institutions for property rights react to differences in 
                                                            
155 On transaction costs and the “Coase theorem,” read Coase (1960). Useful references on the process 
of allocation of property right are Libecap (1989); Libecap (1995); Barzel (1997). On the role of group 
composition, transaction costs, and social cooperation, recent studies have been written by Smith 
(2011); Erlei (2008). Classic references on aggregation of social preferences are always Arrow (1950); 
Brown (1975). The impact of heterogeneity on public good provision has been investigated by Alesina 
et al. (1999); Vigdor (2004); Habyarimana et al. (2007). 
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transaction costs in their evolution path by engaging in benefit-driven “institutional 
changes” that potentially affect institutional design (Acemoglu & Johnson, 2005; 
Demsetz, 1967; North, 1990). Recent research in constitutional economics implicitly 
supports this research strategy: sources of societal heterogeneity are found to affect 
the structure of constitutions and the normative content of the rules written and 
enforced by decision bodies involved in collective action (Bandiera et al., 2005; 
Barros, 2008; Crowley, 2011).  
Using multiple regression analysis, this chapter combines a comparative 
analysis of institutions (Greif, 1998, 2006) with the statistical analysis of individual- 
and community-level data from multiple historical and geographical sources 
(Diamond & Robinson, 2010). The present study focuses on 159 self-governing 
communities that wrote and voted on community bylaws to manage their common 
resources.
156
 The assemblies observed in this chapter took place at different times in 
the Trentino region over six centuries (1245–1801). Several proxies of institutional 
complexity are developed, based on a body of 260 charters comprising 8,994 coded 
articles. Individual-level data about 7,765 attendees offer details on the village 
assemblies that approved the bylaws. Data on community surface estimates are 
obtained from the 1897 Land Register. 
The dataset used in this chapter delineates a robust institutional setting and 
exhibits the following advantages: long timeframe of observation (six centuries); 
well-delimited region with a stable central political power throughout the period and 
heterogeneous environmental characteristics (Alpine area); similar institutions (the 
Carte system) of different types (complete charters, amendments, or other related 
documents). 
                                                            
156 For a detailed description of the dataset and of the sample, please refer to Section 3.3.4. 
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This chapter is organized as follows. The present section continues with a 
subsection containing a description of the research strategy. Measures, statistics, and 
econometric methods are described in Section 8.2; Section 8.3 presents and discusses 
the results of the statistical analyses; and Section 8.4 offers a summary and 
conclusions.  
8.1.2. Research strategy. The sources of heterogeneity are separated from 
other characteristics of the community that are arguably exogenously determined and 
preexistent to the assembly (“before”). Institutional outcomes are modeled as 
dependent on these factors (“after”). This choice will be discussed in the section 
dedicated to the econometric model and has important empirical consequences. For 
instance, it allows the minimization of potential endogeneity issues that could emerge 
when estimating the effects of heterogeneity and size on institutional features: 
techniques often used to deal with endogeneity, like time lags or instrumental 
variables, are not necessary in the present context (Aoki, 2007; Crowley, 2011; 
Leeson, 2005). 
Figure 8.1 maps the components of the research design: group and resource 
heterogeneity, group and resource size, and institutional outcomes. The empirical 
analysis will consist in the testing of a series of statements concerning the possible 
effects of variables on the left-hand side of the pictogram (“heterogeneity” and “size”) 
on variables contained in the box on the right (“design of institutions”). 
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Figure 8.1. Research design. 
 
Two dimensions of group heterogeneity are here identified: social 
heterogeneity and resource heterogeneity. Social heterogeneity is measured by the 
diversity of surnames in the group of the attendants to the assemblies. Measures of 
social heterogeneity based on surnames are controversial, and the conditions for the 
use of this proxy are illustrated in Section 8.2. Resource heterogeneity is measured as 
the diversity of resource endowments within a community. For example, consider two 
communities having both forest and pasture: in one, there is a prevalent resource, 
while in the other, a different resource is prevalent.
157
 Both social and resource 
heterogeneity, and group size, are assumed to exist before the assembly takes place. 
Institutional design can be defined as a “process aimed at producing 
prescriptions, organization charts and plans, usually with some adaptive rules for 
coping with unforeseen circumstances” (Olsen, 1997). It can be reduced to a number 
                                                            
157 A set of variables also indicate the size of the community: the number of attendants, the total 
extension of productive land, a control for high commons endowments. 
246 
of key “institutional features” considering the normative content of the new institution 
in terms of structure and content. These characteristics are represented by a number of 
variables and are assumed to deploy effects after the assembly takes place. 
8.1.3. Research design. The empirical strategy implies four restrictions. 
First, heterogeneity is measured using fractionalization indexes. Other indexes 
have been used in other studies to measure conflict or inequality (for which other 
indexes like the polarization index used by Esteban and Ray, 1994; Garcia-Montalvo 
and Reynald-Querol, 2002; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2003, or the Simpson’s 
index, Gini index, or measures of entropy are usually employed). However, since the 
present interest is on group fragmentation, the fractionalization index, used for 
example in Alesina et al. (2003), seems best suited. This issue is addressed in Section 
8.2. This choice has a number of consequences. For instance, one is that we are bound 
to studying diversity of groups in probabilistic terms, regardless of other measures of 
group heterogeneity, like conflict, economic inequality, and entropy.  
A second characteristic of this study is that the scope of heterogeneity is 
limited to social heterogeneity and resource heterogeneity. The present author is 
aware that other dimensions could be explored, and the data available offered the 
potential of studying only a limited set of information.  
Third, heterogeneity is modeled as exogenously determined and independent 
of institutional features. The endogeneity between fractionalization and other 
variables is a potential limitation introduced by the choice of measuring heterogeneity 
using surnames. This issue will be discussed in detail in Subsection 8.2.2.  
Fourth, all the assemblies are initially considered as separate and independent 
observations, even when occurring in the same community at a different moment in 
time, regardless of the possible effects of internal migrations and endogenous 
247                                                                                                                                                                        
 
population growth. The econometric estimates presented in Section 8.3 instead are 
designed to capture the effect of time and are corrected for potential arbitrary serial 
correlation among observations of the same community.  
The analyses conducted in this chapter hold under the hypothesis that the 
subset of 260 documents is representative of the whole set of charters. Potential self-
selection issues are addressed by assuming that the notary decided to write the list of 
attendants at random. Direct evidence was not found of notarial regulations setting 
forth provisions requiring the notary to write down the lists of attendance. Local 
historians and archival experts on notarial deeds confirmed that there was no explicit 
legal burden on notaries in this sense: hence, randomness in reporting the list of 
attendance can be assumed. Support for this assumption consists of three facts: the 
dataset covers six centuries (1245–1801); it is possible to find both very long and very 
short lists for both small and large meetings; and the lists were written in diverse 
natural settings. The following section discusses the methods employed in building 
each specification, their limitations, and the theoretical and empirical implications of 
their use.  
8.2. Methods 
The present section describes the methods used to build the variables 
employed in the empirical models and discusses their limitations. Eventually, the 
main estimation equation used to identify the effects of social heterogeneity and 
resource heterogeneity, and of group size on institutional features, as represented by 
the estimation framework, is presented and discussed. 
8.2.1. Social heterogeneity. Measures of social heterogeneity differ along the 
dimensions considered by different authors, mainly conflict and fragmentation; 
however, there is no consensus as to which universally captures the phenomenon. 
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Here, an index to measure social fragmentation using surnames is employed. The 
formalization of the index is based on the ethno-linguistic fractionalization (ELF) 
index (Alesina et al., 1999; Alesina et al., 2003; Garcia-Montalvo and Reynald-
Querol, 2002); this index has theoretical and practical limitations of surname 
fractionalization. The results obtained from historical data were eventually compared 
with simulated data.  
Among the vast repertoire of indexes retrievable in the literature, measures of 
ELF represent in an intuitive way how much a society is “fragmented” (technically, 
“fractionalized”). The index works on the concept of “probability”: social 
fractionalization is high when the probability that two randomly selected people from 
a population 
aN come from different groups is proximate to the unit. In its 
mathematical formulation, the ELF index is analogous to the Hirschman–Herfindahl 
index (Hirschman, 1964). The  Hirschman–Herfindahl index is widely applied in 
competition law and antitrust to measure market concentration and is computed as the 
sum of the squares of the market shares of the 50 largest firms: the market shares are 
expressed in fractional form. The index used in the present study works as follows.  
Consider an assembly with N members. The number of assembly members 
with surname j (or belonging to any group j) is jN . The index of surname 
fractionalization for each of the assemblies is computed as:  
2
1
j
j
N
h
N
 
   
 
        (8.1) 
Let /j jN N   be the fraction of the population in group j or the probability 
that a randomly selected person from the population belongs to group j. This index 
measures the probability that two randomly selected individuals from the population 
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come from different “surname groups” (“families”). The readability of this index can 
be improved with some algebra: 
 
 
2
2
1
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The surname fractionalization index can be finally rewritten as 
 1j j
j
h            (8.2) 
When surnames are all equal, there is perfect homogeneity: 0h  ; when 
surnames are all different, there is perfect heterogeneity: 1h  . If the population is 
split into two identical groups, 1/ 4h  . 
Measuring social cohesion using surnames. Surname fractionalization has 
been measured at the assembly level, using all of the attendants’ surnames within the 
assembly dataset. The index, originally referred to the assembly, has been interpreted 
as referred to the community where the assembly took place.
158
 Surnames were 
considered an appropriate dimension to calculate an index of social fractionalization 
in assemblies, and there are practical and theoretical reasons for this choice. 
From a practical standpoint, the analysis of social heterogeneity is limited to 
availability of the data retrievable in the sources (surnames and the composition of the 
                                                            
158 Surnames have been distinguished from other individual identifiers (such as nicknames, job titles, 
etc.) in the lists of attendance and translated and attributed a unique code to enable the within-assembly 
comparison of surnames with the aid of Cesarini Sforza (1914). In his work, Sforza divides the origin 
of surnames into the following classes: 1. Women; 2. Arts, jobs, professions; 3. Physical qualities, body 
parts; 4. Moral qualities; 5. Objects; 6. Places; 7. Animals; 8. Plants; 9. Food; 10. Others. The goal was 
to distinguish real surnames from other individual attributes among the classes listed in the book. 
Efforts have been made to allow cross-assembly comparison of surnames using string distance 
minimization algorithms when attributing the unique codes: The results are not reported in this chapter, 
as for the purpose of these analyses it was relevant only to distinguish whether each surname was equal 
to or different from the surnames of all the other attendants. 
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260 assemblies). Out of the 7,765 individuals, there are 3,317 different surnames. In 
these assemblies, there were, on average, two surnames; however, this figure ranged 
from a minimum of 1 to a maximum of 10.
159
 The unit of observation for social 
fragmentation is the single assembly. Among the 260 assemblies, 252 had a number 
of attendants included between a minimum of 2 and a maximum of 295 attendants. 
From a theoretical point of view, surnames are considered to contain 
information on the genetic traits of populations (Jobling, 2001; King & Jobling, 2009) 
and have been used in anthropology, biology, and genetics to study family structures 
in history (Bowden et al., 2008; Guglielmino et al., 1996), migration (Colantonio, 
Lasker, Kaplan, & Fuster, 2003), the extinction of families (Watson & Galton, 1875), 
inbreeding rates (Darwin, 1875; Lasker, 1977), genetic isolation, and distances 
between populations (Colantonio et al., 2003; Sella et al., 2010).  
A criticism related to the use of indexes based on surnames concerns the 
transmission of the surname from father to son. A perhaps more accurate 
reconstruction of the genetic transmission could be achieved if the surname were the 
mother’s, while in patriarchal societies, the surname represents information on only 
half of the genetic heritage. For instance, two attendants could (a) have different 
surnames and yet be first cousins as their mothers are sisters or (b) have the same 
surname and yet not be related at all. In our case, this criticism has a limited scope 
when referred to the first example. It is assumed, for simplicity, that the interests of 
households having a different surname are independent and not identical. 
Consequently, two individuals having a different surname represent the interests of 
two different households: in fact, only the heads of the households could attend and 
vote at the assembly. The criticism also has a limited scope in situations analogous to 
                                                            
159 Source: own calculations by the present author from the assembly dataset. 
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the second example: the small size of villages and the need to close the community to 
access to the commons by outsiders resulted in high inbreeding rates, as reported in 
the case of the Valley of Non and of other Alpine villages.
160
 Thus, it is more 
plausible than not that, in this study, two identical surnames referred to the interest of 
the same family.  
Surnames in assemblies are treated as competing “parties.” In this sense, 
surname fractionalization indicates the fragmentation of the assembly and also the 
genetic distance of the population (Ahlerup & Olsson, 2012). 
 
Table 8.1.  
Surname fractionalization: summary statistics 
 
 
Properties and limitations of the surname fractionalization index. Three 
properties of the surname fractionalization index are described in this subsection, and 
their implications in the interpretation of the index, and resulting limitations in the 
empirical analysis, are considered.  
Although extremely versatile in its potential applications, it is found that the 
index, in its general form, may suffer from a number of limitations when applied to 
measuring fractionalization based on surnames in the case under analysis. The 
summary statistics of surname fractionalization and the number of assembly 
attendants are in Table 8.1. 
                                                            
160 See, for instance, the studies by Cole and Wolf (1999); Gueresi, Pettener, and Martuzzi Veronesi 
(2001); Gueresi, Martuzzi Veronesi, and Pettener (1994); Prost, Boëtsch, Girotti, and Rabino-Massa 
(2008); Sella et al. (2010); and Viazzo (2006). 
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The larger the assembly and the larger was the surname fractionalization 
index. The correlation between surname fractionalization and the number of assembly 
attendants is 0.5141.
161
 
The first feature of the surname fractionalization index is that it does not 
specify controls for the size of the group N . It provides a “standardized” measure of 
social fragmentation and assumes that the populations that the index is computed for 
are equal in size. In other words, the nature of this index is to represent the probability 
of the event “two random draws belong to different groups” and is based on the 
proportion of each family (where a family is the number of people sharing the same 
surname in the assembly) over the total population observed in the assembly, not on 
their actual size. This measure does not allow consideration of social fragmentation 
independently of the effect of group size, and this is a limitation in the specific case 
under analysis. 
The second feature is that the fractionalization index measures fragmentation 
and not the effect of conflict and distance within groups. The reader may think of 
many examples where the fractionalization index is capturing the wrong relationship. 
One such example might be the effect of heterogeneity on conflict. Measures of 
“polarization” are usually preferred in these cases. For instance, the measure of 
polarization in Esteban and Ray (1994) formalizes the idea that cooperation is more 
difficult to achieve in two large groups than in many small groups. Analytically, the 
fractionalization index can be considered as a particular case of a more general 
polarization index employed to measure social heterogeneity observing group 
conflict. The main difference with a polarization index (Esteban & Ray, 1994; Garcia-
                                                            
161 Table 8.4, Appendix D. 
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Montalvo & Reynald-Querol, 2002) is that fractionalization assumes that differences 
between groups are all the same (Banerjee, Iyer, & Somanathan, 2008).
162
 
A more sophisticated measure could incorporate a notion of social or 
economic “distance” between groups (here regarded as constant), although the 
measure of distance is difficult to define in many cases (Duclos, Esteban, & Ray, 
2004).  
The third feature is that the fractionalization index is maximized when there 
are many very small groups. Consequently, two equally sized groups that split the 
population would be less heterogeneous than ten equally sized groups. 
The index in principle does not account for assembly size and empirically is 
affected by “micronumerosity”, or “the problem of having few observations” 
(Goldberger, 1991). This limitation is somehow related to the theoretical concept of 
fractionalization, while the last limitation is empirical and may bring, in this case, two 
other empirical problems: heteroskedasticity and high correlations with assembly size. 
Both are problems related to the data; however, while the first problem is easy to 
                                                            
162 The study by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2003) reports a clear example of the two indexes used 
to “measure the importance of religious interactions and potential conflict within a country” (p. 202):  
“The index of religious fragmentation (FRAG) can be interpreted as the probability that two 
randomly selected individuals in a country will belong to different religious groups. The form 
of this indicator is the following:  
2
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where /ij in N  is the proportion of people affiliated to religion j in country i. Therefore, 
FRAG increases when the number of groups increases. An alternative indicator of religious 
diversity is the index of religious polarization of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2000): 
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  , 
where ij  is equal to /ij in N . The index POL ranges from 0 to 1. Contrary to what happens 
with the fragmentation index, polarization reaches a maximum when there are two religious 
groups of equal size. In this type of index, what matters is not only how many groups there are 
but also whether they view other groups as a potential threat for their interests. For a given 
number of groups, the threat is higher the larger the size of the other group relative to the size 
of the reference group. Therefore, the polarization index can reflect potential religious conflict 
in a society better than the fragmentation index.” (Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, 2003, p. 202) 
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account for, the second may indicate multicollinearity and requires further 
investigation.  
The three problems, considered together, may raise the suspicion of 
endogeneity between assembly size and surname fractionalization when they are used 
together as independent variables in econometric models. Each of these limitations is 
discussed below. 
The index provides a measure of social fragmentation regardless of assembly 
size: this might be problematic when the indicator used to measure fractionalization is 
the individual surname.
163
 
 
 
Figure 8.2. Surname fractionalization index. 
Note: N=252. To improve visualization, six assemblies with more than 100 attendants are omitted. The 
dashed line indicates a reference value of 0.9. 
                                                            
163 For example, with three assemblies (a, b, and c) with only two families, A and B may have the same 
fractionalization index and yet have very different assembly size. Let the assemblies have size: a=10, 
b=100, and c=1000. Assembly a has 10 attendants in total, nine in family A, and one in B; assembly b 
has 100 attendants, 90 in A and 10 in B; assembly c has 1000 attendants, 900 in A and 100 in B. When 
calculating the fractionalization index, all the three assemblies turn out to have the same 
fractionalization index: The index represents as identical social situations that might be radically 
different. 
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As can be seen from Figure 8.2, many cases of assemblies of different size 
have a fractionalization index equal to 0.9 (mean=0.875, s.d.=0.095, N=258). In the 
same figure, it can also be noticed that there is a high index variability in the size of 
small assemblies: the distance between the minimum and the maximum surname 
fractionalization decreases as the size of the assembly increases—the data exhibit 
heteroskedasticity. This can be controlled in econometric analyses by computing 
robust standard errors and eventually running post-estimation testing for 
heterogeneity.  
The correlation of the surname fractionalization index with group size may be 
due to mechanical factors related to the fractionalization index or have other 
explanations. To some extent, a positive correlation is intuitive, since surname 
fractionalization is computed on assembly attendance, while total attendance is the 
simple counting of the attendants. This problem may introduce statistical bias due to 
high cross-correlations of variables, which could be mitigated and yet not entirely 
solved.
164
 Other studies on fractionalization, using this very index, report high cross-
correlations, well above 0.6 (Alesina et al., 2003). A high collinearity will introduce 
noise in the estimates, and the issue will remain as long as post-estimation testing will 
detect (nearly) exact collinearity. To reduce this correlation, one solution might be a 
                                                            
164 “Collinearity” occurs when two or more explanatory variables in an econometric model move 
together in systematic ways. A correlation of 0.51 or higher is not per se a problem and does not 
indicate collinearity. Exact collinearity is a serious problem, as it leads to the inoperability of ordinary 
least square regression; nearly exact leads to large standard errors. Other consequences are that R2 may 
be high, while individual coefficients are likely to be not significant; in addition, estimates will be 
sensitive to the addition of a few observations. Collinearity often depends on the presence of 
parameters restrictions and on the lack of data; however, accurate prediction may still be possible by 
relaxing parameters restrictions and finding additional data. The presence of large standard errors with 
high R2 and pairwise correlation coefficients in excess of 0.8 (which is not the case here) are just “rules 
of thumb,” granted that collinearity can be detected with appropriate statistical testing, like computing 
the variance inflation factor (VIF) test, in the post-estimation phase of econometric analysis. Studies in 
financial econometrics often report cross-correlations between interest rates that are above 0.9. Widely 
used undergraduate textbooks of econometrics often report similar examples: see, for instance, Section 
6.4 “Poor Data, Collinearity, and Insignificance” in Carter Hill, Griﬃths, and Lim (2011). 
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transformation of the index.
165
 However, the disadvantage of this solution when 
applied to the present case would be a consistent loss of data.
166
 
 
Table 8.2.  
Summary statistics 
 
 
A last solution would be computing another index of social heterogeneity and 
checking whether the correlation with assembly size is still high. In Table 8.2, the 
summary statistics are reported for another proxy for social heterogeneity: the number 
of villages represented in the assembly, which will be commented on in a separate 
subsection. In the dataset, the number of villages represented in the assembly ranges 
from 1–18, and the sum of the villages provides a measure of social fragmentation. 
The idea is that an assembly in which there are people from different villages pools 
individual preferences that are more heterogeneous than in assemblies with a single 
village. The correlation of the number of villages with assembly size is 0.45. The 
                                                            
165 A common transformation is the “standardization” of the index so that its mean and standard 
deviation conform to a normal distribution. The desired result is obtained using a transformation of the 
index values: ( )  
x
STD x



 , with values distributed in conformity to a standard normal 
distribution N(0,1).. 
166 The “standardization” is mathematically impossible when the variance of the sample mean cannot 
be computed or equals zero. Similarly, a data transformation that would remove the mean/variance 
relationship is not desirable (meaning that the variability is different for data values with different 
expected values ) so that the variance becomes constant relative to the mean (the effect would be the 
stabilization of the variance and is obtainable with, for example, a square root transformation): 
Although it may be biased, it is important information for a better understanding of the behavior of the 
surname fractionalization index with assembly size. Another solution that will eliminate the correlation 
of highly collinear variables would be the orthogonalization of one of the two variables: This result is 
fairly easy to obtain with many statistical software packages; however, it has the major disadvantage 
that the orthogonalized variables are complicated functions of the original variables and hence are of 
difficult interpretation. 
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correlation is lower than the 0.51 detected with surname fractionalization;
167
 the 
comparison of the two correlations and the similar trend
168
 appear to provide some 
support to the hypothesis that fragmentation represented by fractionalization and 
number of assembly roles are good proxies of “social complexity” and that they 
correlate with assembly size. 
In conclusion, all the problems illustrated above have econometric remedies, 
even though the most desirable “…remedy lies essentially in the acquisition, if 
possible, of larger samples from the same population” (Goldberger, 1991). The next 
subsection sheds light on these limitations by further studying the properties of the 
surname fractionalization index using a Monte Carlo simulation. 
Monte Carlo simulation. Monte Carlo methods are computational algorithms 
relying on the repeated generation of random numbers through random sampling. 
Monte Carlo experiments “mimic the theoretical properties of realization of random 
variables” and “can be used to verify that valid methods of statistical inference are 
being used” (Cameron & Trivedi, 2009, p. 119). In this case, the simulation will be 
useful to study the statistical properties of the surname fractionalization index.  
A first purpose of the simulation is to better understand whether the simulated 
data replicates the same nonlinear relationship observed in historical data. The second 
information obtainable from this simulation is the observation of whether the nature 
of the correlation between assembly size and social fragmentation results from a bias 
introduced by the method of calculating surname fractionalization using the 
fractionalization index, or a consequence of third causes, thereby pointing to the 
social complexity explanation suspected after comparing the pairwise correlations of 
                                                            
167 The cross-correlation between surname fractionalization and the number of villages within the 
assembly is almost 0.22. 
168 The scatter with the linear fit with assembly size in Figure 8.3, Appendix C, also confirms the same 
positive relationship and a similar nonlinear trend, although with a wider variation in the number of 
roles as the assembly size increases. 
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assembly roles versus assembly size. A third purpose is the observation of the 
behavior of max–min range (chosen as indicator of variability) of the simulated 
surname fractionalization with respect to assembly size and an estimate of how much 
this variation differs from the historical data. 
A simulated index for assemblies having the same size N  on a larger number 
of simulated observations, this time set at n=1000, is computed. The simulation 
follows a three-step procedure:  
1. All individuals (a) having a surname (b) from every assembly  (c) in every 
community (d) in every year ( 7,765N   ) are pooled together in a 
unique dataset. 
2. “Random assemblies” are generated169 by repeatedly drawing uniformly 
from the pool 1,000 random samples of assemblies (set of surnames) of 
different sizes  1,2,...295N  , every time with replacement. The 
reference to the famous Monte Carlo casino looks quite appropriate: the 
simulation works as if a gambler were drawing N  balls from a spinning 
roulette wheel with j surnames for n trials in each round. The game is 
played for (max min )N N  rounds. In this simulation, there are 295 
rounds (one per assembly size). The first round of the simulation has 1N   
and entails n=1000 trials; the second round has 2N   and another n=1000 
trials, and so on up to 295N   and n=1000. In plain words, this means that 
in every round of the simulation, a number of individuals/surnames equal 
                                                            
169 The generator has been written in Java, and the code is available upon request. Thanks to Fabio 
Bruè, Department of Computer Science of the University of Bologna, for the inputs and the help in 
writing and “bugfixing” the code of the generator. The executable file requires setting few parameters: 
the number of random trials n for each community in each N . The routine draws repeatedly n samples 
of size from min N  up to max N  from the pool with replacement and is repeated from min N  up to 
max N . The following parameters were used: n=1,000, min 1N   up to max 295N  . To speed 
up computation, the routine has been broken down in 14 intervals and then appended together. 
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to the round number is randomly extracted from the pool and allocated in 
an assembly, and then replaced in the “urn” after each extraction. 
3. An average surname fractionalization index is computed for every round. 
Indexes for assemblies of each size N  are defined with )( NE h . The 
dataset of the simulation results after the collapsing of 295,000 
observations and counts 295 average simulated surname fractionalization 
indexes for assemblies of every size, each calculated on 1,000 random 
trials of surname samples of the same size (simulated assemblies) obtained 
from the total pool of surnames.
170
  
Surname fractionalization: historical vs. simulated data. Figure 8.4 
compares the results of the simulation with the historical data. In Panel (B), the line 
represents the simulated mean values. The figure summarizes analytically that social 
fragmentation measured by surname fractionalization is a nonlinearly increasing 
function of group size. Diamond and circle markers represent respectively the 
maximum and the minimum fractionalization obtained with the simulation. Panel (A) 
shows that the historical surname fractionalization indexes are included in an area 
delimited by an upper and a lower bound computed using the simulated data. The 
upper bound is defined as the maximum surname fractionalization maxs sl h  of the 
simulated assemblies. The lower bound is, instead, calculated as 
 max 25 max mins s s su h h h    . The simulated max–min range is multiplied by 
an arbitrary constant k=25 to preserve the information that it decreases as the 
assembly size increases.
171
 
 
                                                            
170 Summary statistics of the simulated index are reported along with the historical index in Table 8.3, 
Appendix D. 
171 In order to enclose the range in a 0–1 interval, values below zero of the lower bound have been set 
to zero. 
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Figure 8.4. Surname fractionalization: historical vs. simulated data. 
Note. Each dot of the historical data (Panel A) is a raw observations from one assembly in a given year 
(N=252). Each data point in the simulation (Panel B) represents a mean computed on 1,000 random 
draws based on pooled historical data. 6 observations with total attendance > 100 are omitted to 
improve visualization.  
 
The cross-correlations of “historical” and “simulated” fractionalization index 
with assembly size are similar (0.514 and 0.515, respectively), which confirms that 
the correlation of assembly size with social fragmentation is linked with the 
methodology for computing fractionalization, and not specifically to this dataset. 
Surname fractionalization increases with group size and this property can be proven to 
be true in theory.
172
  
8.2.2. Resource heterogeneity. One intuitive way to study resource 
heterogeneity is to use a fractionalization index that refers to classes of land resources. 
                                                            
172 Example. Consider an assembly in which surname groups have only few representatives. The 
extreme case is that of 1 surname represented by 1 individual, but the following example holds also in 
case the surname j is represented by 10, 50, 100, or Nj individuals. By substituting /j NN   in 
Equation 8.1, algebraically, it is observed that h approximates the unit for large numbers of N. 
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An index of fractionalization applied to the study of the fragmentation in resource 
endowments has been used by Vedeld (2000); in general, the issues related to 
resource heterogeneity are considered quite problematic in the literature, both in 
conceptualization of the problem and, consequently, in the analysis of the impact of 
such heterogeneity (Adhikari & Lovett, 2006; Baland & Platteau, 1996; Nagendra, 
2011; Naidu, 2005; Poteete & Ostrom, 2004; Varughese & Ostrom, 2001; Vedeld, 
2000). The present subsection illustrates the application of a fractionalization index to 
measure resource fragmentation and describes the properties and the limitations of the 
measure. Properties and limitations of the index are discussed using a simulation. 
 
Table 8.5.  
Resource fractionalization: summary statistics 
 
 
Measuring resource heterogeneity. A resource fractionalization index is 
computed for each community in which the assembly takes place, regardless of 
resource type. The total productive surface of each community is divided into four 
categories: 1) vineyard, 2) other private land, 3) forest, and 4) pasture (meadows, 
grazing land, or alp). Each resource type is categorized in a group j ranging from 1 to 
4: the index this time will interpret j as in one of the four “resource groups” instead of 
surname groups.  
Let N  be the total surface (number of hectares) in the community where the 
assembly takes place, and jN the number of hectares belonging to the resource group j 
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in the same community; then, the resource fractionalization index of the community 
is:  
2
1
j
j
N
h
N
 
   
 
         (8.3) 
or, using probabilities: 
 1j j
j
h            (8.4) 
The interpretation of this index (of which summary statistics are reported in 
Table 8.5) is analogous to the one for surname fractionalization: an assembly is 
considered to be highly fragmented when the resource fractionalization in the 
community where the assembly takes place is close to one. High values of this index 
mean that one type of resource prevails over the others, because the probability of 
picking two hectares of the same resource type from the pool of the community’s total 
hectares is low.  
Decoding the meaning of the index requires positing that, when there is 
resource homogeneity, there is a lower level of transaction costs: assemblies 
specialize community governance in enforcing and monitoring property rights on few 
types of land and in smaller surface extensions. Conversely, the definition of property 
right on land entails higher levels of transaction costs when there are different types of 
resources to manage and/or in large extensions. 
Properties and limitations of the resource fractionalization index. In 
principle, it is not expected that resource fractionalization would raise statistical issues 
similar to surname fractionalization, as it displays a low correlation with the total 
surface (-0.21, significant at the 5% level). As done for the surname fractionalization 
index, the present subsection outlines three properties of the resource fractionalization 
index. 
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The first feature descends from a limitation in the data. The values in each 
category of land resources were estimated from the 1897 Land Register. It is assumed 
that community boundaries had not changed over time. The 1897 Land Register is 
organized in cadastral units, and an estimate of the historical surface of each 
community was obtained by adding or subtracting the 1897 cadastral units referred to 
the villages that were part of the historical community.
173
 
The second feature is “mechanical”: the index is calculated on custom 
resource categories based on the categorization retrieved in the 1897 Land Register. 
From the original data, unproductive land is excluded, and productive land is divided 
into four categories that allow for different levels of transaction costs. This 
categorization does not fully capture the resource dynamics of each category (stock, 
flow and growth rate): nevertheless, it allows for different production between forest 
and pasture areas, and, similarly, between vineyards and other private property (arable 
land and fruit garden). An alternative way to build the fractionalization index is to 
weight resources by their production value, which a different categorization with 
additional data could have achieved. 
Generally, forest and pasture (commons) are predominant in large 
communities, while vineyard, arable land, and fruit garden are predominant in small 
communities.
174
 As a consequence, in large communities, the index will be heavily 
influenced by the forest and pasture portfolio. The mean of the index is expected to be 
                                                            
173 The historical surface of the community was reconstructed following the description of the 
community boundaries retrieved in the preamble of the charters and other historical sources. When a 
historical surface changed over time for the same community, the observations are counted as separate 
and with no relation to the original community. The empirical consequence of this limitation is that 
each of the 156 communities that are represented in the dataset may also occur more than once if more 
assemblies have places in it; however, the max–min range of resource fractionalization will always be 
the same in each level of surface extension, because resource fractionalization does not change in 
assemblies held in the same community. 
174 Figure 8.7, Panel A, Appendix C, displays the relative importance (measured in percentage on the 
total surface) of each of the four resource categories, plotted versus the total land surface. Vineyard, 
arable land, and fruit garden were summarized in Figure 8.7, Panel B, Appendix C, under “non-
commons.” 
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stabilized at h=0.5, while the max–min range is expected to decrease with the increase 
of the total surface.  
A third feature of the index is that resource fractionalization does not account 
for land extension. For example, three communities—a, b, and c of 100, 1,000, and 
10,000 hectares each, respectively—can have h=0.5 and two types of resources (A 
and B). In this case, a control for surface extension would distinguish high values of 
resource heterogeneity in communities having a small or large extension.  
Monte Carlo simulation. Another simulation was performed to investigate the 
properties of the index in communities where the land composition is built through 
the random extraction. The previous section raised three important issues concerning 
the resource fractionalization index—the problem of small sample size, the internal 
impact of categories on the computation of resource fractionalization, and the problem 
of filtering out the effect of surface extension in this index. 
The goal of the simulation this time is to obtain simulated indexes for n=1,000 
random communities having the same total surface N . The Monte Carlo generator 
this time draws a ball in a spinning roulette wheel having only four alternatives for 
each of the hectares compounding the surface (up to 10,798) and does this 1,000 times 
for each of the communities (up to 156 “rounds”). In the first round, the generator 
draws 69N   random hectares (the minimum total surface in the dataset) of different 
types for n=1,000 times. In the last round, the generator is programmed to draw 
10,798N   random hectares (the maximum) of different types for n=1,000 times. 
The routine adopted was the following: 
1. A dataset was created that pools all the hectares of productive land for 
every assembly and for every year, divided in four categories. Each 
observation is a hectare and has a value ranging from 1–4 depending on 
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the category the hectare belongs to. For example, a community of 300 
hectares with 120 hectares of forest has 300 observations, and 120 of these 
observations are coded as “forest.” The total surface of all the communities 
in every assembly and every year is 239,936N  . 
2. The generator draws uniformly from the pool n=1,000 random samples of 
communities (set of resource types) of different sizes  69,...,10798N  , 
every time with replacement. The generator should have created n=1,000 
samples of N  size for  max min (10,798 69) 10,729N N     times.175 
3. The dataset produced by the simulation allowed the calculation of resource 
fractionalization in each of the random surfaces generated for 1,000 times, 
building a dataset with 151,000 resource fractionalization indexes. From 
this dataset, it was possible to compute the average resource 
fractionalization index on n=1,000 observations for each round of the total 
surface extensions. The final dataset of the simulation resulting after the 
collapsing of the intermediate dataset counts 151 average simulated 
resource fractionalization indexes. 
 
                                                            
175 Due to limited computing power, the n=1,000 samples were created only for the 156 communities of 
different total surface that required the simulation. Since in the original data, the total surface 
sometimes is not an integer, before pooling the data, the surface of each community was rounded to the 
nearest integer so that the number of rounds decreases from 156 to 151. 
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Figure 8.8. Resource fractionalization: historical vs. simulated data. 
Note. Each dot of the historical data (Panel A) is a raw observations from one community in a given 
year (N=258). Each data point in the simulation (Panel B) represents a mean computed on 1,000 
random draws based on pooled historical data. 
 
Resource fractionalization: historical vs. simulated data. The results of the 
simulation are plotted in Figure 8.8. Panel (B) reports the mean resource 
fractionalization obtained from the simulation.
176
 Interestingly, the mean resource 
fractionalization maintains a flat trend as the total surface increases. In addition, the 
cross-correlations between the fractionalization index and the total surface are very 
different in the simulated and historical data,
177
 which suggests the absence of 
endogeneity between resource fractionalization and total surface. The minimum 
(lower line) and the maximum (upper line) resource fractionalization of the 1,000 
trials for each of the rounds are also shown: the max–min range is visually detectible 
                                                            
176 Summary statistics are reported in Table 8.6. 
177 Table 8.7, Appendix D. 
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as the total surface increases. The minimum resource fractionalization increases, 
while the maximum decreases, with a trend around the mean simulated resource 
fractionalization.  
Panel (A) in Figure 8.8 demonstrates that the historical resource 
fractionalization indexes can be enclosed in the area between an upper and a lower 
bound obtained from the maximum and the minimum of the simulated 
fractionalization indexes. The upper bound is computed as 
 max 1.555 max minu h h h     and the lower bound as
 max 4.5 max minl h h h    . The constants k=1.555 and k=4.5 are chosen 
arbitrarily, so that the minimum observations are left outside the area of inclusion, to 
preserve the information that the max–min range decreases as total surface 
increases.
178
 
In conclusion, resource heterogeneity may be considered as independent from 
total surface and the number of attendants to assemblies. The practical consequence is 
that two communities of 100 hectares and 1,000 hectares can have the same 0.5h   
without need of corrections. The insertion of an interaction term could separate, in 
econometric analyses, the partial effect of total surface in the resource 
fractionalization index; however, this would be more harmful than beneficial for 
estimates, because it is likely to introduce problems of collinearity.  
8.2.3. Institutional design. The purpose of this subsection is to define the 
specifications and the measurements of institutional design employed in the chapter 
(institutional features). A database of 258 assemblies offered the possibility of 
building a number of proxies for institutional design. Five indicators are drawn from 
the text of the Carte Di Regola about: (i–ii) and institutional complexity, (iii) the 
                                                            
178 In order to enclose the range in a 0–1 interval, estimates of the upper bound above 1 are set to 1, 
while lower-bound estimates below zero are set to zero. 
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balance between governance rules and resource management rules, (iv) institutional 
stability, and (v) consensus. A separate subsection is dedicated to each class of 
indicators, and conjectures are formulated that will be tested using multiple regression 
analysis. The conjectures concern how variations in each institutional feature may be 
affected by the sources of social and resource heterogeneity described in the previous 
sections. 
Complexity. Two indexes of complexity are constructed: the length of the 
document decided by the assembly and the number of assembly roles. 
Length of the document. The length of the document consists of the count of 
the number of articles contained in a Carta di Regola or other document. The length is  
related to the choice of the assembly to write a “complete” social contract or to leave 
some gaps. Among the 258 assemblies reported in the data, there are 243 documents 
for which it is possible to count the number of the articles, each corresponding to a 
specific rule.
179
  
The decision of leaving long-term contracts incomplete can be strategic 
(Bernheim & Whinston, 1998) and is a risk that the assembly undertakes, as it may be 
reflected in the quality of law enforcement, internal conflict, and litigation with 
bordering communities.
180
 Historical documents of the Princedom of Trento (the 
Trentino region) report that the costs of border litigations between villages were 
severe, and that litigations persisted for decades. It is plausible that communities with 
longer charters were those communities more complex to manage in terms of rule 
                                                            
179 Although in principle, the length of the document could be decided by the single notary writing the 
document, a careful read of the preambles of the documents reveals that the number of provisions and 
the content of the rules are decided by the assembly. From the econometric point of view, 
idiosyncrasies in document drafting represent part of the unexplained variance. 
180 The issue of contract incompleteness has been widely explored and benefits from well-established 
reference literature. The main references for an economic treatment of the topic are the seminal 
contributions by Hart and Moore (1988) and Tirole (1999). From a law & economics perspective, a key 
reference is Ayres and Gertner (1989). 
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enforcement and the monitoring of resource use. Therefore, long documents can 
proxy the ex-ante investment in better-quality contractual enforcement and might be a 
precise legislative choice when the internal organization is structured on two or more 
levels. In such a case, the higher organizational level might opt for the adoption of a 
framework charter, whereas single villages might have a detailed charter. There are 
three additional considerations on the choice of a short charter: 
1. Short documents are preferable when they serve as framework charters; 
that is, documents providing the grounding principles of community 
governance. Short and framework-oriented charters might last longer as, 
due to their generality, they do not require frequent renegotiation or 
replacement. These charters are likely to be less complex, though 
incomplete (Negretto, 2012). 
2. Short documents may also be less durable, particularly when they are “gap 
filling” documents, as amendments or replacements of old rules (Negretto, 
2012).
181
 A similar conclusion is reported by Hammons (1999) in 
conclusion of an empirical analysis of American constitutions.
182
 The 
possibility of introducing modifications is a form of “constrained revision” 
that, as Chung (1991) argues, is aimed at correcting the inefficiencies 
deriving from contractual incompleteness when new information becomes 
available to consociates. This choice might also be strategic, as Crocker 
and Reynolds (1993) later found in the empirical study of pricing 
                                                            
181 When the result of collective contracting in assembly is a modification of the charter, the 
complexity measured is that of the modification. 
182 In this study, Hammons (1999) criticized what he called the “Madisonian hypothesis,” which posits 
the following: “The shorter the total length of the constitution and the smaller the number of statutory-
type provisions as a percentage of the total document, the more durable the constitution will be” (p. 
838). The results of his study on American constitutions reject this hypothesis (p. 845). 
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procedures used in Air Force engine procurement contracts. Thus, even 
incomplete contracts can be efficient. 
3. In addition, shorter documents entail less accountability of the governing 
village members to non-governing ones. This “decentralization” process is 
generally preferred over the risk of competition of the jurisdictions 
between the main-village and sub-village, consisting of the allocation of 
governing power at the local level under incomplete contracting. This 
choice entails higher risks of accountability for the governing board, and 
the problem is solved with a detailed piece of legislation for the local 
level: the local differentiation of the public good (charter) allows higher 
benefits,
183
 because it “induces individuals to reveal the true preferences 
for levels and combinations of the public good provided by means of their 
location decision” (Seabright, 1996). In the case of rural charters, the first 
problem is overcome with a periodical (usually yearly) role-rotation 
system in community appointments. The number of articles dealing with 
community governance can be a suitable measure of institutional content.  
In conclusion, if heterogeneity increases transaction costs, the gap filling 
process through collective bargaining requires more details to be specified in the 
resulting institutional design. Less heterogeneous societies are likely to require less 
complex institutions and, therefore, shorter documents. 
Number of roles in the assembly. Each individual in the assembly is associated 
with an assembly role that specifies the member’s function in the assembly: village 
member, mayor, officer, etc. The 258 assemblies had a number of roles that ranged 
                                                            
183 Seabright (1996) argues, “[C]entralisation allows benefits from policy coordination but has costs in 
terms of diminished accountability, which can be precisely defined as the reduced probability that the 
welfare of a given region can determine the re-election of the government.” 
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from 1–7.184 The number of roles was not fixed, and the type remained basically 
unaltered throughout the six centuries. The number of roles in the assembly may be a 
useful indicator of the degree of government specialization required to govern the 
community. 
When population increases, the community government can specialize in 
monitoring and enforcement in order to benefit from the higher returns on scale in 
such activities, which would otherwise be excessively expensive. Typical examples 
include the election of full-time monitoring officers or full-time shepherds to graze 
the community herd. If surname heterogeneity has an impact on institutional features, 
governments that are larger in terms of assembly attendance and resource 
endowments should be more heterogeneous and might require a higher degree of 
board specialization (Doupé, 2011) and hence more assembly roles. 
This consideration seems to find support in the dataset: communities in which 
rule enforcement and resource monitoring were easier probably required a simpler 
governance organization.  
In conclusion, institutional complexity can be represented by charter length 
and the number of roles represented in the assembly. 
Whether and how these features vary with social and resource fragmentation is 
the next step of the argument. In light of the preceding reasoning, three conjectures 
are formulated:  
C1-1 Higher surname fractionalization generates more complexity;  
C1-2 A higher number of villages within a community generates more 
complexity;  
C1-3 Higher resource fractionalization generates more complexity. 
                                                            
184 In Chapter 3, a summary table with all the roles in the assembly dataset is provided. 
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Governance vs. resource management. Articles containing community 
governance rules and resource management rules were counted in each document.
185
 
The absolute frequency of community governance rules and of resource management 
rules can be considered as indicators of the transaction costs in two distinct aspects of 
institutional collective action. An interesting measure is the ratio between the number 
of community governance rules to the total number of articles, as it indicates the 
importance perceived by the assembly of the costs required for governing the 
institution relative to the costs of disciplining the technical aspects of resource 
extraction. When the purpose of an institution is to solve a collective action problem 
concerning resources, one would expect a high frequency of articles to contain rules 
on resource management.  Accordingly, as a proportion of the total, resource 
management are expected to represent the vast majority of rules. When the insider 
group is fractionalized, one would expect a high frequency of articles dealing with the 
structure and governance of the institution to coordinate the members’ resource 
extraction in order to avert the tragedy of the commons (Hardin, 1968; Ostrom, 1990). 
Three conjectures may be stated as follows:  
C2-1 Surname fractionalization impacts on the frequency of community 
governance rules;  
C2-2 The number of villages within a community impacts on the frequency of 
community governance rules;  
C2-3 Resource fractionalization impacts on the frequency of resource 
management rules.  
Stability. The number of years between the assembly and the next institutional 
change requiring an assembly can be used as a proxy of the durability of institutional 
                                                            
185 The structure of the regulation and the coding process adopted to construct the relevant variables 
and formulate three conjectures are described in detail in Chapter 3. 
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rules. An explanation is connected to the theory of voting. Voters with heterogeneous 
preferences might form unstable coalitions (Arrow, 1950; Aumann & Dreze, 1963): 
this instability might have origins in external shocks, such as changes in relative 
prices, having asymmetric effects (i.e., having a different impact on a peasant than a 
craftsman, etc.). Consequently, heterogeneous governments are likely to be politically 
unstable and require higher government consumption to mitigate social conflicts 
(Annett, 2001). 
From the reconstruction of the time sequence of the documents, a measure of 
institutional stability of the documents was computed. It was only possible to compute 
the distance from the next change for 62 village assemblies.
186
 The documents 
analyzed in this chapter (N=258) are divided into complete Carte (including 
replacements) or amendments and other documents.
187
 A cursory view of the 
endurance of the institutional changes documented in the dataset shows figures that 
deserve attention: the average duration of 43 complete charters until the next change 
was approximately 121 years and ranged from 1–376 years, while the average 
duration of 19 amendments and other related documents until the next change was 
184 years and ranged from 88–301 years. It is possible to expand the sample to 
include more observations by setting the year of next change to 1807, when Napoleon 
abolished the charter regime. As will be later explained, these estimates do not 
capture the total duration of changes and are affected by right censoring.
188
 The 
econometric model should also account for different types of change: complete 
replacement or modification (Negretto, 2012). Intuitively, changing something that 
                                                            
186 Table 8.14. 
187 Summary statistics are provided in Table S.5 and Table S.6, both in Appendix D. 
188 If institutional change and the abolition of the Carte regime that occurred in 1807 is considered as 
relevant, the average duration of the 165 complete charters under analysis is approximately 203 years 
and ranges from 1–533 years, while the average duration of the 74 amendments and other related 
documents is 157 years and ranges from 6–558 years. 
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already exists entails lower transaction costs than writing and reaching an agreement 
on an entirely new institution.  
This reasoning leads to the following conjectures:  
C3-1 Surname fractionalization lowers stability;  
C3-2 Resource fractionalization lowers stability;  
C3-3 The number of villages within a community lowers stability.  
Consensus. Quorums measure the percentage of attendants who cast a vote in 
the assembly and represent the level of consensus required to approve the 
institution.
189
 The quorum can be interpreted as a measure of the level of preference 
aggregation required to reach a collective decision. The process of preference 
aggregation is typically simpler in smaller groups, because the chances are that 
individual preferences are less heterogeneous than in larger groups, on a purely 
statistical basis. Social fragmentation, making the aggregation of social preferences 
more difficult (Arrow, 1950; Brown, 1975), increases the costs of social contracting 
for the allocation of property rights. Therefore, one might expect that more socially 
fragmented groups tend to decide with lower quorums and deliberate unstable (in our 
language, “less enduring”) rules.190 
The documented quorum, in the present study, is always above the simple 
majority (50 percent plus one vote) and very close to a super-majority (75 percent);
191
 
however, this figure does not account for the difference in quorums with other factors, 
such as the number of attendants or social heterogeneity. Highly fractionalized groups 
                                                            
189 For a discussion concerning the meaning and interpretation of assembly quorums, the reader is 
addressed to Section 3.2.4, under “Participation”. 
190 Majority and supermajority quorums are usually placed to avoid cycles in voting that would lead to 
decisional deadlock, as stated by Arrow (1950) in the formulation of the “impossibility theorem,” later 
developed in many studies on collective decision-making and preferences aggregation including Brown 
(1975). 
191 Table 8.8, Appendix D. 
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might take longer to reach a decision that is approved by a smaller subgroup with a 
lower quorum, which may later be overturned. The following conjectures are stated:  
C4-1 Surname fractionalization lowers quorum;  
C4-2 Number of villages within a community lowers quorum;  
C4-3 Resource fractionalization lowers quorum.  
8.2.4. Econometric model. Several methods have been used in the past to 
estimate the impact of social and resource heterogeneity on various economic 
outcomes; an overview of these methods can be found in Banerjee et al. (2008). The 
present subsection describes the methodology adopted to perform statistical analyses. 
A description of results and post-estimation testing follows in a separate section. 
The empirical strategy adopted to analyze the evidence and provide statistical 
testing to the conjectures stated previously makes use of multiple regression analysis. 
In general, Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression specifications with pooled data 
on assemblies are used for each of the institutional features, while heterogeneity—
consistently with the research framework outlined at the beginning of this section—is 
considered among the independent variables together with other controls. 
The proceeding subsections first list the dependent variables and the 
independent variables; illustrate how endogeneity, heteroskedasticity, collinearity, and 
other problems related to fractionalization are solved in the empirical model; and then 
state the final estimating equation and the goals of each model specification.  
Dependent variables. One peculiarity of this study is that the dependent 
variables are not economic outcomes but features that represent the “institutional 
design” as identified above. 
The length of a Carta  (LENGTH)  is measured as the count of the number of 
articles that are contracted out in each assembly, and they represent one index of 
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complexity of the institution that results from the collective face-to-face agreement, 
regardless of the type of the document: a control for whether the document is a full 
charter or an amendment is present with the insertion of a dummy variable among the 
independent variables; subsequent replacements by full charters are treated as first full 
charters, as they are institutional changes that are conceptually identical from the 
point of view of collective action. 
The number of roles in the assembly (ROLES) is, instead, the simple count of 
the different roles vested by the attendants during each assembly, regardless of the 
type of the role and its relative frequency on the total of the attendants.  
In order to measure the importance of governance rules versus resource 
management rules, three different sets of regressions are run. The first two sets hold 
as dependent variables the absolute frequency of community governance rules 
(GOVREG) and of resource management rules (RESREG), as identified in the 
previous section. The last regression set holds as a dependent variable the ratio of 
community governance rules to the total of contracted articles (FGOVREG); being the 
remaining rules devoted to resource management, this variable measures the relative 
importance of managing the group in the institutions versus the total of the rules. 
When this variable increases and approaches the unit, the relative importance of 
resource management proportionally decreases toward zero. 
Another set of regressions was run to investigate the determinants of the 
stability of institutions (STABIL), measured as the number of years before the next 
institutional change when there are multiple observations of assemblies for the same 
community over the years. The Carte system was forcefully abolished in 1807, and it 
is assumed that once a community adopts a Carta, it is locked in the institution until 
the abolition of the system. Therefore, when estimating the forward duration of a 
277                                                                                                                                                                        
 
document, the strategy may be twofold: it is possible to concentrate only on 
institutional changes reported in the documents, or consider also 1807, the year of the 
abolition of the system, as the year of last institutional change. The first alternative 
provides estimates based on changes that are provoked internally and results in a 
smaller sample; the second includes all institutional changes, produces estimates 
based on a larger sample, but inserts two problems: it does not distinguish endogenous 
from exogenous institutional changes, and it produces estimates that are biased by 
right censoring (as there could be institutions that, in absence of the exogenous event, 
would remain in force after the year 1807 with no need of being replaced or 
amended). On the basis of these complications, the first alternative is preferred over 
the second, although the second alternative could have been tackled econometrically 
using a censored-normal regression model, which fits models with a dependent 
variable containing both censored and non-censored observations on the process. 
The last set of regressions has deliberative quorum (QUORUM) as a 
dependent variable and is expressed in fractional form (0.5, 0.75, … , 1). An OLS 
estimation model is used for the sake of consistency and to improve the ease of 
interpretation of the results, given that frequencies are not excessively compressed 
toward the extremes.
192
 
Independent variables. Among the independent variables inserted were 
measures for social heterogeneity and resource heterogeneity, assembly size and 
surface extension, and other controls. 
                                                            
192 Having a dependent variable that has fractional values may lead to imprecise estimates when there 
are high frequencies toward the extremes (0 and 1), and in these cases, the use of models that work on a 
logit transformation of the dependent variable looks more appropriate (Papke & Wooldridge, 1996). 
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Social heterogeneity is represented by adjusted surname fractionalization, a 
logarithmic transformation of the surname fractionalization index (SURN),
193
 and by 
the number of villages within a community (VILL). Resource heterogeneity is instead 
represented by resource fractionalization (RES). The number of attendants in each 
assembly (SIZE), the total productive surface extension in hectares, was included. 
Documents were divided in two sets: complete charters and amendments to complete 
charters; a dummy variable accounts for the type of the document (“Charter 
amendment,” a dummy that equals 1 if the document is a modification of a previous 
charter and 0 otherwise), as suggested by Negretto (2012). Also included was the 
linear distance in kilometers from the closest urban center of the valley (“Closest local 
town”) and a dummy that controls for endowment of commons above the sample 
median (“Large commons endowment”). A set of 14 dummies controlled for “Area 
fixed effects,” while the year of the assembly controlled for “Time trend.” One 
interaction term, SURN SIZE , controls for the partial effect of the number of 
attendants on adjusted surname fractionalization. 
Estimating equation. To estimate the impact of the determinants of public 
good provision, the following estimating model is commonly used in the literature: 
 ,ikt it ity f p x         (8.5) 
                                                            
193 The raw index has a distribution remarkably asymmetric towards high values of surname 
heterogeneity (Figure 8.2, Appendix C; summary statistics in Table 8.1, Appendix D). In many cases, 
applying a monotone transformation is helpful to give a variable a more symmetric distribution to 
construct 95% confidence intervals and to improve visualization.  As to the first aspect, it is known that 
95% confidence intervals are computed by taking the sample mean plus or minus two standard error 
units. The constant factor of 2 for the standard errors is proper to the normal distribution and varies if 
the sample mean varies normally; however, if the distribution is skewed and the sample size is small, 
the estimated interval might have poor probability coverage. Figure 8.6, Panel A, Appendix C, 
represents the kernel density plot of (a), the original surname fractionalization, while (b) plots the 
kernel density of a logarithmic transformation of the same index using (1 )h ln h     . As to data 
visualization, Figure 8.6, Panel B, Appendix C, shows how, with this monotone transformation, the 
result of “stretching” the original fractionalization index was obtained over a wider interval. 
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where 
ity  is a measure of access or quality of public good k (in this case, the 
Carta) in assembly i at time t and 
itp  is a set of characteristics of the population (in 
this case, of the community in which the assembly takes place) in assembly i at time t. 
This last function may include measures of heterogeneity, while 
itx is a vector 
representing various geographical and historical features of the area in which the 
community is located (Banerjee et al., 2008). 
An interesting improvement of this model related to institutional design and 
change is inspired by a recent unpublished paper by Crowley (2011):  
( 1) 0 1 2i t it ity p x               (8.6) 
with (0,1)N  . In this specification, only one type of public good (the Carta) 
is assumed and the dependent variable is meant to represent some “constitutional 
characteristics” in the post-decision period, while 
itp  captures heterogeneity 
specifically in the pre-decision period and vector 
itx represents additional 
characteristics always in the pre-decision period. The equation model (8.6) is 
explicitly targeted to capture the effect of pre-existing fragmentation on institutional 
design: it uses post-decision variables in the left-hand side and pre-decision 
explanatory variables on the right-hand side, thereby discounting the potential 
endogeneity between the dependent and the independent variables.  
A more complete specification can be written as: 
( 1) 0 1 2 3i t it it it ity SURN RES OTHER              (8.7) 
This time, the equation separates the effects of social heterogeneity (SURN) 
and resource heterogeneity (RES) in each assembly. In order to filter out the partial 
effect of assembly size (SIZE) on surname fractionalization, the model needs to be 
completed as follows: 
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( 1) 0i t k it m it n it ity SURN RES OTHER              (8.8) 
where
0 1k SIZE    . The final estimating equation includes one 
interaction term in the regressions. However, this choice controls for the presence of 
significant partial effects. It also has some “costs”: interaction terms normally 
exacerbate high cross-correlations and worsen collinearity between the 
fractionalization index, interaction term, and assembly size.
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The coefficients of independent variables will represent how many units the 
dependent variable will vary with a unit increase in the dependent variable, holding all 
other variables fixed. The interpretation of coefficients of interaction terms requires 
some clarification (Wooldridge, 2003, p. 197). Let us consider the effects of surname 
fractionalization: the coefficient 
0  on SURN indicates the partial effect on the 
dependent variable of a unit increase of adjusted surname fractionalization when no 
one is attending to the assembly (assembly size is zero), while the coefficient 
0  on 
SIZE indicates the partial effect of a unit increase in assembly size on the dependent 
variable when there is perfect homogeneity (surname fractionalization is zero). The 
coefficient 
1  on SURN SIZE  indicates how the effect of surname fractionalization 
on the dependent variable changes with the addition of one member to the assembly. 
8.3. Results and Discussion 
In total, five sets of OLS regressions were run separately to analyze the impact 
heterogeneity and size on each institutional feature: charter length (Table 8.9), 
number of roles in the assembly (Table 8.10), governance rules versus resource 
                                                            
194 Another possible econometric alternative that has been considered, particularly for surname 
fractionalization, is to “discretize” the fractionalization index: The index could be substituted by a set 
of dummy variables representing homogeneous classes of the index (like deciles). As a result, instead 
of one variable representing surname fractionalization, there would be many dummies representing the 
deciles, which can also be interacted with assembly size. The advantage of this choice would be the 
reduction of the correlation of the index with assembly size. However, major disadvantages would be 
the loss of significance due to the large number of variables and the reduction in precision of the 
dummies that would represent large percentiles. 
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management rules (Table 8.12), stability of institutions (Table 8.14), and assembly 
quorums (Table 8.15). Each of the sets contains a “benchmark” model that accounts 
for time trend and area-sized effects and another model that does not. The other two 
models are specifications of the benchmark in which adjusted surname 
fractionalization (SURN) or the total attendance (SIZE), respectively, have been 
removed to understand the importance and the relation of the two factors. For ease of 
immediate comparison of which of the independent variables has a greater effect on 
the dependent, standardized coefficients are sometimes reported in a separate table.
195
 
The remainder of the present section shows the regression tables and discusses 
the results. Separate subsections are dedicated to effects of social and resource 
heterogeneity (the “heterogeneity” box in Figure 8.1) and to effects of assembly size 
and surface extension (the “size” box in Figure 8.1).  
 
                                                            
195 Standardized coefficients ignore the scale of units of the independent variables, which after the 
standardization all have variance equal to 1. Therefore, standardized coefficients refer to how many 
standard deviations the dependent variable will change in response to a one-standard deviation increase 
in the independent variable. 
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Table 8.9.  
Complexity of institutions: document length 
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Table 8.10. 
Complexity of institutions: number of assembly roles 
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Table 8.12.  
Content of regulation 
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Table 8.14.  
Forward stability of the institution (uncensored observations) 
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Table 8.15.  
Quorums in assemblies 
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All the model specifications reported in the section control for 
heteroskedasticity using cluster-robust standard errors, where the “cluster” is the 
community. With the computation of cluster-robust standard errors, it was assumed 
that covariance structures are homoscedastic within each community cluster; in 
addition, their implementation allows an additional correction for arbitrary serial 
correlation within clusters. Under these conditions, post-estimation testing for 
heteroskedasticity was considered superfluous. 
The specifications mentioned in the following subsections were tested for 
multicollinearity by computing variance inflation factors (VIF). Variables having a 
VIF above 10 underline collinearity. In the selected specifications, the presence of 
multicollinearity is caused by the introduction of the interaction term SURN SIZE  
and involves only SIZE, the interaction term, and two are dummies. This potential 
problem almost disappears when the interaction is removed.
196
  
First, the effects of social and resource heterogeneity on the dependents are 
reported and discussed. Size effects are commented on in a separate section. 
8.3.1. Effects of social and resource heterogeneity 
Complexity. Table 8.9 reports the regression coefficients for analyses on 
LENGTH: Model (2) includes controls for area fixed effects and time trend and is our 
benchmark. Models (3) and (4) exclude surname fractionalization and total 
attendance, respectively. 
The increase of both surname fractionalization and size has a positive impact 
on the length of the Carte, and the interaction term indicates that surname 
fractionalization has a decreasing trend with respect to the increase in size. A unit 
                                                            
196 VIF tests are available upon request. 
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increase in adjusted surname fractionalization is correlated with an increase of seven 
articles of the average Carta when assembly size is smallest (zero).
197
 
The number of villages is, instead, negatively correlated with the length of a 
charter: having one more village in the community organization leads to a decrease of 
almost three charter articles, and the effect is statistically significant. This latter result 
may be explained by historical evidence and is compatible with strategic 
incompleteness of social contracts: oftentimes, single villages had their own charters, 
and multi-village organizations may have had only a framework charter containing 
the discipline of the single village and a set of governance rules to coordinate the 
interaction of the villages; therefore, they are normally less detailed. On the contrary, 
charters of a single village tend to be more detailed in order to cope with local 
heterogeneities. Resource fractionalization is, instead, found to have no statistically 
significant effect.  
In Table 8.10, the increase of adjusted surname fractionalization also is 
correlated with an increase of assembly roles. The interaction term with SIZE is 
negative, meaning that the trend is still decreasing but not statistically significant.
198
 
Therefore, C1-1, that higher surname fractionalization generates more 
complexity, can be confirmed. Support for C1-2 is found; however, the effect is 
relevant only for the number of articles comprising the Carta. On the contrary, C1-3 
receives no empirical support.  
                                                            
197 In post-estimation testing, a linear combination of adjusted surname fractionalization and its 
interaction with the total number of attendants computes the total effect of surname fractionalization, 
returning a coefficient of 7.107 with a standard error of 3.298, significant at the 5% level: Filtering out 
the partial effect of assembly size from adjusted surname fractionalization did not change the result 
much. 
198 A test for the joint significance of adjusted surname fractionalization together with the interaction 
term with size returns a total effect of 0.6405 (s.e. 0.149), significant at the 1% level: Again, 
accounting for the partial effect of assembly size in adjusted surname fractionalization has not changed 
the overall result. 
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Governance vs. resource management. The analysis of the content of the 
rules follows and is substantially a breakdown of LENGTH.  
In Table 8.12, the first three models report estimates for the dependent 
variable GOVREG, the absolute frequency of articles dealing with community 
governance. The benchmark equation is (1). The impact of surname fractionalization 
is positive and significant at the 5% level, and the impact is decreasing with the 
increase in size. This means that the impact of surname fractionalization on the 
number of governance rules is higher in smaller assemblies and smaller in larger 
assemblies.
199
 This behavior was already noted in Table 8.9, and this may be due to 
the increase in the number of rules, regardless of the type, cannot be limitless also in 
case of complete fragmentation. The interpretation finds a visual confirmation in 
Table 8.11, which reports the number of governance and resource management rules 
in assemblies at high-, medium-, or low-surname fractionalization. 
It is possible to notice how, in assemblies where surname fractionalization is 
lower, fewer community governance rules and fewer resource management rules are 
produced. 
Models (4), (5), and (6) report estimates on RESREG, the frequency of 
resource management rules: the impact of surname fractionalization is weakly 
statistically significant. Importance is gained by the number of villages represented in 
the assembly, which exhibits a statistically significant negative effect on the number 
of resource management rules.  
This, as anticipated, may also be explained by the fact that the technical 
aspects of land exploitation were disciplined by the Carte of the single villages, while 
                                                            
199 The total effect of adjusted surname fractionalization and of its interaction with assembly size 
returns a coefficient of 2.814 (s.e. 1.214), significant at the 5% level in specification (1); in (4), the 
joint effect is 4.617 (s.e. 2.63), significant at the 10% level; in (7), the total effect is 0.88 (s.e. 0.324), 
significant at the 1% level. 
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the multi-village organization had the purpose of coordinating the villages together 
with the discipline of the single village where the assembly took place. Amendments 
to the complete Carte are, of course, of significantly shorter length. 
Model (7) reports the most interesting result: surname fractionalization has a 
strong and positive significant impact on the percentage of governance rules set forth 
by the assembly, meaning that the more socially fragmented the assembly is, the 
greater the attention on the management of the group versus the management of the 
technical aspects of resource extraction. The assembly, on average, faces the adverse 
effects of social fragmentation with a more detailed discipline of the collective action 
in the institution rather than disciplining the quality-quantity of resource extraction 
and the related sanctions to avert the potential for the tragedy of the commons. The 
evidence found is compatible with this interpretation. 
Surname fractionalization is stronger in governance rules (1) than in resource 
management rules (4), while the effect of the number of villages within a community 
is higher under resource management rules (4) than under governance rules (1):
200
 
coordinating villages require rules on how to regulate resource extraction that are less 
detailed. Empirical support for the efficacy of this conjecture on effective levels of 
resource extraction cannot be provided due to lack of data. However, the historical 
evidence seems to point to the institutional result of a sustainable resource 
management. 
In conclusion, C2-1 is confirmed: surname fractionalization impacts on the 
frequency of governance rules. Furthermore, surname fractionalization impacts also 
on the relative frequency of governance rules on the total of the provisions set forth 
by the assembly, underlining that the more the assembly is socially fragmented, the 
                                                            
200 To allow the comparison of the effects, standardized coefficients are reported in Table 8.13 
(Appendix D). 
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greater the importance of dedicating more detail to disciplining the governance of the 
group rather than the technical aspects of land exploitation. No empirical support was 
found for the hypotheses on the number of villages (C2-2) and on resource 
fractionalization (C2-3). 
Stability. For a sample of 62 documents, including institutional changes before 
the end period (1807), it has been possible to compute the number of years before the 
next institutional change. Regression estimates exhibit no significant impact in any of 
the factors considered. 
As shown in Table 8.14, resource fractionalization is weakly statistically 
significant. More resource-diverse communities are found to have institutions that are 
less enduring in (2) and (3); however, the significance of this effect disappears in (4) 
when other variables are added and eventually changes direction in (5) when time and 
area effects are added. In conclusion, no support could be found for any of the 
conjectures for stability, probably due to the limited number of observations of 
institutional change. Hence, the issue of institutional stability remains open to further 
inquiry. 
Consensus. As to the analysis of the 91 assembly quorums, the benchmark 
model in Table 8.15 is (4). Surname fractionalization and resource fractionalization 
exhibit no statistically significant effect; therefore, no support is found for the 
conjectures stated in the previous section. Conclusively, even though neither social 
heterogeneity nor resource heterogeneity seem to play a role in affecting the difficulty 
in reaching a collective agreement in institutions, other effects appear to be relevant, 
each, thus, requiring its own subsection, as follows. 
8.3.2. Effects of group size. From the statistical analyses, other independent 
variables have emerged as statistically significant. They are all related to size effects: 
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the number of assembly attendants, the total productive surface of the community 
where the assembly took place, and whether the community has a large endowment of 
commons. This subsection discusses these effects and seeks explanations for their 
presence. 
Complexity. Regression coefficients in Tables 8.9 and 8.10 highlight 
statistically significant group size effects (number of attendants to the assembly) in 
determining the length of the Carta and the number of assembly roles. Both the 
effects are compatible with transaction costs considerations carried out in previous 
chapters and in general with the idea that transaction costs increase as the number of 
simultaneous interactants increases. The number of individual preferences that the 
Carta must reflect is higher in larger groups, and the general tendency seems to be 
writing more complete social contracts in larger groups. The number of different roles 
required to manage an institution involving a larger number of people reflect this 
complexity. After all, on this issue, Olson (1965) was right in stating:  
…to establish a group agreement or organization will nonetheless always tend 
to be more difficult the larger the size of the group, for the larger the group the 
more difficult it will be to locate and organize even a subset of the group, and 
those in the subset will have an incentive to continue bargaining with the 
others in the group until the burden is widely shared, thereby adding to the 
expense of bargaining. (p. 46)  
Although literature supports this statement, a breakdown of the analyses seems 
necessary.  
Governance vs. resource management. Let us consider the analyses 
conducted on the content of regulation in Table 8.12. Group size effects are present 
both in the number of governance rules and in the number of resource management 
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rules, and the effects are in both cases positive and statistically significant. The 
analysis of standardized coefficients highlights the stronger impact of size in 
determining the number of governance rules (1) than in determining resource 
management rules (4), and this provides further support to the conjecture that larger 
groups require a higher number of governance rules for a sustainable management of 
their natural resources. Nevertheless, larger groups need more rules of resource 
management and, therefore, more complete social contracts, as exhibited by the 
positive and significant coefficient on the total number of attendants in (4). 
Stability. As anticipated, regression coefficients in Table 8.14 do not show 
significant effects of any of the independent variables on the number of years 
preceding the next institutional change. A possible explanation may reside in the 
small size of the sample and the lack of additional data. Another analysis has been 
carried out on a subsample of 21 observations in order to investigate how the content 
of the rules may have an impact on the number of years the institution will last. 
Standardized coefficients are reported for ease of immediate comparison in 
Table 8.16. Keeping as dependent the stability of the institution, a different regression 
is run for each of the rule categories available in the charters, with time trend, 
document length, and type of document controlled for. Eventually, quorum is also 
inserted among the independent variables to verify whether a high consensus has an 
impact on the stability of the institution. The regression coefficients exhibit that 
governance and resource management rules have opposite effects on the stability of 
institutions: while a higher proportion of governance rules and participation rules is 
associated with a lower institutional endurance, probably related to the need of 
frequent amendment, a higher proportion of resource management rules correlates 
with a significant increase in endurance. In all the specifications, quorum has a 
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significant positive effect on the stability of the institution: a higher quorum equals a 
higher degree of consensus over the content of the institution deliberated by the 
assembly. Surprisingly, an increased consensus results in a higher institutional 
endurance; in the theory of voting behavior, one of the factors that might affect 
consensus is the size of the voting group. 
Consensus. Group size, measured by the number of attendants to the 
assembly, has a significant effect on the deliberative quorum. The effect is, however, 
negative and significant at the 5% level. This fact underlines common knowledge in 
the literature on voting behavior in public policy: larger voting groups fail in reaching 
agreements due to the high costs of aggregating preferences. When a majority rule is 
set, the Condorcet paradox means that cyclical preferences toward voting alternatives 
are likely to emerge: the decision deadlock can be overcome, for example, by setting a 
lower deliberative quorum or by letting preference aggregation in subgroups that will 
act through a representative (that is, keeping the same quorum, while only few people 
will vote for the whole). In any case, the results for a large voting group are likely to 
be the following two: either they will be represented by a few members attending the 
assembly and casting a vote with a majority or even with supermajority rules (and 
figure as a small group) or they will decide with a lower quorum. This is exactly what 
the regression table displays in Table 8.15, model (4): as the number of attendants 
increases, the quorum decreases. 
Lower quorums are required when the productive surface increases, while 
higher quorums are required when the productive surface is largely represented by 
commons. This observation leads to a first conclusion compatible with the evidence: 
in order to avert the tragedy of the commons, a larger consensus is required. Larger 
consensus is easy to obtain when the face-to-face group of interactants is smaller. 
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Recalling from the previous subsection that a higher quorum is related to a 
longer institutional endurance, a first conclusion is that the evidence found is 
compatible with the thesis that group size has an indirect impact on institutional 
endurance. This might explain why organizing collective action in smaller groups led, 
and is likely to lead, local communities to be successful in overcoming the tragedy of 
the commons.  
 
 
 
Figure 8.9. A summary of the results. 
Note. Solid lines represent statistical significance at the 1% level, dashed lines significance at the 5% 
level, dotted lines significance at the 10% level, and the sign indicates whether the effect has been 
found positive or negative. 
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8.4. Conclusions 
This chapter empirically investigated a long-debated issue in political theory: 
how the design and stability of institutions may reflect the characteristics of the group 
that agreed on them. Specifically, the focus of the study has been on understanding 
how social heterogeneity, resource heterogeneity, and group size may affect 
institutional design and stability. The Carte Di Regola offered a setting for the 
empirical study of this phenomenon over the long term.  
Empirical methodologies and an unusually large dataset allowed the empirical 
analysis of institutions in a novel way under two main aspects. First, this study 
observes similar institutions (the Carte) in several village communities over a period 
of six centuries (1245–1801), in a well-delimited region with stable political 
characteristics and in an environment with heterogeneous resource endowments. 
Second, it develops a long debated issue in institutional analysis: the role of 
heterogeneity and group size as conditions that affect successful collective action of 
groups in common-pool resource management systems. The empirical strategy 
adopted was not completely novel and, together with the consideration of each 
assembly as a single and independent event, facilitated disentangling of potential 
endogeneity issues regarding institutional formation. 
Two sections discussed proxies of social heterogeneity and of resource 
heterogeneity: social heterogeneity is measured using a fractionalization index based 
on the surnames of assembly attendants; resource heterogeneity is measured using a 
similar fractionalization index computed on categories of land resources from a 
historical land register. The subsections also discuss the properties of these measures, 
and light is shed on the limitations by means of two Monte Carlo simulations.  
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A specific section describes five institutional features that are considered 
relevant for institutional design: (i) the length of the Carte and (ii) the number of roles 
in the assembly, considered proxies of the complexity of institutions; (iii) the 
frequency of governance rules and of resource management rules, and the importance 
of governance rules relative to the total; (iv) the number of years before the next 
institutional change, as a proxy of institutional stability; (v) the consensus required to 
reach the collective decision on the institution.  
Ten findings summarize the present research effort, and are visually 
represented in Figure 8.9.  
The following six findings concern the impact of social and resource 
heterogeneity. First, that higher surname fractionalization generated more institutional 
complexity, both in terms of the length of the Carte and in terms of the number of 
assembly roles required for community governance. Second, that the number of 
villages represented in the assembly displayed a negative correlation with document 
length. One possible interpretation for this finding is that multi-village communities 
preferred writing “incomplete” or framework-oriented social contracts. This left the 
single villages with the task of crafting more detailed documents to govern collective 
action and dealing with local heterogeneities. Third, that surname fractionalization 
had a significant and positive impact on the frequency of community governance 
rules. The effect was stronger on the frequency of community governance rules than 
on the frequency of resource management rules. The impact of surname 
fractionalization on community governance rules was stronger when surname 
fractionalization increased in small communities. Fourth, that surname 
fractionalization also had a significant impact on the ratio of community governance 
rules to the total number of rules. This result is non-obvious and underlines that the 
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more socially fragmented the assembly was, the less attention was placed on 
disciplining technical aspects of resource extraction. Fifth, that social and resource 
heterogeneity exhibited no significant impact on the stability of institutions. The 
assembly quorum appears to be unaffected by surname fractionalization. Sixth, that 
none of the five institutional features revealed a significant correlation with resource 
heterogeneity. 
The last part of the analysis was devoted to assessing the impact of size effects 
on institutional features, and led to the following four findings. First, that group size 
had positive and significant effects on institutional complexity: larger assemblies 
represented a multifaceted agglomerate of different individual preferences, required 
more specialized governance, and were reflected in more detailed social contracts. 
This result was further confirmed in the analysis of the frequency of community 
governance rules vis-à-vis resource management rules. Second, that larger groups 
required more governance rules for a sustainable management of their natural 
resources. Third, that an increased consensus correlates with a higher institutional 
endurance. Fourth, a larger group size has a negative impact on the deliberative 
quorum.  
Overall, the evidence here presented is compatible with the arguments in 
previous chapters concerning the determinants and the limits of group size in 
institutional collective action.  
The present chapter contains limitations common in empirical research with 
archival data and in the empirical study of institutions. Additional data from case 
studies in different regions will be beneficial for testing the external validity of the 
conclusions. 
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Chapter 9. Conclusion 
 
9.1. Introduction 
This study explored the relationship between group size and institutional 
change. The research made use of a six-century long database concerning the 
collective action on the commons of hundreds of villages in the Italian Alps. 
According to economic theory, when multiple users have access to a common 
resource and there are no property rights, each individual wants to extract the 
maximum benefit and bear only a minimal share of the total cost of extracting the 
resource. This social dilemma may end in the complete disruption of the common 
resource and lead to a tragedy of the commons (Gordon, 1954; Hardin, 1968). Ostrom 
(1990) challenged this idea by demonstrating that some groups are able to overcome 
the tragedy of the commons by setting up institutions for collective action. In such 
institutions, users of a common resource coordinate their extraction efforts and 
cooperate over the long run for the sustainable use of their common resources 
(Ostrom et al., 1992).  
In several articles and books (e.g., Ostrom 2005b; Poteete et al., 2010; 
Varughese & Ostrom, 2001), Ostrom identified a lack of research into group size and 
group heterogeneity in the theoretical and empirical analysis of institutions created for 
collective action. The present study sought to fill this theoretical and empirical gap 
within this stream of research.  
Although it is recognized that common property was the primordial form of 
ownership in many early societies, a search of the literature revealed a longstanding, 
ongoing debate among European economic and legal scholars
201
 about common 
                                                            
201 This debate is discussed in Chapter 2. 
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property’s importance in legal theory and whether it is an aberration from the private 
property paradigm (Grossi, 1981; Hume, 1739; Laveleye, 1891; Maine, 1861). With 
Ostrom’s Governing the Commons (1990), this debate emerged as one of the most 
promising research subjects in institutional analysis, both in relation to the specific 
domain of the commons and as a result of the innovative interdisciplinary 
methodologies. 
The present study assumed there was a group of appropriators of the commons 
(Chapter 1) and that this group has to decide whether extraction (identified as a 
collective action problem) be performed directly under an informal institution or 
indirectly under a formal institution. The group’s engagement in a formal regime 
requires an additional collective action: participating in the creation of self-enforcing 
institutions for the appropriation of a sustainable amount of commons. This study 
tested the threshold hypothesis, which predicted that the transition from an informal to 
formal institution is driven by cognitive limits that determine a threshold group size. 
The threshold hypothesis (Chapter 4) was broken down into three sub-
problems, which are discussed in three separate empirical chapters. Chapter 5 
investigates group size threshold and its determinants. Chapter 6 examines whether 
the institutional phenomena of group fission and fusion occur after crossing the 
threshold. Chapter 8 investigates the role of group and resource heterogeneity in the 
design of formal institutions. Chapter 8 deals with a specific domain, and it is 
preceded by an introductory chapter that contains a discussion about the role of group 
heterogeneity in the design and stability of institutions (Chapter 7). 
This study used original datasets about the historical case of the Carte di 
Regola in the Italian Alps
202
 region from the early 13th century until the French 
                                                            
202 A discussion about data sources and documentation is found in Chapter 3. 
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invasion of the region in 1796.
203
 This case was first studied by Casari (2007) to 
understand the reasons for the emergence of “institutions that protected property 
rights and regulated their use in the commons” (p. 191). The present study suggests 
the relevance of group size in the transition from informal to formal regimes, based on 
new historical evidence in addition to the one collected in Casari (2007)
204
. New 
research questions were formulated, and statistical analyses were carried out on 
additional legal documents, and sources on population, household size, land 
resources, climate and topography.
205
 This evidence was used to test the research 
hypothesis by examining variations in group size and heterogeneity in a large sample 
of villages observed over six centuries. 
The analysis in this study was based on two main assumptions: (a) the 
independence of groups, which are assumed to have the ability to move from an 
informal institution to a formal institution without any external influence (i.e., from 
local aristocracy); and (b) the exogeneity of population size from the process of 
institutional change, under the ceteris paribus condition. Other minor assumptions and 
elements of the research method were specific to each of the three research questions 
derived from the threshold hypothesis.
206
 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 9.2 provides a 
synthesis of the empirical findings for the whole study and for each specific chapter. 
Section 9.3 illustrates the theoretical implications of this study’s findings, and Section 
9.4 identifies areas that may be useful for creating policy. Section 9.5 outlines 
directions for future research. Section 9.6 contains conclusions about the present 
study. 
                                                            
203 Chapter 2 provides a detailed historical background of the case. 
204 The reader is addressed to Appendix B for a replication of Casari’s (2007) study. 
205 Chapter 3 contains a detailed description of sources and documentation of the research. 
206 Please refer to the specific sections in Chapter 1. 
302 
9.2. Empirical Findings 
There was theoretical and empirical support for the hypothesis that group size 
threshold promotes a change from informal to formal institutions.  
Initial evidence about the empirical relevance of group size in the emergence 
of formal institutions was already suggested by Casari’s (2007) data. It was important 
to investigate the robustness and the reason for this finding. For instance many 
communities were founded later than 1200; however, the datation of the first 
settlement was found to be historically imprecise for the purposes of the empirical 
analyses turned out to be and statistically irrelevant. Instead, historical evidence 
showed how large communities were, for the most part, groups of villages. After 
some time most of them engaged in fission behavior. That is, they split up their 
organization into two or more institutional entities.  
One key finding was the following. An inspection of the trend in regional 
population and average community size revealed an interesting fact: from 1200 to 
1800, the total population of the area increased about three times, while the average 
population size of communities remained stable.  
The empirical findings are articulated around three specific questions on: 
“Group size thresholds in institutions” (Chapter 5), “Group Fission and Fusion in 
Institutions” (Chapter 6) and “Effects of group heterogeneity and size on institutional 
design” (Chapter 8). A synthesis of the key arguments and findings is provided in the 
following subsections for each of the three research questions used to test the 
threshold hypothesis. 
9.2.1. Existence of a threshold group size in institutional change. This 
chapter investigated five factors potentially determining the size of groups for 
successful collective action: (1) resource specificity, (2) free-riding, (3) transaction 
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costs, (4) heterogeneous individual preferences, and (5) cognitive limits. For each 
factor, testable arguments were developed. Strong empirical support was found for the 
cognitive limits argument, and the empirical threshold in group size estimated on the 
data is about 183 or 170 individuals in the group, depending on which data sample is 
used (all communities or single-layer communities). 
The linear fit was stable throughout the observation period. Threshold values 
of 198 and 155 individuals were obtained for the full charter sample by computing the 
mean and median of appropriators, respectively. In non-charter groups, an upper 
bound was identified at a median of 231 individuals, and this threshold was also 
stable over time. These group size thresholds, interestingly, were in the range of 100 
to 231 individuals found by British evolutionary anthropologist Robin Dunbar 
(1993a) in his research about primate and human societies.  
The results of computer simulations of the sample showed that the present 
study’s findings strongly supported the threshold hypothesis. These analyses also 
revealed the following: (a) group size was not resource-specific; (b) large groups may 
have been successful, but they used different institutional technologies to succeed; (c) 
group size differences were attributable to different transaction costs; and (d) large 
groups reached agreements using a direct vote with lower quorums because it is 
difficult to accommodate the preferences of a large group of people in a common 
course of action. 
9.2.2. Group fission and fusion as behavioral responses to the threshold. 
One puzzling finding was that some communities had a size far larger than the 
predicted by the threshold hypothesis. A close inspection of these cases revealed they 
were communities made up of more than one village, adopted institutional 
arrangements, and underwent significant organizational changes similar to the 
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changes reported in primate social groups (Aureli et al., 2008). For example, 
collective action in large groups was handled by subgroups organized in no more than 
four organizational layers. It was found that the size of stand-alone villages remained 
in Dunbar’s group size range throughout the period, while the population of face-to-
face units in multi-village organizations significantly increased between the first and 
last institutional change. The population of face-to-face units and the population of a 
control group of stand-alone villages observed at the last institutional change did not 
differ significantly.  
The process of institutional change was observed in all the case studies, which 
ranged from the fusion of small villages to several types of fission of large 
communities into smaller units or clusters. These changes were ordered in a sequence 
of increasing transaction costs, and it was found that this sequence was related to the 
group size of face-to-face units in multi-village organizations:
207
 the different types of 
fission events range over a spectrum where independence is obtained only by smaller 
multi-village communities up to ca. 1,000 inhabitants, while other fission events 
involving clustering and coexistence and pure coexistence occurred along the whole 
spectrum in multi-village communities.
208
 
9.2.3. Social and resource heterogeneity in groups crossing the threshold. 
The present study also examined the relationship among social and resource 
heterogeneity, group size, and institutional change and design in groups adopting a 
formal regime. Individual surnames were examined to discover internal group 
characteristics that indicated the social fragmentation of assemblies. The diversity of 
groups was also measured in terms of their portfolio of natural resources and the 
variation of institutional design obtained from the systematic coding of a rich body of 
                                                            
207 Figures 6.6–6.7, Appendix C. 
208 The reader is addressed to Appendix A for a succinct definition of these concepts. 
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documents. This analysis was conducted to discover whether social and resource 
heterogeneity and group size had an impact on specific features of institutional 
design: (a) complexity, (b) the importance of governance and resource management 
rules in the documents, (c) the importance of governance rules in the charters, (d) the 
number of years before the next institutional change as a proxy for institutional 
stability, and (e) the level of consensus required to reach a collective decision about 
the institution. In addition, the analysis examined whether the effect of social 
heterogeneity was stronger than the effect of resource heterogeneity. 
Computer simulations were used to investigate the statistical consequences of 
the relationship between group size and the index of fragmentation employed in the 
research. The empirical analysis was aimed at untangling potential endogeneity issues 
in this relationship and empirical analysis of the role of social and resource 
heterogeneity in relation to institutional design. The results provided by the regression 
analysis were intuitive only in part. 
First of all, all five institutional features considered by this study were found 
to have no significant correlation to resource heterogeneity, which was, thus, 
determined to be almost redundant. On the contrary, social heterogeneity had 
significant impacts, especially on institutional complexity, consensus, and the relative 
importance of governance versus resource management rules. 
The results of this analysis show that high degrees of social fragmentation 
were associated with higher institutional complexity. This was verified by observing 
the relationship between surname variety within a group and the length of the Carte or 
number of assembly roles. Multi-village communities were associated with shorter 
charters. This—perhaps less intuitive—result suggested that social contracts for larger 
organizations are merely frameworks that enable single villages to enact a more 
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detailed document at the local level and deal more effectively with local 
heterogeneities. Less obvious results were obtained when observing the relationship 
between surname fragmentation and the content of the Carte. Greater surname 
fragmentation is associated with more community governance rules. Finally, the 
impact in smaller communities is larger than that in larger communities relative to the 
frequency of resource management rules and when there is more surname 
fragmentation. This result was not obvious, because it supported the idea that socially 
fragmented assemblies facing the risk of the tragedy of the commons placed more 
emphasis on community governance than on the technical aspects of resource 
extraction. The analysis of the impact of social and resource heterogeneity on the 
duration of institutions produced unsatisfactory results. The regression produced non-
significant statistics, showing that none of the factors had an impact on institutional 
stability.  
The results did show that assembly size was significantly correlated to 
institutional design. Larger assemblies were associated with institutional designs that 
were more complex. This finding may indicate that larger groups need a functional 
specification of governments: complete social contracts are preferred as an ex ante 
investment to cope with the foreseen contingencies of community governance. In 
addition, it was found that larger groups tend to make decisions with lower quorums, 
which suggests it is easier to obtain a consensus in a small assembly than in a large 
assembly. 
9.3. Theoretical Implications 
That institutional change is driven by group size thresholds suggests that 
cognitive limits and transaction costs could be usefully included in the theory of 
sustainable resource management. This implication was, to some extent, alluded to in 
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the empirical literature. However, the inclusion of group size thresholds in 
institutional change required a critical rethinking of how group characteristics affect 
the allocation of property rights in alternative institutional regimes (Williamson, 
1979). 
A search of the literature revealed a fragmented body of research with 
contrasting results and inconclusive answers, as if there were a missing link in 
defining and investigating the theoretical implications stated above. In Chapter 4, it is 
suggested that a critical reading of selected works in the biological and cognitive 
sciences combined with the predictions of the New Institutional Economics school of 
thought (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Coase, 1960; North, 1990; Williamson, 1979) 
provide rich theoretical insights for the economic and legal understanding of 
institutional change. For example, institutional change can be explained by a 
cognitive limitation in the number of social contacts that each individual can handle in 
face-to-face interactions. This cognitive limit implies at least four consequences:  
(1) It involves the existence of a fixed limit to group size at which face-to-
face interactions may successfully occur (Chapter 5). The existence of 
these limits is related to the idea that interaction always bears a transaction 
cost because the human brain can process only a certain amount of 
information. Institutional change driven by cognitive limits was tested 
against other factors, and the evidence supported the threshold hypothesis 
(e.g., Dunbar 1993a).  
(2) When social groups that interact face-to-face increase in size, there can be 
organizational changes that involve the fission into multiple groups 
(Bickart et al., 2011; Dunbar, 2003, 2012; Hill & Dunbar, 2003; Stiller & 
Dunbar, 2007; Zhou et al., 2005). The response to a change in group size, 
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fission or fusion, is not a one-step decisions, but entails gradual 
transformations of the institutions, which most likely is influenced by 
transaction cost minimization (Chapter 6). 
(3) It can account for the transition of groups from an informal to a more 
formal institution. A formal institution can lower transaction costs using a 
different legal “technology”: the adoption of a formal institution, or 
structuring the organization in several layers, are ways to overcome a 
cognitive limitation. Hence, the process of evolution and allocation of 
property rights can be interpreted as behavioral responses of the group 
when  individuals approach their cognitive limit. 
(4) It is compatible with the economic theory of property rights and 
institutions. The likely institutional type for the allocation of property 
rights depends on transaction costs (Barzel, 1997; Ellickson, 1991; North, 
1990; Williamson, 1979, 1981) and the fit with the enforcement of 
informal and formal resource use rules that are aimed to maximize 
revenues from production209. The synthesis model in Chapter 6 was used 
to illustrate the relevance of transaction costs for institutional change in 
relation to the optimal use of common resources by a group. In this model, 
if transaction costs were zero, institutional changes would be irrelevant for 
the economic outcome. It is also true, however, that for the optimal 
resource use condition to hold in the model, regardless of group size, that 
transactions bear a cost is essential. Without considering transaction costs, 
the problem of allocating property rights for common resources would be 
meaningless. On the other hand, not only has the empirical evidence 
                                                            
209 See Chapter 6 for a discussion about the compatibility of the informal theoretical model of 
institutional change with the empirical evidence contained in Chapters 5 and 6 and the theoretical 
predictions suggested in Chapter 4 
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discovered in the present study shown how considering transaction costs 
helps explain the institutional changes that occurred over time, but it also 
revealed the relevance of group size as a primary institutional factor in 
sustainable resource governance relative to technical resource 
management. 
The results in Chapters 5 and 6 suggest there is a relationship between human 
cognitive limits and institutional change. These cognitive limits are a natural part of 
people’s information processing capabilities and, therefore, affect the human capacity 
to solve collective action problems and interact efficiently in environmentally 
challenging settings. The adoption of fission and fusion strategies, for instance, allows 
people to overcome these limits with an efficient internal structure in informal and 
formal groups alike. This argument has been used in these chapters to suggest that the 
threshold hypothesis can be applied generally to economic institutions and 
organizations that involve self-governance. 
9.4. Policy Implication 
The results of the present study support the threshold hypothesis in collective 
action, which provides a potential explanation for the role of group size and 
heterogeneity in institutional design and stability. As a result, it may be possible to 
develop effective sustainability policies for institutions and organizations that allow 
self-governance. 
The results discussed in Chapter 8 might explain why organizing collective 
action in small groups is likely to lead local communities to institutional success and, 
ultimately, to a sustainable management of their common resources. This evidence is 
compatible with the arguments in previous chapters concerning the determinants and 
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limits of group size in institutional collective action. The results also suggest that 
group size may have an indirect impact on institutional endurance.  
The results discussed in Chapter 8 show how institutional design changes in 
response to group characteristics (e.g., social fragmentation) are associated with 
transaction costs. In spite of Olson’s (1965) prediction that “the larger the group the 
farther it will fall short of providing an optimal amount of good” (p. 36), social 
heterogeneity and group size are key factors that should be carefully considered when 
designing institutions or organizations that can help large groups achieve 
environmental sustainability. While this research may be applicable in many regions 
of the world where the sustainable self-governance of common resources by local 
communities is crucial, potential implementations of the threshold hypothesis can also 
be extended to the management of collective action in large organizations in general, 
from businesses to cities. The threshold hypothesis may inform strategies aimed at the 
minimization of organization costs. By providing additional dimensions for predicting 
when organizational changes should occur, the hypothesis may be helpful in 
designing (and/or instigating) efficient changes pre-emptively. 
9.5. Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research 
Further research will be necessary to strengthen the external validity of the 
conclusions drawn in the present research. There are two main limitations in the 
findings.  
First, the findings rely on evidence from a single case study: the Carte di 
Regola in the Trentino Region. Although the analyses are carried out on hundreds of 
communities, a different case study could have led the researcher to different 
conclusions.  
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Second, this study’s conclusions are based on historical data. Although the 
period considered covers six centuries, subsequent technological progress – like the 
diffusion of modern communication technologies – may render the findings 
unapplicable to some institutions and organizations in industrialized countries while 
retaining their validity in more traditional settings. 
The following topics should be examined in future studies to validate the 
present study’s findings and produce a more comprehensive theory about group size, 
institutional change, and the management of common resources:  
 Research should be conducted that examines whether and when informal 
regimes are superior to formal regimes in terms of total welfare. This research 
should attempt to answer the question about whether, all other things being 
equal, the cognitive trigger leads to superior economic outcomes. Further data 
would be needed to build response variables that can capture welfare 
variations; ideally, this study would use the same case study examined in the 
present study. 
 Research should be conducted to discover if the allocation of property rights 
on the commons has been influenced by group size (i.e., the threshold 
hypothesis) in diverse contexts. This type of research would require fieldwork 
and experiments in present-day societies and historical research, and it could 
provide external validity for the findings of the present study. 
 Literature from the behavioral, organizational, and legal sciences should be 
reviewed to identify group size thresholds and fission–fusion strategies. 
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9.6. Conclusion 
Although group size and group heterogeneity in collective action on common 
resources are considered empirical and theoretical challenges, it is necessary to 
understand them in order to understand the organization and evolution of institutions. 
As an answer to Williamson (1979), the empirical testing of the threshold hypothesis, 
as a possible solution to the problem of group size and group heterogeneity, does 
show that transactions are affected by group size and limited cognition. This 
information may be useful when developing future sustainability and organizational 
change policies.  
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APPENDIX A: DEFINITION OF TERMS 
 
Allocation of property rights. The allocation of property rights is interpreted as a 
welfare maximization problem. “Every distribution of property rights has with 
it a set of production costs and a set of transaction costs. The distribution of 
property rights that maximizes the gains from trade net of all costs is the 
optimal distribution” (Allen, 2000). In addition, the determination of group size 
in institutions may be led by factors related to production costs (extraction of 
the resource) and factors related to transaction costs (Allen, 2000; Allen & 
Lueck, 2002). 
Appropriation. Appropriation is a type of collective action that consists in the 
process of direct extraction of resources by a group that is either coordinated by 
informal rules of cooperation (See: Informal Institution) or uncoordinated and, 
therefore, at risk of failure of collective action. 
Appropriators (eﬀective). The number of “eﬀective” appropriators can be estimated 
only when a list of insiders is provided, and these lists are often available only 
when there is an assembly record in which it is possible to measure 
participation. 
Appropriators (potential). The number of potential appropriators on the commons is 
measured using population estimates. Population size estimates include both 
insiders and outsiders in the appropriators’ group. 
Assembly roles. The individuals in assemblies have a role. They can be divided in 
two classes: those having voting rights (active if they cast a vote, non-active if 
they are not voting) and those without voting rights (non-members) in the 
process of deliberation of the community charter. The attendees without voting 
rights were the notary, the witnesses, and other non-attending village members. 
Carte Di Regola. Also Carte or “rural charters.” The Carte were private-order formal 
institutions with the main purpose of disciplining the use of the commons of 
each village community: forest and pastures. Each Carta established a 
community governance system based on face-to-face village assemblies 
(“Regole”) and had to be approved by the prince-bishop in Trento, appointed 
for a lifetime term jointly by the pope in Rome and the emperor of the Holy 
Roman Empire. The prince-bishop had both secular and religious authority in 
the region from 1027 until 1803 and decentralized the economic governance of 
the villages retaining jurisdiction over tax and criminal matters. 
Collective action. In economic theory, collective action is defined as the provision of 
public goods and other collective goods through the collaboration of two or 
more individuals. One of the concerns of studies of collective action is the 
impact of externalities on group behavior. See Olson (1965). Yoram Barzel 
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(2002) defines collective action as “simultaneous actions by a number of 
individuals” (p.114). Collective action is required when a group of individuals 
sharing a common interest wishes to reach an agreement on a particular course 
of action by discussing and then implementing the decision undertaken by the 
group.  
Collective action in the commons. See: Appropriation.  
Collective action in institutions. See: Participation. 
Common-pool resources. Common-pool resources are distinguished from pure 
public goods because of the way they can be appropriated. Their size or natural 
characteristics allow the costly exclusion of potential users from attaining 
benefits from their use. Examples of common-pool resources include irrigation 
systems, fisheries, pastures, forests, water basins, or the atmosphere. 
Common property. Stevenson (1991) defines: “Common property [as] a form of 
resource ownership with the following characteristics: 1) the resource unit has 
bounds that are well defined by physical, biological and social parameters; 2) 
there is a well delineated group of users, who are distinct from persons 
excluded from resource use; 3) multiple included users participate in resource 
extraction; 5) users share joint, non-exclusive entitlement to the in situ or 
fugitive resource prior to its capture or use; 6) users compete for the resource, 
and thereby impose negative externalities on one another; 7) a well-delineated 
group of right holders exists, which may or may not coincide with the group of 
users” (p. 40). 
Commons. See: Common-pool Resources. 
Community governance rules. Rules decided by the assembly to govern the 
community and not aimed directly to the management of the collective action 
on resources. They are divided in three classes: governance rules, participation 
rules, and constraints on outsiders. 
Community. When not specified otherwise, the community is the unit of 
observation. Communities are composed of one or more villages or subgroups 
of villages called clusters or subgroups. 
Complete Carte. Complete charters are stand-alone documents that lay down the 
rules for governing the economic resources of a community; they can be first 
adoptions or later renewals of previous charters. Some communities may have 
no charter, while others may have adopted up to seven complete charters in the 
period studied. 
Complexity of institutions. Two indexes of institutional complexity are constructed. 
The length of the document decided by the assembly and the number of 
assembly roles provide a measure of the complexity of formal institutions. 
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Constraints on outsiders. Constraints on outsiders are community governance rules 
that described the behavior of the community toward the non-members 
(foreigners). Generally, these rules imposed limitations to the action of 
outsiders, who were excluded from assembly participation. Therefore, this 
exclusion also entailed the impossibility of being an active part in the rule-
making process. 
Content of rules (formal institutions). The content of the rules decided by the 
assembly is the written outcome of the institutional process, decided by the 
community members. Therefore, the content of the rules, in particular if they 
are community governance rules or resource management rules, is an important 
measure that can correlate with both social heterogeneity and resource 
heterogeneity. 
Content of the Carte. The normative content of the charters contains community 
governance rules and resource management rules. 
Economic property rights. See: Property rights. 
Exogenous population growth. In the process of institutional change, population 
growth is assumed to be exogenously determined. This assumption allows the 
consideration of changes in population as independent from the institutional 
type and organization changes. As a consequence, institutions and organizations 
adapt to increasing or decreasing population growth: in particular, groups with 
larger initial population are deemed to have faster technological change and 
population growth (Kremer, 1993). 
Fission and fusion. Fission and fusion are decisions undertaken by the group to 
sustain collective action in the commons, under both the informal and the 
formal institutional regimes; the prediction is that when the group overcomes 
the critical size threshold, it will divide into one or more independent groups 
(fission); alternatively, if two or more groups are too small to sustain collective 
action, they may merge in a larger entity (fusion). 
Fission clustering and coexistence. Fission clustering and coexistence are weak 
fission events. They are defined as institutional changes occurring after (or in 
conjunction with) fission clustering: within a cluster, one or more villages may 
decide to have a village charter coexisting with the cluster charter and the 
multi-village charter (if any). 
Fission clustering. Fission clustering is a strong fission event. It occurs when the 
multi-village structures interaction by letting each village organize 
independently in clusters of one or more villages, which send to the multi-
village assembly only the representatives of the village(s). 
Fission coexistence. Fission coexistence is a weak fission event. It is defined as the 
adoption of a charter by one or more villages, which are not required to bargain 
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their independence from all the other villages or the multi-village organization, 
and they coexist with the multi-village charter. 
Fission independence. Fission independence is a strong fission event (see: Fission). 
With the adoption of a charter, the villages separate their interaction from the 
multi-village organization and have an assembly independent from the multi-
village one and from those of the other villages. 
Fission. The fission behavior is the division of a community in two or more sub-
groups. It has four alternative declinations: coexistence, clustering, clustering 
and coexistence, and independence. Fission events can be strong or weak in 
terms of the intensity, measured by transaction costs required for enforcement. 
Foreigners. See: Outsiders. 
Formal institution. A type of institution governed by formal rules of cooperation, 
overseeing a collective action of participation (see: Participation). 
Framework. The framework formalizes the threshold hypothesis in a graphical form. 
It contains the following components: a) group b) group size threshold, c) the 
institutional type (informal or formal), d) two types of collective action 
(participation and appropriation), e) fission–fusion behavior (see Figure 1.1). 
Fusion. Fusion is the merger of the villages in a multi-village organization. The 
fusion is oftentimes followed by a fission event, underlining a collective action 
problem. 
Governance (community). The governance of the institution may be developed in 
one or more layers. The formal regulation of collective action in the rural 
charters shows evidence of fission and fusion of communities over time. In our 
case study, sometimes face-to-face interaction occurs in communities that are 
structured in two or more coordinating subgroups. Such communities are 
termed multi-layered. Multi-layered communities are distinguished from one-
layered and cluster communities. The distinction between single-layered and 
multi-layered communities concerns the governance of communities. 
Governance rules. Governance rules are community governance rules that describe 
the requirements and the duration of assembly roles and define the system of 
checks-and-balances necessary to elect and make accountable (and, 
occasionally, even liable) those who were called to lead the institution for 
collective action in the capacity of community oﬃcers. 
Group size threshold. A group size threshold is a tipping point beyond which the 
group opts for a diﬀerent institutional type to manage collective action. 
Group. A group consists of a number of individuals who interact face-to-face, decide 
to cooperate, and collectively act toward the attainment of a common goal. The 
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number of potential appropriators on the commons is measured using 
population estimates. Population size estimates include both insiders and 
outsiders in the appropriators’ group. 
Heterogeneity (eﬀects). Heterogeneity is seen as a factor that increases the costs of 
social contracting for the allocation of property rights, decreases the likelihood 
of social cooperation, and hinders the process of aggregation of individual 
preferences in the provision of public goods. 
Heterogeneity. As a first approximation, group heterogeneity can be defined as 
referring to existing diﬀerences across the group’s observation units. 
Individual adoption. See: Transition to a formal regime. Individual adoption is the 
transition of a village from an informal regime to a formal institution. This 
change is the initial status from which further changes of a multi-village are 
considered. It is assumed that once a community adopts a charter, the charter is 
enforced until 1800: that is, there is no switchback to the informal status. 
Informal institution. A type of institution governed by informal rules of 
cooperation, overseeing a collective action of appropriation (see: 
Appropriation). 
Insiders. Insiders are the legal community members: individuals who belong to the 
eﬀective appropriators’ group (vicini). 
Institutional design. The design of formal institutions crafted by the group is defined 
by a set of institutional features. These features are deemed to represent the 
inner functioning of the formal institution and are as follows: rule content, rule 
balance, levels of complexity, the consensus within the group in reaching the 
collective decision, and stability over time of these decisions. Factors that are 
deemed to influence the design of the formal institution, and ultimately the 
collective action in the commons, are as follows: the level of social cohesion, 
resource diversity, and group size. Institutional design can be defined as a 
“process aimed at producing prescriptions, organization charts and plans, 
usually with some adaptive rules for coping with unforeseen circumstances” 
(Olsen, 1997). It can be reduced to a number of key institutional features 
considering the normative content of the new institution in terms of structure 
and content. 
Legal property rights. See: Property rights. 
Length of the document (formal institutions). The length of the document consists 
in the count of the number of rules contained in a document. The length may be 
related to the choice of the assembly of writing a complete social contract or 
leaving some gaps. 
Members. See: Insiders. 
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Modifications. Modifications are partial amendments to charters that occurred after 
the adoption of a complete charter that take the form of additions or appendices 
to the pre-existing document. 
Multi-layered (community). In a multi-layered community, at least one of the two 
criteria does not hold: either there are separate assemblies by village or sub-
group or there is a partitioning of the common resources for use by village or 
subgroup or both. A multi-layered community may include two or more 
bordering villages, or it may consist in a multi-village organization or a cluster 
of more villages. In that case, the general assembly may still include all 
members or only selected representatives from each village or a subgroup of 
members. 
Multi-village. Communities comprising more than one village. They can be single-
layered or multi-layered. 
Non-members. Individuals who attended the assembly as oﬃcers but did not have 
the right to cast a vote; these include notaries, witnesses, and outsiders in 
general. See: Outsiders. 
Number of roles (formal institutions). The number of roles in the assembly may be 
a useful indicator for the degree of government specialization required to 
govern the community. 
Organization (community). Observing a multi-village organization normally entails 
the adoption of a Carta di Regola and therefore the setting up of a formal 
institution that may govern more than one village. 
Other documents. The number of potential appropriators on the commons is 
measured using population estimates. Population size estimates include both 
insiders and outsiders in the appropriators’ group. 
Outsiders. Outsiders (forestieri) are non-members; therefore, they are not legally 
entitled to access, use, or manage the common resources. 
Partial assembly. In partial assemblies, only village representatives participate to the 
face-to-face collective action. Partial assemblies are distinguished from plenary 
assemblies (see). 
Participation rules. Participation rules are community governance rules that 
described the requirements, the periodicity, and the modes of participation to 
legislative assemblies of community members. 
Participation. Participation is a type of collective action that consists in a process of 
indirect appropriation of resources, mediated by rules of cooperation crafted 
and enforced by the group (formal institution). 
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Plenary assembly. Plenary assembly is defined here as a group size estimate that 
represents the largest face-to-face group of interactants, even when collective 
action is structured in more than one level. Plenary assemblies are distinguished 
from partial assemblies (see). 
Population. Population estimates include both the insider and the outsider groups and 
provide a figure of the potential number of appropriators interacting in the 
commons. 
Quorum. Quorum is defined as the number of active members in the community 
assembly required for the meeting to be validly constituted and to deliberate the 
collective decision. 
Resource fractionalization. One intuitive way to study resource heterogeneity is to 
use a fractionalization index referring to classes of land resources. The index 
measures the probability that two hectares randomly drawn from the pool of 
hectares of a community belong to diﬀerent resource classes. 
Resource heterogeneity. Resource heterogeneity is measured as the diversity of 
resource endowments within a community. 
Resource management rules. These rules defined the precise actions and 
precautions that had (or had not) to be undertaken by village members in order 
to coordinate in the access and the use of natural resources, mainly the 
commons (forest and pasture). The violation of each rule was normally backed 
by a monetary sanction (Casari, 2007), comprising at least the restoration of the 
damage and often a component to deter future damages. 
Single-layered (community). Or: One-layer community. Single-layered 
communities can be ruled under either an informal or a formal regime, while 
multi-layered communities require by necessity a formal institution. In a single-
layered community, active members met only in a general assembly (or 
interacted informally, if the single-layered community did not have a formal 
regime), and all members had access to all of the common resources according 
to the assembly regulations. 
Social heterogeneity. Social heterogeneity is measured by the diversity of surnames 
in the group of the attendants to the assemblies. 
Stability (formal institutions). In the present study, an institution is more stable than 
another when its forward duration is higher than that of the other. 
Stand-alone (villages). Stand-alone villages never belong to a multi-village during 
their existence and are considered one-layer structure communities by default. 
They are considered as a control group in our analyses of the effects of fission 
and fusion in multi-village organization. 
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Surname fractionalization. Surname fractionalization is computed as the probability 
that two randomly selected people from a population are from diﬀerent surname 
groups (families). 
Threshold hypothesis. This is the conjecture tested in Chapters 5 and 6. Institutions 
for the management of the commons having the requirements listed by Ostrom 
(1990) transit from informal to formal institutions when they overcome the 
group size threshold; this threshold is within Dunbar’s range; after crossing the 
threshold, large groups tend to structure their internal organization in smaller 
sub-groups. The thesis of this dissertation is that there exists a critical group 
size threshold that drives institutional change.  
Tragedy of the commons. The tragedy of the commons is a collective action 
problem involving common-pool resources, identified by Hardin (1968). When 
multiple non-cooperating individuals have simultaneous access to a common 
resource, standard economic theory predicts that the resource becomes 
depleted, because individuals acting self-interestedly are compelled to extract 
the most individual benefit they can from the resource by bearing only a 
fraction of the total cost, despite the knowledge that doing so is contrary to the 
long-term interests of both the individuals and the group. Elinor Ostrom (1990) 
challenged this conventional theory by demonstrating that groups are able to 
overcome the tragedy of the commons by setting up institutions for collective 
action in which co-users of a common-pool resource coordinate extraction 
efforts and cooperate over the long run on a sustainable use of their common 
resources. 
Transaction costs. The costs associated with the transfer, capture, and protection of 
rights (Barzel, 1997, 1982; Allen, 1991). Barzel (1997) states that “what Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) define as agency cost is what is defined here as 
transaction cost” (footnote 4, p. 4), and “when transaction costs are positive, 
rights to assets will not be perfectly delineated. The reason is that, relative to 
their value, some of the attributes of the assets are costly to measure” (p. 4). 
Transaction costs include: search and information costs, bargaining and 
decision costs, policing and enforcement costs (Dahlman, 1979). 
Transition to a formal institution. An institutional change that entails an activity or 
a set of activities as a result of a group decision. After undertaking the decision, 
a group that was formerly governed by an informal institution adopts a formal 
institution, as, for example, a Carta di Regola (see: Carta di Regola). 
Type of institution. The degree of formality of an institution. There can be informal 
and formal institutions for collective action in the commons. 
Village. A village may include one or more cadastral units according to the 1897 land 
registers.  
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APPENDIX B: INITIAL RESULTS 
 
B.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this appendix is to replicate the results obtained by Casari (2007), in 
which the author writes:  
“This article finds, in particular, that the likelihood of a legal institution’s 
being established increases with a community’s size, its proximity to other 
settlements, and the amount of its common resources.” 
In the analysis of the case performed throughout the chapters in the dissertation—and 
particularly in Chapter 5—the focus was on finding possible explanations for the role 
of group size, and transaction costs appear to be one of the explanations having the 
highest explanatory power. Scholarly work supports this hypothesis implicitly, 
although this relation has not yet been formalized. In empirical analyses, the present 
author elaborated a strategy to identify the role of transaction costs and their possible 
relation with group size. Static and dynamic econometric analyses were performed, 
considering a variety of explanatory variables for the choice between informal and 
formal regimes, exploiting a rich dataset from archival sources covering the 
Princedom of Trento from 1200 until 1800 (described in Chapter 3).  
The results in the econometric analyses performed in this appendix converge in 
underlining the relevance of group size in transitions between informal and formal 
allocation of property rights. One explanation is that there is a relation between group 
size and transaction costs and that transaction costs may be context dependent. 
Nevertheless, this relation is unclear, and the direction of causality cannot be 
determined clearly from the data. 
This appendix focuses only on the replication of results using expanded datasets, 
which basically consists of adding new variables to fairly analogous regression 
models. Since the purpose of this appendix is not to be additive of original research, 
the reader may refer to the original article for a description and a discussion of the 
results. The main conclusion of this appendix is that the results obtained are in line 
with Casari (2007) with the additional data acquired. 
In Subsection B.2, the reader will find a succinct description of the methodologies 
adopted to analyze the data. Section B.3 addresses the reader to a summary of the 
regression tables with standardized coefficients and the coefficients for population 
size in bold. 
B.2 Methods 
Statistical analyses were performed on two separate datasets described in Chapter 3: 
the expanded panel and the reduced panel. The purpose of using two different datasets 
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was dictated by the necessity of observing communities in some selected years 
without time effects. The evolution of institutional choice over time was also 
considered. For this, two types of analyses, a static model (Subsection B.2.1) and a 
dynamic model (Subsection B.2.2), were developed. 
To capture the impact of group size in the adoption of a formal regime, it was 
assumed that there are different information cost structures in different resource 
settings. As communities were endowed mainly with common land, they were divided 
into three classes according to the prevalence of a particular commons resource 
(pasture-prevalent, forest-prevalent, and mixed resources). The rationale behind this 
assumption is that collecting and disseminating information in the forest is more 
costly than in pasture-prevalent environments (monitoring at eyesight is easier in 
pastureland). Moreover, the risk of the tragedy is worse in forest-prevalent areas: they 
could be subjected to socially undesirable extraction with a low probability of being 
caught, particularly during nighttime, and forest has a renewal rate lower than a 
pastureland. This technique is helpful to infer the effects of transaction costs in two 
different environments. The simultaneous impact of several factors was tested on a) 
the probability of having a formal institution in each of the selected years, b) the risk 
of adopting a formal institution throughout the period 1200–1800.  
Two logit models were used with a dummy that gives 1 when the community adopts a 
charter (formal interaction technology) and 0 otherwise (informal) as the dependent 
variable. Commons considered were forest and pastureland. Pastureland is composed 
of grazing land, alp, and half of the surface devoted to meadows (the other half is 
considered under an open-field regime and it is disregarded). Cultivated land is 
composed of vineyard, plow land, and fruit garden. 
B.2.1. Static model 
In the static model, the determinants of the probability for a community to have a 
charter in a given year are sought. Let the likelihood for a community i of having a 
charter be defined by the following binary choice model using a logit regression:  
 0 1 1 ,( ) ...
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logit p log x x
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   
 
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 
, 
Where 
ip  is the probability for each community i to have a charter in one of the 
selected years. The error term   is normally distributed. The following 
specifications are included in this static model: population size estimate, temperature 
estimate (Celsius), common land surface above the median (dummy), distance from 
the closest local town (Km), altitude difference from local town (mts.), forest v. 
pasture, commons v. cultivated land, and a set of 15 geographical controls (dummies). 
Summary statistics for the end period (1800) are reported in Table B.1 (Appendix D). 
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It was investigated whether the transaction cost structure is different in communities 
having two different types of resources (with two different production functions and 
two different monitoring costs). The same regression model was run for each of the 
six selected years and produced three panels: one considers all the observations 
regardless of the focus on a particular type of resource, and then separate estimates 
are provided for pasture-prevalent and forest-prevalent. Results of the empirical 
analyses are summarized in the regression tables: Table B.2 (Appendix D), Table B.3 
(Appendix D), and Table B.4 (Appendix D). A logistic regression model was used, 
with robust unclustered standard errors. A set of 15 area dummy variables was 
inserted to control for geographical variation. The original coefficients were 
standardized to allow the reader to quickly compare the intensity of the effect of the 
regressors on the dependent variable directly from the table. The coefficients are 
expressed in terms of “1 standard deviation increase” and not in terms of effects of 
unit increases of each regressor on the dependent variable. 
B.2.2. Dynamic model 
In the dynamic model, the focus is on the determinants of the change from informal to 
formal regimes during 1200–1800. It is, reasonably, assumed that the information 
network structure is different in pasture-prevalent and forest-prevalent areas. The 
model of institutional change employed in this part is similar to the one elaborated by 
Casari (2007). Some new specifications were added coming from the extension of the 
original dataset with further research. The statistical technique used was event history 
analysis (Allison, 1984; Jenkins, 2004), in which a number of predictors are tested to 
have impact or not on the likelihood of adoption of a first Carta over time. Another 
difference with respect to original analyses is that communities were differentiated by 
pasture or forest prevalence. The specification used is a logit model:  
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As in Casari (2007), P(t) represents the number of charters adopted in time interval t 
divided by the number of communities in the risk set in the same time interval t. The 
error term ( )t  is normally distributed. Communities in the residual group are not 
considered in the model. The model, widely applied in survival analysis (Allison, 
1984; Jenkins, 2004), measures the increase or the decrease of the likelihood of 
adopting a charter for each community in the dataset in the discrete time interval [t,t-
5], captured by the last year of the observed interval. The dependent variable is a 
dummy that becomes 1 when the community adopts a charter and 0 otherwise. Each 
community is observed since the time of the first document and, in any case, as from 
the year 1200, and then disappears from the dataset when the dependent variable 
changes (i.e., until charter adoption). Three types of regressors were used: time trend, 
time invariant, and time varying. The time trend was captured with an entirely non-
parametric hazard baseline using six century dummies (no dummy for 1800). Among 
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the time invariant regressors 
1 1x , specifications for resource endowments (two ratios 
to control for the size of forests and for the size of commons: forest versus pasture, 
common land versus private land; additionally altitude and endowment of commons 
above the median [M=756.8 hectares in 1800] were also controlled for) and 
remoteness (in terms of linear distances in kilometers from the closest local town and 
in terms of altitude difference in meters from the closest local town) were inserted. 
Time varying regressors 
2 2 ( )x t  are population (estimate of each community in the 
last year of the considered time interval [t,t-5]) to capture the effect of transaction 
costs (Cheung, 1969), climate (measured by a yearly temperature estimate for the 
community in the last year of the considered time interval), and dummies for specific 
historical events of regional scale and taxation-effects controls. Two dummy variables 
control the effect of taxation on charter adoption. The role of political influence is 
controlled using as a proxy the linear distance (in kilometers) from the closest local 
town (the political center approving the charters). Regression coefficients are reported 
in Table B.5 (Appendix D).  
B.3 Results 
Results are summarized below, and coefficients are reported in the respective tables: 
• Table B.2 (Appendix D): Institutional Choice. Main result: considering the full 
samples of communities in each of the observed years, population size is strongly 
correlated with the probability of having a Carta di Regola. This probability is seen to 
have an increasing impact with the passing of centuries. 
• Table B.3 (Appendix D): Institutional Choice: Having a charter when pasture is 
prevalent. Main result: considering the subsample of pasture-prevalent communities 
in each of the observed years, population size is weakly correlated with the 
probability of having a Carta di Regola. 
• Table B.4 (Appendix D): Institutional Choice: Having a charter when forest is 
prevalent. Main result: considering the subsample of communities where forest is 
prevalent in each of the observed years, population size is correlated with the 
probability of having a Carta di Regola. This probability is seen to have an increasing 
impact with the passing of centuries. 
• Table B.5 (Appendix D): Event History Model: Risk of Adopting a Charter in 1200–
1800. Main result: considering the full samples of communities observed in the time 
interval [t, t-5] in the period 1200–1800, population size is strongly correlated with 
the likelihood of adopting a Carta di Regola. 
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APPENDIX C: FIGURES 
 
 
Figure 2.2. “Carta” of the community of Pinzolo, 1772. 
 
 
Figure 2.3. “Banco de la Reson,” Valley of Fiemme, present day. 
                                                                               359 
 
 
Figure 2.4. Carte di Regola in Trentino, 1800. 
Note. Color map with orography. The full sample counts 354 communities, plotted on the map. Red 
dots indicate the non-communities in 1800 (127). Yellow dots indicate charter communities (227, 
65%). Source: data from own dataset elaborated in ARCGIS using the geographical coordinates 
obtained using Google© API. Author: Trevor O’Grady, reproduction is not permitted. 
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Figure 3.1. Population estimates in Trentino (1200–1800). 
Note. Estimates obtained by adding the population of all the communities in each year. Source: present 
author’s estimates based on Andreatta and Pace (1981) and the trend of the Italian population based on 
Bellettini (1987). 
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Figure 3.2. Heterogeneity in natural resources. 
Note. Ternary diagram representing the fraction of private, forest, and pastureland in the 159 
communities in the heterogeneity dataset. The chart shows how—due to the highly variable conditions 
of altitude, temperature, and position—settlements were endowed with resources in differing 
proportions. The chart uses the 1897 Land Register data (published in 1903). It is possible to notice the 
importance of the commons, forest, and pasture relative to the total productive land. Unproductive land 
surface is excluded from the computation of total surface. 
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Figure 5.1. Aggregate surplus maximization on the commons. 
 
Figure 5.2. Group size estimates. Informal vs. formal institutions. 
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Figure 5.3. When do larger communities adopt a charter? 
 
 
Figure 5.5. Active members in assemblies 1249–1801. 
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Figure 5.6. Participation. Unanimity vs. other quorums. 
 
 
Figure 5.7.2. Number of appropriators in 1249–1801. 
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Figure 5.10. Upper bound group size for informal institutions. 
Note. Panel (a): n=778, only informal institutions are represented. Straight line: the linear fit. Panel (b): 
n=6, the median population of informal institutions in each of the selected years is represented. In 
Panel (a) and (b), the dashed lines represent the upper bound at 231 individuals. 
 
Figure 6.2. Internal organization of multi-village organizations. 
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Figure 6.3. Appropriators’ group size: estimates, assembly data 1296–1796. 
 
Figure 6.4. Village population distribution at last institutional change. 
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Figure 6.5. Kernel densities: Face-to-face interaction at last institutional change. 
 
Figure 8.3. Number of villages within a community vs. assembly size. 
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Panel A 
 
Panel B 
 
Figure 8.5. Transformation of the surname fractionalization index. 
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Figure 8.6. Resource fractionalization index. 
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Panel A 
  
Panel B 
  
Figure 8.7. Resource heterogeneity: classes of resources. 
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Figure S.1. Adoption of Carte Di Regola: A time profile. 
 
Figure S.2. Internal organization of multi-village organizations (first institutional 
change). 
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Figure S.3. Assembly size: Face-to-face meetings of group members (1296–1796). 
 
Figure S.4. Village population distribution at first institutional change. 
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Figure S.5. Empirical distributions. Last institutional change. 
 
Figure S.6. Kernel density. First institutional change. 
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Figure S.7. Empirical distributions. First institutional change. 
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APPENDIX D: TABLES 
 
Table 3.4.  
Summary statistics: assemblies 
 
 
Table 3.5.  
Number of appropriators on the commons (1245–1801) 
 
 
n=239. Sample: raw sample. Source: Author’s estimates from assembly data. 
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Table 4.2.  
Group size in modern hunter-gatherer societies 
 
Note. Reproduced from Dunbar (1993). 
                                                                                                                                                                              
 
Table 5.2.  
Population estimates 1350–1800: summary statistics 
 
Note. n=1498, observation unit: community. Source: Author’s estimates. 
 
3
7
7
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Table 5.3.  
Median year of first charter adoption and group size classes 
 
Note. n=230, 11 missing values in population. Source: Author’s estimates. 
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Table 5.4.  
Transaction costs: resources 
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Table 5.5.  
Transaction costs: remoteness from closest town 
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Table 5.7.  
Number of appropriators (1245–1801) 
 
 
Table 6.1.  
Assembly levels 
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Table 6.2.  
Categories and samples 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
Table 6.3. Case selection: list of multi-villages 
3
8
3
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Table 6.4.  
Internal organization at last institutional change 
 
Note: the frequencies include also 76 stand-alone villages in the one-layer class. The only case of four-
layer community is Revo: Rumo is a multi-village coordinating seven villages of which we have 
neither the population for 1810 nor a charter. 
 
 
Table 6.5.  
Internal structure at last institutional change: villages detail. 
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Table 6.6.  
Internal structure at last institutional change: multi-villages 
 
 
 
Table 6.7.  
Internal structure at last institutional change: multi-villages detail 
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Table 6.8.  
Appropriators’ group size: estimates on assembly data (1296–1796) 
 
 
 
Table 8.3.  
Surname fractionalization: summary statistics 
 
 
 
Table 8.4.  
Surname fractionalization: cross-correlation table 
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Table 8.6.  
Resource fractionalization: summary statistics 
 
 
 
Table 8.7.  
Resource fractionalization: cross-correlation table 
 
 
 
Table 8.8.  
Consensus in assemblies: quorums 
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Table 8.11.  
Mean number of articles per type 
 
 
Note: the adjusted surname fractionalization index is used. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
Table 8.13.  
Content of regulation (standardized coeﬃcients) 
3
8
9
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Table 8.16.  
Forward stability of the institution (uncensored observations) 
 
 
 
Table B.1.  
Static model. summary statistics – Year 1800 
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Table B.2.  
Institutional choice 
 
 
 
Table B.3.  
Institutional choice: having a charter when pasture is prevalent 
 
 
392 
Table B.4.  
Institutional choice: having a charter when forest is prevalent 
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Table B.5.  
Event history model: risk of adopting a charter in 1200–1800 
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Table S.1.  
Population estimates 1350–1800 
 
 
Table S.2.  
Assembly size: face-to-face meetings of group members (1296–1796) 
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Table S.3.  
Plenary meetings, last institutional change: detail 
 
 
 
Table S.4.  
Plenary meetings, first institutional change: detail 
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Table S.5.  
Summary statistics: institutions (full charters) 
 
 
 
Table S.6.  
Summary statistics: institutions (modifications and other) 
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APPENDIX E: CASE HISTORIES 
 
In this appendix, a detailed account of multi-village organization is provided in 
tabular and graphical form. For ease of reading, a legend of the statistics reported in 
each table is provided below: 
 
The table of each case is divided into three parts: header, body, and statistics. The header 
contains the name of the multi-village organization and the following information: the years in which 
an institutional change has been detected, the fission or fusion event in each year (IC), and the internal 
structure of the multi-village organization in each year (L). The body contains information on the 
villages belonging to the multi-village organization: for each village, the estimated population for each 
village in each of the observation years is reported in the correspondent cell. The total population of the 
multi-village is computed. Shading indicates the start of an autonomous charter. When population is 
marked bold, this indicates that an institutional change occurred with that village (the first for adoption, 
the following for renewal). Cell borders are used to indicate whether a village is independent or 
whether more villages are considered as sharing a common organization. The statistics section contains 
relevant statistics at the village and cluster levels.  
 
A visual profile for the population of each village follows for each multi-village organization. 
 
Particular cases of multi-village organizations are described in detail below the respective 
table: 
1. Valle di Fiemme 
2. Comun Comunale 
3. Pergine 
If a description is not provided, it means that the organization is either horizontal, or that it 
was not possible to obtain the description of the formalized organization directly from the documents. 
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GIOVO, FAEDO Year 
Population in: 1400 1646 1680 1757 
IC 
Individual 
Adoption 
Fusion 
Fission 
Coexistence 
Renewal 
L V MV MV MV 
Faedo 169 247 268 334 
Giovo 417 609 658 821 
Total 586 856 926 1155 
By Village:  
N 2 2 2 2 
Pop. largest village 417 609 658 821 
% largest village (M) 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 
% largest village (C) 293 428 463 577.5 
Total pop./N 293 428 463 577.5 
By Cluster:     
N 
    
Pop. largest cluster 
 
  
 
% largest cluster (M) 
    
Cluster pop./N 
    
Notes: no data on cluster structure. All separate village assemblies 
Note. No data on cluster structure. All separate village assemblies.
 
QUATTRO VICARIATI Year 
Population in: 1300 1411 1440 1565 1616 1619 
IC 
Individual 
Adoption 
Individual 
Adoption 
Individual 
Adoption 
Renewal 
Individual 
Adoption Fusion 
L V V V V V MV 
Ala 692 1496 1584 2219 2339 2305 
Avio 0 1520 1609 2254 2376 2342 
Brentonico 636 1372 1453 2037 2146 2116 
Mori 687 1483 1570 2200 2319 2285 
Total 2015 5871 6216 8710 9180 9048 
By Village: 
 
N 3 4 4 4 4 4 
Pop. largest village 692 1520 1609 2254 2376 2342 
% largest village (M) 0.343654 0.258862 0.258812 0.258783 0.258799 0.258842 
% largest village (C) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Total pop./N 671.6667 1467.75 1554 2177.5 2295 2262 
By Cluster: 
 
N 
Pop. largest cluster 
% largest cluster (M) 
Cluster pop./N 
                                                                               399 
 
 
RONCONE, LARDARO 
Year 
Population in: 1500 1702 1761 1793 
IC Fusion 
Fission  
Independence 
Renewal 
Fission  
Independence 
L MV V V V 
Lardaro 112 150 179 200 
Roncone 553 741 885 986 
Total 665 891 1064 1186 
By Village: 
 
N 2 2 2 2 
Pop. largest village 553 741 885 986 
% largest village (M) 0.831579 0.83165 0.830986 0.831366 
% largest village (C) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Total pop./N 332.5 445.5 532 593 
By Cluster: 
 
N 
Pop. largest cluster 
% largest cluster (M) 
Cluster pop./N 
Note. No data on cluster structure. All separate village assemblies. 
 
TELVE DI SOPRA Year 
Population in: 1296 1648 
IC Fusion 
Fission 
Coexistence 
L MV MV 
Carzano 297 174 
Ronchi 0 0 
Telve di sopra 387 227 
Torcegno 0 319 
Total 684 720 
By Village: 
 
N 2 3 
Pop. largest village 387 319 
% largest village (M) 0.565688 0.443055 
% largest village (C) n.a. n.a. 
Total pop./N 342 240 
By Cluster: 
 
N 
Pop. largest cluster 
% largest cluster (M) 
Cluster pop./N 
Note. All separate village assemblies. 
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BRESIMO Year 
Population in: 1309 1391 1587 1603 1671 
IC Fusion 
Fission 
Coexistence 
Fission 
Coexistence 
Renewal Renewal 
L MV MV MV MV MCV 
Livo 148 102 157 161 151 
Preghena 135 93 143 147 137 
Scanna, Cassino 0 49 75 77 72 
Bresimo 136 94 144 148 138 
Cis 135 93 143 147 137 
Total 554 431 662 680 635 
Livo, Preghena (*) 
    
360 
Bresimo, Cis 
    
276 
By Village: 
 
N 4 5 5 5 5 
Pop. largest village 148 102 157 161 151 
% largest village (M) 0.266923 0.237591 0.237043 0.236351 0.237369 
% largest village (C) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.501624 
Total pop./N 138.5 86.2 132.4 136 127 
By Cluster: 
 
N 
    
2 
Pop. largest cluster 
    
360 
% largest cluster (M) 
    
0.566423 
Cluster pop./N 
     
 
Note. The documents report a division in 1722, without specifying the villages, nor the resources involved. This 
change is reported in the chart on fission–fusion in the paper but not observed here. 
Note 2. Presence of face-to-face plenary assemblies at multi-village level at the last institutional change. 
(*) Livo, Preghena, Scanna are compound another: Mezzalone. First charter in 1504, last 1671. The first charter is 
not recorded here, but is considered in the dataset. 
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REVO’ Year 
Population in: 1320 1550 1587 1598 1611 1633 
IC Fusion 
Fission 
Coexistence 
Fission 
Coexistence 
Fission 
Coexistence 
Fission 
Coexistence 
Fission 
Clustering 
L MV MV MV MV MV+ MCV+ 
Romallo 0 369 407 423 412 384 
Cagno' 245 195 215 224 218 202 
Revò 918 734 809 841 818 761 
Cloz 595 475 525 546 530 494 
Lauregno 0 249 274 285 278 258 
Proves 0 185 204 212 206 192 
Rumo (*) 781 624 689 716 696 648 
Total 2539 2831 3123 3247 3158 2939 
Romallo, Cagno, Revo 
     
1347 
Cloz, Lauregno, Proves, Rumo 
     
1593 
By Village: 
 
N 4 7 7 7 7 7 
Pop. largest village 918 734 809 841 818 761 
% largest village (M) 0.361548 0.25901 0.258974 0.258939 0.25879 0.258944 
% largest village (C) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.565055 
Total pop./N 634.75 404.4286 446.1429 463.8571 451.1429 419.8571 
By Cluster: 
 
N 
     
2 
Pop. largest cluster 
     
1593 
% largest cluster (M) 
     
0.541737 
Cluster pop./N 
     
1469.5 
Note 1. (*) After 1611, Rumo is part of a multi-village community, coordinating with the following seven villages: 
Marcena, Mione, Mocenigo, Corte Superiore, Corte Inferiore, Alzenigo, Lanza (Giacomoni, II, 445). None has a 
charter, and no 1810 census data is available. 
Note 2. All separate village assemblies. 
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CONDINO, BRIONE Year 
Population in: 1324 1341 1389 1504 1566 1721 1751 
IC Fusion Renewal Renewal 
Fission 
Coexistence 
Renewal Renewal Renewal 
L MV MV MV MV MV MV MV 
Brione 98 94 79 97 116 136 149 
Condino 473 452 383 469 559 657 715 
Total 571 546 462 566 675 793 864 
By Village: 
 
N 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Pop. largest village 473 452 383 469 559 657 715 
% largest village (M) 0.828371 0.827839 0.827214 0.828622 0.828148 0.827456 0.827546 
% largest village (C) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Total pop./N 285.5 273 231 283 337.5 396.5 432 
By Cluster: 
 
N 
Pop. largest cluster 
% largest cluster (M) 
Cluster pop./N 
Note. All separate village assemblies. 
PINE Year 
Population in: 1388 1430 1465 1498 1764 
IC Fusion Renewal Renewal Renewal 
Fission 
Coexistence 
L MV MV MV MV MV 
Baselga 663 678 732 799 670 
Bedollo 0 0 0 0 684 
Fornace 496 507 548 598 501 
Lona-Lases 290 295 319 348 292 
Miola 0 0 0 0 693 
Total 1449 1480 1599 1745 2840 
By Village: 
 
N 3 3 3 3 5 
Pop. largest village 663 678 732 799 693 
% largest village (M) 0.457669 0.457817 0.457855 0.457651 0.244014 
% largest village (C) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Total pop./N 483 493.3333 533 581.6667 568 
By Cluster: 
 
N 
Pop. largest cluster 
% largest cluster (M) 
Cluster pop./N 
Note: separate village assemblies. 
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COREDO, SMARANO, SFRUZ Year 
Population in: 1437 1483 1581 1582 1696 
IC Fusion 
Fission 
Coexistence 
Fission 
Clustering 
Fission 
Independence 
Fission 
Independence 
L MV MV MCV MCV V 
Smarano 169 190 249 249 261 
Sfruz 210 237 310 310 324 
Coredo 380 428 561 561 587 
Total 759 855 1120 1120 1172 
Smarano, Sfruz 
  
559 559 
 
Coredo 
  
561 561 
 
By Village: 
 
N 3 3 3 3 3 
Pop. largest village 380 428 561 561 587 
% largest village (M) 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 
% largest village (C) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Total pop./N 253 285 373 373 390 
By Cluster: 
 
N 
  
2 2 
 
Pop. largest cluster 
  
561 561 
 
% largest cluster (M) 
  
0.50 0.50 
 
Cluster pop./N 
  
560 560 
 
Presence of face-to-face plenary assemblies at the multi-village level (first), and at the cluster level (1581, 1582). 
ROMENO, DON AMBLAR Year 
Population in: 1459 1493 1691 1694 
IC Fusion 
Fission 
Independence 
Fission 
Independence 
Renewal 
L MV MCV V V 
Don 112 123 162 164 
Amblar 95 104 138 140 
Romeno 266 290 383 389 
Total 473 517 683 693 
Don, Amblar 
 
227 
  
Romeno 
 
290 
  
By Village: 
 
N 3 3 3 3 
Pop. largest village 266 290 383 389 
% largest village (M) 0.561181 0.558767 0.559942 0.560519 
% largest village (C) n.a. 1 n.a. n.a. 
Total pop./N 157.6667 172.3333 227.6667 231 
By Cluster: 
 
N 
 
2 
  
Pop. largest cluster 
 
290 
  
% largest cluster (M) 
 
0.558767 
  
Cluster pop./N 
 
258.5 
  
Note: presence of face-to-face plenary assemblies at cluster level in 1493. 
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SAN SISINIO Year 
Population in: 1492 1551 1586 1632 1728 
IC 
Individual 
Adoption 
Individual 
Adoption 
Fusion 
Fission 
Clustering 
Fission 
Clustering 
L MV MV MV MCV MCV 
Sanzeno 115 137 151 145 174 
Salter-Malgolo 135 160 177 169 203 
Tavon 86 102 113 108 129 
Banco 112 133 147 141 169 
Casez 135 160 177 169 203 
Total 583 692 765 732 878 
Sanzeno, Salter-Malgolo, Tavon 
   
422 506 
Banco, Casez 
   
310 372 
By Village: 
 
N 5 5 5 5 5 
Pop. largest village 135 160 177 169 203 
% largest village (M) 0.230769 0.229885 0.230769 0.230559 0.230944 
% largest village (C) n.a. n.a. n.a. 1 0.545699 
Total pop./N 116.6 138.4 153 146.4 175.6 
By Cluster: 
 
N 
   
2 2 
Pop. largest cluster 
   
563 506 
% largest cluster (M) 
   
0.575716 0.575654 
Cluster pop./N 
   
366 439 
Note. All separate village assemblies. 
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TELVANA Year 
Population in: 1267 1574 1595 1631 
IC Fusion Renewal 
Fission 
Clustering 
Fission 
Clustering 
L MV MV MCV MCV 
Castelnuovo 312 374 395 367 
Novaledo 238 286 302 281 
Telve 617 740 781 727 
Roncegno 988 1186 1250 1164 
Borgo Valsugana 1621 1946 2053 1910 
Total 3776 4532 4781 4449 
Castelnuovo, Novaledo, Telve 
  
1478 1376 
Borgo Valsugana, Roncegno 
  
2053 3073 
By Village: 
 
N 5 5 5 5 
Pop. largest village 1621 1946 2053 1910 
% largest village (M) 0.429222 0.429346 0.429309 0.429292 
% largest village (C) n.a. n.a. 1 0.621419 
Total pop./N 755.2 906.4 956.2 889.8 
By Cluster: 
 
N 
  
2 2 
Pop. largest cluster 
  
2728 3073 
% largest cluster (M) 
  
0.429309 0.690825 
Cluster pop./N 
  
2390.5 2224.5 
Note. Telvana is a jurisdiction. All separate village assemblies. 
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MALOSCO Year 
Population in: 1469 1578 1582 1586 1587 1593 1616 1624 1746 
IC 
Individual 
Adoption 
Fusion 
Fission 
Clustering 
Fission 
Clustering 
Fission 
Coexisten
ce 
Renewal 
Fission 
Coexiste
nce 
Fission 
Coexistence 
Renewal 
L V MV MCV MCV MV MV MV MV MV 
Ronzone 160 160 191 191 194 199 193 188 231 
Sarnonico 156 156 186 186 189 194 188 183 225 
Malosco 178 178 213 213 217 222 215 210 258 
Seio 0 0 81 81 82 84 82 80 98 
Total 494 494 671 671 682 699 678 661 812 
Ronzone, 
Sarnonico   
378 378 
     
Malosco, Seio 
  
294 294 
     
By Village: 
 
N 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Pop. largest 
village 
178 178 213 213 217 222 215 210 258 
% largest village 
(M) 
0.3611
32 
0.3611
32 
0.3174
37 
0.3174
37 
0.3181
13 
0.3175
28 
0.317
11 
0.317629 
0.3177
34 
% largest village 
(C) 
n.a. n.a. 
0.7244
88 
0.7244
88 
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Total pop./N 
164.66
67 
164.66
67 
167.75 167.75 170.5 174.75 169.5 165.25 203 
By Cluster: 
 
N 
  
2 2 
     
Pop. largest 
cluster   
378 378 
     
% largest cluster 
(M)   
0.5618
47 
0.5618
47      
Cluster pop./N 
  
335.5 335.5 
     
Note. The organization of Malosco is horizontal, and the assemblies were held in Malosco. All separate village 
assemblies. 
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COMMEZZADURA Year 
Population in: 1494 1731 
IC 
Individual 
Adoption 
Fusion 
L V MV 
Almazzago 72 107 
Deggiano 100 149 
Mastellina 74 110 
Piano 102 151 
Total 348 517 
By Village: 
 
N 4 4 
Pop. largest village 102 151 
% largest village (M) 0.292404 0.29233 
% largest village (C) n.a. n.a. 
Total pop./N 87 129.25 
By Cluster: 
 
N 
  
Pop. largest cluster 
  
% largest cluster (M) 
  
Cluster pop./N 
  
Note. The organization of Commezzadura is horizontal, all separate village assemblies. 
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COMUN 
COMUNALE 
Year 
Population in: 1492 1544 1611 1656 1662 1750 1753 1759 1768 1786 1796 
IC Fusion 
Renewa
l 
Fission 
Clusteri
ng 
Fission 
Coexist
ence 
Fission 
Coexist
ence 
Fission 
Coexist
ence 
Renewa
l 
Fission 
Coexist
ence 
Fission 
Coexist
ence 
Fission 
Coexist
ence 
Fission 
Coexist
ence 
L MV MV MCV MCV MCV MCV MCV MCV MCV MCV MCV 
Aldeno 0 752 850 751 762 994 1011 1027 1061 1111 1144 
Castellano 508 500 565 499 508 662 673 684 706 739 761 
Cimone 406 399 451 398 404 529 537 546 563 590 607 
Isera 379 373 422 372 379 494 503 511 527 552 569 
Marano 159 157 177 157 159 207 211 214 222 232 239 
Nomi 762 749 847 748 761 992 1009 1025 1058 1109 1142 
Pederzano 421 414 468 413 420 548 557 567 585 612 631 
Villa Lagarina 413 406 459 406 412 537 547 556 574 601 619 
Brancolino 0 114 129 113 115 150 153 155 160 168 173 
Folas-Revian 86 83 95 84 85 111 113 115 118 125 128 
Sasso 0 0 0 123 126 164 166 170 175 184 189 
Noarna 152 149 169 149 152 197 201 205 211 221 228 
Piazzo 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pomarolo 698 686 777 685 696 909 924 939 970 1015 1046 
Savignano 223 220 248 219 223 291 296 301 310 325 335 
Nogaredo 364 358 405 358 364 474 482 490 506 530 546 
Total 4571 5360 6062 5475 5566 7259 7383 7505 7746 8114 8357 
Aldeno, Castellano, 
Cimone, Isera, [...]   
4644 3351 4168 5438 5529 5620 5803 6076 6259 
Brancolino, Folas-
Revian   
223 197 200 261 266 270 279 292 301 
Sasso, Noarna 
  
169 273 227 361 367 375 386 404 417 
Piazzo, Savignano, 
Pomarolo   
1025 905 920 1200 1220 1239 1280 2485 1381 
By Village: 
 
N 12 14 14 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Pop. largest village 762 752 850 751 762 994 1011 1027 1061 1111 1144 
% largest village (M) 
0.16
672 
0.14
0246 
0.14
0176 
0.13
7056 
0.13
6899 
0.13
6946 
0.13
6988 
0.13
6912 
0.13
6916 
0.13
6957 
0.13
6942 
% largest village (C) n.a. n.a. 
1.00
005 
0.75
7307 
0.75
7054 
0.75
7728 
0.75
7296 
0.75
7691 
0.75
7546 
0.57
436 
0.75
7365 
Total pop./N 
380.
9167 
382.
8571 
433 365 371.
0667 
483.
9333 
492.
2 
500.
3333 
516.
4 
540.
9333 
557.
1333 
By Cluster: 
 
N 
  
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Pop. largest cluster 
  
4644 3351 4168 5438 5529 5620 5803 6076 6259 
% largest cluster (M) 
  
0.76
6161 
0.61
1889 
0.74
8958 
0.74
8941 
0.74
8955 
0.74
8935 
0.74
8993 
0.74
8936 
0.74
89 
Cluster pop./N 
  
1515
.5 
1368
.75 
1391
.5 
1814
.75 
1845
.75 
1876
.25 
1936
.5 
2028
.5 
2089
.25 
Note. In the 1544 charter, four informal clusters are identified at the beginning: 1) Aldeno, Castellano, Cimone, 
Isera, Marano; 2) Brancolino, Folas-Revian; 3) Sasso, Noarna; 4) Piazzo, Savignano, Pomarolo. A short list of 
elected members from each cluster is provided, together with a list of three officers (massari) from Pomarolo and a 
list of nine mayors (three from Castronovo, three from Rovereto, and three from Nomi), which were “probos et 
discretos” (just and confidential). From the text, it is learned that only the representatives are sent to the multi-
village level assembly. Thus, this case is interpreted as having multiple separate assemblies at the village level. 
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PIEVE DEL BANALE Year 
Population in: 
130
0 
1468 1469 1472 1570 1584 1593 1718 1749 1751 
IC 
Indivi
dual 
Adopt
ion 
Individu
al 
Adoptio
n 
Fusion + 
F. 
Clusteri
ng 
Fission 
Coexiste
nce 
Fission 
Coexiste
nce 
Fission 
Coexiste
nce 
Fission 
Coexiste
nce 
Renewal Renewal 
Fission 
Coexiste
nce 
L V V MCV MCV MCV MCV MCV MCV MCV MCV 
Andogno 0 65 65 65 86 90 92 100 109 109 
S. Lorenzo in Banale 0 393 393 393 521 542 557 604 657 657 
Dorsino 0 110 110 110 146 152 156 169 184 184 
Sclemo 0 76 76 76 49 51 52 51 128 128 
Premione 0 63 63 63 40 41 43 41 105 105 
Stenico 347 293 293 293 189 197 201 194 489 489 
Seo 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 50 129 129 
Tavodo 0 35 35 35 23 24 24 24 59 59 
Villa Banale 0 0 0 0 88 92 94 90 229 229 
Total 347 1035 1035 1035 1142 1189 1219 1323 2089 2089 
Andogno, S. Lorenzo in 
Banale, Dorsino  
568 568 568 753 784 805 873 950 950 
Sclemo, Premione, 
Stenico, Seo, [...] 
347 467 467 467 388 404 414 450 1139 1139 
By Village: 
 
N 1 7 7 7 8 8 8 9 9 9 
Pop. largest village 347 393 393 393 521 542 557 604 657 657 
% largest village (M) 1 
0.379
71 
0.379
71 
0.379
71 
0.456
617 
0.456
229 
0.456
932 
0.456
538 
0.314
505 
0.314
505 
% largest village (C) 1 
0.691
901 
0.691
901 
0.691
901 
0.691
899 
0.691
327 
0.691
925 
0.691
867 
0.691
579 
0.691
579 
Total pop./N 347 
147.8
571 
147.8
571 
147.8
571 
142.7
5 
148.6
25 
152.3
75 
147 
232.1
111 
232.1
111 
By Cluster: 
 
N 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Pop. largest cluster 347 568 568 568 753 784 805 873 1139 1139 
% largest cluster (M) 1 
0.548
792 
0.548
792 
0.548
792 
0.659
947 
0.659
933 
0.660
377 
0.659
864 
0.545
237 
0.545
237 
Cluster pop./N 347 517.5 517.5 517.5 571 594.5 609.5 661.5 
1044.
5 
1044.
5 
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PERGINE Year 
Population in: 1364 1401 1419 1516 1589 1780 
IC 
Individual 
Adoption 
Fusion 
Fission 
Coexistenc
e 
Renewal Renewal 
Fission 
Coexistenc
e 
L V MV MV MV MV MV 
Canezza 0 0 0 0 0 333 
Castagne 0 0 0 0 0 426 
Costasavina 0 0 0 0 0 218 
Falesina 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Frassilongo 511 451 413 448 554 559 
Ischia 0 0 0 0 0 470 
Madrano 326 287 263 285 353 357 
Nogare 0 0 0 0 0 289 
Pergine 2177 1925 1760 1911 2363 2384 
Roncogno 0 0 0 191 236 238 
Serso 0 0 0 177 219 221 
Susa-Canale 407 360 329 357 441 445 
Tenna 0 0 0 265 327 330 
Viarago 525 464 424 460 570 575 
Vigalzano, Costa(Savina), [Casalino], 
etc. 
0 0 436 474 586 592 
Vignola 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 3946 3487 3625 4568 5649 7437 
By Village: 
 
N 5 5 6 9 9 14 
Pop. largest village 2177 1925 1760 1911 2363 2384 
% largest village (M) 
0.55185
4 
0.55194
1 
0.48551 
0.41830
5 
0.41832
2 
0.320555 
% largest village (C) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Total pop./N 789.2 697.4 604.1667 
507.555
6 
627.666
7 
531.2143 
By Cluster: 
 
N 
Pop. largest cluster 
% largest cluster (M) 
Cluster pop./N 
Note. In 1516, the general assembly of Pergine had the following participation: one mayor per village, one capitain 
and pievano (priest), one gastaldo, one massaro (officer) elected among those having the requirements. During the 
assembly, the general assembly, the general mayor, and the gastaldo were elected by the capitain, and the regolano 
(head of the assembly) was elected by the attendants. In addition, 12 good and prudent men were elected in charge 
for a yearly appointment, together with several other charges. From the text of the charter, it is evident that the 
assembly was participated in by village representatives; therefore, this case was counted as separate unclustered 
village meetings. 
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VAL DI GRESTA Year 
Population in: 1678 1787 1789 
IC Fusion 
Fission 
Coexistence 
Fission 
Coexistence 
L MV MV MV 
Nomesino 0 0 0 
Manzano 202 276 280 
Chienis 310 424 431 
Pannone 383 524 531 
Ronzo 305 419 425 
Total 1200 1643 1667 
Nomesino, Manzano, Chienis 
 
700 711 
Pannone, Ronzo 
 
943 956 
By Village: 
 
N 4 4 4 
Pop. largest village 383 524 531 
% largest village (M) 0.319094 0.318685 0.318652 
% largest village (C) n.a. 1 0.654798 
Total pop./N 300 410.75 416.75 
By Cluster: 
 
N 
 
2 2 
Pop. largest cluster 
 
943 956 
% largest cluster (M) 
 
0.57395 0.57348 
Cluster pop./N 
 
821.5 833.5 
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VAL DI LEDRO Year 
Population in: 1435 1567 1590 1736 1781 1793 
IC Fusion Renewal Renewal 
Fission 
Coexistence 
Fission 
Coexistence 
Renewal 
L MCV MCV MCV MCV MCV MCV 
Barcesino 69 85 75 68 78 81 
Bezzecca 343 420 373 336 386 404 
Biacesa 0 0 0 200 229 240 
Concei (Locca, Lenzumo) Enguiso 0 0 454 409 469 490 
Legos 302 369 328 295 339 355 
Mezzolago 0 0 0 124 142 148 
Molina 0 332 295 266 305 320 
Pieve di Ledro 171 211 187 168 193 202 
Pre 0 0 0 217 249 261 
Pregasina 0 0 0 116 133 139 
Tiarno di Sopra 397 487 433 390 447 468 
Tiarno di Sotto 481 590 524 472 542 566 
Total 1763 2494 2669 3061 3512 3674 
Tiarno di Sopra, Tiarno di Sotto 878 1077 957 861 988 1034 
Barcesino, […] 885 1417 1712 2201 2525 2640 
By Village: 
 
N 6 7 8 12 12 12 
Pop. largest village 481 590 524 472 542 566 
% largest village (M) 0.272812 0.236593 0.196246 0.154022 0.154219 0.154035 
% largest village (C) 0.547577 0.547761 0.547465 0.547674 0.548125 0.547481 
Total pop./N 293.8333 356.2857 333.625 255.0833 292.6667 306.1667 
By Cluster: 
 
N 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Pop. largest cluster 885 1417 1712 2201 2525 2640 
% largest cluster (M) 0.501785 0.568072 0.641537 0.718771 0.718644 0.718648 
Cluster pop./N 881.5 1247 1334.5 1530.5 1756 1837 
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VALLE DI FIEMME Year 
Population in: 1304 1480 1533 1605 1608 1613 1615 1624 1776 1783 
IC 
Indivi
dual 
Adopt
ion 
Fusion 
+ 
F. 
Cluster
ing 
Fission 
Coexis
tence 
Renew
al 
Fission 
Coexis
tence 
Renew
al 
Renew
al 
Fission 
Coexis
tence 
Renew
al 
Fission 
Coexis
tence 
L V MCV MCV MCV MCV MCV MCV MCV MCV MCV 
Predazzo 0 962 1029 1196 1179 1163 1163 1130 1454 1499 
Moena 1484 783 837 972 959 946 946 919 1184 1220 
Dajano 0 134 143 166 164 161 161 157 202 208 
Tesero 1335 704 754 875 863 851 851 828 1065 1098 
Panchia' 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 395 407 
Ziano 0 497 532 618 609 601 601 583 751 774 
Cavalese 1633 861 921 1070 1055 1040 1040 1011 1302 1342 
Forno 0 0 0 108 106 105 105 102 131 136 
Varena 0 181 193 225 222 219 219 212 273 283 
Carano 453 239 256 297 293 289 289 281 361 372 
Castello 776 409 438 508 501 495 495 481 618 638 
Valfloriana 0 0 487 565 557 550 550 534 687 709 
Stramentizzo 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 44 45 
Trodena 0 216 232 269 266 262 262 254 328 338 
Total 5681 4986 5822 6869 6774 6682 6682 6492 8795 9069 
Predazzo, Moena, Daiano 
 
1878 2010 2334 2302 2270 2270 2207 2840 2927 
Tesero, Panchia, Ziano 
 
1201 1285 1493 1473 1452 1452 1411 2212 2280 
Cavalese, Forno, Varena 
 
1042 1115 1403 1384 1365 1365 1326 1707 1760 
Carano, Castello, 
Valfloriana, Stramentizzo  
864 1412 1640 1616 1595 1595 1550 2039 2102 
By Village: 
 
N 5 10 11 12 12 12 12 12 14 14 
Pop. largest village 1633 962 1029 1196 1179 1163 1163 1130 1454 1499 
% largest village (M) 
0.287
365 
0.192
905 
0.176
81 
0.174
027 
0.174
035 
0.174
069 
0.174
069 
0.174
007 
0.165
319 
0.165
29 
% largest village (C) 
 
0.826 0.826 0.76 0.76 0.762 0.762 0.762 0.762 0.762 
Total pop./N 1136 498 529. 572 564 556 556 541 628 647 
By Cluster: 
 
N 
 
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Pop. largest cluster 
 
1878 2010 2334 2302 2270 2270 2207 2840 2927 
% largest cluster (M) 
 
0.376 0.345 0.339 0.339 0.339 0.339 0.339 0.322 0.322 
Cluster pop./N 
 
1246 1455 1717 1693 1670 1670 1623 2198 2267 
Note 1. Predazzo 1608 is actually a charter of Vardabio, a fraction of Predazzo of which there is no 1810 census 
data. Predazzo 1615 is the charter of Rucadin, another fraction of Predazzo of which there is no 1810 census data. 
Note 2. In the 1533 charter, the organization of collective action of the Valley was structured in three layers. 
Studies by local historians (Ciresa & Salvotti, 1978) confirm that at the first level there are village meetings where 
the villagers had to vote (at unanimity or simple majority) the election jurors and regolani (heads of village 
assembly) for each village, plus a variable number of other village appointments, like officers to monitor private 
and common forests and arable land to prevent trespassing. At the second level (cluster), the villages (“ville”) were 
organized into four zones (clusters) having separate assemblies of representatives. The third level was the Valley 
League, having an assembly of a variable number of representatives: the sovereign body of the Valley was the 
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General Assembly (Giunta), which could meet in the ordinary form (assembly of 25 village regolani together with 
all the village members: the 1544 apparently was not an ordinary assembly) or extraordinary form (40 participants 
including the 25 village regolani and the scario). The largest face-to-face interaction unit was the village; therefore, 
this case is considered as separate village meetings.
 
Case Histories: charts. 
Giovo, Faedo 
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0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1400 1646 1680 1757
Faedo
Giovo
Total
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
9000
10000
1300 1411 1440 1565 1616 1619
Ala
Avio
Brentonico
Mori
Total
                                                                               415 
 
Roncone, Lardaro 
 
 
 
Telve di Sopra 
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0
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Carzano
Ronchi
Telve di sopra
Torcegno
Total
416 
Bresimo 
 
 
Revo 
 
 
 
 
0
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800
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Bresimo
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Preghena
Scanna, Cassino] (Livo)
Total
Livo, Preghena
Bresimo, Cis
0
500
1000
1500
2000
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3500
1320 1550 1587 1598 1611 1633
Cagno'
Cloz
Lauregno
Proves
Revò
Romallo
Rumo
Total
Romallo, Cagno, Revo
Cloz, Lauregno, Proves, Rumo
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Condino, Brione 
 
 
 
Pine 
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0
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418 
Coredo, Smarano, Sfruz 
 
 
Romeno, Don, Amblar 
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Don, Amblar
Romeno
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San Sisinio 
 
Telvana 
 
0
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Casez
Salter-Malgolo
Sanzeno
Tavon
Total
Sanzeno, Salter-Malgolo,
Tavon
Banco, Casez
0
1000
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6000
1267 1574 1595 1631
Borgo Valsugana
Castelnuovo
Novaledo
Roncegno
Telve
Total
Castelnuovo, Novaledo, Telve
Borgo Valsugana, Roncegno
420 
Malosco 
 
 
Commezzadura 
 
 
 
 
 
0
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1469 1578 1582 1586 1587 1593 1616 1624 1746
Malosco
Ronzone
Sarnonico
Seio
Total
Ronzone, Sarnonico
Malosco, Seio
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Comun Comunale
 
  
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
9000
Aldeno
Brancolino
Castellano
Cimone
Folas-Revian
Isera
Marano
Noarna
Nogaredo
Nomi
Pederzano
Piazzo
Pomarolo
Sasso
Savignano
Villa
Total
Aldeno, Castellano, Cimone,
Isera, Maran
Brancolino, Folas-Revian
Sasso, Noarna
Piazzo, Savignano, Pomarolo
422 
Pieve del Banale 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
1300 1468 1469 1472 1570 1584 1593 1718 1749 1751
Andogno
Dorsino
Premione
S. Lorenzo in Banale
Sclemo
Seo
Stenico
Tavodo
Villa Banale
Total
 Andogno, S. Lorenzo in Banale,
Dorsino
Sclemo, Premione, Stenico, Seo,
Tavodo,
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Pergine 
 
 
 
  
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
1364 1401 1419 1516 1589 1780
Canezza
Castagne
Costasavina
Falesina
Frassilongo
Ischia
Madrano
Nogare
Pergine
Roncogno
Serso
Susa-Canale
Tenna
Viarago
Vigalzano, Costa(Savina),
[Casalino], etc
Vignola
Total
424 
Val di Gresta 
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Chienis
Manzano
Nomesino
Pannone
Ronzo
Total
Nomesino, Manzano, Chienis
Chienis, Ronzo
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Val di Ledro 
 
  
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
1435 1567 1590 1736 1781 1793
Barcesino
Bezzecca
Biacesa
Concei (Locca, Lenzumo)
Enguiso
Legos
Mezzolago
Molina
Pieve di Ledro
Pre
Pregasina
Tiarno di sopra
Tiarno di sotto
Total
Tiarno di Sopra, Tiarno di
Sotto
Barcesino,
426 
Val di Fiemme 
 
 
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
9000
10000
1304 1480 1533 1605 1608 1613 1615 1624 1776 1783
Carano
Castello
Cavalese
Dajano
Forno
Moena
Panchia'
Predazzo
Stramentizzo
Tesero
Trodena
Valfloriana
Varena
Ziano
Total
Predazzo, Moena, Daiano
Tesero, Panchia, Ziano
Cavalese, forno, Varena
Carano, Castello, Valfloriana,
Stramentizzo
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Appendix F: Codebook of the Polity database 
 
Introduction 
The Polity database (version 7, dated August 14, 2012) for each of the documents (complete 
charters and change to charters) reports the following information:
210
 
 
 
 
Inizio e fine del documento  
1. Saltare il paragrafo iniziale dove vengono elencati i partecipanti all’assemblea  
2. Iniziare la codifica a partire dal primo articolo del documento. Il primo articolo è 
identificato da diciture come:  
(a) “Capitolo 1” 
 (b)<1>, [1], etc.  
(c) “i,” “I,” etc. seguito da segno di punteggiatura .” “oppure “-” 
3. Ogni articolo identifica una “norma.” Ciascun articolo è di lunghezza variabile, e può 
essere approssimato dalla lunghezza del paragrafo che inizia con  
                                                            
210 This version of the codebook is dated August 14, 2012. The codebook is written in Italian: it is assumed that 
the coder willing to replicate the analyses contained in the paper is able to read the original text of the Carte di 
Regola. The fruitful fruition of the original sources requires a certain degree of familiarity with archives (a 
comprehensive guide is offered by Casetti (1961)), proficiency in Legal Italian, Medieval Legal Latin (in 
particular with notarial acts), French (to read the Medieval Latin dictionary by Du Cange (1887)), and 
knowledge in Medieval and Italian Law. 
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(a) “Capitolo #” 
(b)<#>, [#], etc.  
(c) “i...,” “I...,” etc. seguito da segno di punteggiatura .” “oppure “-” 
4. Si assume due set di articoli appartenenti a due documenti diversi, ma riferiti alle stessa 
comunità, siano stati decisi nella stessa assemblea quando hanno congiuntamente  
(a) Stessa data:  
i. gg-mm-aaaa  
ii. mm-aaaa quando gg-mm-aaaa non è disponibile  
iii. aaaa quando mm-aaaa  
(b) Contiguità/ continuità rispetto allo stesso documento  
i. Non vi sono segni o separazioni (come ad esempio una approvazione, o un sigillo notarile) 
che fanno apparire i due set di documenti come decisi in due assemblee distinte.  
5. 5. Interrompere la codifica all’ultimo articolo deciso nella stessa assemblea.  
 
Codifica 
1. Gli articoli che compongono il documento così come definiti nella sezione 1 sopra 
vengono divisi in 4 categorie “normative.” 
(a) Government 
(b) Participation  
(c) Constraints on Outsiders  
(d) Resource Management  
2. Le sezioni successive contengono una descrizione dettagliata di come ciascuna delle 
categorie è determinata per consentire la replica della codifica.  
3. Ciascun articolo può essere identificato da una e una sola di queste categorie.  
4. La somma delle frequenze di tutte le categorie restituisce il totale degli articoli. I totali 
sono già stati contati dall’Autore.  
5. Definizioni delle categorie:  
(a) Government rules. Norme che definiscono il governo della comunità. Trattano delle 
modalità attraverso cui gli abitanti del vilaggio (gruppo dei “vicini”) sono chiamati a cariche 
di governo comunitario e i meccanismi di controllo e bilanciamento (checks and balances) 
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per la gestione efficiente della comunità e la minimizzazione dei costi di agency. Trattano 
anche del contenuto dei diritti e dei doveri di coloro che sono chiamati a cariche di governo.  
(b) Participation rules. Norme che stabiliscono le modalità di partecipazione dei “vicini” al 
governo della comunità nel sistema assembleare. Trattano di modalià di convocazione delle 
assemblee, condotta da mantenere nelle assemblee, meccanismi di voto per l’assunzione di 
decisioni, stabiliscono requisiti per la partecipazione a tali riunioni. Stabiliscono quando le 
assemblee devono tenersi.  
(c) Constraints on Outsiders. Norme stabilite dal gruppo dei “vicini” a protezione dal rischio 
di espropriazione da parte dei non residenti nella comunità (siano essi abitanti nella comunità 
ma privi del diritto di residenza, o anche residenti in comunità limitrofe che hanno interesse 
nelle risorse della comunità), fattore che a causa dell’incontrollato incentivo al free-riding 
porterebbe allo sovrasfruttamento delle risorse e al rischio di tragedy of the commons. Sono 
norme che prevedono un trattamento diverso per i “forestieri” rispetto ai “vicini,” nel senso 
che prevedono restrizioni (o preclusioni) all’utilizzo di particolari risorse, o prevedono 
modalità di godimetno più onerose o in subordine ai “vicini,” o sanzioni maggiori rispetto a 
quelle dei “vicini,” o l’esportazione di beni al di fuori della comunità. Sono in genere norme 
che, ponendo un limite al godimento o dei costi maggiori a carico della frangia dei forestieri, 
chiudono la comunità (intesa sia come gruppo di persone che come insieme definito di 
risorse) verso l’esterno mantenendo l’uso delle risorse collettive a solo beneficio della gruppo 
dei vicini.  
(d) Resource Management Rules. Tutte le altre norme nel testo. 
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Government rules 
• Definisco “cariche di governo” gli incarichi determinati validamente dall’assemblea e 
assunti da individui afferenti alla comunità’ in merito a:  
– cariche di governo (governance)  
– azionamento della carta di regola (enforcement)  
– cariche che impongono un obbligo di fare  
∗ monitoraggio (monitoring)  
∗ riscuotere tasse (enforcement)  
∗ riscuotere di pegni (enforcement)  
∗ sequestri (enforcement)  
∗ comminare sanzioni (enforcement)  
∗ riscuotere sanzioni (enforcement)  
• Si considerino nel conteggio solo gli articoli in cui chi ha incarico di governo è soggetto o è 
destinatario di un obbligo di facere: criteri di selezione, procedure di nomina, deposizione, 
sostituzione. Sono escluse le facoltà (“liceat,” “ha il potere di,” “può,” etc.)  
• Norme che definiscono chi può assumere cariche all’interno della comunità 
• Norme che definiscono il numero (preciso, minImo o massimo) di chi può assumere cariche 
all’interno della comunità 
• Norme che definiscono chi può eleggere rappresentanti e giurati del gruppo dei vicini  
• Norme che definiscono chi è qualificato a scegliere coloro che assumeranno cariche di 
governo all’interno della comunità  
• Norme che definiscono la periodicità con cui vengono rinnovate le cariche  
• Norme che definiscono le assemblee (se ci sono, quando e dove) in cui vengono nominate le 
persone che assumeranno le cariche  
• Norme che determinano le maggioranze richieste per l’approvazione/rinnovo/revoca della 
nomina  
• Norme che definiscono il compenso monetario o altre forme di retribuzione di coloro che 
assumono cariche di governo  
• Norme che definiscono le sanzioni per coloro che si dimostrino negligenti o commettano 
degli illeciti all’interno della comunità e che detengono un incarico di governo  
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• Norme che definiscono la periodicità e le modalità del rendimento dei conti (accountability) 
dell’amministrazione della comunità  
• Norme che definiscono e disciplinano modalità e procedure per la risuluzione delle 
controversie tra abitanti della comunità, tra abitanti della comunità e coloro che hanno 
incarichi di governo, tra abitanti della comunità e autorità centrale (signori feudali, il Principe 
Vescovo), tra coloro che hanno incarichi di governo.  
• Norme che disciplinano le modalità attraverso le quali chi ha incarico di governo può 
modificare/introdurre/abrograre nuove Norme.  
• Altre Norme che impongono un obbligo di fare/non fare/ astenersi a coloro che hanno 
incarico di governo.  
• Norme che escludono forestieri da cariche di governo e determinano i criteri per elezione 
dei vicini a cariche di governo.  
• Si fornisce, a scopo illustrativo, un elenco di cariche tratto dalla codifica degli elenchi dei 
partecipanti alle assemblee (in ordine alfabetico):
211
  
 
Attuario e coauditore massile; Capitano; Capitano militare; Capoconsole; Cavaliere; 
Comissario; Consigliere; Consigliere e Massaro; Consigliere-giurato; Console; 
Console-giurato; Console-saltaro; Correggente; Curato; Delegato; Eletto; Gastaldo; 
Giurato; Giurato e Regolano; Mansionatore; Massaro; Notaio; Notaio pubblico; 
Notaio rogante; Notaio verbalizzante; Notaio e Giurato; Notaio e accettante; Notaio 
e cancelliere massarile; Notaio ufficiante; Notaio rogante; Notaio testimone; Notaio-
giurato; Notaio-regolano; Procuratore; Rappresentante; Regolano; Regolano 
maggiore; Regolano minore; Regolano e Giurato; Regolano e Saltaro; Regolano-
giurato; Saltaro; Saltaro-giurato; Scrivano; Scrivano e testimone; Scrivante vicinale; 
Segretario; Segretario verbalizzante; Sindaco; Sindaco speciale; Sindaco e Massaro; 
Sindaco, Regolano e Massaro; Testimone; Testimone-notaio; Vicario; Vice regolano; 
Vice regolano maggiore; Vice regolano e giurato; Vice-console; Vicemassaro; 
Vicereggente. 
  
                                                            
211 Si includono anche notai e giurati in quanto a volte sono residenti nella comunità in cui esercitano il loro 
ufficio e in quanto fisicamente presenti alla gestione faccia a faccia dell'azione collettiva in assemblea. 
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Participation rules 
• Norme che disciplinano le modalità e i criteri di partecipazione alle assemblee di comunità  
• Norme che disciplinano forme di partecipazione obbligatoria alle assemblee (inclusa anche 
la convocazione ad assemblee ad hoc).  
• Norme che definiscono il quorum costitutivo e deliberativo delle delibere assembleari, o per 
particolari decisioni.  
• Regola che definiscono i poteri di controllo dei vicini sull’operato di coloro che hanno 
cariche di governo  
• Norme che disciplinano la frequenza delle assemblee  
• Norme che disciplinano il numero di rappresentanti per ciascuna famiglia e per ciascun 
villaggio  
• Norme che disciplinano la condotta da tenere in assemblea (es: non bestemmie, non portare 
armi in assemblea, non insultare o far mentire i vicini)  
• Norme che disciplinano l’esclusione di particolari categorie di vicini (non forestieri) dalla 
decisione in merito a particolari materie.  
• Norme che demandano all’assemblea il potere di modificare le norme contenute nella carta 
di regola, determinandone o meno le maggioranze necessarie.  
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Constraints on Outsiders 
• Norme che contengono la parola “forestieri”/ “advena”/ “forenses”/ “non terrigeno”/ “non 
residenti”/ “abitante” e simili locuzioni, sia in latino che in italiano o dialetto locale che 
indicano individui non appartenenti al gruppo dei residenti convocati e abilitati al voto in 
assemblea, siano essi abitanti nella comunità o anche esterni alla comunità (residenti in una 
comunità confinante o con rapporti con quella in cui si osserva l’assemblea) 
• Norme che determinano una disparità di trattmento tra vicini (gruppo dei residenti) e gruppo 
dei forestieri in termini:  
– di accesso, estrazione e gestione dei beni comuni (foreste, pascoli, fontane, specchi 
d’acqua, fonti e pozzi dei villaggi, et similia). Es. Norme di esclusione dal godimento dei 
beni comuni. Es “Chiunque forestiero non può pascolare sui prati della comunità,” etc. 
– di acquistare la “vicinanza,” il diritto di residenza, di ereditarlo, o di negoziarlo in 
compravendita o altra figura contrattuale.  
– di acquistare la “vicinanza” tramite matrimonio con residenti nella comunità 
– di essere parte contrattuale nell'affitto o acquisto di terreni (o in altro rapporto contrattuale 
agrario) nella comunità di cui si osserva l’assemblea  
– di portare i propri animali al pascolo insieme a quelli della comunità di cui si osserva 
l’assemblea  
– di transitare con i propri animali attraverso i territori della comunità 
– di portare i propri animali al pascolo sui territori della comunità 
– di maggiorazione della pena prevista per illeciti a danno di beni comunitari e beni privati, 
bestiame, oggetti, etc, solo a danno dei forestieri (per i vicini la pena è prevista in misura 
minore).  
– di pagamento di somme per poter acquisire il diritto di accesso, uso o usufrutto dei beni 
collettivi.  
• Nel caso in cui in uno stesso articolo vi siano norme che si riferiscono sia ai vicini e ai 
forestieri (con formule del tipo “sia vicino che forestiero,” ma non “di qualunque 
condizione”), la norma viene riferita ai forestieri (in quanto comporta comunque una 
situazione di differenza di comportamento tra le due classi).  
• Sono escluse le norme che escludono forestieri da cariche di governo e determinano i criteri 
per elezione dei vicini a cariche di governo (vanno tra le Government rules) 
• Sono incluse le norme che, includendo nel novero dei vicini anche abitanti di paesi 
confinanti, escludono tutti gli altri dalla definizione e pertanto contribuiscono a meglio 
definire il gruppo dei forestieri e il campo di applicazione delle norme a loro detrimento (es. 
Vigo Lomaso 1756, n. 77).  
434 
Resource Management rules 
• Categoria residuale che raccoglie tutte le norme che non rientrano nelle precedenti tre 
categorie, indipendentemente dal loro contenuto.  
• Si tratta normalmente di norme riferite alla generalità dei residenti  
• Si tratta normalmente di norme riferite alle modalità di gestione delle risorse comunitarie: 
divieti, permessi, etc. spesso accompagnati da sanzioni (monetarie e non) per la violazione 
dei precetti contenuti nelle norme. 
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Examples 
The following are exemplary excerpts from a sample of charter articles extracted from 
Giacomoni (1991). The selection of the examples from this book was considered an 
opportunity to allow the reader the easiest access to a large compilation of rural charters.  
One example from each century is chosen, but before the French Revolution (1789) and 
Maria Theresa (1740).  
Each example is representative of one of the categories illustrated before, and a translation 
into English follows each example. The present author’s own translations from the sources 
written in Medieval Latin in the Polity database have been produced using the specialist 
lexicon (Du Cange, 1887).
212
 
The following is an example of governance rule stating the election and replacement of new 
community officers:  
Example 1. “<1.>Primo ogni anno sian mudati et cambiati il massaro de' dicti logi et 
quatro consiglieri, quali cu[m sagramento] debiano custodir, regere et gubernar bene 
et dritamente el comune predicto” [Lizzanella, 1494] 
Translation: “<1.>[it has been decided] that every year the monitoring officer and the 
four counsels shall be replaced with new ones, who will have to swear the oath and 
keep, govern, and manage rightfully the aforementioned community.” 
The following is an example of participation rule imposing for mandatory attendance to 
village assemblies for community members, backed by the threat of a monetary fine: 
Example 2. “<1.>Primo quod quilibet persona comunis dictarum villarum de Dro et 
de Cenicha qui non venerit ad regullam solvere debeat quinque solidos denariorum 
parvorum Tridentinorum pro unaquaque vice dicte communitati.” [Dro and Ceniga, 
1385] 
Translation: “<1.>[it has been decided] that whoever from the mentioned villages of 
Dro and Ceniga do not show up at the community assembly shall pay five small 
Trentino coins for each of the mentioned villages.” 
The following is an example of rule punishing generally non-cooperative behavior in 
assemblies, backed by a monetary fine: 
Example 3. “62. Item se alcuno, tanto teriero quanto forestiero, ingiuriasse qualunche 
persona sopra la regola, che l'ingiuriante sii condannato in lire cinque per cadeuna 
volta e persona: salva l'accione d'ingiuria all'ingiuriato, sì come anco venisse offeso in 
factis, al fisco e al medemo ingiuriato.” [Amblar, 1691] 
                                                            
212 The lexicon is available online at http://ducange.enc.sorbonne.fr/.  
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Translation: “62. [It has been decided] that if one, both resident and foreigner, were to 
insult someone during the assembly, he shall be condemned to pay 5 lire per each time 
and person: [...].” 
The following is an example of rule stating the requirement of an assembly quorum for 
particular decisions: 
Example 4. “Decimoquarto che non si possa concludere cose di rilievo pubbliche e 
straordinarie se non con l'intervento di tre delle quattro parti di tutti li vicini di 
Comezadura.” [Commezzadura, 1731] 
Translation: “Fourteen, [it has been decided] that it shall not be possible to decide on 
issues of public and extraordinary interest without the participation of 3/4 of all the 
community members of Commezzadura.” 
The following is an example of rule placing a constraint on foreigners: 
Example 5. “<3.>Item si aliquis extraneus fuerit inventus cum bestiis in dictis 
montibus vel in dicto nemore, si erit claptum admitat pocionem, si non erit claptum 
amitat .xx. solidos vel unam besstiam meliorem.” [Civezzano, 1202] 
Translation: “<3.>[it has been decided] that if a foreigner were caught with his cattle 
on the grazing land of the mentioned mountains or in the mentioned forest, if he was 
unaware shall he be acquitted, if he did it willfully shall he pay 20 coins or lose one of 
his better beasts.” 
The following is an example of a resource management rule: 
Example 6. “10. Item che niuno ardisca pascolar cavalli ne' pratti della montagna: in 
pena de grossi sei per cadaun cavallo, oltre la refacione del danno al danneggiato.” 
[Cloz, 1550]  
Translation: “10. [it has been decided] that nobody shall graze horses in the alps: 
upon a fine of 6 “grossi” for each horse, and in addition to repair the harm to the 
victim.” 
 
